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MAJOR GEORGE BROADFOOT, C.B.

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MAJOR GEORGE BROADFOOT, C.B.

A Recollection of 1843.

THE CAREER

OF

MAJOR GEORGE BROADFOOT, C.B.

(GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S AGENT N. W. FRONTIER, 1844-5)

IN

AFGHANISTAN AND THE PUNJAB

COMPILED FROM HIS PAPERS AND THOSE OF

LORDS ELLENBOROUGH AND HARDINGE

By MAJOR W. BROADFOOT, R.E.

With Portrait and Maps

LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET
1888

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PREFACE.

THE first two paragraphs of this work briefly explain the reasons which seemed to justify its publication. In the search for original documents which the task I had proposed to myself involved, a great quantity of material was collected, consisting of original despatches, letters, notes, and diaries of persons who had either taken part in the events described, or had held high office at the time.

The natural result of examination and selection from so great a mass of matter was that, as originally compiled, the work was on too large a scale. It had to be done over again so as to reduce its dimensions by a half. Though, in this process, much that was interesting to myself and to some of my friends has disappeared, I do not doubt that the book has gained substantially.

The confidence and kindness with which records of great importance were placed at my disposal deserve grateful acknowledgment; as also do the personal interest and trouble taken by many correspondents in answering references.

The letters, &c., are as far as possible transcribed as they were written, though occasionally the retention of expressions ambiguous or inelegant has resulted. Major Broadfoot often wrote important letters under great pressure, and the supply of some verbal corrections or interpolations for the sake of

lucidity seemed absolutely necessary; but these are few and for the most part indicated by brackets. Where there are omissions, that which is left out is either irrelevant, or likely to hurt the feelings of some survivor of the events, or of his descendants and friends. But in a work of this kind, where current errors have to be corrected, it is perhaps impossible entirely to avoid the publication of remarks which may be displeasing to some. Serious and sincere endeavour has been made to avoid this where no material injury to truth seemed to be involved; and if this endeavour has not been always successful, I must ask my reader for kindly construction.

Transliteration of Indian names is a vexed and troublesome business. In quotations the forms used in the originals have as far as possible been preserved. In the rest of the text names are spelt according to the official system as exhibited in Hunter's 'Imperial Gazetteer of India,' only after the first appearance of a name I have dispensed with the repetition of diacritical marks.

As regards the frequent recurrence of the term 'political' in an Anglo-Indian sense, it may be as well to recall a few words of Macaulay: 'The only branch of politics about which they [the English functionaries at Fort William] much busied themselves was negotiation with the native princes. . . . We may remark that the phraseology of the Company's servants still bears the traces of this state of things. To this day they always use the word "political" as synonymous with "diplomatic."'

It will be observed that George Broadfoot's private life is scarcely noticed; nor would the case have been materially different had the work been issued on the larger scale originally contemplated. In fact I know little of it, nor do the

papers in my possession throw much light on the subject. But it is only fair to say that in the documents quoted not a single sentence has been suppressed with the view of concealing defects in his character or conduct.

The indulgence of the reader for many faults in the composition of this book is solicited. I have tried to be accurate and to avoid offence, but am well aware that success is difficult, and perhaps not possible.

Special acknowledgment is due to the following persons for a great variety of assistance :—

To Col. Henry Yule, C.B., R.E., for help and advice which no words of mine can adequately describe. From its commencement he has taken the kindest interest in this book; he has read the manuscript of the work as originally compiled, and the proofs in its present condensed form. This was done by a man much occupied and in indifferent health; and here I beg to record my sincere gratitude for and recognition of the inestimable advantage of the corrections suggested by his reading and experience.

He has placed publisher and editor under further obligation by presenting the autotype frontispiece as a friendly contribution to the book from one who, after more than forty years, keeps a grateful and admiring remembrance of its subject. The sketch is mainly a recollection,[1] but has received some aid from imperfect materials representing Broadfoot in his younger days.

To Viscount Hardinge, for much information about Major Broadfoot; for many original letters and despatches connected with the Punjab; and for reading part of the manuscript and adding remarks which have a special value from one who was

[1] Viz. of Major Broadfoot, as he rode into Karnál, in January 1843, accompanying Lord Ellenborough from the Camp at Firozpúr.

private secretary to the Governor-General in 1844, and throughout the first Sikh war.

To Lord Colchester, for permission to see and use a great number of letters and despatches among the late Lord Ellenborough's papers, including some written by Major Broadfoot. The information thus acquired has been of great value.

To Mr. R. N. Cust, for a memorandum on the events of the last year of Major Broadfoot's life, during which he was that officer's personal and confidential assistant. Also for the use of books, and for much general assistance and encouragement very kindly afforded.

To Gen. S. A. Abbott, for a memorandum describing events before and after the outbreak of the first Sikh war, including the battle of Firozshah; and for many other minor but most valuable aids.

To Mrs. Colin Mackenzie, for letters, books, and documents relating to Afghanistan, to her distinguished husband, and to George Broadfoot.

To Mrs. Jackson, for various letters and documents.

To Mr. E. B. Backhouse, son of the late Col. Julius B. Backhouse, C.B., Bengal Artillery, for his father's diary, kept during the first Afghan war. It contains matter 'curious and surprising.'

To Mr. H. W. Lawrence, for letters, papers, and journals of his father, the late Sir Henry Lawrence, for letters to G. Broadfoot, &c.

To Sir Lionel and Lady Smith-Gordon, for original letters by Eldred Pottinger.

To General Sir Fred. P. Haines, K.C.B., G.C.S.I., &c., for information respecting the early part of the first Sikh war.

To the late Sir Robert Montgomery, K.C.B., G.C.S.I.;

Sir Henry Rawlinson, K.C.B.; Sir Owen Burne, K.C.S.I., C.I.E.; the late Mr. C. C. Prinsep; Mr. F. C. Danvers; Mr. C. Grey; Dr. Rost, C.I.E.; Mr. Wade; and others connected with the India Office, for a great variety of assistance mo courteously given. And to their names I must add those F. M. Lord Napier of Magdála; Lady Edwardes; Sir Alexander Cunningham, K.C.I.E., and his nephew, Mr. W. A. Cunningham; Sir J. Campbell Brown, M.D., K.C.B.; Gen. G. B. Tremenheere, R.E.; General Maclagan, R.E.; Lieut.-Gen. Sir Andrew Clarke, G.C.M.G., C.B., C.I.E., R.E.; Mr. T. H. Thornton, C.S.I., D.C.L.; Major-Gen. R. Young, R.E.; Colonel Sir James Browne, K.C.S.I., R.E.; Mr. Boyd Kinnear; and last, but not least, Mr. John Murray and his partners; from whom I have received advice and information of much value.

Great numbers of letters and despatches were copied by Mrs. Broadfoot, a work spread over several years, and some by Mrs. Wood, to both of whom acknowledgment for assistance is due. In addition, Mrs. Broadfoot carefully examined both manuscript and proofs.

The names of the books chiefly consulted will be found in the following note.

W. BROADFOOT,
Major, R.E.

LAUDER, N.B.: *Sept.* 1, 1888.

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[1] The spelling of this name is uncertain: Gardener, Gardner, and even the orientalised form Gordana, are varieties in use.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

1807-41.

PAGE

Introductory—Early years of George Broadfoot—Appointed to the Madras Army—Selected for service in Afghanistan—Chief events which preceded invasion—The Indus bridged at Sukkur—Kabul occupied—Subsequent disturbances—Parwán Pass, death of Lieut. J. S. Broadfoot—Broadfoot's Sappers—Convoy of Shah Zamán and the ladies of the Harem to Kabul—Confusion and incapacity prevalent there . . 1

CHAPTER II.

1841.

Night attack at Butkhák—Letter to Mr. Prinsep—First fight, Sappers engaged—Scarcity of officers with N.I. regiments—Service with Sale's brigade—Khurd Kabul pass—Advance to Tezin—Attack between Jagdalak and Surkháb—Distinguished conduct of Broadfoot, F. Cunningham, Wyndham, Coombs, and Sergeant-Major Kelly—Broadfoot's opinion of officers with the force—Outbreak at Kabul—Death of Sir A. Burnes and W. Broadfoot—Of Sir W. Macnaghten—Letter to Dr. Malcolmson—Arrival of Sale's brigade at Jalalabad 30

CHAPTER III.

1841-42.

Defence of Jalalabad—Capt. Broadfoot's report as garrison engineer—Sorties by the garrison—Extracts from diary: from letter to Dr. Malcolmson—Defensive measures—Letter to Thoby Prinsep—Extracts from diary—Dr. Brydon—Wild's failure to force the Khaibar pass—Council of war—Letter to Havelock—Letter from Havelock—Havelock to Durand—Broadfoot's memorandum—His opposition to the proposed capitulation ultimately successful 47

CHAPTER IV.

1842.

PAGE

Defence continued—Major-Gen. Pollock—Earthquake at Jalalabad—Arrival in India of Lord Ellenborough—His correspondence and policy—His endeavours to restore confidence—Defence continued, Sale's 'after orders'—Skirmish, March 24, Broadfoot severely wounded—Forage parties—Extracts from Backhouse's diary—Action, April 7, described by Backhouse—Siege raised: arrival of Pollock's force—Governor-General's orders, 'That illustrious garrison'—Lord Ellenborough to George Broadfoot—Letter to Malcolmson, recapitulation of events—Afghan cruelty and treachery—Governor-General's orders on Pollock's arrival—Colin Mackenzie's services—Letter to Mrs. Bayley—Extracts from other letters 81

CHAPTER V.

1842.

Pollock's army at Jalalabad—Lord Ellenborough and Generals Pollock and Nott—Letter to Mr. Loch: services of Dr. John Forsyth—Besúd expedition—Letter to Mrs. Bayley—The prisoners—Bad equipment of Pollock's force—Colin Mackenzie's services—What led to Sir A. Burnes's murder—Successor to Mr. Hodgson required in Nepál—Letter from Lord Ellenborough—The Kabul disasters—Broadfoot's remarks on Eyre's narrative—Expedition to Fatehabad 110

CHAPTER VI.

1842.

Advance on Kabul—Mámú Khel despatches—Broadfoot's report—Col. Taylor's letter—Extract from the 'Englishman'—Broadfoot's reply to Col. Taylor—Sappers ordered to Mamu Khel—Instructions from Gen. Pollock—Description of the ground—Broadfoot attacked and carried the village—Pursued the enemy to Kúdí Khel—Partially cleared the hills beyond—Advance arrested by the arrival of a senior officer—Unfortunate result—Troops retired to Mamú Khel—Afghans skilful in mountain war—Letter to Mr. Loch—Gen. Elphinstone—Letter to Mrs. Bayley—Post of honour given to Broadfoot's Sappers—Affair at Jagdalak—Action at Tezín—Arrival at Kabul—Recovery of the prisoners—Gen. Nott—Capture of Istálif: Broadfoot wounded—Return of the army to Firozpur—Letters to Mrs. Bayley and Mr. Loch and from Lord Ellenborough—Broadfoot gazetted brevet-major and C.B. 130

CHAPTER VII.

1842.

PAGE

Selections from Lord Ellenborough's correspondence—Marquis of Wellesley to Lord Ellenborough—Principles which guided Lord Wellesley—All civil authority to be subjected to the General in command—An efficient army an effectual guarantee for peace in India—Protest against any permanent occupation of Afghanistan—Education in India: Lord Brougham—Lord Ellenborough's notification—Policy announced generally approved—But condemned by Lord Palmerston—Real question at issue 172

CHAPTER VIII.

1843-44.

Lord Ellenborough's impartiality in the exercise of his patronage—Letter to Lord Ellenborough—Broadfoot's arrival in the Tenasserim Provinces—Letter from Havelock—From Francis Cunningham—Extracts from Lord Ellenborough's letters: to the Queen, and Duke of Wellington—The native press—Letter from Havelock: from Mr. and Mrs. Cameron—Letter to Lord Ellenborough: reply—Death of John Malcolmson—Letter from Lord Ellenborough transmitting the Order of the Bath: reply—Lord Ellenborough and the Court of Directors—Duke of Wellington's opinion—Correspondence between the Cabinet and the Court—Lord Ellenborough recalled: Sir H. Hardinge appointed—Letters from Lord Ellenborough on the subject—Broadfoot's reply—Letter to Miss Sutherland: Capt. W. C. McLeod—Letter from Havelock: Broadfoot appointed to the N.-W. Frontier 186

CHAPTER IX.

1843-44.

Sir Henry Hardinge—Sketch of Punjab history and politics—Ranjít Singh—His chief officers and courtiers—Maharaja Kharrak Singh—Death of Kunwar Náo Nihál Singh—Indus flood in 1841—Insubordination in the Sikh army—Murder of Maharaja Sher Singh and Raja Dhyán Singh; accession of Duleep Singh—Col. Richmond, C.B.—Hostile policy of the Darbár—Return of Sardár Attar Singh to the Punjab—Sikhs protest against the action of the Government of India—Suchet Singh's treasure: Capt. Saunders Abbott—Correspondence about the treasure—Major Broadfoot, C.B., appointed Governor-General's Agent—Dispute regarding village of Mowran 216

CHAPTER X.

1844.

PAGE

Sir H. Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough—Frontier arrangements—Letters congratulating Broadfoot on his appointment—His first interview with the Lahore Vakil—Diplomatic fencing—The frontier—Suchet Singh's treasure—Village of Mowran—Letter to Lord Ellenborough—Lahore news—Raja Hira Singh's policy—Rani Jindan—Mangla, the slave girl—Flight and destruction of Hira Singh—Anarchy at Lahore—Broadfoot's orders to his Assistants—Instructions from the Governor-General—Sir H. Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough: Punjab affairs—Broadfoot's reports—Letters from Sir H. Gough and Sir Charles Napier . . . 233

CHAPTER XI.

1845.

Decline of the Sikh Government—Letter from Sir C. Napier—Insubordination of the Sikh army—Courage of Rani Jindan—Effect on our sepoys of successful mutiny of Sikh soldiers—Governor-General's memorandum—Scare caused in Lahore by the issue of certain orders by the Commander-in-Chief—Movement of Sikh troops towards the Sutlej—Interview between the Agent and the Vakil—Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India—Letter to Lord Ellenborough: Punjab news—Relations between a Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief in India—Sir H. Gough's letter about the orders he had given—Letter from Mr. Currie: the political situation—Inquiry regarding disaffection among the sepoys—Overtures to the Agent from Gulab Singh—Letter from Sir C. Napier: Bugtis defeated—Sir H. Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough: Punjab news—Instructions to the Agent—Letter from Gen. Ventura 253

CHAPTER XII.

1845.

Sikh troops withdrawn from North-West Frontier—Interview between Agent and Vakil: Sutlej the limit of supremacy of the two Powers—Mulla Ahmad—Sir H. Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough: Punjab news—Letter from the Private Secretary: the boats for a flotilla or bridge—Sikh expedition against Jammu—Deputation to Gulab Singh—Letter from Sir C. Napier: the Bugtis—Letter from Havelock—From Lord Ellenborough—Sir H. Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough: Punjab news—Gulab Singh's negotiations with the Sikhs—Troops available for frontier defence—Jammu: fighting between Sikhs and hill men—Negotiation—Gulab Singh virtually a prisoner—Violation of our fron-

PAGE
tier by Sikh troops—Resolute and prompt steps taken by Broadfoot—His action commended by the Governments of India and England—Letter to Lord Ellenborough: Capt. W. Smith of the 'Siren'—His services in the fight with the 'Chesapeake;' and in Burma—Letter from Lord Ellenborough—Broadfoot in Simla—Lahore news . . 279

CHAPTER XIII.

1845.

Sir H. Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough: Punjab news—Complimentary letter from the Governor-General—Governor-General's presence on the frontier—Letter to Sir H. Hardinge: review of the situation—Sir H. Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough—Disorganisation in Lahore—Precautionary arrangements—Sikh warlike preparations—Peshora Singh seizes Attock—Disturbance at Anandpur Makhowal—Mr. Clerk's memorandum referred to Agent—His reply—Sir H. Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough—Forbearance carried to the verge of danger—Gulab Singh's proposals: rejected 310

CHAPTER XIV.

1845.

Death of Major Leech, C.B.—Letter to Mr. C. S. Hardinge: evils from increased communication with Europe—The cis-Sutlej States—Letter from Sir H. Hardinge: general policy indicated—Sikh complaints against the Government of India—Strange Scene in Darbar—Death of Peshora Singh—Rumours current in Punjab: Mohan Lal—Letter from Sir H. Hardinge: reference to rumours—Increased hostility of Jawahir Singh—The Khalsa demand his surrender—His death—Suttee of his wives—Sikh attempts to corrupt our sepoys—Desertion from native regiments—Notes from Capt. Nicolson's diary—Hopeless state of the Punjab Government—Sir H. Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough: Punjab news—Boats for bridge 332

CHAPTER XV.

1845.

Lahore in November—Letter from P. A. Vans Agnew—Major Mackeson—Notes from Capt. Nicolson's diary—Broadfoot warns the Darbar—Intimates the Sikh movements to Sir H. Gough and Sir J. Littler—The Commander-in-Chief orders up certain troops—Broadfoot issues orders regarding supplies for them—Instructions to his Assistants—His view of the objects and duty of the frontier force—Sincerity of endeavours to maintain peace—Necessity for taking things coolly—Letters from Sir H. Hardinge and Mr. Currie—Final effort of the moderate party in

PAGE

Darbar to avert war—Broadfoot joins the Governor-General at Karnal —The Governor-General postpones bringing up the troops—The Sikh army moving towards the Sutlej—Vakil ordered to leave the camp—Provision for the rapid march of the Meerut troops—Capt. Saunders Abbott's narrative—The Sikh troops cross the Sutlej—Discrepancies in various reports—Proclamation by the Governor-General—Advance of the British army—Arrival at Mudki 357

CHAPTER XVI.

1845.

The battle of Mudki—Deaths of Sir R. Sale and Sir J. McCaskill—Private accounts of the battle—Capt. S. A. Abbott's services—Arrangements for attack at Firozshah—Disposition of the forces—The Sikh position —The battle of Firozshah—Broadfoot killed—Our troops bivouac outside the Sikh lines—Insubordination among the Sikhs—Gravity of the situation of the British—Assault in the morning of the 22nd—Arrival of Tej Singh—Sufferings of our troops—Quotations from despatches—Burial of George Broadfoot—Letters and general orders about his death —His loss regretted in both Houses of Parliament—Opinions of eminent men of his value—Monument and tablet erected—Sir H. Hardinge to the Earl of Ellenborough—Arrival in England of the news of the battles—Comments on the Governor-General's measures—Current criticisms—Propriety of a Governor-General serving in a subordinate capacity discussed—Accusation of treachery made against Sikh leaders rejected—Mr. Currie to Lord Ellenborough—Inscription on the Madras memorial 384

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

PORTRAIT . . . . . *Frontispiece*

MAP OF JALALABAD . . . . . *To face page* 108

MAP OF THE SCENE OF OPERATIONS ON THE SUTLEJ . . . " " 426

SERVICES

OF

MAJOR GEORGE BROADFOOT, C.B.

CHAPTER I.

1807–41.

Introductory—Early years of George Broadfoot—Appointed to the Madras Army—Selected for service in Afghanistan—Chief events which preceded invasion—The Indus bridged at Sukkur—Kabul occupied—Subsequent Disturbances—Parwán Pass, death of Lieut. J. S. Broadfoot—Broadfoot's Sappers—Convoy of Shah Zamán and the ladies of the Harem to Kabul—Confusion and incapacity prevalent there.

The letters and journals of the late Major George Broadfoot, C.B., contain much of the secret or unwritten history of some of the most important and interesting events connected with our Indian Empire in its relations with Afghanistan during the first Afghan war, and with the Punjab prior to and at the beginning of the first Sikh war.

Careful study of these records appeared to establish their importance. The power and talent evident in many of the papers; the noble sentiments expressed in some of them, written when calamity was avenging the errors of a vicious system, and despondency had settled deep in the hearts of brave men; and last, but not least, the errors, the existence of which they indicate, in the accepted histories of that time, seemed to warrant their collection and publication.

The subjects referred to are the first Afghan war, 1838–42; the administration of the Tenasserim Provinces, 1843–44; and

the conduct of the policy with the Punjab, 1844–45, when the Sikhs invaded British India and war was declared.

George Broadfoot was the eldest surviving son of the Rev. William Broadfoot. He was born at Kirkwall, in the Orkney Islands, in 1807. In 1817 Mr. Broadfoot left Kirkwall and settled in London. He had no tie to the former place; his family, he used to say, came from the neighbourhood of Bradford, in Yorkshire, and a branch of them lived in Galloway and in the south of Lanarkshire.[1] The change to London was welcome to Mr. Broadfoot, and of advantage to his sons in the matter of education. George was sent to various day schools and was taught privately; his brothers were educated at Westminster. As two of them are mentioned in letters hereafter quoted, they may now be briefly introduced. William, born in 1810, went to India at the age of fifteen, and was appointed Ensign in the 1st European Regiment, now the 1st Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers. James Sutherland, the youngest of the family, was born in 1816. He was appointed in 1835, from Addiscombe, to the Bengal Engineers.

At an early age George seems to have given promise of the ability and resolution for which he was afterwards distinguished. One of his masters, Mr. Hunt, spoke of him in these terms: 'Mr. Broadfoot, you are indeed happy in your son: his talents are of the highest order, and he has a spirit which no difficulty can impede. There *is* no difficulty to him. Set but a noble end in view, away he goes, straight to the mark, clearing every obstacle, distancing every competitor.' In character he was ardent, fearless, and impetuous; the head of his class, and the leader of his companions in their games out of school.

In 1825 he obtained a cadetship in the E.I. Company's service and sailed for Madras. On arrival he was posted to the 34th M.N.I. It is unnecessary to dwell long on the period during which he served with his regiment; he used the time well, acquired knowledge of the detail of regimental duty, and the reputation of being a good regimental officer and an exceptionally good linguist. Two intimate friends of those early

[1] Sir Hew or Hugo de Bradfute, of Lamington, was the head of this branch; his only daughter, Marion, married Sir William Wallace, the Scottish hero; their daughter married Capt. Baillie.

days may here be mentioned: Colin Mackenzie,[2] who had been a fellow-passenger to India; and Dr. Malcolmson, surgeon of the regiment, to whom in after years he wrote many interesting letters from Afghanistan.

After seven years' service Broadfoot returned to England, and was absent from India for the unusually long period of five years. Whilst on leave he continued to study his profession; he travelled in France, Germany, and Italy, made himself acquainted with their history and forms of government, and to some extent acquired their languages. During the last year of his leave he was appointed Orderly Officer at Addiscombe College. There he studied fortification and other branches of military education, then considered unnecessary for an infantry officer. When remonstrated with for overworking, and told that his health would suffer, and that he knew his own work well enough, he replied: 'Well enough to be food for powder, or to lead a company properly into action; but to command an army, to have the lives of other men dependent on you, is another sort of affair and requires a different preparation. In India, when an emergency arises—and sooner or later it will arise—the men fit to meet it will be found out and brought to the front. When work has to be done, the fittest man will get it to do. No man can say what the work may be: to raise, organise, and command an army; to arrange a question of diplomacy; or to direct or assist in the civil administration of a province. Hence the importance of being prepared.'

It is strange to think that within the brief space of six years he was called upon to raise and command a regiment of sappers; to fortify Jalálábád as garrison engineer; to reform the civil administration of the Tenasserim Provinces; and to conduct the diplomatic relations between the Government of India and the Punjab.

On his return to India in February 1838 he was appointed to the Commissariat Department of the Madras Army, under Col. Cullen.[3]

[2] A distinguished soldier and one of the prisoners in Afghanistan. His life has lately been written by Mrs. Mackenzie, under the title *Storms and Sunshine of a Soldier's Life*.

[3] Major-Gen. William Cullen, Madras Artillery, was an officer of great talent and an ardent reformer. He was educated at Woolwich, appointed in 1803 to the Artillery, and

Broadfoot soon discovered much that required reorganisation and reform. Supported by his chief, but opposed by almost all the rest of the department, he carried his point. His report was considered to have been able and exhaustive, and his services on this occasion were brought prominently to the notice of Lord Auckland, then Governor-General. Col. Cullen submitted the report to Lord Elphinstone, Governor of Madras, who wrote as follows:

August 24, 1840.

I have been much interested by Capt. Broadfoot's memoranda on the Tenasserim Provinces.

He is certainly a very able officer, and a great loss to us. I shall write to him to say that if he does not find Afghanistan quite so agreeable as he expected, that he must let me hear from him, and that if I can further his views I shall have much pleasure in so doing; but I fear (for us) that they will not let him come back, and perhaps his abilities will be more usefully employed in that quarter than they would in a more peaceful sphere.

I shall certainly request Sir S. Whittingham's [4] early attention to the subject of our force at Maulmein, and I shall particularly point out to him the suggestions of Capt. Broadfoot. The evils of the present system are so clearly demonstrated by him, and might prove of such incalculable injury to the Service, both in the most extended sense of the word, and in particular to the Madras Army, that I hope we shall be able to induce the Supreme Government to apply a remedy.

From some expressions of Capt. Broadfoot, I am led to believe that his report, and the very interesting appendix, have been already submitted in some shape or other by him to the Supreme Government. Can you inform me if this is the case? If not, I should be very much inclined to lay them before the Governor-General.

Believe me &c.

ELPHINSTONE.

Before this letter was written the war in Afghanistan had commenced. William and James Broadfoot had already distinguished themselves; it was natural, therefore, that George

after holding many offices was made Commissary-General in 1834. In 1840 he was Resident at the Court of Travancore. He retired, but did not return to England, and died in 1862.

[4] Sir Samford Whittingham, Commander-in-Chief, Madras.

should wish to go there. But the question arose whether he was justified in giving up an appointment in which he had done well, and going amongst comparative strangers to Afghanistan on the pay of his rank. After careful consideration, Lord Elphinstone, Col. Cullen, and Dr. Malcolmson approved of his going; nearly everybody else who was consulted, except himself, was against the step. When he got the option he determined to go, though Lord Auckland very kindly pointed out the difficulties in his way, which were such, he thought, as to hold out the prospect of a hard struggle for several years.

Before describing Broadfoot's somewhat exciting journey to Kábul, it is desirable to recount briefly the main incidents which preceded our invasion of Afghanistan.

In that country, consolidated into an empire in 1747 by Shah Ahmad, Abdáli, Shah Shuja, the legitimate successor to his throne, had been defeated and driven away by Dost Muhammad Khan, Bárakzái. The Shah, after many adventures, was a refugee in British India, and Ranjit Singh, the Maharaja of the Punjab, had seized and held Peshawar. British anxiety for the welfare of Afghanistan was first roused when there seemed to be a possibility of invasion by France and Russia combined. That danger was removed by the victories of the Duke of Wellington, but not before missions to the Punjab and to Afghanistan had been sent.

In 1837 British interest was again excited by the news that the Persians, instigated by Russia, had despatched an army to besiege Herat, and Lord Auckland sent a mission to Dost Muhammad under the conduct of Alexander Burnes.

That officer, already known as a traveller in Central Asia, had many qualifications which justified his selection, but he was so hampered by restrictions as to be able to make no substantial promises of aid to the Amir, whilst he was instructed to demand much from him. The Amir very naturally turned from him to Vicovich, the Russian Agent; Burnes's mission was withdrawn, and the Government of India took immediate steps to dethrone Dost Muhammad and place Shah Shuja on the Kabul throne.

What is known as the Tripartite Treaty was negotiated between the Government of India, Ranjit Singh, and Shah

Shuja, whereby the first and second parties contracted to assist the third to re-establish himself on his throne.

A large force was assembled at Karnál, and on October 1, 1838, Lord Auckland issued his manifesto, in which Durand has said[5] 'the words "justice" and "necessity" . . . were applied in a manner for which there is fortunately no precedent in the English language,' and of which Sir H. Edwardes remarked,[6] that 'the views and conduct of Dost Muhammad Khan were misrepresented with a hardihood which a Russian statesman might have envied.' Sir H. Fane, Commander-in-Chief in India, was to have led the British troops; but shortly before their departure news was received that the siege of Herat had been raised, and that the Persian troops with their accompanying Russian officers had retired. Though this movement was determined by British action in the Persian Gulf, yet no notice of the siege, however brief, can be made without acknowledging that the honour of the defence is due to Lieut. Eldred Pottinger, of the Bengal Artillery, who appears to have been in the city in an unofficial capacity disguised as a horse merchant. Consequent on this event the strength of the British army was reduced, and its command devolved on Sir John Keane. Sir W. Macnaghten was appointed Envoy and Minister, to the disappointment of Captains Burnes and Wade. The mischievous device of separating the supreme military from the diplomatic conduct of the campaign having been accepted, it was thought necessary to associate with the General a person of higher relative rank than that of Captain. The arrangement had practically the effect of subordinating a General commanding an army in the field to civil authority which accompanied him wherever he went. No more perfect contrivance to insure disaster could have been imagined.

The Shah with his own force accompanied the British army. Space cannot be afforded to follow minutely the movements of the troops from Firozpur to Rohri, and thence across the Indus at Sukkur to Kandahar, Ghazni, and Kabul; but certain incidents which have been overlooked in some of the accounts of the march, or about which information from fresh sources has been collected, will be described.

[5] *First Afghan War*, p. 81.

[6] *Life of Sir H. Lawrence*, vol. i. p. 233.

Amongst these, one of the most serious difficulties, successfully surmounted, was to bridge the Indus and to pass the army with its stores and baggage across.

No one who has seen that river can doubt the magnitude of the task, even if every appliance which science could suggest had been at hand. But on this occasion, as on many others, the engineer was confronted with the obstacle, and left to overcome it with such means as nature had provided.

The Engineer officers with the force were Capt. Thomson, Chief Engineer; Capt. Sanders; Lieuts. Anderson, Durand, Sturt, McLeod, Pigou, and James S. Broadfoot. In a letter dated Shikarpur, February 9, 1839, the last-mentioned officer wrote:

> The Engineers went on ahead to Bukkur, an island in the Indus twenty miles from here. We were on the bank of a river, 1,100[7] yards wide, with a torrent like a mill stream; we had eight boats, and there was nothing near us but a small village; here we had to make a bridge over the river. First we seized, by great exertion, about 120 boats, then cut down lots of trees; these we made into strong beams and planks; there was no rope, but we made 500 cables out of a peculiar kind of grass which grows 100 miles from here; the anchors were made of small trees joined and loaded with half a ton of stone. Our nails were all made on the spot. We then anchored the boats in the middle of the stream, in a line across, leaving twelve feet between each; strong beams were laid across the boats, and planks nailed on these for a roadway. This is the largest military bridge which has ever been made; and as we had no towns like English ones to give us workmen and stores for the asking, you may conceive what labour we had in finishing it in eleven days.

Capt. Backhouse, of the Bengal Artillery, an able officer and intelligent observer, remarked: 'The Engineers give themselves, and with great justice, no little credit for their job: since they have here made themselves almost every article in use, with the exception of the boats.' He has further recorded with natural indignation an arrangement, for which a Brigadier-General was responsible, whereby his guns

[7] At the island of Bukkur there are two channels said to have been 500 and 367 yards wide respectively. (*First Afghan War*, p. 122.)

were on one side of the river and their ammunition on the other!

After a narrow escape from starvation the army reached Kandahar, where the General committed the extraordinary error of leaving behind him four 18-pounder guns, the only ones with his force suitable for breaching purposes. When Ghazni was reached the want of these guns became apparent, and the position of the British force was critical in the extreme. Before it lay the fort of Ghazni, strong in itself and strongly garrisoned. On either flank, at a distance of twelve to fifteen miles, there were two forces of the enemy under Ghilzi chiefs, waiting to take advantage of any check which might occur. And, most serious of all, supplies were nearly exhausted. Here the army was indebted for its safety, and the General for his rewards and peerage, to the resource of the Engineer, Capt. G. Thomson.

He suggested two alternatives—to blow open a gate and immediately assault, an operation the success of which must always be doubtful and attended with heavy loss; or to mask the fort with a small force, and advance with the rest of the army to attack Dost Muhammad in the direction of Kabul. The latter alternative had to be abandoned for want of supplies, and the former was, as is well known, successfully carried out.

The result of the capture was decisive. Dost Muhammad could not persuade his army to face the British, so great was the impression caused by the capture of Ghazni, and the road to Kabul was clear. That city was occupied without further opposition, and on August 7, 1839, Shah Shuja was seated on the throne.

The army of occupation was reduced in numbers, part of it having been sent back to India. What remained, instead of being concentrated in one or two important places, was scattered in small bodies over a vast extent of country. Our administration, though nominally that of Shah Shuja, was unpopular, and disturbances arose in various directions. The rising among the Ghilzis may be here mentioned, as James Broadfoot accompanied the force sent under Capt. Outram to restore order. He surveyed a great deal of the Ghilzi country, and after the expedition was over accompanied, in disguise, a

caravan of Lohani merchants from Ghazni to Dera Ismail Khan by the Gomal route. His reports[8] on the journeys and tribes received high commendation from Lord Auckland; and up to the present time (1888) they form the principal basis of our information regarding that part of Afghanistan and its inhabitants.

William Broadfoot was on detachment duty at Bámián, Saighán, and Bájgáh, the latter being the farthest point in the direction of the Oxus ever occupied by our troops. He made a road from Bámián across many passes, including the Palu and Dandan Shikan ('tooth-breaking'), which was then intended to be a commercial route from Kabul to Khulum.

He was also at this time (1840) desired to raise a corps of Hazara pioneers, and succeeded in enlisting some men. Those formed the nucleus of the corps which was afterwards commanded by Capt. George Broadfoot, and known as 'Broadfoot's Sappers.'

Dost Muhammad, after wandering as far as Bokhara and suffering many vicissitudes of fortune, having got together some followers, raised his standard at Khulum. He was defeated in an endeavour to penetrate towards Bamian, and made his way into what is known as the Kohistan of Kabul. Sir Robert Sale with a small force was sent to intercept him if possible, and prevent his return beyond the Hindu Kush. Sale sent on the cavalry to prevent Dost Muhammad escaping by the Parwán Pass, and the latter, seeing his retreat threatened, determined, with a small body of sixty or eighty Afghans, to cut his way through. Capt. Fraser, who commanded the two squadrons of the 2nd Bengal Cavalry, ordered them to charge, but the men wavered and fled in spite of the most earnest exhortations of their officers. What happened cannot be known with absolute accuracy. The officers of the cavalry, accompanied by Dr. Lord and James Broadfoot, but deserted by their men, charged the Afghans who were advancing under Dost Muhammad. Of six officers who thus charged, three—Dr. Lord, Lieut. J. S. Broadfoot, and Cornet Crispin—were killed; and two—Captains Fraser and Ponsonby—were desperately wounded.[9] James Broadfoot was badly mounted; he was

[8] See Supplementary Papers, R. G. S., vol. i. part iii. 1885.

[9] Cornet Moffat appears to have escaped unhurt.

seen trying to prevent the flight of the cavalry, and it was believed for some time that he was killed by our own men.

This does not appear to have been the case, for afterwards an Afghan, Jan Fishan Khan,[1] who was present, reported that when our cavalry fled, he saw Capt. Fraser in front and James Broadfoot on the flank. When Fraser was wounded, he saw James cut his way through the Afghans to a great distance, when all at once the engineer cap, by which he had hitherto kept him in view, disappeared in the midst of a group of Afghans, and, said Jan Fishan, 'having no more hope, I, too, turned and rode away.'

This happened on November 2, 1840; next day Dost Muhammad rode in to Kabul with one companion and gave himself up to the Envoy. Macnaghten returned his sword to the Amir, and made suitable arrangements for the custody of so brave and important a prisoner.

Yet this event did not help to tranquillise the country.

The Shah was discontented because he possessed the shadow only of power, the substance being in the hands of the Envoy. The English Government were dissatisfied, because they thought the administration in Afghanistan not altogether prudent; and they presented to Lord Auckland the alternatives of either maintaining our position in sufficient force and at whatever sacrifice might be entailed, or of abandoning the country and confessing failure.

The choice of either alternative was evaded by the Government of India on the plea that the circumstances of the case were altered by the surrender of Dost Muhammad.

Occupation of the country was continued with a diminished army. The immediate result was an apparent increase in hostility on the part of the people in more than one locality. Such was the state of affairs when Capt. George Broadfoot was appointed to Shah Shuja's force; he was ordered to raise

[1] Jān Fishān ('devoted' or 'life-sacrificing') was the title given to Saiyid Muhammad Khan, Chief of Paghmān, on account of his gallantry. His wife appears to have deserved the title as well as Jan Fishan himself. Lady Sale has recorded that when the insurrection broke out in Kabul, Jan Fishan urged his wife to fly for safety to Paghman; but she replied: 'I will not leave you; if you fall, we die together; if you are victorious, we will rejoice together.' Jan Fishan said this answer was worth a lakh of rupees.

a regiment of sappers, and proceeded to Delhi and towards the N.W. Frontier for that purpose.

He was accompanied by Colin Mackenzie, to whose sister-in-law, Mrs. Bayley, he wrote the following letter descriptive of the journey:

Delhi: October 10, 1840.

My dear Mrs. Bayley,—I had the great pleasure of receiving your letter of September 7, with its inclosure for Colin, just as we were leaving Agra, and fully intended to have answered it immediately on our arrival here, but I found it necessary the very first day, to move into my tents at the lines of the Sappers, away both from city and cantonments, and ever since I have been, from sunrise till dark, literally surrounded by a mob. At length, however, affairs are getting *en train* to a certain extent, and from them to you I turn with something of the feelings of the weary knight of old passing from a wilderness, and seeing before him a fair garden and the bower of some beauty without peer. Being, however, but a modern preux chevalier, I must be allowed to commence my address to the fair ladye with a *scolding*, most unknightly and yet well deserved, for your letter to me is little less than an apology for writing at all; or, as you are pleased to term it, *troubling* me. Now, it is clear you take me for a downright monster, a Caliban, and under this afflicting belief I shall continue till you tell me the contrary under your own hand, and prove it by a letter containing more than an *apology*, however prettily written.

Colin and I have not lived together here, so I do not know whether you have found him a punctual correspondent or not. But he has, no doubt, told you how we left, or rather *sent on*, our servants and baggage from Allyghur, and went ourselves by Agra; how we were delighted with the Taj, the Moti Musjid, and all the other beauties there; how we went round by Futtehpore Sikri, Bhurtpore, Deeg, and Gobardhun to Muttra; how we hunted as we went, and how the cheetas were more successful than Colin and his friend; how Colin lost himself in a jungle, and was hunted for with elephants and torches; how we were objects of great curiosity throughout, for I had been recognised as having served three years with the native chiefs in Afghanistan and Turkistan before our armies went there; how I had been a prisoner in Candahar (or some other city) and professed Islam; how it was useless to deny it, as I had been recognised in Futtehpore and Bhurtpore by some who remember me a Musalman! How Colin (with indignation he heard it) was, *if not my son, a very young warrior* setting out under my auspices; how the English up there, being *au*

désespoir, Government were sending every one up who knew those countries.

At Muttra we passed part of a day with Col. Pattle, and a few hours at Allyghur with Mr. and Mrs. Neave. On arriving here we found Mr. Metcalfe had left, and I fear [we] deprived Mrs. Metcalfe of her night's rest by taking possession of the house after she had retired for the night. Next day we moved; Colin, from his nice sense of decorum, to the house of a namesake and kinsman of the 64th Regiment; I, from necessity, to the tent from which I write. Of the lions of Delhi, I can say nothing, having seen none of them, nor paid a single visit, but official ones. But Colin saw them all, and two days ago went off dawk to Loodhiana, and is doubtless now adorning the harem of our master the Shah. He rode out to Soneput, and had two falls, without serious injury to himself, but with much to his horse. He was foolish enough to gallop over unknown ground by moonlight, which, though beautiful, is as deceitful as other beauties are said to be by poets. He is very much better than when I wrote, but still far from well. It is a very great matter for him to have escaped the journey to Goruckpore. I am sure it would have killed him; even without it I was at one time very apprehensive about him. I hope very shortly to set out for Loodhiana, where I shall rejoin him.

I have begun a letter to Bayley, which I shall finish to-day or to-morrow. In the mean time give him and all your circle my very best regards, and believe me, my dear Mrs. Bayley,

Most sincerely yours,

G. BROADFOOT.

I shall look with impatience for an answer to this.

Capt. Broadfoot succeeded in recruiting the number of Hindustanis and Gúrkhas he required, and these with the Hazaras, raised near Bamian by William Broadfoot, formed the Shah's regiment of sappers. At first, when offered the command by Lord Auckland, he declined on the score of being unwilling to supersede his own brother. His Lordship, however, took no notice of the refusal, and after some time sent him orders about details which concerned the regiment *to the command of which he had been appointed.*

Further objection was, of course, impossible. It was also ascertained that, prior to the arrangement here described, Lord Auckland had decided, in ignorance of W. Broadfoot's claims to the command, to appoint him second in command, a

position which he considered suitable to his subaltern rank. His Lordship, with kind intentions, thought that it would be more agreeable to William Broadfoot to be superseded by his brother than by some stranger, and hence his refusal to consent to George's resignation. As a matter of fact the supersession never took place, for William Broadfoot received a political appointment under Sir Alexander Burnes, and George remained commander of the regiment. No men in it were more devoted to their leader than those raised by William in Hazara.

The regiment is thus referred to by Marshman in the Life of Havelock:[2]

> They were instructed in all the duties of entrenching and siege operations, and were encouraged to become superior light troops. In their ranks were not only Hindostanees of every province, but Ghoorkas, and men from Cabul, Peshawar, Eusofzye, and Hazara. Many of the men thus enlisted were desperate and intractable characters, but they were soon moulded by the talent of their chief into daring, skilful, and obedient soldiers. Capt. Broadfoot was on his side like a father to these men, in attention to their real wants, while he exacted from them the most implicit obedience to his orders, and punished their faults with a severity which many would have deemed ferocious.

When Capt. Broadfoot was about to start for Kabul, he was desired to take charge of and protect the families and attendants of Shahs Shuja and Zaman. This was a most complicated and undesirable addition to his cares, consisting as it did of the blind Shah Zaman and of some 600 ladies of the zenanas with numerous attendants. These, together with a large amount of treasure and baggage, he had to escort through the Punjab, then in a very disturbed state, with its troops for the most part in open mutiny.

It is to be regretted that want of space makes it unadvisable to print Capt. Broadfoot's reports of this journey *in extenso*, for they are of great interest and testify to his sound judgment, decision of character, and capacity for command. The latter quality, indeed, seemed to rise exactly in proportion to the difficulties and dangers which he was called on to face.

[2] Edit. 1870, p. 87.

The Lahore Darbar deputed three officers of position, Sardár Shám Singh of Atári, Rai Kesri Singh, and Col. Chet Singh, to accompany the convoy and afford assistance. They further sent an escort of picked troops from the Sikh army; but these, infected by the spirit of mutiny then abroad, were a source of danger rather than of protection.

Mr. Clerk,[3] the Political Agent for Punjab affairs, in the end of April 1841 expressed anxiety for the safety of the convoy consequent on the disaffection prevailing at Peshawar; he also thus described an instance of the mischievous consequences of the example of successful mutiny: 'A mutiny which lately occurred in the Sappers and Goorkhas under Capt. Broadfoot's command assumed the same features which have marked the commencement of most of the mutinies of late among the Sikh battalions. They turned out armed and demanded two months' pay. They spoke, and were inclined to conduct themselves, most resolutely. But they were met with still greater resolution by Capt. Broadfoot and their other European officers. The ringleaders were flogged on the spot, and the detachment fell in and returned to obedience.'

Capt. Mackeson, Political Officer at Peshawar, wrote to Broadfoot to inform him of the mutiny there, and of the occupation of the road by four mutinous battalions. He added that Avitabile[4] had reported that they meant to attack the convoy, and begged that Broadfoot would halt and await relief unless Sham Singh would be responsible for his safety.

Broadfoot replied that, having all along foreseen the probability of attack, he had taken precautions, and that therefore

[3] Now Sir George R. Clerk, G.C.S.I., K.C.B.

[4] Gen. Avitabile, an officer in Ranjit Singh's service, was Governor of Peshawar and Yusufzai. His hospitality to our officers who passed through Peshawar was unbounded. He is thus described by Sir Herbert Edwardes: 'With the intrigue and cunning of an Asiatic, the broader wisdom and self-dependence of a European, and the remorselessness of one who professed to own no God, Avitabile, backed by a powerful Sikh force, was soon master of the valley, and to this day is spoken of by the Afghan population with the admiration of a troop of jackals for a tiger. To do him justice, though he stuck at nothing that would serve his ends, he did much good.' (*Life of Sir H. Lawrence*, vol. i. p. 292.) The Afghans had the same respect for George Broadfoot; they called him the 'black-coated infidel,' who was at Jalalabad as Avitabile was at Peshawar.

Avitabile's declaration supplied no reason for fresh preparation or for increased anxiety on his account.

As to Sham Singh and the other officers being responsible for the safety of the convoy, he fairly laughed at the idea. He pointed out that, owing to their zeal and good faith, the chiefs had incurred grave risk from the Sikh troops, and that the knowledge that he (Broadfoot) would protect them had hitherto saved them from violence, if not from death.

He further declined to halt and wait for succour, and said he hoped he was not improperly confident in believing that he would repulse any attack the Sikhs might make. He was aware that the utmost caution was required to avoid disaster, but added, 'It is, however, safer than standing still, and as far as any military operation is certain of successful issue I consider this to be so; for if we do not get on quietly, and cannot force the passage, we shall, I doubt not, hold our own till you send us assistance.'

He accordingly marched forward, and at last came on the mutineers with guns commanding the road, at a place called Saidu, beyond Attock, on the Indus. The position was decidedly critical—the mutineers from Peshawar, with their guns, in front, and his Sikh escort, equally dangerous and ready for plunder, in rear. He met the crisis boldly—marched the convoy and his own men across the river, and broke the bridge before the Sikh escort could cross. Thus he insured freedom from attack on the rear, and could concentrate his energies on the danger in front.

The following letters to Col. Cullen and Dr. Malcolmson contain accounts of this interesting journey:

Camp, Peshawar: May 21, 1841.

My dear Colonel,—It has been for a long time my intention to write to you, but you will believe that to conduct a large convoy, with a very feeble escort, across the Punjab at such a period, required every moment I could spare to obtain the requisite information of what was going on amidst the scene of confusion, in order to provide for ourselves. I forget whether I ever replied to your letter containing a most flattering notice of me by Lord Elphinstone. I think I did; but if not, may I beg you to express to his Lordship my deep sense of his uniform kindness? Indeed, the indulgent way

I was always treated makes me often regret that I could not carry my old masters with me into the new world I am now entering.

I was long detained at Loodhiana and Ferozpore by being nominated to take charge of the royal families of Cabool on their way to their native country. There is the old blind Shah Zeman, a host of shahzadas, and a huge number of ladies of all ranks and ages. It was a duty I could not well decline, there being no other officer of the Shah's service present, though it was easy to see it was one pretty sure to be troublesome and thankless. To complicate matters, the Punjab was verging towards anarchy when we started, and daily got into greater confusion as we advanced. The mutinous troops were moving in all directions towards Lahore, and occasionally crossed our path. They had already murdered or expelled their officers before starting, and were governed by punchayets [5] elected by universal suffrage. They were suspicious of our intentions, and from the first have been averse to our troops having a passage through their territory. We were sometimes in danger of collision with them, but by one way or other got clear through till we had crossed the Attock. Then four battalions in a state of mutiny and six guns were before us, encamped so as to command the only road we could go by. Every effort was made to make them move, but in vain. They said if we proceeded at all we must go by that road, they being under arms and standing to their guns. Letters from the Court, orders from Gen. Avitabile, and the entreaties and menaces of the Vakeels with me were ineffectual to get them to go one march off the road. The report was through the country that they intended to plunder the kafila, and Gen. Avitabile declared to the Political Agent here, he could not answer for their intentions towards us. So the Political Agent sent for a brigade of our troops. I went to the mutinous camp, or at least to within 800 yards or so, and had an interview with them. The hostility of their proceeding was pointed out, but in vain. At length they formally declared the brigade, or 50,000 men, might come, they also were soldiers and would fight. They said we might consider them enemies or friends as we pleased; they were ready for us. We parted with a formal declaration that, having refused to abandon their menacing position, even for a few hours, and it being impossible for us to advance, but by putting the kafila in their power, that they must be looked on as enemies of the three Governments.[6] The chief of the Lahore Vakeels was with me and shared in all this.

[5] *Panchdyat*, a committee of five members, one of whom is president and has a casting vote; afterwards used to designate any representative committee.

[6] British India, Punjab, and Shah Shuja's Government.

They were warned no longer to venture near our camp, or even to approach the hills where we were, or try to enter the pass leading to Attock. They despised us too much to heed the warning, and a gang of the punchayet went to our camp and stayed beyond the time allowed for them to consider. I met them among the hills and made them prisoners. This prevented us from being in future inundated by them. For two days we thus remained with almost seven miles between us; they demanding the prisoners, with menaces of attack; and we refusing, though offering to hand them over to the Sikh Vakeels if they would leave the road, removing some of their guns as an evidence of sincerity. They several times got under arms, and once even advanced a short distance in our direction; but this last time their hearts failed, and they accepted the terms just before rejected, went back to their camp in haste, and crossed a gun to the other side of the river; dreading, no doubt, the approach of the brigade, and feeling they had not power even to force our position. I released the prisoners, and the mutineers began to loiter in crossing, so that I could not march that day; but in the night, moved, it is said, by a report of our brigade approaching, most of them bolted across the river in great haste, and next day we passed on, and are now safe here.

It was necessary to be always on the look-out among these people, and consequently the work was heavy for officers and men. Poor Orr, who acted as our quartermaster, has been fairly worked into a rather severe fit of illness, but, I am glad to say, is now nearly well again. He is an active, intelligent, and high-spirited young officer. Some more of our number are ailing. The officers are all from Madras, and are very fine young men. My own health stood well till these last few days, in fact till the *work* was pretty well over. The position I was in was one of extreme delicacy; there was seldom time to deliberate, and scarcely a measure could be adopted, or a word said or written, without incurring the censure of one party or another. Some blame me as rash in not calling for assistance, and in making the punchayet prisoners; and obstinate in not surrendering them when menaced with an attack. Others again swear there was no danger at all, and the Political Agent here seems to think he cleared away the mutineers by a civil letter, to which they returned a civil answer (I suspect Brigadier Shelton [7] is the real Simon Pure). The fear of his brigade did the work. However, here we are safely through the Punjab without a shot being fired; a consummation few expected till it has occurred.

[7] Shelton's brigade was to march from Jalalabad to relieve the kafila, if necessary.

In the mean time, whether I get credit or obloquy, I look back on the whole transaction without seeing many errors in the course I followed. That, however, is but poor evidence of their not being many and great.

The journey through the Punjab has given me a very high opinion of old Runjeet Singh. Here is this large army utterly disorganised, turned into a lawless multitude, going to their homes when they please, but generally crowding to the capital. The people chiefly Mahomedans, hating the Sikhs, but recently conquered, with the families of their old chiefs among them, yet afraid to rebel. Old Runjeet's constant success, or speedy recovery from defeat, and the vigour as well as justice of his rule, have produced an impression of the stability and resources of his Sirkar,[8] something like that prevailing in our territories regarding the Company. The end, however, is fast approaching, and next cold weather will probably see extinguished the last vestige of Indian independence.

Camp near Cabool: July 3, 1841.

My dear Malcolmson,—As you must be beginning, like all my friends, to think me negligent in not writing, I send this merely to say that I am recovering from smallpox, and am still very weak. I was seized with it at Peshawur, and it first showed itself *outwardly* at Jumrood or Futtehgurh, the frontier post of the Sikhs. There the garrison seemed disposed to molest us, or rather, actually seized a lot of property and made an attempt at a search of the Begums' palkees.[9] The excitement cured me for the moment, and I made them disgorge by threatening to resort to force, and proceeding to preparations. Avitabile, however, sent a soft letter to them (I had treated them as thieves), and thinking he and our Political Agent *funked*, they seized cattle next day, and even came (the Killadar,[1] or rather two of the punchayet dragging him) to my tent with intent to be insolent.

I had again to rouse up; they got frightened, and gave me Avitabile's letter to read, which I threw in their faces, saying no letters could make thieves honest men, and if in ten minutes all was not given up I should no longer treat them as soldiers. This impudence had the effect, for impudence it was, seeing they had a fort with 8 guns, and 1,000 men nominally (probably 700 or 800), and I had not 500 firelocks, and no guns; but next day, when we were safe across the frontier, I sank so much that I did not expect to weather the disease; the reaction of the disputes with these fellows

[8] Government. [9] Palankins.

[1] Officer in charge of the fort.

was almost too much for me, and I came up here in a palkee. I am still weak, and regain strength very slowly.

Our late journey was a very interesting one in every way. I see some notices of it in the papers—all lies, or at least many lies and many errors. Sir W. Macnaghten has reported of me in terms of praise too strong, more than I deserve. Burnes also is on the same side, but I hear some newspapers are going to assail me; why, I know not, but such is the fashion in these parts. If I can find time, I mean to draw out a short account of the journey I intended it for Col. Cullen, whose good opinion I desire to retain. I can then mention what duty requires me not even in self-defence to mention in a newspaper (not, however, that I am going to answer any of the threatened attacks), and this I shall send open to you that you also may see it. We have with the kafila a Dr. Thomson,[2] a very excellent young fellow, a chemist, botanist, and geologist, the son of the Glasgow Professor of Chemistry, and not a degenerate one. William has been dangerously ill, and still is very ill; a rush of blood to the head. Only yesterday did he take the favourable turn, and now the least thing would throw him back. It arose from exposure in riding out several marches to meet me when ill, the sun here being very hot. Alas! this is dismal work, nursing him in a room full of all that belonged to poor James. He [J.] has left the reputation of extraordinary talent and extraordinary bravery. It is to me quite affecting to hear the Afghans and others speak of him. 'The young Broadfoot that spoke our language,' they call him, and to compare small with great, the impression left by him on all classes of natives is of the same kind (though less in

[2] Dr. Thomas Thomson was born on December 4, 1817. He gave proof of unusual talent and observation in science at the early age of seventeen. He joined the medical service of the E.I.C., arrived in Calcutta in 1840, and was appointed Curator of the Museum of the Asiatic Society. He was soon transferred to the medical charge of a party under orders for Afghanistan, and accompanied the convoy under the command of Capt. Broadfoot. In 1841 he was appointed to the 27th N.I., and, with the rest of the officers of that regiment, was made prisoner by the Afghans on the capitulation of Ghazni.

In 1845 he served with the army in the Sutlej campaign. Two years later he was appointed a member of the commission to define the boundary between Kashmir and Thibet. The other members were Major Cunningham, B.E., and Capt. H. Strachey. He took every opportunity of collecting information about the flora and physical geography of the various countries he saw, and did much work in after years in conjunction with Sir Joseph Hooker. In 1854 he was appointed Superintendent of the Botanical Gardens in Calcutta, and professor of botany in the Medical College. He retired in 1861, returned to India for a short time in 1871 with the party sent there to observe the eclipse, and died in 1878. He was the author of *Western Himalaya and Tibet* (London, 1852).

degree) as that left by Elphinstone, which is altogether extraordinary even now.

Sir W. Macnaghten's report to the Government of India of the arrival of the convoy is as follows :

To the Secretary to the Government of India, Secret Department.

I have the honour to report, for the information of the Right Hon. the Governor-General in Council, the safe arrival at Cabul of his Majesty Shah Shoojah's family.

This event has been a source of much gratification to his Majesty, and it will, I trust, have a beneficial effect throughout the country. To the energy, tact, and judgment displayed by Capt. Broadfoot, who had the superintendence of the family, must mainly be ascribed their having overcome the formidable obstacles opposed to their progress, and their having escaped the serious dangers to which they were exposed throughout a long and harassing march.

I introduced Capt. Broadfoot to the Shah yesterday evening, and his Majesty was pleased to express to that officer, in the most flattering terms, his gratitude for the kind, judicious, and considerate treatment which had been shown to the Royal Family, and as a mark of his approbation his Majesty conferred a horse, a sword, and a dress of honour upon Capt. Broadfoot, which I trust, under the very peculiar circumstances of the case, he may be permitted to retain. I have &c.

W. H. MACNAGHTEN,
Envoy and Minister.

Broadfoot's conduct of the convoy, though highly approved by Government, was attacked in certain newspapers, and in a subsequently written history of the Sikhs is unfavourably criticised. He took no notice of the attacks; but, fearing lest some paragraphs might be copied into English newspapers, and cause pain or anxiety to his friends, he wrote the following letter to Mr. Loch, a director of the E.I.C., in which will be found a favourable opinion as to his management expressed by Gen., afterwards Sir Harry, Smith, as well as some other matters of general interest:

Cabool: August 4, 1841

My friend Mr. Thomason,[3] the Secretary to the Agra Government, lately sent me a note to him from Mr. Robertson, the Lieut.-

[3] James Thomason, of the Bengal Civil Service, an eminent member of that distinguished body of public servants, was appointed a writer in 1821,

Governor, inclosing one from Gen. Smith, the Adjutant-General of the Queen's troops, to whom I am altogether unknown. The General had just received accounts of the early part of our journey, and of the suppression of a mutiny of part of our little force near Lahore, and he expressed himself of me, as a soldier, in terms which, though I could hardly feel I deserved [them], yet I confess gratified me exceedingly; for, as Mr. Robertson said in writing to Thomason, it was indeed 'Laudari a laudato,' Gen. Smith being reckoned one of the first men in the Royal Army. It was he who finally put down the Caffirs in the late war at the Cape, and, widely as opinions differ as to the justice of that war, they were unanimous among professional men as to the ability and vigour of Gen. (then Col.) Smith's operations.

There is much to interest one in this country. I am still too superficially acquainted with what is going on to have any positive opinions, but I cannot help thinking we leave the financial part of the business too much out of view.

One good effect from this occupation of a poor country by the Bengal Army will be, that a searching economy on a large scale will be forced on the Supreme Government. They will have to do throughout the system what Col. Cullen, under so many diffi-

and held a variety of offices of the usual description till 1840, when he took leave to England.

On his return to India in 1841 he was appointed Secretary to the Government N.W.P.; next year he became a member of the Sadr (Sudder) Board of Revenue, and in 1843 he was promoted to the important position of Secretary to the Government of India in the secret, political, legislative, judicial, and revenue departments.

Mr. R. N. Cust has favoured me with the following remarks: 'James Thomason was Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department under Lord Ellenborough, and succeeded Sir George Clerk as Lieut.-Governor of the N.W.P., and occupied that post ten years, when in 1853 he was appointed Governor of Madras, but he died at Bareilly before he took up the appointment.

'He carried out all Robert Bird's reforms in the Revenue Department —settlement and collection. Under his guidance John Lawrence, Robert Montgomery, Donald Macleod, John Thornton, George Edmonstone, and many others learnt their lesson, and introduced the same system into the Punjab. Mr. Thomason started the Ganges Canal in concert with Cautley. He reformed and improved every department of government, and introduced a high tone into the service.'

Lord Dalhousie's estimate of his value may be gathered from the following extract from the order in which his death was announced: 'Conspicuous ability, devotion to the public service, and a conscientious discharge of every duty, have marked each step of his honourable course; while his surpassing administrative capacity, his extended knowledge of affairs, his clear judgment, his benevolence of character and suavity of demeanour, have adorned and exalted the high position which he was wisely selected to fill.'

culties, and with such signal success, accomplished in the Madras Commissariat. The more I see of the service in different parts of India, the more highly do I estimate his services to the State.

Herat is occupying much attention at present in consequence of the late news from Persia. Our error was in at first guaranteeing its independence. During the siege our succour should have been given on condition that, on the death of Kamran, it should revert to Cabool as a lapsed appanage; such terms would then have been thought liberal. It is now a great difficulty, for, as Sir J. McNeill justly says in one of his printed letters, 'the case of Herat involves that of all Afghanistan.'

But this difficulty, and the many others arising from our advance beyond the Indus, should be fully looked in the face, their cost estimated, and their solution provided for. The greatest caution should be used, precipitation would be very dangerous, but delay in commencing is equally so; the present makeshift policy is ruinous in its expense, and leaves us at the end of the year nearly where we were at the beginning, only poorer.

Major Todd has just left; he is about to memorialise your Court, and he has certainly a strong case. I know too little to judge between him and the Government of India, but the latter seem to me to have committed the grievous mistake of punishing an error of judgment as they would a crime. In distant situations much discretion is necessarily left to the local authorities, and in critical circumstances the necessary self-possession and nice balance of judgment are hardly to be looked for where the fear of ruin for life is felt, if the opinion formed does not coincide with that of a superior a thousand miles off. It is to be regretted, therefore, that the Government did not transfer Major Todd, if his judgment proved unequal to his situation, to a post where he would be more a mere executive officer. That such precipitation should have been suffered by so just and temperate a man as Lord Auckland, is another proof of how essential to the welfare and good government of India is a body such as the Court of Directors. It will be long before India can be safely committed to a minister; a changing, party-riven House of Commons is no check, or rather would pervert a well-intentioned minister.

Affairs at Kabul at the end of September 1841 were in miserable confusion. Gen. Elphinstone was in a pitiable state of health, absolutely unfit for duty. Sir W. Macnaghten, already appointed Governor of Bombay, was anxious to go, but unwilling to leave whilst existing disturbances made it

impossible that he could say he handed over to his successor a pacified country. The delay about this, and the apparent increase rather than decrease of disaffection, seem to have induced a state of nervous irritation (by no means soothed by orders for retrenchment from India), which was fatal to the harmony essential to good government.

Sir Alexander Burnes was anxious for the Envoy's departure, and thought he would easily quell the disturbances which had arisen, and reign in his stead.

The following description of the efforts made by Broadfoot to obtain some strictly necessary information and instructions, respecting an expedition on which he had been ordered, affords a sad picture of irritable incapacity and feebleness:

On October 7, 1841, I received a note from Brigadier Anquetil, desiring me to prepare for immediate field service 100 sappers, and directing me, as there were no other officers available, to proceed in command. (Orr and Cunningham, with about 250 men, were absent on service in Zoormut, west[4] of Ghuznee, the other officer was sick.) I rode into cantonments to obtain detailed orders, and was told that Tezeen was our destination, to punish the Ghilzi chiefs, who had stopped the *daks*, and that I should have to destroy the forts. I was directed to receive further orders from Lieut.-Col. Monteath, who was to command the expedition. I passed the night at Burnes's, sitting up till near daylight in discussions that, as matters have turned out, were very curious, for he and I differed widely in our views, and he was just then much shaken as to his own opinions, though he seems to have relapsed.

I had sent to the artificers (armourers and smiths, numerous in Cabool) in the city to make some mining tools not in the magazine. (All ours gone to Zoormut—no others), and the armourers refused to work for the 'Feringees.' Burnes sent an order without any effect, and I took down a party of our men, gave each smith his work with men to keep him at it, and next day got the tools, the best they had ever done for us in the city. They were busy forging arms, for what purpose we have since learned; Burnes said, for the wandering tribes about to migrate.

Next morning, the 8th, I waited on Lieut.-Col. Monteath, whom I did not before know. He said he could give me no orders, having received none himself, except to move towards Jelalabad; that he did not even know I was to go, but should be glad of my company.

[4] Probably a mistake for *east*.

He declined to apply for information, saying he knew these people too well,[5] admitted all the dangers of going on service in the dark, but said it was not the custom here to consult, or even to *instruct*, the commanders of expeditions. He spoke bitterly of sending officers and troops on wild-goose chases, bringing them into scrapes and letting them get out if they could, for the Envoy's credit, but if his politicals failed, to their own discredit. He again refused to refer for instructions, saying he had too much experience of these people, but permitted me to go to the General, the Envoy, or anyone I pleased. I went to the magazine to learn what preparations the Commissary of Ordnance was making. I found he was making none, or rather that none had been ordered, though he had been in hourly expectation of orders. He (Lieut. Eyre[6]) and I put in train the preparation of all *he* could furnish, in case I wanted things, and I sent men to the city and cantonment bazaars to procure what the magazine did not afford.

Eyre and I went over to see if Major Thain (Gen. Elphinstone's aide-de-camp) knew anything of the proposed service, but he was not at home, so I sent up my name to the General, who was very ill. He received me, however, with his usual cheerful kindness; insisted on getting up, and was supported to his visiting room. This exertion so exhausted him, that it was half an hour before he could attend to business, indeed several ineffectual efforts to do so had excited him so much that I was sorry I had come at all. He knew, no more than Col. Monteath, the nature of the service, having merely received an order to send him and so many men. He did not know the number or strength of the forts, nor whether anyone to act as engineer was going, and said he would leave the provision of tools and stores to me; and he did not know whether sending Col. Monteath was a measure of precaution or of hostility.

I pointed out that I could not prepare for a service the very nature of which I knew not; and as to taking, as he suggested, enough to meet any possible emergency, that, in such a country of mountains, rivers, and innumerable forts, would require so much carriage as to delay the expedition greatly to collect it, all *public* carriage being sent to Zoormut; while it would, from the enormous rates of hire given by our Commissariat, entail on Government a great expense, of which part, perhaps nearly all, would be useless.

He admitted all this fully, but said he could give me no orders, and expressed himself unwilling to refer to the Envoy on a point which ought to have been left to him to arrange. At last he gave

[5] The Envoy and his staff. [6] Afterwards Sir Vincent Eyre.

me a private note to the Envoy, begging him to listen to me, and saying he considered what I wanted was reasonable; viz. to know whether there were to be hostilities or not, with whom, and the strength and position of the enemy; and especially whether forts were to be taken and destroyed.

The Envoy seemed to be annoyed, said the General expected him to turn prophet; how could he predict whether there would be hostilities or not? and, finally, he desired me to state all my wants to the General, and promised to sanction whatever the latter proposed.

I mentioned the necessity of knowing something about the forts, and he said he would send to the Wazeer and learn.

He gave me a note to the General, which the latter read to me. The Envoy used the phrase of being asked to turn prophet, and said he could not say whether there would be hostilities at all, though he thought a force should perhaps still go, but not so soon as lately ordered; not, indeed, till the Zoormut force returned; but in the mean time we are to be ready.

The General was much hurt and agitated on reading this note, and complained bitterly of the way he was deprived of all authority and reduced to a mere cipher. He was so evidently too weak and excitable for business that I changed the subject, and soon after would have taken my leave, but after leaving him was recalled, the business having returned to his recollection. He said, as I had been thrown on his hands, he would not shirk the job.

He made me go over again my reasons for declining to estimate for tools and stores in ignorance of the nature and extent of the work to be done. He took them down in writing, saying he could not otherwise remember them; they were those above mentioned, only I added that, if I did not estimate to meet all possible exigencies, any failure would be charged, without further inquiry, to my incapacity, or to the inefficiency of the corps, not to mention the public injury or dishonour from a failure a little forethought might have obviated. He said I must not be made to decide in ignorance, and neither was it fair he should, but he recoiled from again applying to the Envoy.

After much discussion, he asked me to go to Sir W. Macnaghten. The latter was peevish, and spoke of Gen. Elphinstone's being fidgety. I said I was in this case to blame, having declined to be responsible without requisite orders. This led to a long discussion, and he seemed to see the reasonableness of what was said; he mentioned again the Wazeer, and asked me to come back and hear the reply. He said there was no one who had the required information but Capt. Macgregor, the Political Agent, who

knew all these parts intimately, and that till his return nothing could be done.

I stayed with the General until it was time to return to the Envoy. On going back, I found him apparently irritated at something. He gave me the Wazeer's information, which was that a force ought to be sent to Tezeen, but that the rebels were about to quit. As to their forts, they were very weak.

I said information so vague was useless. The Envoy called in the Wazeer's man and some other Afghans, and told me to examine them myself. They said they knew only the fort near the road at Tezeen, which I had seen myself from the road; another at Tezeen, on the hill, they could not describe; they said the enemy had other forts, some very strong, across the river; on which the Envoy said we were not to go there. The men then said there were other forts on this side, but the number, situation, and strength, they knew not; only they were all weak, and there was no occasion for us to fear.

The Envoy interrupted me impatiently, saying there would be no fighting; that he had resolved on sending Col. Monteath to Bootkhak as a demonstration,[7] and that immediately—to-morrow morning; that he expected the submission of the rebels that evening. If it came, Col. Monteath would go on to Jelalabad; if it did not come to-day, his march to Bootkhak would so terrify them that it would be sure to arrive to-morrow. The Colonel was only to have his own regiment, two guns, a squadron of cavalry, and 100 sappers.

I asked what was to be done if the submission did not arrive. Was Col. Monteath to return?

He said, 'No; in that case he will halt at Bootkhak till the Zoormut force comes in: it will be a *demonstration*; that will be sure to terrify the Ghilzi chiefs.' He asked me if I did not think this plan would answer.

I, of course, stated the obvious objections to it as a military measure—that any alarm produced by the march to Bootkhak (ten miles) would be turned into confidence by finding we went no farther, which would be ascribed to fear; and that, if Monteath was to wait for the Zoormut force, he had better remain in cantonments than move to the skirts of the plain, near all the passages into the hills, a situation which invited attack, for the enemy could arrive unseen, and Col. Monteath was too weak to pursue, even if able to beat them. All this would strengthen the cause of the rebels. Our course was to prepare diligently, and when the troops could be

[7] A military operation in great favour with political officers.

spared, to move in full force, and never to stop for a moment till the enemy were utterly destroyed.

These reasons I gave to the Envoy late in the day, but now he interrupted me on my saying they might be tempted to attack Monteath. He became angry, said these were his orders, and the enemy were contemptible, the Eastern Ghilzis the most cowardly of Afghans (a foolish notion he and Burnes had); that as for me and my sappers, twenty men with pickaxes were enough; it was a peaceable march to Jelalabad, and all that we were wanted for was to pick stones from under the gun-wheels.

I asked if these were his orders; he said no, only the opinion given at the General's request and mine, that the General was responsible, and must decide on what sappers and tools must go.

Soon after I rejoined the General he received a note, ordering Lieut.-Col. Monteath's immediate march, and containing almost the above words as to the sappers and the enemy, but declining all responsibility.

The General was lost and perplexed, though he entirely agreed in the objections as to the move, yet he did not feel himself at liberty to prevent it. He asked me to follow my own judgment as to reducing the number of sappers, and what quantity of tools I would take, but made me give my reasons, which he took down in the form of a memorandum addressed to himself. The Adjutant-General, Capt. G——, came in, and to him the General referred. This officer, after abusing the Envoy, spoke to the General with an imperiousness and disrespect, and to me, a stranger, with an insolence it was painful to see the effects of on the General, who yet tried only to soothe him. He advised the General not to have anything to say to Macnaghten, to me, or to the sappers, saying Monteath had men enough, and needed neither sappers nor tools. At last he took a newspaper, went to a window, and would no longer speak to the General on the subject, saying, 'You know best.' This man, I have since heard, was the poor General's evil genius during the subsequent troubles. The General's health threw all business into Capt. G——'s hands; he fancied him indispensable, and in his feeble state of health could not contend against his insolent blustering. G—— despaired from the first, and kept the poor General in a state of continual and fatal irritation.

The General at length resolved to adhere to his own opinion, and made me go back to Macnaghten to tell him of it with the reasons, and so gave him the opportunity of countermanding it. The Envoy would hear no reasons, saying he had given his opinion, and the General was responsible; but he approved of the General's having told me not to join Monteath till the Zoormut force came,

unless hostilities broke out, as I had much to do organising the corps, and was pitched in sight of Bootkhak.

He resumed the subject of my objections to his demonstration plan, hearing them, though impatiently, as well as what I had to say of the Eastern Ghilzis. He lost his temper, however, in answering them, and said if I thought Col. Monteath's movement likely to bring on an attack, I need not go, I was not wanted; if I were, there were others. I rose at once, and, saying a word or two as to what had brought me there, declined to listen to such language (he denied all intention to offend), and made my low bow. He seemed very angry, though half sorry, but said nothing. As I was mounting my horse, however, he came out, and held out his hand in evident kindness, though still ruffled; and so we parted, never again to meet.

I went back to the General, and found him in bed and quite worn out. He made me stay some time, however, and told me once more how he had been tormented by Macnaghten from the first; reduced, to use his own words, from a General to the Lord Lieutenant's head constable. He asked me to see him before I moved, but he said, 'If anything occur, and in case you have to go out, for God's sake clear the passes quickly, that I may get away. For, if anything were to turn up' (he alluded once again to the Candahar and Herat quarter), 'I am unfit for it, done up body and mind, and I have told Lord Auckland so.' This he repeated two or three times, adding that he doubted very much if ever he would see home, even if he did get away.

Nothing can be more unlike Macnaghten's general demeanour than what is above described, and it altogether astonished me. He was always courteous to everyone, and, to me, kind in the extreme.

Burnes, whom I saw for the last time after leaving the General, however, told me he had occasionally seen the Envoy behave in the same manner, and that he was really a passionate man. From what Mackenzie has told me, I infer that during the last few days of his life he must have been in much the same temper. When the Ghilzi insurrection broke out, he had heard of his appointment as Governor of Bombay, and was on the eve of setting out. He and Burnes were on anything but cordial terms, and he could not suffer the idea of his leaving the country disturbed for Burnes to have the merit of pacifying it. Both he and Burnes treated the insurrection with contempt (Burnes called it, to me, a tempest in a teapot), and the rebels, absurdly enough, as less formidable than any other Afghans. Burnes had loudly exclaimed against the policy which caused the insurrection, though not till the insurrection occurred. He was not, however, even consulted, before it, nor even after,

by Macnaghten and his party, as he was thought to be pleased at it.

I was very intimate with Burnes, and believed to hold his opinions; an error, however. (I thought both Burnes and Macnaghten grievously wrong, and in the same way, though Burnes would have managed the bad system better than Macnaghten.) And my seeming to overrate the untoward events, and even predict their increase from the measures taken, was naturally irritating to a man already provoked.

Broadfoot's memorandum to the General on the subject of the tools and stores is an excellent one, showing foresight and caution, but it need not be reproduced. He learnt to his astonishment that, though the bulk of the troops were sent every winter to Jalalabad, where they were virtually cut off from communication with Kabul by the snow, yet there was no magazine either at Gandamak or Jalalabad. When he pointed out the necessity, Macnaghten remarked that he spoke as if he were in an enemy's country!

As it was, when the troops moved out under Col. Monteath, a severe reprimand was sent after Broadfoot for taking so many tools, although he had obtained the General's sanction. This reprimand was crossed on the road by a demand *for still more*, the necessity for them and the wisdom of Broadfoot's arrangements having been forcibly demonstrated. The reprimand was cancelled in a very handsome way, and Broadfoot was allowed *carte blanche*. He made large demands, which could only be partially complied with; but the tools and stores were mainly instrumental in saving Sale's force in Jalalabad, and even the regular sappers of Pollock's relieving army had to indent on Broadfoot for tools.

He remarked, when considering the matter some time afterwards: 'When at length the Cabool insurrection broke out, it seemed as if Providence had stiffened my neck on that occasion; for Burnes strongly advised me not to take the tools or I would make enemies; and he held the enemy in contempt. He thought me on that occasion, and on one or two others, a sort of professional pedant.'

CHAPTER II.

1841.

Night attack at Butkhák—Letter to Mr. Prinsep—First fight, Sappers engaged—Scarcity of officers with N.I. regiments—Service with Sale's brigade—Khurd Kabul pass—Advance to Tezin—Attack between Jagdalak and Surkháb—Distinguished conduct of Broadfoot, F. Cunningham, Wyndham, Coombs, and Sergeant-Major Kelly—Broadfoot's opinion of officers with the force—Outbreak at Kabul—Death of Sir A. Burnes and W. Broadfoot—Of Sir W. Macnaghten—Letter to Dr. Malcolmson—Arrival of Sale's brigade at Jalalabad.

THE expedition, referred to towards the end of last chapter, which was designed to overawe the Ghilzis, marched from Kabul to Butkhak on October 9, 1841. It consisted of the 35th N.I., a squadron of the 5th Cavalry, two guns under Lieut. Michael Dawes, and a company of sappers under Capt. Broadfoot, with Col. Monteath in command.

In the following letter from Broadfoot to Mr. Henry Thoby Prinsep a detailed account of the night attack by the Ghilzis will be found. The demonstration was a failure, and Sir Robert Sale with the 13th L.I. joined Monteath on October 11 with orders to clear the passes.

It should perhaps be explained that Butkhak is the camping ground one march from Kabul in the direction of Jalalabad; It is mentioned by Burnes[1] as the place where Mahmud of Ghazni buried the rich Hindu idol from Somnath..

Jelalabad: January 2, 1842.

My dear Mr. Prinsep,—In yesterday's letter we reached Bootkhak on the afternoon of October 9. On being ordered to remain, I sent back to Cabool the two Wazeer's men, and a small party (twelve) of my own men, who had escorted stores &c. Of the twelve, one was a prisoner, and handcuffed, and one was an unarmed orderly. The remaining daylight passed in preparing the men's arms for use, and in examining narrowly our position, and even pacing the distance

[1] *Travels into Bokhara &c.* p. 130.

to cover for enemies; for the ground was so unfavourable to us that it seemed as though chosen by an enemy. At dusk, word was brought that our returning party was attacked, and with some hesitation leave was given me to take the company out to their aid. After a march, or run, of two or three miles, we arrived just in time to save our party, who after a gallant resistance were about to disperse, being surrounded and reduced to five cartridges among them all. We pursued the enemy about a mile, to recover the body of one of our men who had been killed, and brought it in. This was the opening affair of the present war, and gave a good earnest of what I might expect from the men of the corps, and nobly have they justified my hopes, and rewarded all trouble I have taken: for, though forgotten, I see, in the General's despatches, they have literally borne the brunt of every action of importance, being first in every assault, and last in the retreat, and standing firm when all others present (*none* excepted, Europeans or natives) shrank from the fight. Their not being noticed is, I believe, accident. The General was in his dooly, others commanding did not chance to be where the fight was hot, and I was afterwards too much occupied (even if inclined) to bring my own doings to the notice of those who ought to have seen them. But as it has gone even the length of ascribing to others (by implication at least) what the Sappers did, I shall perhaps occasionally enter into more detail than I should otherwise have done, and mention a few things I should not otherwise have alluded to.

Soon after our return to Bootkhak, the outposts sent notice of sounds from the hills as if they were occupied. I again went partly up one and observed the direction &c. of the objects noted by daylight. The Afghans with me thought they heard people above us, and foretold an attack before morning; but all was so silent that I returned, and was just entering my tent, when the crash of musketry from the front, and both flanks, turned us all out, and set every sentry and guard round the camp firing. Our camp was on a level spot, with rocky hills along the front; on the left separated only by the road to Cabool, and on the left and rear a deep and wide watercourse. These our small force could not occupy while they gave cover to the enemy up to our sentries; especially the left, and there were placed the Sappers, with a large magazine containing twenty barrels of powder. In the ravine, however, on the left, was a picket of the 35th, and Col. Monteath immediately sent a company to support it, but this was thrown into confusion by meeting the picket just running in in disorder pursued by the enemy, and the very young officer (Norton) with them could not rally them.

Another company was sent to their support under another officer, a little senior; but matters did not mend, and at length they were

driven in on the cattle and magazine of the sappers. These last I had taken a little to the front of the line, and made to lie down without firing behind a slight swell, which sheltered them from the shot which fell thick on our *regular* place. On learning a fire was going on among our powder barrels, I went and removed the disorderly troops, and with the consent of the two officers (both of whom I had commanded as cadets when orderly officer at Addiscombe) took charge of their men, and rallying them behind the sappers, who were all this time steady as veterans, never firing a shot, at length restored order and made the enemy draw off a little. In the mean time the front and flanks were enveloped in fire, and Col. Monteath was making excellent dispositions, so good that, notwith-



CAMP, BOOTKHAK. OCTOBER 9 AND 10, 1841.

1. 35th N.I. Col. Monteath.
2. Squad. 5th Cav., Capt. Oldfield.
3. 2 guns, Lieut. Dawes.
4. Shah's Sappers, Capt. Broadfoot.
5. Sapper Magazine.
6 and 7. Camp.

standing our vicious position, the enemy was fairly baffled, and, after four hours of incessant firing, gradually withdrew without penetrating our camp. Col. Monteath in this affair showed himself a good soldier, and the bad position was not, I believe, his fault. He was sent out expecting to move quickly on to Tezeen, and finding his camp misplaced did not think it worth altering. The loss fell chiefly on the 35th, and mainly on the two companies thrown into disorder. The enemy, too, suffered, for we found blood in the wells and heard the wounded call out to be carried away; but they would have suffered still more heavily but for the premature fire of the two companies on the left and some others of the 35th which drove them back to their cover when advancing to rush in on the place where the sappers lay. I had fixed bayonets, and only waited for them to round a bank of about four feet which would impede their flight, to make the sappers rise up and give them a volley, and charge. They were within forty yards (46 paces) of the sappers; we had wheeled up (crawling) to face them; once down the bank, nothing

could have saved them, for they were doubtful of our being there (we heard their conversation) from our not being betrayed by white belts, and standing up like the rest.

The main body of the 35th were very steady. 'It is a fine regiment, but greatly injured for want of officers, and especially of old officers. The natives are peculiarly unmanageable by griffins; otherwise, one of the young officers (Norton) would have rallied his men, for he is a fine promising young soldier, but it was his first action, and the circumstances trying to an old officer. All Col. Monteath's old officers present were employed in important places, and could not be spared. The accident of my being there saved our camp being entered, or disaster would have followed, partial if not total. Some method must be devised to remedy the scarcity of officers, and I am not sure that the financial difficulty is a real one; for the efficiency of the native army would be so increased that fewer European regiments would do, and fewer native troops would be required, as they could do more work: there would also be less for any troops to do, the turbulent lacking the encouragement to fight which arises from partial success.

The enemy were discouraged by their failure, but this good result was diminished by their getting the bedding &c. of the picket and a few camels on the skirts of the camp, for so closely did they pursue. Had their failure been *complete*, who knows what it might have prevented?

Here also I first had proof of the value of our own Afghan troops, when raised as mine are, i.e. subject to as rigorous discipline as the rest, and with no man of influence among them, but the promotions made for personal merit by the commander. The *gradual* introduction of discipline is an error. These men are a bolder race than the Indians, more European and like Europeans, and require a sterner discipline. Their commander must be feared, though he must also know and manage their prejudices, and provide for their wants. I found the same with the Burmese. On October 10, Col. Monteath objected to my returning to Cabool till the service was over, that is for a week; and on the 11th Gen. Sale with other troops arrived, and I wasjoined by Colin [Mackenzie]; but what followed must wait till to-morrow.

On October 12, 1841, the force under Sale marched towards Khurd Kabul through the pass. Every step of the way was disputed. The enemy held the heights, fired on our troops as they advanced, and retired whenever attacked. Early in the day Sale was wounded, and the command devolved on

Col. Dennie. The sappers were actively employed, some under Capt. Broadfoot reconnoitring; others under Colin Mackenzie, who had accompanied the 13th in order to be present.

Mackenzie led the men well, and had the good fortune to come up in time to help Michael Dawes when he and his guns were in considerable danger. Broadfoot, in describing the action, pointed out that chance threw on the sappers under Mackenzie, and on Dawes, the task of forcing the pass. He added: 'Mackenzie commanded in a way few officers could have done; the success was rapid and complete, and the day was gained. Unquestionably great credit was due to him. Dawes showed the coolness he ever showed.' Mackenzie, remarking on this, said, 'He was the only man, except Broadfoot, whom he ever saw wear a natural smile in battle.'

The 13th returned to Butkhak, and Monteath and his force encamped at Khurd Kabul in the valley outside the pass. Our loss was six killed and thirty-five wounded. Negotiation was tried, and Capt. Macgregor was sent to Monteath's camp as Political Officer to make the desired arrangements. The result was unsatisfactory; a night attack was repulsed, but the little force lost eighty camels.

Meanwhile Sale was reinforced from Kabul; and having joined Monteath on the 20th, orders to advance on Tezin on October 22 were issued.

The force here detailed marched on that morning, the wounded General being carried in a litter:

H.M. 13th L.I., Col. Dennie, C.B.
35th N.I., Col. Monteath, C.B.
37th N.I., Major Griffiths.
Squadron 5th B.C., Capt. Oldfield.
Artillery, Capt. A. Abbott.
Shah's Sappers, Capt. G. Broadfoot.
,, Mountain train, Capt. Backhouse.
Troop 2nd Cavalry, Lieut. Mayne.
200 Jezailchis, Jan Fishan Khan.

The march was not well managed; Lieut. King of the 13th was killed, and his men, having been led too far in advance, had to retire, a movement which soon degenerated into flight, with the Afghans in pursuit. Eventually the force reached Tezin and there in the fort, most providentially, forage for the cattle sufficient for two days was found. It is difficult to believe, but it is true, that this force with from 3,000 to 4,000 cattle was sent forward into a country where forage was scarcely to be found, without any arrangement for its supply.

It was intended next day to assault and take the various forts in the neighbourhood; Col. Dennie with half the force was to command, with Broadfoot as engineer. But instead of this, negotiation with the chiefs was commenced by Capt. Macgregor. There is some obscurity as to why the change was made; Durand, generally well informed, has said that the chief, not relishing the prospect of a fight,[2] 'determined to open negotiations and again to overreach Macgregor;' Backhouse thought it was plain, and to none more so than to Macgregor, that the disinclination to fight was rather on the part of some of our troops. Mr. Cameron, legal member of Council, collected and sifted the evidence on this point.[3] He concluded that Macgregor at that time became aware of the serious and widespread nature of the conspiracy, and thought it better to negotiate than to attack the fort. Great courage in going unprotected to meet the Ghilzis was shown by him; terms were discussed, and agents were sent to remain with Macgregor.

Subsequent events made it amply clear that the chiefs had no intention whatever of keeping faith; they instigated their followers to attack our troops, the agents or hostages being simply spies. Colin Mackenzie when a prisoner made the acquaintance of one of these agents, who openly boasted of circumventing the British on that occasion. An agreement was made, and forage was supplied; Sale, however, appeared not to value the compact highly, for he wrote in orders: 'Though the enemy have given hostages, it would be both imprudent and unsafe in us to relax our vigilance,' &c.[4]

A discussion took place subsequently at a critical moment as to whether or not hostages on this occasion had been given: Broadfoot asserted that they had been given and were of no value, Macgregor denied that we had taken hostages.[5]

On October 26, Sale sent back the 37th N.I., three companies of Broadfoot's Sappers, and half of the mountain train, to Kabar Jabar, between Tezin and Khurd Kabul, to await the arrival of a regiment expected from Kabul. His object was to take their carriage for the use of the rest of his brigade; a proceeding not easy to justify when the country was in so dis-

[2] *First Afghan War*, pp. 336, 337.

[3] Notes from Mr. Cameron's minute on the Afghan disaster.

[4] *Sale's Brigade*, p. 96.

[5] Compare p. 73.

turbed a state. He marched that day to Seh Baba,[6] and next day to Kata Sang: the rear guard on both days having been pretty constantly engaged. On October 29 they marched to Jagdalak,[7] escaping an ambush laid for them in the Pari darra, or Fairy's Glen, by avoiding that route and marching by the high land.

On October 29 the brigade marched from Jagdalak to Surkháb. In expectation of trouble the rear guard was strengthened: it consisted of two companies of the 13th L.I., two companies of the 35th N.I., Lieut. Dawes and two guns, the mountain train, and a company of sappers. It was nominally under the command of an officer of the 13th, but was virtually commanded by Backhouse. The sappers being the last of the rear guard were first engaged: they were, indeed, in action before they had quitted the camping ground at Jagdalak.

The first three miles of the road are up a steep incline, difficult for guns and laden camels, commanded by the heights on either side till the top is reached; after that the pass becomes more open with a descent to Surkhab.

The plan adopted for protecting the march through was that the advance and main body should detach parties right and left to ascend to suitable posts, hold them till the baggage passed, and then come on with it. An excellent arrangement provided the main body halted at the top of the pass to give the baggage and these protecting parties time to join. Unfortunately this was not done; the main body moved off, 'leaving the posts referred to and the rear guard to withstand the pressure of the whole strength of the enemy now concentrating at the exit of the pass.' The parties sent to protect the baggage, seeing themselves abandoned by the main body, with one honourable exception, quitted their posts, and the whole force of the enemy came down on the rear guard, which fell into the greatest confusion and panic. The exception here mentioned was a party of Broadfoot's Sappers commanded by Lieut. F. Cunningham,[8] 'who stuck to his duty and obeyed his orders.'

[6] Baba Isa's tomb.

[7] The accent is on the second syllable, and all the vowels are short; it used to be written, Jugdulluk.

[8] Francis Chantry Cunningham, the youngest son of Allan Cunning-

The panic-stricken companies of the 13th and 35th hurried forward in confusion to get out of the pass. The Ghilzis, occupying the cover on either side, fired into the mass of fugitives, and the villagers pressed up the pass after them knife in hand.

At this juncture and amid this confusion 'most fortunately a few intrepid British were found to face the enemy, headed by Capt. Broadfoot: these were Capt. Wyndham and Lieut. Coombs of the 35th, Lieut. Cunningham and Sergeant-Major Kelly of the Sappers, with five or six sepoys of the Sapper corps who had remained with Broadfoot and Cunningham as orderlies (the Sapper company had been again sent up the hills to skirmish); these ten or twelve charged the Ooloos, or villagers above referred to,' and held them in check until they reached the exit of the pass. Poor Wyndham, who was so lame as to require support from two sepoys of his company, could not retire with the others, and fell into the hands of the merciless mob; both the sepoys, to their infinite honour, stuck to him to the last and shared his fate. 'During this scene of terror all who fell wounded were of course abandoned; the enemy as they came up falling upon them in heaps, and, as Capt. Broadfoot describes it, "like hounds on a fox."'

Our men were rallied 'by the dispositions made at the outlet by Captains Backhouse and Fenwick, and covered by the bold front ever maintained by Capt. Broadfoot.'[9] Reinforcements were sent back from the main body, and the rear guard arrived at Surkhab just about dark. Next day, October 30, Gandamak[1] was reached without molestation.

ham the poet, was born in 1820, and entered the Madras Army in 1838. He served with distinction in Broadfoot's Sappers, as quartermaster, in Afghanistan during the years 1840-42; and received medals for Jalalabad and Kabul. He was afterwards appointed to the Mysore Commission by Lord Ellenborough, and retired on December 31, 1861, on account of bad health. From this time till he died in December 1875 he wrote a good deal, and was a frequent contributor to the *Saturday Review*. He had two brothers in the Bengal Engineers: Joseph Davy Cunningham, for some years an Assistant to the Governor-General's Agent for the N.W. Frontier, and author of a *History of the Sikhs*; and Sir Alexander Cunningham, K.C.I.E., still living, who was for many years head of the Archæological Survey of India.

[9] Letter to the *Friend of India* 'from the pen of one who was on the spot:' the previous quotations are mainly from Backhouse's diary.

[1] Gandamak: accent on the second syllable, and all the vowels short.

Some interesting remarks by Broadfoot will be found in the following letter to Dr. Malcolmson:

Sale's Camp, Gundumuk: November 4, 1841.

. . . I would fain give you a history of the last month, but must defer it. Suffice it to say we have had military operations far more serious than was expected; instructive professionally by showing that against even Afghans no rules of military science can be neglected with impunity, and interesting to those much employed from the difficulty of the country and the boldness of the enemy.

. . . . . .

On ten days we were more or less engaged with the enemy, and in four of the more considerable affairs I had no reason to find fault with the share allotted to me. In fact we have been at the post of danger always. In a fifth I had it all to myself, having had an excursion of about three hours, during which we recaptured 300 camels and demolished a good many of the enemy. One day, a hot one, I had Colin Mackenzie with me, and a famous second he is: another time William was with me, also stout in fight.

Now I suppose you think I am loaded with honours. Nothing farther from the case. I have never been mentioned in orders till the very last occasion, and then in a way subordinate to others who had not my luck. Colin Mackenzie was furious, and there has been a great uproar on the subject, caused by an artillery officer at a big dinner here (I was not present) attacking poor Col. Dennie about the matter.

The truth is, Gen. Sale was wounded in the second action; he was not at the first or third, and goes in a dooly: he is entirely unacquainted with what happens at the chief fighting places. One occasion of our doing something arose from a blunder of Dennie's, another from the misconduct of the troops. No one likes to report such things, and the General, who treats me most kindly, and I am sure considers me a tolerable soldier, continually mentions to me things as done by others which they did not do, and I do not undeceive him, as it would seem boasting, and might lead others, who left their posts, into trouble. But all will come right: this country will give more work, and I cannot but perceive a feeling to have arisen that I may be turned to use.

Broadfoot then proceeded to remark on the qualifications of the officers with whom he was associated. He considered —and the opinions of the ablest of his companions were, for the most part, the same as his own—that Col. Dennie was wholly unqualified for command. Among the senior officers

he reckoned Sale and Monteath to be the best soldiers. He then said:

We must then come low for good officers, and first comes Capt. Havelock of H.M.'s 13th Regiment. It is the fashion, especially in his own corps, to sneer at him; his manners are cold, while his religious opinions (Baptist) seclude him from society; but the whole of them together would not compensate for his loss. Brave to admiration, imperturbably cool, looking at his profession as a science, and, as far as I can see or judge, correct in his views.

All our artillery officers are above the average: two, Backhouse and Dawes, greatly so; Backhouse a hero, though a mad one. Capt. Abbott a superior officer too. Then we had Capt. Paton, Quartermaster-General, a very brave and sensible man, now gone to Cabool. The rest are all below those named.

Among the young hands are many fine, gallant, and intelligent lads; none surpassing, only one (Coombs) equalling, my two Mulls,[2] Orr and Cunningham. The former was wounded severely in his first action, but is doing well.

And now do not wonder if the papers teem with stories, true or false, on these matters, and if my name be taken in vain, for we had an awkward business for a short time in the last considerable affair, and a handful of sappers saved several hundred infantry, chiefly European, from being destroyed by Afghans! I would have hushed the matter up, but it was impossible, and all are talking of, and lying much about, what really occurred.

I ordered a charge of bayonets, and on getting among the enemy —whom, however, we for the moment dispersed—found myself followed only by two officers, Cunningham (Sappers), and Coombs (35th), wounded, also Wyndham, a poor lame Gilchrist chum of mine, since killed, our sergeant-major, and five Afghans of the Sappers, of whom one fell. The rest of the Sappers were engaged on the hill above, and of the infantry, European and native, only a part charged, and they stopped short before getting halfway, fearing to close with our enemies, who were destroying our wounded!

You may imagine the talk this has caused, and will understand the papers; but the thing was after all a trifle, and by means which I must give you hereafter we got the panic-struck rogues off without disaster till they rallied, inflicting heavy loss, far exceeding our own, on the enemy.

The country from this to Cabool is the strongest we have yet operated in, and a little confusion for a few hundred yards, in a fight of eleven and a half hours—such it was to us of the rear guard—over

[2] Madras officers: Mull is an abbreviation of Mulligatawny, a Madras invention.

a dozen miles of rocky mountains, covered with bushes, is nothing but what might be expected.

I grieve to say that with all but old Havelock, not to be daunted, and Sale, who does not know the details, and is a bold man moreover, except Monteath also, and some of the 35th officers &c., a strong feeling of depression has been produced among men and officers of the European and native infantry, and the regular cavalry.

Give the news to Col. Cullen, and he to whom he pleases.

Broadfoot finished his letter by ordering a pipe of Madeira for the Sapper mess, and after his signature is the following postscript:

Bengal sepoys are good troops.
My corps Sappers, 600, is:

300 Hindoostanees	brave
200 Goorkhas	braver
100 Afghans and Hazaras. . .	heroes

And all from emulation beyond their several unmixed countrymen.

Meanwhile at Kabul our evil system of administration had borne fruit. On November 2, 1841, the outbreak occurred; Sir Alexander Burnes, his brother Lieut. Burnes, and William Broadfoot, were killed in Burnes's house in the city. The treasury was sacked, and the mob was rewarded to the extent of 17,000*l*. The only serious effort to relieve Burnes and put down the mob was made by the Shah, and not, as might have been expected, by the English officers in the cantonment.

The Envoy turned to the General for assistance, but the latter was wholly unfit from illness to meet the crisis. Incapacity and imbecility among the senior officers was naturally followed by demoralisation and cowardice among the troops. The Envoy in these days of humiliation showed a better spirit than the military chiefs, but to no purpose: he was obliged to negotiate with the enemy, and became involved in transactions regarding them which, if the Afghan account may be trusted, cost him his life.

He was, as all know, killed by Akbar Khan at an interview, and before long the Kabul force capitulated.

That army paid dearly for the error; with the exception of the prisoners and hostages in Akbar Khan's hands, and of

Dr. Brydon, who escaped, they were utterly destroyed in the passes through which Sale's brigade had fought its way. The Envoy had summoned Nott and Sale to his assistance. The former was prevented by the season of the year and by other considerations from compliance. When Sale received the orders he consulted his officers and decided that he could not obey. This decision has been much questioned. Durand has stated that 'it was regretted by some of the ablest officers in his force, foremost among whom was Broadfoot.'[3] Sir Herbert Edwardes on the same subject has said:

> Of course it will always remain a moot point whether Sale could have returned or not; and if he had returned, whether it would have saved the Kabul force. From Sale's own account it is probable he could not have returned in a state of efficiency; but there were at least two men with Sale's brigade who would have made all the difference: one—Henry Havelock—who would have recalled the discipline and spirit of poor Elphinstone's subordinates, if mortal man could do it; the other—George Broadfoot—who, in the last resort, would have dared to supply the army with a leader.[4]

Whilst Sale's force was at Gandamak rumours of the Kabul outbreak reached them: they are thus alluded to by Broadfoot in a letter to Dr. Malcolmson, dated Gandamak, November 8, 1841:

> . . . For a good many days we have had no communication with Cabool, and it is of course clear from this that the country we fought through is again, in whole or in part, closed against us. We have rumours of the most extraordinary and contradictory nature as to occurrences at Cabool, all agreeing that there has been an outbreak there, but differing as to results; some saying we were besieged, others that the enemy were defeated. Burnes, too, is asserted to be murdered or a prisoner, besides other officers, and these latter reports are credited in camp. They interest me most deeply, for the few officers living in the city, all of whom are said to have been destroyed, are: Burnes and his brother, William Broadfoot, Colin Mackenzie, Capt. Johnson, paymaster, Brigadier Anquetil, Capt. Troup, and Capt. Trevor of the cavalry. William lived with Burnes in the heart of the city, far from succour; they had a havildar and twelve men as a guard. Next door, Capt. Johnson's treasury was guarded by a native officer and thirty men. . . . The

[3] *First Afghan War*, p. 360.
[4] *Life of Sir H. Lawrence*, vol. i. p. 285, note 4.

rest were near succour. Now some attempt at Burnes's house is possible; but unless surprised, or unless Burnes might be weak enough to listen to terms offered and surrender, I believe they would hold their own, small as their party was, even for twenty-four hours, *if they had ammunition.* I know what William is as a soldier, and from Burnes's confidence in him, I know, too, that he would command, and surely a first effort of our troops would be their relief. . . .

As for us, though short of ammunition and nearly without money, we may laugh at all Afghanistan *if our troops are rightly managed,* otherwise we have already had proof that the finest troops may be discouraged to a degree painful to think of. Nay, further, if we are true to ourselves and manage decently, we can hold out famously, till relieved from India, even if the whole country rise against us and our communication with India be closed. But we must rectify some great errors in our military arrangements; we must not be without battering guns in a country studded with mud forts, and we must have district magazines; one, for example, at Jelalabad, which during half the year is, in a military sense, deprived of communication with Cabool by the snow, and at all times separated from it by mountains over which it is difficult and frightfully expensive to carry stores.

I believe something has been written on the subject, for I spoke to Havelock yesterday and formerly about the measures of precaution we required, and he concurred and went immediately to move the General about it. You know from former letters how high my opinion is of Havelock, though it is the fashion here to sneer at him.

When I last wrote I alluded to the *discouragement,* to speak mildly, prevailing among all the troops except the Shah's people, who are but few here; an opportunity has occurred to get rid of it, and again we have the satisfaction of hearing men and officers speak as they ought of our enemies and themselves. On the 4th, word was brought in that one of the great lords at court had rebelled. Meer Ufzul Khan, the Urzbegee, and his son had occupied a fort about 3½ miles from our camp, and was going to raise the country on us. Capt. Macgregor, the Political Agent, was at dinner with us, at the Sapper mess, when he got the final and certain news, and after a consultation between him, Backhouse, Dawes, and myself, he went off to urge the General to attack at once; but returned late, having totally failed, though he had cited Backhouse's and my formal opinions; nay, one staff officer (not Havelock) actually proposed retiring to Jelalabad! There were then thirty men in the fort! but, of course, likely to increase every hour. Backhouse and I went, though it was midnight, and turned out Havelock. I pledged my character as a soldier to find the means of taking the place, even

if, as was said, the artillery (which Backhouse and Dawes, excellent officers of artillery, denied) was too weak to do its part properly. Havelock held the same views, but had been overborne. He saw, however, the necessity of stopping the discouragement, especially after talking over our Jugduluk adventures, and said he would do what he could. We wanted a strong advanced guard to move at three o'clock and invest the place at daybreak; but it then came out, the General had decided (!) on not attacking, and was listening to some half-caste, who assured him the man[5] might perhaps not be hostile; or, rather, this was the excuse. Col. Dennie came in on hearing (he never sleeps, I believe) us in Havelock's tent, and was—but I must not give you all details; suffice it to say, the immediate move Havelock could not accomplish, but he got us off in the afternoon of the 5th. The enemy fled, firing a few shots on Abbott and myself reconnoitring; and though from mismanagement they were allowed to pass under our noses with slight loss, yet the benefit is incalculable. Our own men once more in spirits for anything, and the enemy, as well as our own Afghan troops, undeceived as to our being afraid to come near them. Macgregor, too, has good information that only the next day a large reinforcement was to have come in, and the country would have been up.

So now no fear of us: never mind the newspapers. In spite of what has happened, a finer brigade than Sale now has I would not desire to see; and if the worst comes to the worst, we shall be discovered here, unable perhaps to do much from want of ammunition, but not to be hurt by the enemy. More likely is it, however, that all will blow over, and then if the Calcutta people act prudently, and are seconded by good management here, a little vigour in spring will make us all the stronger for this outbreak; and then for a careful revision, or rather the formation of a definite system for the retention of this country on the cheapest terms.

Now send this to Col. Cullen with my kindest regards. Send, if you can, a copy to England to Mr. Loch with the same message; and send all or part to Col. Sim, or any friend at Madras; but remember there are in this opinions not to get into the papers, and you know how easily these things go there. Do you know Lord Elphinstone? I think not. If so, ask Col. Sim to give him the news. Col. Cullen will, I dare say, do so, but the route is circuitous. I would have written to Lord Elphinstone myself, but, to say the truth, I am worked like a horse, putting up defences to remedy in some degree the vices of an abominable position they have thrust the force into, and must to work. G. B.

[5] The man in charge of the fort.

It may be as well to put a paragraph in the papers to counteract the desponding private letters sure to go down. Do not name me, but say, on authority, we are well; and having well thrashed the enemy, are ready to do so again.

On November 11, Sale's brigade resumed its march towards Jalalabad. As carriage was deficient, a quantity of baggage and stores was left in charge of Capt. Burn, of the Khaibar corps. This proceeding appears to be inexcusable when it is remembered that there was then a general rising among the Afghans, that the Khaibar corps was wavering, and that Capt. Burn protested strongly against the additional temptation to mutiny and plunder thus supplied.

Nevertheless he and one or two other officers were left to take their chance, as also were Lieut. Cunningham and a party of sappers who had been sent to destroy the Mamu Khel fort.

The brigade showed a disposition to march towards Jalalabad with more haste than was either becoming or consistent with the safety of the small detached party.

Backhouse, looking back from the main body, which had reached Nimla, saw smoke in the direction of Mamu Khel, and indications that Cunningham was engaged. He told Broadfoot, who requested him to apply to Col. Monteath for assistance from the rear guard. First Backhouse and then Broadfoot went and pointed out the danger of the detachment and the ample strength of the rear guard, but without result. The rear guard proceeded on its way, leaving Cunningham and his few men to shift for themselves.

Late that evening Capt. Burn with some Khaibaris arrived in full flight, guns and baggage having been abandoned. Along with them Cunningham's party came in with ammunition exhausted and having suffered severely. Even on arrival at Sale's camp their danger was not over, for not being recognised in the dark they were received by a volley from the guard. Capt. Burn, with ready presence of mind, made his bugler sound 'Cease firing;' the order was recognised by Sale's men, and the fugitives got safely into camp.

For a long time Broadfoot failed to get Cunningham's services on this occasion properly acknowledged. He at last

succeeded so far as to get Sale to publish the following garrison order.

(Extract.) December 27, 1841.

The Major-General has also to express his best thanks to Lieut. Dowson, who ably assisted Capt. Gerrard, and to Lieut. Cunningham of the Sappers and Miners, whose perseverance and resolution in effecting the demolition of the fort appears to the Major-General deserving of the highest commendation.

On the margin of this order Broadfoot added:

Lieut. Cunningham was sent with Sergeant-Major Kelly and thirty sappers to demolish the fort by mining. In the mean time Gen. Sale marched for Jelalabad. The janbaz horse deserted, and the enemy attacked the party at the fort under Capt. Gerrard. The fort was set on fire, yet Lieut. C. and his party persisted till they blew up the towers, though often obliged to make new mines from the flames approaching. On their retreat the jezailchis were thrown into confusion; and the little party of sappers and the sowars standing firm till they rallied alone saved them.

Next day, November 12, the brigade marched from Fatehabad to Jalalabad. Col. Dennie commanded the rear guard, in which, on this occasion, were the mountain train and all the sappers. The enemy collected before the advance had left the ground, notwithstanding which Sale marched off as usual. The account of the passage of the rear guard through Fatehabad was written by Backhouse, and is excellent.

The village was crowded with people on the walls and on the roofs of the houses as the rear guard passed; and although these apparently unarmed villagers were bent upon having at us immediately they could, without being particularly noticed, join the other body of savages hanging on our rear, still they sat as quiet as conscious innocence itself while the rear guard passed by and amongst them. My native officer wished to know why these scoundrels were not pitched into, for, says he, 'they will all fire upon us in less than five minutes after we get past the village.' Everyone knew this; still our British forbearance will never allow us to fire upon an enemy before he has openly declared himself to be such.

The expectation of attack was immediately fulfilled; the enemy followed the rear on to a plain and opened a brisk fire. It is said that Capt. Oldfield asked permission to charge, but was refused. Lieut. Mayne's troop was sent back with

ammunition by Sale; and Backhouse has recorded that Broadfoot, seeing the opportunity, got Mayne's detachment to join Oldfield, persuaded the latter to charge without orders, and promised every support with the sappers. The cavalry drew up facing the enemy and immediately charged, 'Broadfoot and the sappers endeavouring to keep their pace. . . . The cavalry soon came to close quarters with the foe, who evidently little expected such a movement on our part, as they threw away their firearms *instanter*, and bolted clean; not, however, unscathed, for some sixty or seventy at least bit the dust to rise no more. This . . . created a fine stirring feeling, and, moreover, put a sudden and most complete stop to any further annoyance during this march. . . . Broadfoot and his Sappers, seeing the cavalry in no need of support, took a line of his own to his right, and completely routed the parties on the hills whom Dawes had opened fire upon. . . .'

The official account of this affair agrees mainly with the above description, the chief divergence being that in the former it is stated that Col. Dennie ordered the charge. He at any rate thanked Capt. Oldfield for it, and Capt. Broadfoot for his soldierlike and intrepid support of the cavalry.

Jalalabad was reached without further molestation; but during the night the enemy burnt the cantonments, and in the morning Sale moved into the town, so hastily and in such confusion as to encourage our enemies and discourage our friends.

CHAPTER III.

1841–42.

Defence of Jalalabad—Capt. Broadfoot's report as garrison engineer—Sorties by the garrison—Extracts from diary: from letter to Dr. Malcolmson—Defensive measures—Letter to Thoby Prinsep—Extracts from diary—Dr. Brydon—Wild's failure to force the Khaibar pass—Council of war—Letter to Havelock—Letter from Havelock—Havelock to Durand—Broadfoot's memorandum—His opposition to the proposed capitulation ultimately successful.

THE town of Jalalabad is on the south side of the Kabul river, a little more than halfway between Kabul and Peshawar. It was a place of considerable importance with a very fluctuating population; though used as the winter residence of the Shah, its defences were in a state of disrepair and dilapidation.

The following extracts from Capt. Broadfoot's note on the defensive works will give an idea of the place as it was when occupied by Sale:

On November 12, the Major-General commanding, having resolved to occupy Jellalabad, directed me with a committee of officers to examine and report on the works of the place.

The committee reported unanimously that they were not then defensible against a vigorous assault.

As will be seen in the accompanying plan, the town is an irregular quadrilateral, having half of the western side salient and the southern side broken by a deep re-entering angle. It was surrounded on every side with gardens and houses, inclosed fields, mosques, and ruined forts, affording strong cover to an enemy; these were everywhere close to the walls, and in many places connected with them. Beyond these on three sides (N. E. and W.) at from 400 to 500 yards run the ruins of the wall of the ancient city, on which the sand has accumulated so as to form a line of low heights, giving cover to the largest bodies of men. . . .

Two very solid walls,[1] 300 yards apart, run from the place to this bank, thus inclosing on three sides a space probably occupied

[1] W. W. on the plan.

originally by the Mogul Emperor's palace, but found by us to contain a large mosque, and numerous gardens and houses occupied by fakeers: one of the gates of the town opens into it, and it was traversed by a watercourse about ten feet wide, which entered the town by a tunnel under the rampart, large enough to admit several men abreast; a similar tunnel allowed it to pass out of the town on the eastern side.

The walls of the town extended about 2,100 yards, without reckoning the bastions, of which there were thirty-three. The works were of earth and in the usual style of the country, viz. a high thin rampart, but in a state of ruin, without parapets and without ditch, covered way, or outworks of any kind.

. . . . . .

To give some idea of the state of the works, I may mention that, of the committee sent to inspect them on November 13, not one except myself succeeded in making the circuit; large gaps cut off the communication, or insecure footing compelled the officers to descend among the adjoining inclosures, from which it was difficult to find the way [to the rampart].

Sale consulted the officers commanding regiments or corps on three courses which were then open. First, whether to hold the whole town; or, second, merely the Bala Hissar and such part of the town as was necessary; or, third, whether it might not be better to withdraw from the town and form an entrenched camp outside.

It was eventually decided to hold the town, and Broadfoot, as garrison engineer, was required to make it defensible.

This consultation has in some books been erroneously referred to as a council of war; it was merely a consultation as above described.

The position of the garrison was serious; they were partially surrounded by the enemy, were short of provisions, and had on an average only 150 rounds of musket ammunition for each man. The Afghans kept up an irregular fire on the walls, and occupied the rocks opposite the south-west bastion, on which they executed a dance to the tune of a bagpipe. These rocks were afterwards known as 'Piper's Hill.' A sortie was arranged, which, though rather mismanaged, was successful. The cavalry killed about eighty men, the Afghans disappeared, and on November 16 supplies were received from the other side of the river.

Broadfoot was busy repairing and improving the works, ample use being found for the tools which he had insisted on taking with him, which, indeed, had to be supplemented by more made on the spot. Food was supplied mainly by means of the exertions of Capt. Macgregor. That officer, in a letter to Capt. Mackeson, dated November 30, 1841, mentioned that the Afghans avoided the open plain, but kept up a desultory fire on the defences. Whilst this was going on at one side of the town, grain, flour, and other supplies were brought in unopposed at the other. Such was the Oriental method of conducting a siege.

The enemy returned to close quarters on November 28, and a second sortie, commanded by Col. Dennie, was organised. Again the infantry were mismanaged, with the exception of Broadfoot's Sappers, who drove the enemy from the inclosures along the Kabul face of the fort, and took Piper's Hill, killing eight or ten of them. The cavalry, as before, did well, and had they been supported by the infantry the results would have been more decisive. As it was, the garrison was unmolested for a long time, and the enemy applied to Kabul for a reinforcement of 1,500 cavalry; 'a tacit but very handsome compliment to our 200 horse under Oldfield and Mayne, although the General saw no necessity of mentioning their services in his order of thanks.'[2]

The entries in Broadfoot's small diary kept at this time are for the most part dry records of work done, but occasionally there are references to other matters of interest. On December 14 he appears to have heard from Macgregor of William Broadfoot's death. The entry is: 'Alas! my fears were true; he fell with Burnes on November 2. My noble and beloved William. On that day twelvemonth James was slain. Bitterness of heart is my portion, and, alas! for home.' On the 16th he recorded:

The General still interfering with parties about loopholes, for which his mania continues. A report in to-day that our troops at Cabool have been driven from the cantonment to the Bala Hissar. Another by a man sent on purpose to spread it, that a capitulation has taken place, and our troops are in full retreat on this place. The latter absurd; but if true we are bound by no capitulation they make.

[2] Backhouse's diary.

December 18.—At the works as yesterday. Heard from Cabool, the letters dated the 10th, from Sir W. Macnaghten and Lady Sale. All inactive since the 23rd, only three days' supplies: rumour said the Candahar reinforcements were near, but no certain accounts.

More details of the events of the 23rd ult. Colin Mackenzie again wounded. The cavalry charged through our infantry. The loss of our troops was very small, not enough to account for their torpidity. The Envoy complains of their inaction: the General urges the Envoy to capitulate.

It would be insanity to do so. They would inveigle our troops into the passes, and on the horses dying of hunger and cold would attack them, seize the guns, and starve or massacre the men reduced by want of food, shelter, or fuel.

The Envoy wishes to postpone capitulation to the last. It is wrong to judge on insufficient information, but grievous errors seem to have been committed; may they not be fatal!

Why were not the troops concentrated from the first, and a pitched battle fought with all our strength? On November 23, it seems, eighteen companies of infantry and some cavalry sallied under Brigadier Shelton. Cavalry, 5,000 it is said, charged and rode through their ranks and back again. A fresh troop of the 5th Cavalry charged the enemy's horse and recovered the gun. We pursued the enemy, who rallied, and forced us to retire to the cantonments. Since then nothing has been done: the numbers of the enemy are less, but their boldness is greater.

Capt. Woodburn was on his way to Cabool with about 100 men when the insurrection broke out. He was attacked, but threw himself into a fort, which he defended till his ammunition failed, when he capitulated, on the enemy swearing on the Koran to keep faith. He and his men were no sooner in the enemy's hands than they were murdered. Woodburn was reckoned the best officer in the Shah's service. Macgregor considers it probable the military will drive Sir W. Macnaghten to grant Mahomed Acbar the terms we heard of, viz. Shah Shooja to reign, with Dost Mahomed as his minister.

December 19.—Heard of Sir W. Macnaghten's answer to the enemy on their proposing Dost Mahomed's recall, our departure for Peshawar, and on news of that being done, their returning to the provinces under a Barukzye escort: our people to lay down their arms at once, and give up the married men and their families as hostages. Sir William replied, 'Death is better than dishonour: we trust in the God of battles, and in His name bid you come on.'[3]

[3] It is said that this reply was suggested to Sir W. Macnaghten by Colin Mackenzie. *Storms and Sunshine of a Soldier's Life*, vol. i. p. 235.

With this spirit they will do well yet; but, unhappily, the military authorities are said not to share it.

December 23.—Among the people the report is rife that the Envoy has capitulated. Altogether improbable—incredible; it would be insanity; but all reports seem to concur as to some accommodation having taken place. Macgregor probably guesses rightly that Mahomed Acbar Khan, finding himself but a secondary person, has made his own terms with us, and that *thus* the rebellion is broken up, or at least disunion produced.

Was asked by some officers of the 13th, whether I saw any of the fighting in the Khoord Cabool pass! This from men whom we preceded; who were not even in sight while the Sappers and Dawes's guns (the latter unable to act) were alone dislodging the enemy from his principal positions! This is indeed the *bubble* reputation.

Received 160 pounds more of country powder. I am promised some sulphur and saltpetre by a Hindoo, but it must come from Balabagh, and Meer Ufzul, Nazir, with a few horsemen, is stopping the road. Everything is difficult for want of money. Macgregor complains bitterly of Mackeson, but is now, happily, beginning not to lean on him. Hard frost, weather delightful.

December 24.—The road across the town, from the Cazee bastion, is a great improvement, or will be if finished. One side can now support the other with reinforcements in a moderate time. A few hours' work will finish the right flank and face, but to-morrow is Christmas Day and a general holiday. Seventy-five camel-loads of barley and Indian corn arrived for the cattle; they are very ill off for forage. There is a good deal in the country, but we want money.

Gool Shah and Uslum Khan, with others, urging me to commit to them the revenge of William's death. The former wants leave to go as soon as he can be spared to murder Ameenoollah Khan, Logaree. Alas! poor William, just are their praises of thee—valiant, generous, and gentle wert thou indeed.

December 25, *Christmas Day.*—A holiday for all hands. Dined with the 13th L.I. No news in. Wrote to Malcolmson.

The following extracts are from this letter:

Since I last wrote, little has occurred here, and we have had no news from Cabool, though rumours of every kind abound. . . .

In the mean time, we are busy putting up defences, and, though executed very roughly, they are already becoming formidable against such enemies as are likely to oppose us. The work has been, and continues to be, a great one. The walls were ruinous, and, in a great portion of the circumference, more accessible from

the outside than the inside. This is already all changed. Nothing can be more admirable than the cheerfulness and goodwill with which the troops labour. Never was a finer body of men assembled. Confidence, too, is greatly restored, and we are tolerably well off for provisions. Had we but money we should be all right, but we have *none*, though some, I hear, has at last been despatched from Peshawur.

We have also got a small quantity of powder from the neighbourhood, and are getting houses [built] for the troops. Altogether, we are getting into that state which would render it clearly our duty to hold our ground here, whatever may be determined on at Cabool. But I trust they will submit to no unworthy terms.

My health is good: the work from the first day till now I have taken great interest in; in fact, were it not for the bitter loss of William, I should be happy, for I am actively employed, and cannot but feel myself, or at least hope, I am useful.

I have some thought of publishing a short statement of our operations (that is this force—not the Cabool people), at any rate I shall draw one out, and you shall see it. Havelock is going to publish also, and I shall give him plans, sections, &c., and show him the paper I write.

People seem to think here I am one of those sure of the brevet-majority and C.B. It may be so, and I should certainly be gratified exceedingly were it so, for I should feel conscious of at least trying to deserve it; but the want of William, and the thought of the sorrow at home, embitter every thought of the future. How he would have shone in the present gloom at Cabool!

I hear there is an 'Englishman' paper in (I have not seen it), saying we must have succumbed before succours can reach. Do not fear for us. This force if rightly managed will hold its own. It was indeed once in a bad way, but, as I wrote you at the time, it would have been our own fault had it been destroyed. We could always, if we had not got provisions, have fought our way to meet our reinforcements; and now, if we manage well, we could sustain *here* the attack of all Afghanistan. Despondency has been our chief danger here. Do not let it extend to India, or evil might indeed befall. And make them keep off a Burmese war. But I forget you are out of the way of all these things in the far West.

December 26.—At work as before. Opened a road from the new bastion to the Cazee bastion, a most useful work. Newspapers in from India—the General's despatches—the Sappers never mentioned! General indignation thereat—spoke to Havelock and Wade pretty freely regarding it.

December 27.—Trying to make the best of the vicious tracing

of these old works. Treasure 25,000 rs. arrived from Peshawur at last, brought by horsemen in the service of Torabaz Khan. More on the road. The horsemen seemed much astonished at the works we have put up.

The first brigade of the reinforcements arrived at Peshawur on the 24th. Clerk's sending on these reinforcements was a vigorous and wise measure. The objects to be gained justified risking them in the Punjab. We have to a certain extent saved ourselves, but we owed much to the knowledge the Afghans had that these troops were on their way. It encouraged our friends, and gradually disheartened the enemy.

Have had no time to write to anyone. No news from Cabool.

Cunningham and Gerrard at length noticed in orders[4] for the Mamoo Khel affair. This is in consequence of a letter (official) sent in by Backhouse, remonstrating on the neglect of it hitherto. The General uses my words regarding Cunningham persevering in the mining when the place was on fire. It was paid no attention to formerly.

December 28.—At work as usual. Lost the morning in going round the place with Col. Monteath to choose an encamping ground for the troops coming up. The Colonel does not willingly adopt suggestions, as I found at Khoord Cabool, where it required poor Jenkins's death and the loss of many men to convince him how faulty was the position of the right picket. He agreed to occupy the rocks, but declined placing the troops so that the fort and they could help each other; and gave reasons which told more strongly against his position than the other.[5] However, I obeyed orders in going. Rain fell, and I got wet: not very well at night.

The entries regarding the next few days refer as usual to the progress which was being made with the defensive works. A report, afterwards confirmed, of the murder of Sir W. Macnaghten is also noticed. With reference to the effect this news might have, Broadfoot wrote: 'All I fear is panic in our leaders, and consequently in the troops. We are strong if that be kept off; strong enough to do great deeds. Reinforcements are at Peshawur. In a week or ten days they should be here, and if my voice can do anything to urge our leaders, we shall then resume, what with such enemies should seldom be abandoned, the offensive.'

[4] See p. 45.

[5] Means apparently that the reasons given by Monteath told more against the position he wished to put the troops in than against the one advocated by Capt. Broadfoot.

January 1, 1842.—Little doubt seems to be now entertained of Sir W. Macnaghten's fate. They must have had very hard work at Cabool; we shall no doubt hear of great suffering and much heroism when the communication is reopened. Poor Trevor was a fine fellow. Wade spoke to-day of a report of the state of the works, and mention of the Sappers. . . . Spoke to Havelock about it. Wrote to Thoby Prinsep.

The first part of the letter referred to has already been quoted;[6] the second, with the exception of a long postscript, may now appropriately follow.

You of course know all our news from Macgregor's communications. The reinforcements are soon expected; and as to the Khyber, if they cannot force that they are hardly worth having, or rather their commanders might be spared; but the Khyberees will, we hope, not oppose. The rumours of poor Macnaghten's murder are confirmed from every side, and the details reported you of course know. I am truly sorry for him; he was a kind man, and specially so to me as a friend of yours. His late firmness, too, redeemed many errors. They have had a severe struggle at Cabool, and still have; but if they are only well handled, and in each effort exert *all* their strength, they will deliver themselves. If they continue in jeopardy, their relief must be our care. A winter march is an undertaking of great difficulty; but nothing is impossible with forethought, due preparation, and calm obstinate courage. But these are rare qualities, *all* wanting here; gallantry and right-heartedness we have, but not the nerve to look the very worst in the face, and by preparing, or even unprepared, to meet it unshaken. I have crossed the Alps twice in different parts in winter, and have travelled in German mountains in snow, and once had to travel on foot the Apennines also, and I was born in the latitude of St. Petersburg. The dangers, and the means of meeting them, of a winter expedition I have therefore some notion of; scarcely another man here has, and while the majority speak of the attempt in a way unbecoming men called to a struggle like ours, others consider it so easy that its unavoidable difficulties will, as we have already seen in other cases, scare them at the moment when vigorous perseverance alone can save. An attempt to relieve Cabool at once should be made, if we find any tolerable prospect of success in doing so, but ought not to be risked unless absolutely necessary. With arrangement we might do it; even with such moderate share of it as we are likely to have, we might get through if the weather was

[6] See p. 30.

fine; but if snow storms come on and we are vigorously opposed, we should have to strain every nerve to avoid signal disaster. I am now glad Colin is wounded, or he would have been with poor Macnaghten.

What a tragic history is this we are making, but yet how noble a struggle to be engaged in! Enough to make men of women.

One good, a great good, will arise from this evil: no treaty is now possible till it be dictated by us as conquerors—by us, here, together with the reinforcements we will hope; but even should it be by a new army of the Indus, our destruction would be a less evil to the State than any treaty impeding what ought now and easily can be achieved, the conquest of this country. Recede from it we never can, or it ceases to be in our interests, or even neutral. We must regard it as a fortress to be held for the security of India; a certain expense, indeed, but an inevitable one, and one to be diminished to the utmost. This diminution can only be effected by *governing it ourselves*, not introducing Indian regulations more than English law, by wholesale, but administering and improving its finances, and tranquillising it by breaking all military power but our own, and, to the extent necessary to secure these objects, administering justice.

Never mind these fellows gathering, we have made this place now defensible against an attack *de vive force*; formerly we could not have kept them out if they had tried to get in, they could have forced us to a street fight; but our true line of defence is going out and fighting, and if that be rightly done, no fear of them; let the worst come, you may have an army round by Candahar before they have succeeded in demolishing us. G. B.

Macgregor is a good man; it is not with him the aversion to previous preparation lies. As I was carrying this to the postmaster, I learned the afflicting intelligence that poor Colin *was* with Macnaghten, and is now a prisoner in Cabool. Most deeply do I sympathise with you all and with all his relations. But there is yet hope, and good hope; they have not yet murdered any of the prisoners, nor is it likely they will now do so, for it would defeat their end in saving them at first. In the mean time, their deliverance must be our aim; and if I have hitherto never ceased to urge preparation on our leaders for every emergency, and to make it, as far as concerned me, my efforts shall not slacken now that private affection joins with the sense of duty and the call of honour. Doubly needful is it now that a blow should be struck the moment the reinforcements arrive; and while the disheartening news is still spreading among the enemy, let it be followed up each day by accounts

of a fresh blow inflicted on them. This will spread dismay and disunion among them at Cabool. Should they carry off their hostages, we must follow them wherever they are harboured, be it in Herat or Bokhara.

Think not these are mere opinions founded on feeling. If we mean, among a warlike and hitherto never perfectly subdued people, to avoid incessant rebellions, with all the expense of repressing them, and continually being ready to meet them, it must be by showing them once for all, that much as we have borne, it is not from weakness; that no combination is beyond our power to crush, and that from our power there is no refuge. Nothing but showing beyond all doubt that insurrection is hopeless, will effectually prevent it; but that *will* do so, and now is the time to secure ourselves for the future.

But what are we to say to Pottinger's communications: a retreat on us, to evacuate the country! and this the defender of Herat! the most fortunate man at this moment in Asia! Filling a situation insuring a harvest of glory, a man would part with ten years to have so fair a trial. There must surely be circumstances we know nothing of to bring this on.[7] If they do agree to abandon the country, it will fearfully complicate our evils for a time, for we here are in no way bound by such convention till the Government of India ratifies it, and that of course you will never dream of. Nor can they include us in any convention. A general, not the absolute ruler of a state, can only capitulate for those under his own orders, for the instant he capitulates he ceases to command; abdicates, *ipso facto*, all authority over all not in the same straits as himself. He yields to force; those not subject to that force are not bound to yield to commands he, no longer a free agent, is compelled to give.

But will they not revenge our resistance on the retreating force? They will, perhaps, try to do so, but that breaks *their* truce also, and, united, we can be at them. In any case let us fight to the uttermost to rescue our brethren or make them victorious, but not sell our country as the price of saving them from attack.

What a change from the unvarying glory of the last half century, when such questions are seriously discussed. But all will yet be right, if you and we acquit ourselves like men. We shall soon know of the retreat commencing, if ever they attempt it, for the whole country will rise, and then, come what may, our duty is to prolong the struggle till able to conquer.

[7] When Broadfoot wrote these lines he did not know that Pottinger had to the best of his ability endeavoured to rouse the chief military officers to a sense of duty and of honour—without success.

But younger, or at least more energetic, men must be employed. Seniority will not answer. Brevet rank should remedy the evil. Rank given for service no one can grudge or envy. This brigade has done more than many forces where the brevet has been given; and as I feel injustice done to me, and the public voice before the despatches appeared in print had pointed me out for anything given, I shall ask the General to remedy his injustice; and if he does not, shall send you a statement of the case, to show how matters really stand.

If Pottinger attempts to capitulate and retreat, they will probably inveigle them into the passes and attack them, and heavy indeed would be their loss without cattle, fuel, or food, assailed night and day amidst the snow. Consider that our brigade (mismanaged certainly, but will they do better?) lost 250 killed and wounded between Cabool and Gundumuk.

As to Shah Shooja, the partner of the Kafirs, the country will regard his fate with indifference. Pension him liberally, but do not govern through him: either you make him such a cipher that he and his, being the scorn of the country, will hate and thwart us, who make them so; or else, power in his or any other Asiatic hands, so situated, will be exercised alternately with feebleness and tyranny, but always clumsily, odiously to the people, and expensively to us. Nor is there any breach of faith in this. We set up the Shah at our own charge that he might keep Afghanistan friendly to us, but he cannot perform his part of the contract; he cannot hold it for himself; and the same necessity of self-preservation that justified our sweeping away the *de facto* rulers to make room for this experiment, justifies us in resorting to other means when these fail. Especially as the Shah could not fail to be an enormous gainer compared with what he was at Loodhiana. Our choice rests between this course and re-enacting, without the same excuse of novelty of situation, the Carnatic history of Chunda Sahib and Mahomed Ali and Wala Jah down to the forced abdications of Lord Wellesley's administrations. Clamour of injustice there will be in either case: in the one, once for all, and a drain on our finances permanently limited, and brought under our own control; in the other, for a generation or two, with the accompaniments all that time of misgovernment and its results, discontent, revolt, and waste of our resources.

Now this is pretty well from me to a member of Government; but a report is just in that the enemy are gathering again at Balabagh; likely enough; we shall probably have hard work before you read this, and some, if not many of us, be for ever at rest, and none more likely than myself, for my escape hitherto has gone

beyond the chances, for though forgotten in the despatches, no fear of our being omitted in the hour of danger. So be it. But if angry at my presumption, be appeased by the reflection that the offence may never be repeated. Should this happen, the truth will then out, and what little bubble of reputation I ought to have will be accorded to me dead, and I trust please my friends, and in time soothe my heartbroken relations at home, for such this fatal 2nd of November must have made them. . . .

If I fall, pray inquire as to the services of the Sappers, and do not forget my two officers Orr and Cunningham, and two sergeants Kelly and Bruen. They have done good service to their country, and do not forget the corps at large. But, to turn before parting to something better, give my kindest regards to all your circle, and say I fully expect yet to take the place in it once more I so greatly valued, and should it be minus an arm or a leg, the ladies will have pity on the *pauvre estropié*. And Colin, too, I mean to bring with me.

Believe me &c.

G. BROADFOOT.

Extracts from Capt. Broadfoot's diary are now continued; they serve to show much that was passing in his mind, and illustrate some of the difficulties with which he had to contend. The continued exposure to the glare of the sun had brought on severe inflammation in one of his eyes, and the hard work and bad food seem to have made his general state of health unsatisfactory. He had urged that plans of operations in case of certain eventualities should be prepared, and that officers should be made familiar with them, so that when the time came no delay in taking action might occur. But this, like much else which he urged, though wise and prudent, was opposed.

Recommended once more that a plan should be fixed. Macgregor objects the uncertainty of events. True, but let us fix with reference to probable or even to all conceivable issues, and see what answers in all cases, and be ready to execute that at once when reinforcements come.

January 7.—Bastion finished before breakfast. Some grasscutters destroyed by the enemy near Khoosh Goombuz; our cavalry pursued them in vain. Hindoo merchant has sulphur at Killa e Bukhtan on this side of Chahar bagh. Urged Macgregor to get the General to let me take out a detachment to bring in that, and Macgregor suggested forage also. An excellent hint, but the General told Macgregor that

he did not want powder! but would see about forage. Nothing has been done—deplorable imbecility! exposing us to the contempt of the country, and encouraging [our enemies].

I had arranged to get materials for gabions, but the native [who was to go out and collect them] wanted a guard. On asking for it the General could not see the use of gabions! I said in case of going out to attack these forts in the neighbourhood they would be required for batteries. He did not see the use of batteries. I told him he would not get his artillery to do much without them, and on his denying this mentioned Abbott's refusing to continue firing at Tezeen under a musketry fire. He denied this! I reaffirmed and said it was this that made me attack the fort. He denied my attack, and said Col. Dennie and the 13th took it. I told him they did not; and that the Sappers alone did so. He said then it made very little resistance, and was open! I said the resistance was little, but I had to force an entrance, and blow off the bolt of the wicket to get in. He seemed ashamed, and thought, I fancy, of his despatch.

He has also prohibited the removal of the huts on the ramparts, declaring them useful as the men are on their posts! forgetting that so much parapet is lost and the rampart rendered impassable except by narrow doors through huts encumbered by bedding &c.

Wrote to Thoby Prinsep.

Macgregor doubtful, I grieve to find, about holding out.

January 9.—Three Achikzye horsemen brought in a peremptory order from Gen. Elphinstone to Gen. Sale to quit Jelalabad for Peshawur. The order was 'to be delivered by the new Governor.'

Answer: that it is of an old date, and not delivered by the person named; and as Mahomed Acbar Khan's proclamations are about, calling on the people here to attack us, what security have we that we shall have a safe passage to Peshawur?

In the mean time the reinforcements are at Jumrood, and rumoured to be farther on.

Our duty in every case is clear—to stand fast to the last, unless our Government resolve to abandon the contest, an unlikely contingency.

Wrote a few lines to Malcolmson and Thoby Prinsep. Hear Colin Mackenzie and the others are released; I fervently trust it is true.

Referring to the refusal to obey Elphinstone's order, Broadfoot wrote to Malcolmson:

. . . The General declines acting till further advices are received. This is all right, but the trying time will be when the force (if ever)

comes down.[8] We must then encourage the old General by every means to hold out, for this place is more defensible now against Afghans than many places held out against better troops for very long periods at the earlier epochs of our Indian history. I for one protest against yielding; but I must close.

In a postscript he complained about the omission in despatches of mention of the Sappers, and said he was about to address a remonstrance to Sale.

They are the only corps omitted, and I the only commanding officer, and you may print if you like that they have been scandalously used in burking their exploits and even ascribing what they did to others, as the capture of a fort at Tezeen.

January 10.—Eyes too much inflamed to write. News from Cabool of the 4th. Lawrence writes for Pottinger, and such a letter! contradictory and absurd. Sturt writes the General—the King's party looking up unaided by us—and we! I blush to think of it—such terms as we have made.[9]

Attempts made to corrupt our men reported to me by themselves, hitherto unsuccessful; but not so, I fear, with the Juzailchees.

At this very critical period a part of Capt. Broadfoot's diary has been lost. From January 10 to February 1 the leaves have disappeared, and all endeavour to trace them has been fruitless. When Major Broadfoot was killed in 1845, the diary was in the hands of the late Sir H. Havelock, who sent it to Broadfoot's successor in office, Sir H. Lawrence, from whom it was received some years after by Major Broadfoot's family without the pages referred to.

On January 12, Backhouse recommended that the camp followers should be armed to increase the number of available defenders; and on the 13th, Dr. Brydon, severely wounded and clinging to an exhausted pony, was seen from the walls and brought in. He was, with the exception of the prisoners and hostages in Akbar Khan's power, the sole survivor of the unfortunate Kabul army.

His dreadful story still further depressed the Jalalabad garrison, already in sufficiently low spirits. But they hoped much from Wild's force at Peshawar. These hopes were not

[8] Refers to the Kabul force.

[9] These remarks refer to the news from Kabul and the terms under which Kabul was evacuated.

shared by Broadfoot; he divined correctly the probable failure of assistance from that source, and on learning the destruction of the Kabul force, he, as garrison engineer, laid the facts regarding the state of Jalalabad before Major-Gen. Sir R. Sale, and pointed out that unless he were prepared to hold the place to the last extremity, he should retreat that night, and fight his way out of the country. A plan of operations was prepared; the retreat was to be conducted as a military measure without convention or agreement with the enemy. But Sale, believing in Wild's assistance, decided to remain, and wrote to the Commander-in-Chief that he had resolved on the most determined defence of the place, relying on the promise of early relief, the necessity for which he again strongly urged.[1]

Wild's brigade failed to penetrate the Khaibar, and Sale, on learning this, seems to have been appalled by a situation which a few days before he declined to contemplate.

With the assistance of Capt. Macgregor he devised a scheme for the evacuation of Jalalabad under a convention with the Afghans, and on January 26, 1842, he summoned a council of war to listen to and approve of proposals in which the honour and safety of the garrison were involved.

Broadfoot, as has been stated, had foreseen the danger, and when confronted with it was differently affected. The following extracts from a letter written on January 25 to Mrs. Bayley show the line of conduct which he considered should be followed before he was aware of the proposals about to be recommended to the council. It should be mentioned that the news of the Kabul disasters appeared to have completely paralysed the Governor-General and Council in Calcutta. Instead of putting forth all their strength and using every resource at their disposal to relieve the Jalalabad garrison, the Government seemed unable or unwilling to give them prompt assistance.

By labours rarely equalled we have given time to the Government to relieve us and retrieve the national fortunes; they have not used the opportunity, but sent battalions instead of armies, and we shall perhaps, nay *probably*, perish. But we shall fall with honour, with the consciousness that history will acquit *us* of failing in our duty, and acknowledge that even though destroyed we have given time for the first dangerous terror to subside,

[1] Major-Gen. Sir R. Sale to Major-Gen. Lumley, January 13, 1841.

and rendered the conquest of this country still possible, though with a difficulty and national effort tenfold greater than if advantage had been vigorously taken of our resistance. Gen. Pollock is approaching, but he has with him two battalions only, and will find but four, defeated and dispirited. If he succeeds (and four battalions would have easily succeeded at first), we may yet hold out here till the army for Cabool arrives; but if he fails (and every obstacle will now be accumulated against him), none of us may live to tell the tale of our fall; but glorious, or at least honourable, rely on it, it will be.

The proceedings and decisions of the council of war, when it first met and afterwards reassembled, are of all the events connected with Sale's brigade the most memorable and important. For in that assembly the question whether to defend the place to extremity and maintain untarnished the honour of their arms, or to negotiate with the enemy for capitulation, was discussed and eventually decided.

The council consisted of Major-Gen. Sir Robert Sale, president, with the following officers as members: Col. Dennie, C.B., 13th L.I.; Col. Monteath, C.B., 35th N.I.; Captains Abbott, Backhouse, and Macgregor, Bengal Artillery, the latter being the Political Officer; Capt. Oldfield, 5th Bengal Cavalry; and Capt. Broadfoot, of Broadfoot's Sappers, garrison engineer.

Captains Havelock and Wade were present as members of the General's staff, and recorded proceedings; but they had no vote, and consequently could not directly influence the decision. The records connected with the proceedings were in Havelock's charge, and the following correspondence will explain why Capt. Broadfoot thought it necessary to draw up a memorandum on the subject and to obtain Havelock's testimony to its accuracy.

Major Broadfoot to Major Havelock.

Steamer 'Enterprise:' April 10, 1843.

My dear Havelock,—You remember my coming to you in Ferozpore after meeting Macgregor at Maddock's, and your telling me of your having been deprived somewhat suddenly of all the documents regarding our Jellalabad parliaments. I then, I think, told you I should draw out a sketch of what I remembered of them, and leave copies with my friends. Well, the night of my departure from Delhi, I wrote one in great haste and left it with Durand, together with what was more trustworthy, as not liable to errors of memory,

viz. such copies of documents as I had preserved. Now, in the former there was the trace of the ludicrous portion of the debates, and of what was worse, too visible; there were also omissions, &c.; so I have, in these respects, amended it, and propose sending you a copy of the amended one, and asking you to apprise Durand and myself if you found any points erroneously stated, distinguishing between what you may merely not remember, and what you know I am mistaken in.

I have not time, however, before gettting out of the river to make another copy for Durand. I therefore send him this with a request that he will forward it to you. Kindly point out to him any errors you may notice; and if you think it worth while, keep a copy of the paper. If you would like copies of the documents I have, you shall have them. Among them is the French letter which made such an impression, and the copy of my own reasons for voting as I did.

Should you have copies of the Persian papers, I wish you would let me have transcripts, though, on second thoughts, your having been recently deprived of them may render it improper in you now to communicate them. You had them as in Gen. Sale's confidence, and are bound by his wish for concealment. I had them as a voting member, and am not so bound; but mind, I nevertheless desire not *publicity*.

I believe I told you it was a note of mine to Malcolmson, written at the time, which made the mere *fact* of councils having assembled known; but I find from Malcolmson it was not.

That note went with the official papers (Macgregor's) by a cossid,[2] who was killed; or, at any rate, never reached. Another man carried a line from me to Mackeson, begging him to give my news to Malcolmson; and in this I mentioned my regret at what I took for granted he knew, our having offered to capitulate; we were then waiting the answer.

I need not tell you this summary is by no means intended as a full account of the councils. Such an account is nearly impossible, as you know, from the heat and irregularity of the debates; two or three discussions going on at the same time occasionally, and the same arguments urged and answered over and over. I have merely endeavoured to give the general scope of the reasonings on both sides and the results. I think the account of the letter actually sent is something near the mark, and that is the main point.

I am going now to an old scene, but to new duties,[3] and have some difficulties to encounter; and I confess to you, I never before entered

[2] *Cossid, ḳāṣid*, courier, messenger.

[3] He had been appointed Commissioner of the Tenasserim Provinces.

on duties with more anxiety or less cheerful anticipation. Save perhaps on first going into Jellalabad, amidst all that you remember; but then there was the stimulus of the enemy at the door. However, now as then, I shall do my best, and for the best.

I am very sorry I was not able to see Mrs. Havelock, but here is the dak-boat, and I must conclude. Let me hear from you; I shall write on this voyage, and despatch it from Maulmain.

Ever &c.

G. BROADFOOT.

P.S.—I have no time to write to Durand. I must send him this for transmission. The pencil marks were for you, but there is no harm in Durand seeing them.

Major Havelock to Major Broadfoot, C.B.

Kussowlee: May 1, 1843.

My dear Broadfoot,—I got some days ago yours of the 10th ult. I have perused carefully your notes on the councils in Jellalabad, and compared them with such memoranda as I have still in my possession. I consider that they contribute a fair and correct statement of that which occurred. There are certainly one or two little incidents mentioned which I either did not observe or have forgotten. I do not recollect Col. Monteath, for instance, having quoted poetry. But I might have been out of the room at the moment, or my attention might have been attracted to something else (for in all jackdaw parliaments such distractions are frequent), or the fact of the gallant Colonel's usual declamation having something of the character of prose upon stilts might have prevented my remarking that he had taken a flight bodily into the poetic region. In every material point your recollections so closely coincide with mine, that I have not thought it necessary to append any remarks to your paper before returning it to Durand. I propose to copy it to-day, and shall be most thankful to you for a transcript of your reasons for your vote, as well as of the French letter, and any other documents which you may have regarding the councils.

I was only yesterday, by a letter from my wife, made aware that you had been at Serampore at all. I share in her regret that she was in Calcutta at the time. John Marshman's numerous avocations have prevented him from sending me a line for, I think, the last two months.

I have to thank you for the copy of the 'Englishman' containing your letter respecting the Koodee Kheil affair.[4] Here, too, my

[4] This refers to the action at Mamu Khel, shortly before Pollock's force marched to Kabul. See pp. 134–152.

recollections generally confirm yours. I did not know, indeed, that the detachment of the 9th had been formally placed at your disposal; but I saw you leading the attack which they made. I think the only man who fell was a grenadier, and, if so, Ogle, who probably was with his company, was your senior; but we know that in helter-skelter *skrimmages* (and the pursuit at Koodee Kheil was eminently such) portions of troops often act under the orders of a forward junior, whilst a senior is carried along with them, inadvertent of the circumstance, or unwilling or unable to rectify the error in the hurry of events. Col. Taylor is an active, very gallant, and intelligent officer, too, but not a man of very clear ideas or sound judgment, and has shown the defects in his character in this instance, by exposing publicly in the columns of a newspaper, the little jealousy excited in his mind by the assertion that you had commanded a part of the Queen's 9th Regiment.

I do not know what kind of difficulties you have to encounter in governing the Tenasserim Provinces, but will guess that they may be those which, in peace or war, my small experience has always shown me to be the most formidable—viz. the selfishness, obstinacy, and imbecility of those who ought to be coadjutors, but whose minds are absorbed, that of each in the pursuit of his own private ends, *et totus in illis*.

Most sincerely do I wish you success, and pray you to believe me, ever &c. H. HAVELOCK.

P.S. *May 5.*—Before despatching this, your kind letter of the 15th reached me, but to it I will reply separately and at the length the generosity of its sentiments merits. H. H.

I have taken a copy of your paper regarding the councils.

Major Havelock to Capt. Durand.

Kussowlee: May 1, 1843.

My dear Durand,—I have read over Broadfoot's memoir regarding the councils of war in Jellalabad, and compared it with such memoranda as I possess. I consider it a faithful account of that which occurred.

As was to be expected, some minor incidents have adhered to his memory which have escaped mine, such as Col. Monteath's quoting poetry and the like; and of course if I were to tell the story I should introduce like personal anecdotes, which he has forgotten, such as the astounding vehemence with which Oldfield exclaimed, 'I for one will fight here to the last drop of my blood, but I plainly declare that I will never be a hostage, and I am surprised anyone should propose such a thing, or think that an Affghan's word is to be taken for any-

thing.' But the account of the debates as given by Broadfoot is so correct that I have thought it unnecessary to attach any remarks to his sketch. Oldfield and Broadfoot were the only two who voted at the first council absolutely against treating to quit the country.

. . . . . .

As to the imputed excesses of our troops in the last campaign, a distinction is to be drawn between the punishment inflicted by authority, such as the destruction of the bazaar and mosque at Cabool, Khuda Baksh Khan's fort at Tezeen, and the conflagration of Istaliff, Lughmanee, Charekar, &c., and the irregularities of the troops and followers arising from a relaxed discipline.

The former in my opinion were far too slight, and ought to have been carried much farther, certainly to the utter destruction of the Bala Hissar, and the devastation of the valley of Logar, Tootoo, and Hissaruk; all the Ghilzie villages near Jugdulluck, and finally Teera, the Khyberee capital. The latter[5] of course ought to have been none at all; the previous provocation considered, they were not great. But a heretic like me can hardly hope to be listened to on this subject, seeing that I hold the ultra, and perhaps irregular, opinion of the expediency of keeping Affghanistan altogether, in the way of complete subjugation, after having once come there.

Kindly forward the accompanying to the Tenasserim governor, and believe me &c. H. HAVELOCK.

Capt. Durand to Major Broadfoot, C.B.

Barrackpore: July 17, 1843.

My dear Broadfoot,—I have long kept these papers with the view of myself taking a copy of them; but finding that this remains as little advanced as on the day I received them from Havelock, I return the documents with his two notes, one to yourself, one to me. The latter you can at your convenience return to me. If you can by a confidential person have a copy made for me of your memorandum, I should be obliged.

We reached this place on the 12th, and on the 13th Lord Ellenborough resumed his seat in Council.

I hope soon to hear good news from your quarter; and send this to the Foreign Office with a request to Thomason that it may be sent with the next Government despatches for Moulmein.

Mr. Bird is continued as Deputy Governor of Bengal. Mr. Maddock is laid up with a troublesome thumb. All else much as usual in this quarter, by no means a favourite one with myself.

Yours sincerely,

H. M. DURAND.

[5] 'The latter:' that is, the irregularities from relaxed discipline.

Broadfoot's memorandum referred to in these letters will be found of great interest. It is printed as nearly as possible as it is written; the original is in his own handwriting, the remarks on the margin are partly in his and partly in Havelock's writing.

COUNCILS OF WAR IN JELLALABAD.

Notes by Major Broadfoot and Remarks by Major Henry Havelock.

Memorandum by Major Broadfoot on the proceedings of the Councils of War.

Here is all I have regarding our councils of war, or at any rate all that was written at the time. The affair happened thus:

Early in January, Capt. Mackeson announced his purpose of dividing Brigadier Wild's force: of course failure was looked for. On the 13th Dr. Brydon came in. To hold Jellalabad now became of great importance, but of as great difficulty. Not expecting help from Peshawur, and not believing Gen. Sale and Capt. Macgregor equal to face a struggle such as might occur; knowing them both also to be in the habit of keeping away the belief in danger, rather than of estimating and preparing for it; I begged Capt. Havelock[a] to lay the case before the General, and tell him, if he found himself unequal to a defence to extremity, he should retreat that night when it was still possible. The General resolved to stand his ground, and the letter to the Commander-in-Chief was written.

The defeat of Col. Wild's force in the Khyber was announced.

A letter from Shah Shoojah was received asking Capt. Macgregor what his intentions were, nothing more.[b]

It ran thus: 'Your people have

[a] Over the Cabool gate, about half an hour after Brydon came in, Holcombe reported the massacre as going on close at hand. I took out some of the Sappers, but was recalled. On coming back I found the gates shut, and the General and all the officers over the Cabool gate; the poor General looking out with a spy-glass Cabool-ward. It was there our conversation took place.—G. B.

I perfectly recollect this.

H. H.

[b] You, I believe, kept a detailed journal, and may re-

Notes and Remarks—cont.

member if there was anything else. G. B.

Nothing of importance. H. H.

[c] In this, or in the one laid before the second council of war, he intimated that if we only supplied him with money, he did not want our troops, but would hold the country—for us. G. B.

All Shah Shooja's private letters spoke much of money, and of his not requiring our troops, but especially that laid before the second council. H. H.

[d] We had previously had all the papers said to bear on the question read to us and laid on the table; but this was kept back. It had been received before Brydon came in. G. B.

Major Broadfoot's Memorandum—cont.

concluded a treaty with us; you are still in Jellalabad; what are your intentions? tell us quickly.' A private letter from the King was full of professions of friendship.[c]

The council of war was called, and assembled at Gen. Sale's quarters.

The General said he had called us to consult on a matter on which Capt. Macgregor and himself were agreed, and which Capt. M. would explain.

Capt. Macgregor then detailed the circumstances we were in as he viewed them: he and Sale saying we had nothing to hope from Government. Capt. Macgregor, moreover, said that, though he reserved his right to do as he pleased, he was willing to hear our opinion as to offers he had from Mahomed Akbar (now in Lughman), to treat for the evacuation of the country and restoration of Dost Mahomed. The excitement in the council of war was great.

I maintained we had no grounds to think the Government had abandoned us, though their measures were weak. Gen. Sale, in the heat of dispute, quoted the terms of the French letter, and Capt. Macgregor denied they were so strong. I insisted[d] on its being produced, when they were found to be as Gen. Sale said. The indignation against the Governor-General (and Government, including the Commander-in-Chief, but chiefly the Governor-General) now went beyond bounds. I tried to urge that a new Governor-General was on his way out, and perhaps in India (we did not know he was coming round the Cape), while the Duke of Wellington was now in

Notes and Remarks—cont.

Major Broadfoot's Memorandum—cont.

office, and a feeble war policy impossible, but in vain; and Col. Dennie and Capt. Abbott took advantage of the vehemence of my language to damage my arguments with those who hesitated.

I therefore proposed adjournment, which was carried. Col. Monteath, as we went out, expressed his concurrence in it being our duty to hold out, and quoted some not inappropriate poetry.

I should have said that after detailing the case, Capt. Macgregor and Gen. Sale informed us that they had resolved to yield and negotiate for a safe retreat. They laid before us a letter they wished our assent to. It was Persian, in reply to Shah Shooja.

As well as I remember, it was as follows: [e]

That we had received H.M.'s letter; that we held Jellalabad and the country only for him; and, of course, if he asked it, we were ready now to go back to India; but, after what had happened, we thought it necessary to propose the following terms:

That we forthwith evacuate Jellalabad and the country.

That we would give four hostages to show our sincerity.

That the King was to send a force to escort us in safety and honour to Peshawur; that is, with our arms, colours, guns, &c.; and that this escort was to be commanded by one of the princes, his sons.

That Mahomed Akbar was to be withdrawn from Ningrahar before we quitted Jellalabad.

That hostages were to be given

[e] My eyes were so inflamed that I could not copy it, though I had all the papers for some days for that purpose. Indeed, I was obliged to employ Cunningham in the English documents. You of course had the originals, but did not Wade get from your mooftee copies of all the Persian letters, including our own as sent to Cabool?

G. B.

Copies, I think, were taken of all or nearly all the Persian papers, and attached with translations to the proceedings of the councils. All these papers I had in my possession, and gave all to Sir R. Sale on our return towards India; I think in camp at Jellalabad.—H. H.

Notes and Remarks—cont.

[f] Not Ghilzie, but Shinwaree, Afreedee, and Mohmund, I think. H. H.

The phraseology of this letter, in the original, was so submissive that on reading it I could not help throwing it from me, and it fell to the ground. I had forgotten this till reminded of it by an Afghan chief (Burukut Khan's brother), who heard it from Capt. Macgregor's mooftee, who was present occasionally, and with other Afghans, at the door of the room adjoining (i.e. Capt. Macgregor's room). I mention it as it made a great *sensation* among the Afghans, as I afterwards heard. G. B.

Major Broadfoot's Memorandum—cont.

us as far as Peshawur, there to be exchanged for our hostages and prisoners in the Afghans' hands.

That these hostages were to be Sooltan Jan, said to be a favourite cousin of Mahomed Akbar; a son of the Nawab Zeman Khan, Barukzye; a son of Ameenoola Khan of Logur; with some [f] (Ghilzye, I think) Shainwaree and Khyberee chiefs.

That we were to be assisted in the matter of supplies and carriage.

At night I visited Capt. Havelock on the affair, and I found that though he thought with me, he disapproved of the warmth of my language. Next morning, therefore, I put all I had to say on paper. Capt. Havelock agreed to every word, and during the subsequent meeting occasionally intimated his adhesion to these views, but he had no vote, though present as one of the General's staff.

When the council met, Col. Dennie and Capt. Abbott employed on their side ridicule, and hints of my judgment being obscured by warmth of feeling. I obtained a hearing, however, for the paper, and argued every point, taking votes first on the propriety of treating at all, and then on some of the details.

At this meeting Col. Monteath avoided me and seemed gloomy; he sat near Capt. Macgregor, who, in a long conversation, completely gained him over. I was now alone, I thought, as to votes, but was surprised in the main point to get that of Capt. Oldfield.

To treat for a surrender on the above terms (one excepted) was carried.

Our giving hostages was not car-

Notes and Remarks—cont.

[g] I do not think it came to a vote. Col. Dennie, I remember, treated the objection as if it were merely from a spirit of opposition, and the general feeling seemed strong against me, save Capt. Backhouse, who seemed to have but one feeling, viz. indignation at our supposed abandonment. G. B.

[h] Their arguments, I think, were that it was useless to ask for them, where we ought, in fact, to give additional hostages, and that our asking for them would only prejudice the present arrangement, which would restore them to us at Peshawur. G. B.

[i] I dare say you remember the plan; you and I were for a time alone, and we talked of it several times. Dennie himself became a convert after some weeks, and held forth on it after his wont. G. B.

I recollect generally, but should like to be reminded of all its details. H. H.

[k] Save in the matter of hostages. You reminded me of his energy in saying he would fight, but *never* be a hostage. G. B.

Major Broadfoot's Memorandum—cont.

ried, though Capt. Macgregor volunteered to go himself as one; he and Gen. Sale contended earnestly for this point.

[g] I objected to showing fear of Mahomed Akbar by asking for his removal; but this was carried against me.

I proposed to demand all our prisoners before going, and used every argument I could. None spoke at first in reply; but at length [h] Gen. Sale and Capt. Macgregor opposed it, and after a sharp discussion between us three my proposal fell to the ground.

I proposed that if the country was to be evacuated, we should do it as a military operation, deceiving the enemy as to our intentions and fighting. Against this was urged our having surrendered our cattle, a measure I had a few days before vehemently opposed. I proposed [i] a plan for still effecting the operation; the details were listened to and no objection made till Col. Dennie observed there was *genius* in the plan, when after a short discussion all thoughts of it were given up.

[k] Capt. Oldfield took little or no part in the debates. Capt. Backhouse seemed only to have the one feeling above mentioned.

I objected to certain Persian phrases in the letter as abject, and they were altered to a certain degree; when, the offer of hostages being omitted, the letter as above given was carried.

Notes and Remarks—cont.

[1] You may remember old Dennie's rather startling doctrine as to *faith* in such matters. G. B.

Quite well.—H. H.

[m] You may remember his pushing this so far that I asked, 'Why then show fear by asking what we are not likely to get?' on which he *backed* a little. G. B.

Major Broadfoot's Memorandum—cont.

After all the votes, on my congratulating them on the figure we should make if a relieving force should arrive just as we were marching out,[1] Col. Dennie protested that in such a case he would not go. I said we would make him, as faith must be kept. This caused merriment as we broke up.

Gen. Sale—or rather Capt. Macgregor, for he was the chief spokesman—argued that we were abandoned by the Government, who would send nothing save Wild's force, which had failed. That we could not hold out much longer—could not retreat—and that the plan now proposed was safe and honourable. Capt. Macgregor so confidently assured us of his belief in Afghan good faith under *this* treaty, that few at last seemed to doubt it.

He said Sir W. Macnaghten had mismanaged in not getting hostages, and that had he done so the Cabool force would have been alive.[m] In fact he said the securities now demanded were so great he feared they would scarcely be given. As to our prisoners, they would be got back when we reached Peshawur. He also said the treaty being opened gave us time to see if Col. Wild made another effort, and its result. But this last argument was not pressed, as we were bound by our offer. Not that we formally agreed to this, but no answer was made to me when I said so.

On the other hand I urged:

The improbability of our entire abandonment by the then Government—its still greater unlikelihood under the new one; and I remember referring to Capt. Mackeson's own ex-

Notes and Remarks—cont.

Major Broadfoot's Memorandum—cont.

pression regarding the French letter, as the result of the first panic only. But Capt. Macgregor opposed all this, and urged in favour of his opinions his experience about men in high places.

I denied our holding the place for Shah Shoojah; and our right to give it up except by order of our Government.

[n] I maintained that we could hold out even till relieved by Candahar, in fact for any time we liked; could colonise if we liked; also that we *could* retreat.

I denied the value of hostages; asked what good Capt. Macgregor's hostages at Tezeen had done us? Capt. Macgregor vehemently denied we had ever received hostages[6] at Tezeen.[o] I mentioned several things to show we had, but as he persisted in his denial, I said I must have been under some extraordinary delusion, and that of course any argument founded on it must fall to the ground. But I still held hostages utterly worthless while the enemy had our hostages and prisoners in their hands. I asked, what would they do if attacked? Gen. Sale said, 'Fight.' I asked, 'Why invite all Afghanistan round you before fighting?' In answer to another question the General said he would execute a hostage if we were attacked. I asked if he would do this if the enemy before our faces hanged two ladies for every man we put to death.

[n] Do you remember the discussion on this point, and old Dennie's exclamation, which caused the discussion to end in my being cried down? I spoke of uniting vigour with moderation. D. called out, 'Oh, yes, moderation! sacking! &c. None of your moderation! bring the whole country on us!' referring to one of the measures talked of in discussing the mode of retreat. And the old man got up and walked about in agitation. G. B.

[o] Hostages were announced in Gen. Sale's orders and reported to Gen. Elphinstone. I was blamed for opposing one of them in a fight at the time. And afterwards met him in charge of Capt. Mackenzie on his mission to Gen. Pollock, when he reminded me of [my] having nearly killed him when he was a hostage. These are my grounds for still thinking I was right. G. B.

I had urged that we had only a right to save the troops when so doing was more useful to the State than risking their loss, which I denied in our case. I denied also that our service was a mere compact with Government, which failure

[6] See p. 35.

Notes and Remarks—cont.

in the latter to support us cancelled; but maintained it was a duty to our country which we could not decline, however the Government (which I admitted *usually* represented our country) might treat us. In fact the discussions were carried to a depth neither usual nor safe. First principles are not to be safely approached even, save in 'fit company though few.' The notion of DUTY *to country*, however, rather than COMPACT *with the Governor-General in Council*, should be made more familiar to our officers and men. In all these views Capt. Havelock expressed decided concurrence, though otherwise taking no share in the debates.

[p] This was the time of Oldfield's outbreak. G. B.

[q] Gen. Sale, Capt. Macgregor, Capt. Havelock, and myself had before discussed the obedience due to a superior officer no longer a free agent. I held none was due by those themselves free; that a general reduced to capitulate was not a free agent, and only entitled to command those in the same dilemma with himself. The discussion arose from Gen. Sale being ordered by Gen. Elphinstone to surrender Jellalabad.

Major Broadfoot's Memorandum—cont.

Capt. Abbott maintained our right (being abandoned by the Government) to look to our own safety only, and ridiculed what I said to the contrary.

Capt. Abbott said if we did not go, our hostages in Cabool would be put to death. I replied, that any party which chose to kill prisoners could then gain its objects.

As to gaining time, I asked Capt. Macgregor if the enemy would delay one hour his preparations because he was negotiating; or if he would not rather quicken them on learning by this offer to capitulate, that our hearts had failed us. He did not answer, or rather (I believe) he agreed they would not delay—in fact the argument was dropped.

I opposed giving hostages as disgraceful. Col. Monteath said nobody would go.[p] I said I would if ordered. That as long as we were an army I should obey all orders; but once we capitulated, I should consider myself free to act as I pleased at the first shot which should violate the capitulation.[q] [7]

The letter went to Cabool signed by Capt. Macgregor. The debates appearing interminable, it was agreed that each member who chose should record the reasons of his votes.

I wrote mine knowing they would be read when people were calmer, and I added the 7th as I was carrying the paper to Capt. Havelock's office, on hearing officers at a working party talk of Capt. Abbott having spoken of

[7] 'And well would he have acted on the deep resolve of an heroic mind had matters come to such a point.'—*First Afghan War*, p. 398.

Notes and Remarks—cont.

Capt. Havelock alone supported my views; and I am not sure whether he did not wish them to be right rather than feel convinced they were. He would, I imagine, have acted as I would, but more as in an extreme case justifying disobedience than as in one annulling the leader's authority.

Major Broadfoot's Memorandum—cont.

my being mad about the strength of Jellalabad, and not knowing the extent of our *fix*, as it used to be called.

Col. Monteath recorded his reasons; chiefly reliance on the opinion of Capt. Macgregor, Political Agent of Jellalabad.

Capt. Abbott recorded his, including a joke against the opposite views, which he said would no doubt gain us a considerable share of posthumous reputation, but our duty was to preserve the troops, &c. He dwelt also on the uselessness of holding Jellalabad, a place so weak that English troops, with heavy ordnance, would take it in a few hours,[r] and, I think, mentioned the risk to our hostages.

[s] I am not sure whether anyone else recorded his reasons.

Next day the ditch was begun, which greatly raised the men's spirits, depressed by seeing these councils assemble, though ignorant of what passed.

Capt. Backhouse no sooner recovered from his anger against the Governor-General, than he saw what he had done.

A few days after this Lieut. Dawes of the Artillery, who lived at the 35th N.I. mess, mentioned to me remarks of Col. Monteath which he could not comprehend, but which showed me he was returning to his first views.

I now without scruple talked to my

[r] I had in former times thought we clung too closely to Jellalabad, which when we entered it was a source of weakness rather than strength. We were less assailable outside, and might besides have been better employed. But *now* the Cabool force was gone, and Jellalabad our only hold on Northern Afghanistan. To abandon it might have produced a disastrous impression in India, and would have greatly augmented the difficulty of regaining our credit as we did.

[s] Did not old Dennie write?

G. B.

Col. Dennie recorded his reasons in writing. H. H.

Notes and Remarks—cont.

Major Broadfoot's Memorandum—cont.

friends of the council, of plans which were all ready when the answer came from Cabool. These were, that if our terms were accepted, simply and at once, we must evacuate the place, but be ready to fight at whatever disadvantage if faith were broken with us on the way to Peshawur.

But if, as we might expect, the answer was delayed, or evasive, or clogged with conditions or reservations, we were free to do as we pleased.

The answer came in due time, and said: 'If you are sincere in your offers, let all the chief gentlemen put their seals.' [t]

[t] With this also came a long, incoherent, private letter from Shah Shoojah professing friendship, abusing the Barukzyes, and saying our misfortunes arose from neglecting his advice, &c.

A council was called, when Gen. Sale and Capt. Macgregor urged us to affix our seals to the former letter.

I proposed reconsidering the whole matter, as their answering our proposal by a doubt of our sincerity set us free; and I read a draft of a letter telling the Shah that as he and the chiefs had not chosen to answer our proposals even by a *yes* or a *no*, we now referred them to the Governor-General, whose orders alone we would obey.

After hot debates this was rejected as violent. An excellent and most temperate letter proposed by Capt. Backhouse, to the same effect, was also rejected.

Gen. Sale used strong language about our opposition, and high words followed, but we adjourned, and met in good humour an hour after.

Capt. Abbott and Col. Dennie had also come to the conclusion that we should hold out, and the latter, with Col. Monteath, prepared a letter which, though not very clear, was *not* a con-

Notes and Remarks—cont.

[u] Or hoping the day might *not* come. G. B.

Major Broadfoot's Memorandum—cont.

tinuation of the negotiation. This was adopted; Gen. Sale and Capt. Macgregor alone continuing to think capitulation the best course; the former, however, resolving to be guided by the opinion of the council; the latter[u] warning us the day might yet come when we should regret having neglected the chance of such terms as he could now get for us. The messenger was sent back to Cabool.

Next day a letter came from Peshawur telling us every effort would be made to relieve us. The ditch was nearly round the place, and the men in higher health and spirits than they had ever been.

G. BROADFOOT.

Thus was the council of war led, at last, to adopt the more honourable and wiser course—to defend Jalalabad at all hazards—mainly by the exertions and strength of character of George Broadfoot.

The first to support Broadfoot, let it be recorded to the honour of his memory, was Capt. Oldfield. The next was Backhouse; then after an interval there followed Dennie, Monteath, and Abbott; and there were left in the minority, blind apparently to the lessons of the Kabul disaster, Sir R. Sale and Capt. Macgregor.

It may readily be imagined that to the majority of the members of this council of war, all brave and good men, the recollection of their having temporarily agreed to support the proposals laid before them, was anything but agreeable. Naturally they desired, especially after the crisis had passed, to bury the transactions in oblivion; and when that was impossible, to persuade themselves that the reasons advanced by Macgregor as Sale's mouthpiece were sufficient to justify the garrison in acting solely with reference to its own safety.

This was what Broadfoot denied an army or a soldier could ever do without dishonour. 'Safety was to be consulted, but

not safety only; nor ever, except subordinately to the good of our country.'

On this occasion Broadfoot's warmth of language, want of self-restraint, and violence, have been unfavourably criticised; and the paralysing effects of responsibility have been urged in excuse of the proposals laid before the council.

There can be little doubt that when Broadfoot learnt their nature, his expression of contempt and anger was clear and probably violent. But the crisis was one in which moderation of language and calmness of utterance might have failed. When comrades are seen hesitating between duty and disgrace, and capitulation would have involved disgrace and probably destruction, then no language which can arrest them can be too strong, and no action too violent. There are times when it is well to be angry. And Broadfoot's anger served its purpose, for an adjournment became necessary and a day's delay was secured; 'and thus,' wrote Durand, 'for a while he obstructed the rash timidity which threatened to destroy Sale's brigade.'[8]

With reference to the excuse urged, it is sufficient to say that men liable to be paralysed by a sense of responsibility are unfit for supreme command.

The council may be said to have been finally dissolved on February 12. During the interval between its first assembling and final dissolution many events of interest to the garrison occurred. Lieut. Mayne captured 730 sheep and 175 head of cattle; an important capture, for provisions were scarce, and one which enraged the enemy as much as it raised the spirits of the garrison.

At this time Broadfoot's diary is full of references to his constant endeavours, unfortunately without success, to induce Sale to sally forth and bring in forage. The following extracts refer to such matters and others of interest.

A man is said to be in with news that Mackeson is at the mouth of the Khyber treating with the chiefs. I hope not true. There should be no treating till we have force to compel without delay the acceptance of the terms most suitable to us.

Pottinger writes to Macgregor that the continuing to treat with the enemy after the Envoy's murder was against his will, and the

[8] *First Afghan War*, p. 394.

doing of Gen. Elphinstone, urged and supported by Brigadier Shelton.

Abdool Ghuffoor talking again of the country people laying their loss of the cattle to me—the Kafir with the spectacles and red beard who is here as Avitabile is at Peshawur. This is true, I believe—our own Afghans have trumpeted me a good deal, and I shall meet no mercy if I fall into their hands.—Amen! So be it!

The General much annoyed at the poor fugitives of the Cabool force saying Mahomed Acbar Khan's sowars prevented refugees getting in, and that Md. A. K. had ordered the destruction of the Feringees. The General seems indeed convinced of the friendship of the Surdar, at least for the future. . . . He thinks he and Macgregor are getting over him by negotiation. He also is elated by rumours of Gen. Pollock being about to force the pass, and will scarcely listen to plans of defence. He has also positively declared against bringing in forage &c. from Charbagh or any neighbouring village, and said he would never sally by night if we were besieged. Havelock and I have been urging a foray for many weeks. At least I have, and lately Havelock has earnestly joined. We are short of forage, and the neighbouring villages are open or feebly fortified. By going out at 4 A.M. we should be at say Charbagh by daylight. Take 800 infantry, all the cavalry, and six guns. The village is open on one side. Let us bring in all arms, ammunition, and clothing found; also as much grain and forage as our cattle and all the cattle of the village can carry; also all that the inhabitants male and female can carry: setting the men loose to bring in the remainder as a ransom for their females, and if resistance is made, destroy the village. We thus supply to a certain extent, perhaps to a great extent, a pressing want, and repair in some degree the error of giving up the bulk of our cattle to the enemy, while we should break the confidence given them by the disaster of the Cabool force, thus enfeebling beforehand their attacks on us, and inspiriting our own men. The news of such a blow would cause hesitation and discouragement among the tribes opposing Gen. Pollock, and probably cause all, from this side of the Khyber, to return for the defence of their own homes. But the poor General is tied by the fear of retaliation on the captives in Lughman.

I hear Monteath is talking now as if he repented his vote at the council of war. But surely, after voting and leading others to vote for treating, he does not now mean to refuse to abide by the conditions he offered, if the enemy accept them. I for one will be a party to no perfidy; and though I opposed treating at all, yet

being outvoted, and the terms being offered by us, I shall give my voice for abiding by them, disastrous and shameful as I think them, for to violate faith would be worse still.

Monteath broke down sadly there; Macgregor got hold of him, and fear is infectious.

Lance Naik Heera arrived and reported Bygrave alive, and well treated by a chief named Nizamooddeen. He truly says the want of *bundobust*[9] was worse than the snow, and exclaimed to me, 'Ah! sir, if we had had you to make the bundobust you made in the Punjab, we should all have arrived!'

The indignation of our men is deep and universal, and vengeance is their only thought. Their confidence in our ultimate success, too, is unshaken.

Vigorous and skilful measures will yet set all right. May Pollock well support his present character. He has a noble field before him, and much is expected of him. He is of an able family too. I hope to see him a peer, the first of our service since Clive.

A poor wretch, a servant of poor Major Ewart, reached the nearest villages, and was then cut down and left for dead, but crawled in.

Shall we never strike a blow to make these men respect us?

[9] *Band-o-bast*: arrangement, plan, method, or settlement.

CHAPTER IV.

1842.

Defence continued—Major-Gen. Pollock—Earthquake at Jalalabad—Arrival in India of Lord Ellenborough—His correspondence and policy—His endeavours to restore confidence—Defence continued, Sale's 'after orders'—Skirmish, March 24, Broadfoot severely wounded—Forage parties—Extracts from Backhouse's diary—Action, April 7, described by Backhouse—Siege raised: arrival of Pollock's force—Governor-General's orders, 'That illustrious garrison'—Lord Ellenborough to George Broadfoot—Letter to Malcolmson, recapitulation of events—Afghan cruelty and treachery—Governor-General's orders on Pollock's arrival—Colin Mackenzie's services—Letter to Mrs. Bayley—Extracts from other letters.

THE events of the siege of Jalalabad from the time when defence to extremity was chosen in preference to capitulation, till near the end of March, will not be recorded in great detail. There was much similarity between one day's work and that of another. Forage parties and working parties were sent out, and somewhat timidly recalled when threatened by the enemy. There were, however, a few events which deserve more prominent mention, first of which was the arrival on February 11 of the news of the birth of the Prince of Wales. It is curious to contrast the length of time occupied by the transit of the news from London, over three months, with that which would now suffice. Now, such news would be known in Peshawar on the same day as in London, and in three days instead of three months it would reach Jalalabad.

The next news of importance, received two days later, was that Major-Gen. Pollock had arrived in Peshawar to command the force which was destined for the relief of the garrison.

Pollock was the third officer nominated for this command; the other two had been Sir Edmund Williams and Major-Gen. Lumley.

The Governor-General expressed his satisfaction with the selection of Pollock, and declared his intention to invest

him with controlling political authority. Major-Gen. Pollock had seen service in Lake's campaigns at Dig and Bhartpur (1804–5); in 1824 he commanded the Artillery with credit in the first Burmese war. His reputation was that of a safe and cautious officer, who, if not in the first rank as a commander, would not at any rate repeat the errors committed by Elphinstone and Shelton. He was justly credited with correct knowledge and appreciation of the native soldier, on whom the success of his expedition must greatly depend. The orders he received were such as to limit his operations to the relief and withdrawal of the garrison from Jalalabad. When he reached Peshawar he found an enormous proportion of Wild's force in hospital, suffering from the most dangerous and infectious of all maladies, demoralisation. The officers too, it is grievous to record, were disheartened and hopeless. The new commander, with judgment and skill deserving of the highest praise, successfully combated this deplorable state of affairs, and overcame the reluctance of his force to enter the Khaibar. In this work he was ably assisted by Capt. Henry Lawrence, who had been sent to Peshawar by Mr. Clerk to facilitate Sikh co-operation.

The next event—and it might have been disastrous—was the severe earthquake, on February 19, by which 'in one moment the labours of three months were in a great measure destroyed.

'No time, however, was lost: the shocks had scarcely ceased, when the whole garrison was told off into working parties, and before night'[1] the fortifications were substantially repaired. Broadfoot was on the works when the catastrophe happened; he turned to a friend beside him, and said, 'Now is the time for Akbar.' His first thought was of the opportunity afforded to the enemy.

Havelock was sitting beside Sale writing a letter for him: they had just time to escape from the house when it fell in ruins.

Backhouse has recorded his impressions: 'For more than a minute the earth rolled like the waves of the sea; with difficulty one could keep his legs on level ground. Most of us expected the earth would open and swallow us. I affirm that

[1] Capt. G. Broadfoot's report.

this was my own and the general expectation; and more, it struck me that the end of the world was at hand. The idea was of course momentary; it passed; never shall I forget it.'[2]

Another important event which occurred at this time was the arrival of Lord Ellenborough in Calcutta, and the departure of Lord Auckland. The new Governor-General arrived and assumed office on February 28, 1842, at a crisis till then unparalleled in the history of India. His predecessor's policy, that of the Whig Government which had appointed him, was one of intervention in Afghanistan in order to insure greater safety to British interests in India from exterior aggression. Errors of administration, civil and military, had resulted in the Kabul disasters and the paralysis of British power and influence throughout Afghanistan. At this juncture a Tory Government displaced the Whigs, and Lord Ellenborough was selected to succeed Lord Auckland.

His previous career had proved him to be hardworking, able, and conscientious in the discharge of his duties; and as President of the Board of Control, he had acquired some special knowledge of India. Though a Tory, he was an ardent and thorough reformer; and like others of that class he thereby incurred the hostility of the idle and inefficient. In addition to these, the preponderating class of respectable mediocrity viewed all Lord Ellenborough's measures with suspicion and dislike. They granted him talent, but denied that he had principle or stability. His more vicious enemies have not scrupled to charge him with every possible offence, and to deny him a single redeeming quality.

One thing clear to any soldier who has had the privilege of reading his letters on military subjects is, that he had a grasp of every professional detail which would have been highly creditable to one trained in the army, and which in his case was extraordinary. His letters to the Commander-in-Chief and to Major-Generals Pollock and Nott contain ample evidence of this; whilst their correspondence with him, the letters addressed to him by the Marquis of Wellesley and the Duke of Wellington himself, bear high testimony to his military knowledge and capacity.

It is not intended, nor would this be the proper place, to

[2] Backhouse's diary.

enter fully into the merits and demerits of Lord Ellenborough's administration. As a principal actor in the scene, he must appear often in these pages; facts will be stated as far as they are known and relevant, and letters and despatches quoted. The deductions made from them can be tested by the capacity and knowledge of the reader.

It had been Lord Auckland's custom to correspond privately with almost every person in India who held an important position. He thus got separate opinions, which, being in a sense private though entirely on public affairs, were expressed with a freedom not admissible in official letters. This practice was continued by Lord Ellenborough, who in addition kept up a voluminous correspondence with many statesmen and men of note in England, and with many foreign diplomatists.

On assuming charge of his office, Lord Ellenborough found the Government totally demoralised by the news from Afghanistan. He found letters arriving constantly from the chief officers under him, some recommending one course of action, others another. Mr. T. C. Robertson urged him to leave Calcutta forthwith, and come nearer the scenes of action, where he could see passing events without 'the mists that ever seem to obscure the vision of those who look at the affairs of India through the medium of the Calcutta official atmosphere.' His Lordship was also recommended to bring none in his train, in situations of influence, who were in any way committed to the policy 'of which we are now reaping the fruits.' Mr. Robertson proposed a simultaneous advance from Kandahar and Peshawar on Kabul in order to obliterate the traces of the recent disaster. Mr. Clerk held the same view and advocated similar measures; when these had been effected, he considered that we might withdraw from Afghanistan with dignity and undiminished honour.[3]

Sir Jasper Nicolls, the Commander-in-Chief, on the other hand, expressed a strong opinion against the reoccupation of Kabul. These views had to be considered by the Governor-General, by whom a line of policy had to be declared and adopted.

On March 15, after a fortnight's experience and study, a brief period considering the issues involved, the opinions held

[3] Commander-in-Chief to the Government of India, January 24, 1842.

by the Governor-General in Council as to the measures to be pursued in Afghanistan were declared.[4]

First: 'the possession of Afghanistan, could we recover it, would be a source of weakness rather than of strength in resisting the invasion of any army from the west; and, therefore, that the ground upon which the policy of the advance of our troops to that country mainly rested has altogether ceased to exist.'

Second: the conduct of Shah Shuja was doubtful, and not such as to compel the British Government, alone, to maintain the tripartite treaty.

Third: that military considerations alone must guide the course to be taken with the view of relieving our men in Afghanistan, and of re-establishing our military reputation.

Lastly: the falseness and danger of the position of our troops in Afghanistan were recognised.

It was pointed out to be erroneous 'to suppose that a forward position in Upper Afghanistan would have the effect of controlling the Sikhs,' or in Lower Afghanistan the Biluchis and Sindians.

That which will really and will alone control the Sikhs, the Biluchis, and the Sindians, and all other nations beyond and within the Indus, is the knowledge that we possess an army, perfect in its equipment, possessed of all the means of movement, and so secure in its communications with the country from which its supplies and its reinforcements are drawn, as to be able at any time to act with vigour and effect against any enemy.

In war, reputation is strength; but reputation is lost by the rash exposure of the most gallant troops under circumstances which render defeat more probable than victory; and a succession of reverses will dishearten any soldiers, and, most of all, those whose courage and devotion have been mainly the result of their confidence that they were always led to certain success.

All unnecessary risk was, therefore, to be avoided; but the object of inflicting signal punishment on the Afghans was deemed sufficient to justify some risk, care being taken to insure success.

The advantages of entering Kabul prior to retiring from

[4] Governor-General to the Commander-in-Chief, March 15, 1842. The policy was also announced to Nott, Pollock, and Clerk.

the country were recognised, as also the fact that Gen. Pollock, not being then strong enough to force and keep the Khaibar without the first reserve brigade, could not be permitted to occupy an advanced position beyond the pass. The despatch is an admirable one, and leaves nothing to be desired, if the propriety of a policy of withdrawal from Afghanistan be conceded. Considering that the Punjab was independent, and liable any day to be actively hostile, it would seem that the only alternative to withdrawal was the conquest of the Sikhs and annexation of their country, a measure absolutely out of the question at that moment.

The native army was then greatly demoralised, and the reputation of the English as invincible was lost. Lord Ellenborough's early endeavours were to restore confidence and to encourage the troops. To this task he devoted himself with characteristic energy.

Necessarily ignorant of the abilities and character of his generals in the field, Pollock and Nott, he endeavoured by inquiry, by correspondence with them, and by noting their actions, to ascertain how far he might safely trust them in the very responsible positions they occupied.

And now to return to Jalalabad: it does not appear that during the early part of March 1842 the duties performed by Broadfoot's Sappers were in any way exceptional; nevertheless on the 11th Gen. Sale, enlightened, it may be hoped, as to the injustice he had done them in despatches, issued the following 'after orders:'

The Major-General, having had reason to believe, from the nature of the information given to him yesterday, that the enemy was attempting to drive a mine under some part of our northern defences, considered it to be expedient to order a sally to be made, to ascertain this point, and to destroy any works that might have been commenced.

He was fully satisfied with the manner in which the details placed under the command of Lieut.-Col. Dennie performed that duty.

It fell to the lot of the detachment of the corps of Sappers under Capt. Broadfoot to be the most actively and closely engaged with the enemy on this occasion; and these troops, under their commander, fully maintained the character for boldness, and steadiness under fire, which they have fully merited from the commencement of the operations of this force in the pass of Khoord Cabool.

Everywhere, and at all times, in the judgment of the Major-General, they have done the duty both of useful sappers and valuable light infantry soldiers; and never has their conduct in the latter capacity been more creditable than this morning.

The skirmishers of the detachment of the 35th N.I. and as many of the 13th as were thus employed were equally worthy of commendation.

Broadfoot remarked on this:

Lieut. Orr, Lieut. Cunningham, and the two sergeants very conspicuous. We were much in advance of the 13th and 35th, and on the force retiring, were in close action. The other two corps did not wait for us, and we were charged by the cavalry as soon as the 13th and 35th disappeared. We repulsed them, and retired over bad ground followed by their whole force, which we had to repel. The above officers and non-commissioned officers were most useful, and showed the greatest coolness and bravery.

Sale's tribute to the services of the Sappers and of their commander is in its way sufficiently handsome. For the benefit of non-military readers, it is proper to explain that orders of this kind are not forwarded to Government nor made known to the public. The injury, therefore, done to Broadfoot and his corps by omitting to mention their services in despatches, was a public injury likely to affect him in his public capacity; the amende here made was solely an acknowledgment of Sale's error, not a public correction of it.

The skirmishing on March 24 was on a larger scale than usual; and as on this occasion Broadfoot was severely wounded, and as the references to the subject in his letters are brief, the following description is borrowed from Backhouse's journal.

Forage parties attacked this morning on the river side. . . . At the west wall the action between our parties there and the enemy in the ravines was closer and warmer. One of the 13th and two of the Sappers were killed, when they were ordered in.

On seeing our parties retire, the enemy rushed in a body of some hundreds from the ravine, and, under cover of the old bank of the river, up to the post our troops had just quitted, and two of them, sword in hand of course, actually ascended to the top of the bank.

Capt. Broadfoot, who was retiring with his Sappers into the place, seeing this, rushed back followed by his men, and regained his old position, and immediately after ran down the bank, and with two or three men attacked the foremost of the enemy hand to

hand. He cut one down with his sword, while one of the few close to him bayoneted another. The whole body of the enemy immediately turned, *en masse*, in utter confusion, back to the ravine from which they had emerged, while the sapper party pitched in a fire of musketry from the end of the west wall, which they had re-occupied. Broadfoot now ran up the bank to call his men down to charge the flying enemy with the bayonet; but in the act of doing so, most unfortunately received a shot through the hip.

The Sappers, shortly after, were again called in; but the enemy did not attempt a second time to follow them from the ravine.

Capt. Abbott, writing of the same affair, said that on the enemy annoying our covering party, Capt. Broadfoot attacked them, and drove them back with loss. That then they collected in force, and Broadfoot retired towards the old walls, and much skirmishing followed. At length, the Sappers being called in from the walls, the enemy rushed valiantly on their rear. Broadfoot turned with a few men, charged, and killed three with his own hand, driving back the whole body in confusion. He was wounded in the hip; one European and one sapper were killed, and two or three wounded.

Either description shows that the affair was a gallant one, and the wound received was severe.[5]

The occurrence is referred to in the following extract from garrison orders of March 24, 1842:

2. The Major-General regrets extremely that the severe wound received this morning by Capt. Broadfoot, garrison engineer, will deprive him of that officer's valuable services, he hopes but for a short time; and at his request, Lieut. Orr is appointed to perform the duties of that office.

3. The Major-General was highly gratified this morning by the spirited manner in which a detachment of H.M.'s 13th L.I. under Capt. Fenwick, and of the Sappers and Miners under Lieut. Orr, the whole led by Capt. Broadfoot, drove the enemy in confusion

[5] Sir John Campbell Brown, K.C.B., a surgeon who joined Sale's brigade with Capt. H. P. Burn from Gandamak, was standing on the wall watching the skirmish. He suddenly noticed Broadfoot, supported by two men, making his way towards the gates, and sent out a doolee for him. When brought in he was very pale, and his face was bathed with perspiration. His sword, covered with the blood and brains of an adversary, was still in his hand. The doctor looked into the doolee, expecting to be told about the wound; but Broadfoot's first words were, 'Well, Brown, I had no idea a man's head was so soft'!

and with loss from a work attached to the north-western wall, which they had temporarily taken possession of upon our working and foraging parties retiring.

On this Broadfoot remarked:

Lieut. Orr very forward on this occasion. His party immediately supported me, and was hotly engaged.

This caused for a day or two a little more respect on the part of the enemy for our foragers and working parties. But soon the old arrangement prevailed: a dozen or so of Akbar Khan's men drove in our people; or, to be more correct, our people were recalled on the appearance of this formidable body, and scarcity of forage as a natural consequence followed.

Sale gravely discussed how many seers[6] of grass and of grain were required to keep horses and ponies in health. He asserted that grass cut one day was hay three days afterwards, and that 10 lbs. of it were enough for a horse. He preferred useless argument of this kind to the practical measure of sending out a party sufficiently strong to protect the grass cutters and foragers. It is melancholy to contemplate. But it has a humorous side also: witness the following description by Backhouse:

These forage parties are quite farcical; they are either so posted as to afford no protection to the grass cutters, or the grass cutters invariably stray beyond their protection. Then down come a few of the enemy: in run the grass cutters, and the General immediately orders the forage parties to run in also, no matter what their strength may be: and so our troops are, daily, drilled to run before a twentieth part of their own numbers! The enemy, after beating our troops in, then go home to chaff about it; and shortly after, out again go the grass cutters, *without any forage parties at all*, except perhaps half a dozen dismounted troopers, and cut a good day's supply.

The enemy, having gained one victory in the morning over our troops, do not trouble themselves about the grass cutters a second time, but merely send a few footmen to fire long shots at the unfortunate squatters; and there they now sit, some hundreds, in the marshy ground opposite the river gate, while ten or twelve of the enemy are every minute sending a shot amongst them from a distance of about 400 or 500 yards. But blacky moves not: these Hindustanis are capital *sitters* under any circumstances.

[6] A seer is a measure equal to two pounds.

It should, perhaps, be explained for the benefit of the uninitiated, that our black fellow-subjects in the East generally do everything in a way precisely contrary to that which obtains in this country. They usually write from right to left, we from left to right; in speaking of parents they say mother and father, we say father and mother; as a mark of respect they uncover the feet, we uncover the head; when at work, cutting grass for example, they sit down, or squat, in a manner to us unattainable, while in this country the mower or reaper stands.

Just before the end of the month, Backhouse from the walls saw one of his guns, which had fallen into the enemy's hands in the Kabul disaster, paraded by them with pomp and circumstance, and was not allowed to go out and retake it. Full of indignation he went to his tent, 'after witnessing about as disgraceful a sight as it has been, hitherto, my lot as a British officer to behold.'

A large number of Akbar's people were on their way to the Khaibar, and 'one of my former guns (which was lost with the Kabul force) has just been drawn past this place, within three-quarters of a mile, and about 200 of the enemy's horse and foot, who were scattered about, its only protection. In less than twenty minutes the gun might have been in this fort. . . . The General is worse than I have hitherto called him.' And the writer proceeded to supply the omission. Nothing could persuade the General to sally out.

'I much fear that there are a good many other officers, besides the General, who wish to have as little to say to the enemy as possible; amongst them Lieut-Col. Monteath, C.B., appears to be very much against anything like an active defence. . . .' He added that he was glad to be able to say that Col. Dennie was now 'quite on the other tack.'

It will be seen how completely Backhouse had recovered from the state he was in at the first council, when he voted against Broadfoot. Even when Pollock wrote announcing the postponement of his advance to the relief of Jalalabad, and when suspicion was still in his mind that Government did not intend to exert its strength to save them, but to procrastinate 'in the sure and certain hope that time must ultimately floor us all, and that there the matter will end,' he counselled vigour.

'We have only to attack Akbar with vigour to floor him and his altogether, and it is undoubtedly the General's duty to make the attempt now that an opportunity offers itself; most officers in the garrison are of this opinion, and Capt. Havelock has said all he could to the General in favour of it, but in vain.'

This want of vigour emboldened the Afghans so much, that they actually brought their flocks to graze within 600 yards of the walls; a proceeding which at once destroyed the forage and stimulated the appetites of the garrison.

At length the General was persuaded to permit an attempt to capture the sheep: success rewarded the enterprise, 481 sheep were brought in, 'a very pleasing addition to our commissariat resources.'[7] The Afghans were furious, and Akbar swore he would have the sheep back; but, as Backhouse said, he must look sharp about it, as 'the flock is going the way of all flesh pretty fast.'

It is worthy of record, and by no means the sole instance of similar conduct on the part of our native troops, that the 35th N.I. gave up their share of the sheep, 40 in number, to the 13th L.I. because they believed that Europeans required animal food more than they did.

On April 5 and 6 it was reported that Gen. Pollock had attempted to force the Khaibar pass, and had failed.

Akbar Khan, on hearing this, caused a salute to be fired, which induced the officers of the garrison to wait on Gen. Sale and beg that he would lead them at once against the Afghans.

The General opposed the proposal, and raised many objections; words ran high, and the case seemed hopeless, but at last he agreed to make the attempt. The success of the enterprise is well known, and is recorded in a despatch which, though not free from error, is less misleading than others from the same source.

A few extracts from Backhouse's description of the fight will be found of interest. The force was divided into three columns, the centre under Col. Dennie, the left under Col. Monteath, and the right, in the absence of Capt. Broadfoot, wounded, under Capt. Havelock; the whole being commanded by Gen. Sale in person.

Reference to the sketch of Jalalabad and its environs[8]

[7] Extract from garrison order.

[8] P. 47.

will greatly assist the reader in following Backhouse's description.

'All got quickly out and formed in columns, with skirmishers pushed in advance of each column, when "*forward*" was the word for this day. The enemy soon opened a peppering fire on the right column as it passed to the right of the "old patched-up fort," which was the advanced post of the enemy, and occupied by 200 or 300 of their best men. Havelock kept moving and took no notice of this old fort, the plan being' to go straight on to the enemy's camp, and disperse or destroy their horse, their principal strength.

'Gen. Sale, however, who was with the centre column and passing to the left of the "patched-up fort," on getting well peppered, ordered the 13th to carry it, and in the attempt we suffered considerably: in fact, our whole loss was sustained here, and, of course, fell principally on the 13th.'

The guns were sent for, Abbott and Macgregor battering one bastion, Backhouse and Dawes another.

During the delay occasioned by these proceedings, the right column had got ahead, just in advance of 'No. 1 Fort,' and the enemy's horse had collected and some of them had come down upon it. Havelock here halted, formed square, and beat them back. The left column, which was also halted, now became threatened by the enemy's cavalry in force, when Gen. Sale was persuaded to leave the old 'patched-up fort' and push on to the main object.

Then were the Afghans driven before our troops for some three miles into Akbar's camp, where, though they fired a few guns, nothing like a stand was made. As the English came in at one side, Akbar and his followers bolted out at the other.

'Although Gen. Sale did not pursue, the rout of the enemy was complete, and they dispersed in all directions, leaving four guns (all they had), all their tents, with three standards,' and plenty of grain and supplies.

'It is impossible to say what the strength of the enemy might have been; but in all probability they were neither materially above or below 2,000 horse and 1,000 foot. Nor is it possible to say what the enemy suffered in killed, as all those killed at a distance by the guns were, of course, carried off, our steady advance and frequent halts giving them ample time. Not above thirty dead were counted on the field, nine of these being inside the "patched-up fort," where our own loss in killed must have equalled that of the enemy.

'Our only regret is the loss of poor old Col. Dennie, of the 13th,

who fell while gallantly bringing on the regiments to try and get into the "patched-up fort."'

Describing the fighting at this fort, Backhouse continued:

There must have been some strange work going on here, the 13th putting their muskets in through the loopholes, and firing in, while the enemy were in the same manner firing out at them. The rascals inside pulled one of the 13th muskets in, and the 13th in exchange pulled one of theirs out, which proved to be one of the late 44th.[9]

The result of this gallant affair was that the garrison achieved its immediate relief. Akbar retired, carrying with him the prisoners from Lughman, and his army was nowhere to be seen. Backhouse concluded his description by moralising on the state of man, the state of military life, and the value of its honours and rewards as exemplified by the fact that to Sir R. Sale, to his Staff, and to his regiment would fall the chief rewards and glory of the defence of Jalalabad.

Pollock's force arrived on April 16, unopposed save during two days in the Khaibar pass. After great exertion the Sikh troops had been induced to co-operate. There are two entrances to the Khaibar pass, which unite at Ali Masjid; the shorter, seven miles long, called the Shádí Bagiárí route, and the other, fourteen miles long, the Jaba kí route. Pollock selected the shorter, and the other, with a longer exposure to danger, was assigned to our allies. With this arrangement we can have no quarrel; in the general interest of the expedition the harder task was assigned to the Sikhs; but if they cheerfully undertook it and performed it gallantly, we might expect, at least, that the thanks of the General would be tendered to them, and that they would be favourably mentioned in despatches. Far from it, their services were as completely ignored by Pollock as those of Broadfoot's Sappers had been by Sale. Fortunately in both instances the clear sight of the Governor-General detected the omission, and the errors were rectified.

No description of the defence of Jalalabad would be complete without the insertion of Lord Ellenborough's notification which he issued at once on hearing the glad tidings of the

[9] The 44th Regiment was part of the Kabul force recently destroyed.

victory of April 7. In it he applied to the garrison the term 'illustrious,' which it has borne ever since, and which it well deserved. He appealed successfully to the spirit and feelings of the army, and it is not too much to say that the notification in question is a model of what such a document should be, written in such circumstances.

Sir William Casement, the military member of Council in Calcutta, wrote:

'Your Lordship's orders,' of the 21st and 30th April, announcing the victory of the illustrious garrison of Jalalabad, and their consequent rewards, 'will be perused by every soldier throughout India with feelings of pride and gratitude, and will add more to the real strength of the army than would be effected by an augmentation of 10,000 men.'

Sir Herbert Edwardes, long afterwards, remarked on the fine sympathy and truth of the words which revived the spirit of the army.

NOTIFICATION BY THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA.

Benares: April 21, 1842.

The Governor-General feels assured that every subject of the British Government will peruse with the deepest interest and satisfaction the report he now communicates of the entire defeat of the Afghan troops under Mahomed Akbar Khan by the garrison of Jellalabad.

That illustrious garrison, which by its constancy in enduring privation, and by its valour in action, has already obtained for itself the sympathy and respect of every true soldier, has now, sallying forth from its walls, under the command of its gallant leader, Major-Gen. Sir Robert Sale, thoroughly beaten in open field an enemy of more than three times its numbers, taken the standards of their boasted cavalry, destroyed their camp, and recaptured four guns which, under circumstances which can never again occur, had during the last winter fallen into their hands.

The Governor-General cordially congratulates the army upon the return of victory to its ranks.

He is convinced that there, as in all former times, it will be found, while, as at Jellalabad, the European and native troops, mutually supporting each other, and evincing equal discipline and valour, are led into action by officers in whom they justly confide.

The Governor-General directs that the substance of this notifi-

cation, and of Major-Gen. Sir Robert Sale's reports, be carefully made known to all the troops, and that a salute of twenty-one guns be fired at every principal station of the army.

Careful search has been made in voluminous records, public and private, for a clue as to what first brought Broadfoot's services in Jalalabad prominently to Lord Ellenborough's notice. No trace of any interest having been used has been found; and since Sale's earlier despatches, as has been already stated, omitted to mention these services, his Lordship's early recognition of them must be credited partly to the insight into character and quick appreciation of talent which he, in common with other great rulers, possessed to an eminent degree; and partly, in all probability, to the general sympathy with the army which he had always evinced.

The first letter the Governor-General addressed to Broadfoot was on hearing that he had been severely wounded. It is as follows:

Allahabad: April 25, 1842.

Sir,—I heard with great regret of the severe wound you sustained lately in action in Jelalabad. I trust that it will not for any lengthened period prevent your service in the field, where your conduct has been so distinguished upon all occasions. I should be glad to hear from yourself how you are.

If you should be capable of active service, I will endeavour to find some mode of employment for you where your presence will be useful. If you should be, at present, unable to act in the field, I will endeavour to find some employment for you which will not require great bodily action.

I remain, sir, your faithful friend and servant,

ELLENBOROUGH.

This letter, it will readily be acknowledged, is most kind and considerate. It is, moreover, one which would attach the officers of the garrison to Lord Ellenborough and his Government; for they could not fail to rejoice at the evident interest taken in one of themselves. To it Broadfoot replied:

Jelalabad: May 14, 1842.

My Lord,—I had yesterday the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 25th ult., and I beg to assure you that I am not more flattered by so great and unexpected a distinction as your Lordship's approbation so expressed, than I am penetrated by the kindness of your inquiries and offers of protection.

My wound is so nearly healed that I have already in part resumed my duties, and have every reason to hope that in a week or ten days I shall be fit for active service in the field, where it will be my endeavour and my pride to merit your Lordship's favour better than I can pretend to have done hitherto.

With reference to future employment, my ambition is to serve the Government and my country in the way your Lordship may consider me most likely to be useful; and if, in subordination to this, I might express a wish, it would be to serve in the field till the end of the war, whether with the corps I have now the honour to command or otherwise. I have &c.

G. BROADFOOT.

To the Right Honourable Lord Ellenborough.

The following letter, written when suffering from his wound, refers in some measure to events already described. Allusion, it will be observed, is made to correspondence with Colin Mackenzie, then a prisoner at Badiabad. On April 26, Akbar Khan sent him to Jalalabad on parole to negotiate for the release of the prisoners. He returned, unsuccessful, on the 29th.

Jelalabad: April 17, 1842.

My dear Malcolmson,—Yesterday Gen. Pollock's force arrived, and for the first time for several months we received letters, all former communications having been confined to a scrap of paper (on public business) small enough to be concealed in a quill, and this only two or three times a month. We had four months' English news to receive. From you I received your notes of January 15 and 27, and your letter of the 17th; and am merely able to certify under my own hand that I am alive, and would have been well but for a wound received on the 24th ultimo, which is getting better, but still lays me up.

The papers will probably give you more or less accurate accounts of our doings here. At present I cannot; and perhaps by the time I have strength enough, the tale will be too old to tell. There has been some secret history, which will now probably never be known, but which will when we meet I dare say interest you, for we have been in circumstances rare in British armies, or even in modern war, and such as could not fail to try men severely.

Briefly, our history is that our defensive works were far advanced; we were, in fact, secure against such enemies by the middle of February. Then came Mahomed Acbar Khan, who, speedily finding there was little hope of carrying the place by arms, proceeded to

blockade us. On February 19 an earthquake damaged our defences very seriously, and almost destroyed the town. Great labour on the part of the troops soon set matters right. About the end of the month the enemy commenced a system of almost daily attacks on our foragers and working parties, and on the fort itself; each contest of course had its own little history, now hardly worth recording; at all events, I am too weak.

On March 24 they attacked with more than ordinary boldness; but a sortie, commanded by your humble servant, overthrew them in a manner that prevented them ever returning. They say, till then, the more sanguine hoped to take the place, but after that all despaired; but I got a bullet into my body for my pains.

After several days of rest we took the offensive by going and driving in a flock of their sheep, dispersing and killing the guards, who fled. Nothing then occurred till the 7th, when the enemy's camp was attacked, and he fled, leaving guns, tents, and all in our hands.

They heard of Pollock's success in the Khyber, though to us it was reported our troops were defeated. Mahomed Acbar fled early, and carried off the prisoners and hostages from Lughman.

The country is in terror of us. Mahomed Acbar's present abode and intentions are not very well known.

The Shah is murdered, and all in confusion at Cabool. But I must stop. I meant to inclose a letter home, but this will be too early for the mail, and I am much exhausted, you may easily believe.

April 20.—After seven months without pay, my poor fellows are in rags, and their many wants, now we are relieved, have occupied me to exhaustion, and so much so that I could not finish this till now.

It is not certainly known where the poor prisoners were carried after the defeat of the enemy on the 7th. Negotiations were in progress (not very hopeful) for their release, but no intercourse has taken place since Acbar's flight.

I send you a copy of poor Colin's [1] last letter to me. I never had but one before, though the other prisoners wrote often; but they and we were obliged to be very cautious, as all letters were sent open and translated to Mahomed Acbar, by a Delhi College student with him. A letter sent secretly by Pottinger reached this, but the circumstance was discovered (by our despatches being intercepted), and caused severe usage and threats to the poor prisoners. I wrote very cautiously, and spoke very respectfully of Mahomed Acbar; but they took it into their heads I was an obstacle to the attainment of their wishes; and, you will see by Colin's letter, interdicted for a time correspondence with me.

[1] Colin Mackenzie.

We have been quite shocked, in getting newspapers, at the conduct of persons in Peshawur, or the provinces, writing to the papers fabrications that must have caused great misery to the suffering relatives of those who have fallen. People known here to be killed are said to be alive; and Dr. Brydon or a Jelalabad letter coolly quoted as authority. Alas! there is little reason to look for a single European except those known to be in Cabool, and lately in Lughman. Poor Brydon too, whose collectedness in trying circumstances, and whose caution and accuracy of memory, are remarkable, is made to father every sort of contradiction. He is recovered of his wounds, and marched this morning with a detachment to the Khyber.

The affair of the 7th was a very brilliant one: errors there were, but these will always occur. I was of course not there, being then in the early stage of the wound; but my place was admirably filled by a better man, Havelock, who commanded my column. I hope it will be the means of getting him his promotion.

Gen. Pollock's difficulties have been great, from the previous failures and the depression among the troops. It has filled me with shame to hear of the way officers talked there; and I fear this unmanly, nay disgraceful, state of things is not yet at an end; but this has existed in every army even under able leaders. It ruined Sir John Moore, and Wellington's correspondence shows how he had to contend against it. Mismanagement and feeble commanders always produce it. Vigour and success remove it.

Pollock's attack on the Afreedees seems to have been judicious and well executed. At Dakha there was a little mismanagement, but, I believe, *not his*.

I am bedridden, and hardly know what is going on. There are difficulties regarding supplies, and a hesitation apparent, that make me fear a little the want of previous preparation and forethought, as well as of a fixed plan, without which no military enterprise can prosper.

What are all the papers raving about Acbar's humanity and innocence? The Afghans and Acbar are no worse than other nations in the same state of civilisation; but ferocious cruelty and treachery are universal among them. Add to this the Mahomedan religion and the fanatical excitement lately raised, and you will wonder at nothing. Why, what I have seen with my own eyes, and what I know to have occurred, would make quiet people's blood run cold.

I know that Macnaghten's murder was considered by Mahomed Acbar's nearest relations (to one of whom I may, when well and at leisure, or when we meet, introduce you) as a clever and legitimate stratagem. Had poor Macnaghten been in any degree acquainted with mankind, had he even known what Afghans are, he would no

more have gone out as he did, than he would have shot himself. Why, the old grey-bearded men came out with oaths and protestations of pity, and with bread in their hands, to a poor fugitive officer near this, to throw him off his guard, and having succeeded in doing so, with a knife ripped up his belly as he was patting the man on his shoulder. Now this they look upon as an act of piety and cleverness. 'You do not know how to make war,' said a Barukzye chief to me. 'You take a place, and spare the people: nay, give rewards to your enemies (too true of Macnaghten), when you should invite the heads to meet you, and seize and kill them, and then take the place—kill every man and old woman, have the women ravished, and the boys and girls given to the troops. Then all the neighbouring places are afraid, and submit. That was how Dost Mahomed conquered the Kohistan; but he was a wise man till the Kuzzilbashes ruined him'! This was a very superior man, and a very near relation of the Dost; a first cousin, son of Futeh Khan's elder brother, *by the same mother*, a very different relationship here from brotherhood only by the father.

But I must stop; my strength fails, and the inflammation of the eyes threatens to return.

I have only had one interview with Gen. Pollock; he was kind and frank. My impression was, that he is much above anything we have yet seen in this country. What he has done has been well done, though difficult; but it still remains to be seen whether he is quite equal to the very arduous task before him. I trust and hope he is; and if so, and *if Government do their duty*, all will be well.

You mention a note inclosed in yours from your chief secretary; but it came not. I have heard of him.

You will observe the religious tone of Colin's letter.[2] It is not more so than his letters and conversation on all occasions. He has been very religious for several years, and ever since his wife's death.

Write to yours ever affectionately,

G. BROADFOOT.

I trust all yours are well at home.

The wound is low in the right side, through the top of the hip bone into the abdomen; ball cut out between navel and groin; a very narrow escape. Send my news on at once to Gen. Cullen, and say to-morrow I begin, but it may take me days to finish, letters both to him and Lord Elphinstone. From the latter I have a most kind letter. The unfortunate General, his relation, will now be made the scapegoat of all. His error (being bedridden) was not resigning the command in name as well as in reality.

[2] The letter is not reproduced for want of space.

Too weak to copy Colin's note: to-morrow you shall have both that and his former one. Yours ever, G. B.

You say many about you were interested for me. Thank all most kindly. I know not how it is, I feel every kindness still most sensibly, and yet seem to myself, since William's death, utterly seared and burnt up in the heart. The future is joyless.

Broadfoot's letters at this time are naturally full of references to the prisoners. In one to Mr. Loch, after mentioning that two lakhs of rupees had been offered, and three lakhs (30,000*l.*) would be given if necessary for their release, he remarked: 'A little more vigour in our military arrangements would secure their release better than treating with such men.' This view was shared by Lord Ellenborough, who has been, it is believed unjustly, accused of indifference to their fate.

Broadfoot never omitted a fair opportunity of recording his appreciation of the services of his subalterns; in the letter just cited, he wrote:

Young Orr is my adjutant, and a most gallant and intelligent soldier. Another officer with me is a son of Allan Cunningham the poet; and two braver or more promising officers are not in the service. If I lost them, this force, large as it is, could not replace them (excepting one young officer, Lieut. Mayne, of the Quartermaster-General's Department).

On hearing of Pollock's arrival at Jalalabad, Lord Ellenborough published a general order announcing the fact, and directing the issue of a medal to the garrison. The following extracts have special interest as showing his clear perception of the nature and value of Pollock's services, and of those rendered by the garrison.

Allahabad: April 30, 1842.

The Governor-General has received a report from Major-Gen. Pollock, C.B., dated the 16th instant, announcing his arrival at Jellalabad.

The Major-General has thus carried into effect the orders of the Government in a manner which entitles him to the highest approbation.

Receiving the command of the army at Peshawur under circumstances of peculiar difficulty, he has, in the midst of new and unfore-

seen embarrassments and disappointments, preserved a firm mind, and, justly relying upon his own judgment, he has at last, with equal discretion and decision, accomplished the object he was directed to effect.

The Governor-General requests Major-Gen. Pollock to accept his acknowledgments of the good service he has thus rendered to the Government of India, and begs he will communicate to the gallant officers and troops under his command the entire satisfaction with which their conduct has been regarded on this occasion.

The Governor-General has already, in communicating the despatch from Major-Gen. Sir Robert Sale, K.C.B., dated the 7th instant, expressed his high sense of the services of that officer, and of the garrison of Jellalabad, terminating on that day by a decisive victory, which would have left nothing to desire had Col. Dennie survived to enjoy it.

The garrison of Jellalabad having on that day achieved its safety by its own prowess, and being now reunited to the army by the movements of the force under the command of Major-Gen. Pollock, C.B., it remains only for the Governor-General to testify his opinion of the just claims of that garrison to the gratitude of the Government and of their country.

. . . . . .

The Governor-General, taking into consideration the many great privations to which the troops composing the garrison of Jellalabad were exposed during the blockade of that place, and the noble fortitude with which all such privations were borne, as well as the various losses the troops sustained, is pleased to direct that a donation of six months' batta be made to all the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, European and native, who composed the garrison of Jellalabad on April 7, 1842.

One or two opinions of distinguished soldiers on Lord Ellenborough's notifications and general orders have already been quoted: the impression they made on Broadfoot may be gathered from the following extract from a letter dated May 16, 1842, to Dr. Malcolmson:

Have you seen Lord Ellenborough's order? Its effect has been extraordinary. When such is seen to be the head, the miserable grumblings we have had will quickly cease. There is great discrimination in praising Pollock. This is of the Wellesley school, and will soon raise the tone of the troops to that of the great Marquis's time.

He has even addressed to me a most handsome and kind letter;

which, even not deserving, I confess I felt vain of. I send you a copy, which pass on to Gen. Cullen and home.

Broadfoot next referred to Colin Mackenzie's fruitless mission on behalf of the prisoners, and to his having returned to a captivity which then seemed hopeless, though some of his friends urged that circumstances which had occurred had released him from his parole. 'Poor Colin—most noble Colin—the modern Regulus as Havelock truly styles him, has been in again on his fruitless mission. Heroism such as his may gild even defeats such as ours.'

Of Gen. Elphinstone in the same letter Broadfoot wrote that he was a high-minded, generous, and most unfortunate man. He did not surrender to the Afghans, 'but was entrapped and detained in spite of repeated demands to be sent back that he might perish with his men. He was reduced to mental and bodily imbecility by disease, but never ceased to be a brave and high-spirited soldier.'

In a letter to Mrs. Bayley, dated May 3, 1842, in which the good service performed by Colin Mackenzie at Kabul is detailed, it is mentioned that when Sir W. Macnaghten was murdered, Mackenzie and George Lawrence

were savagely attacked by the multitude, and Colin's life saved only by [the] extraordinary exertions of a chief (Moyunoodeen Khan), who literally risked his own life to save him. This chief has all along been one of the most active and boldest of our enemies both at Cabool and here; but between him and Colin there is a strict alliance. Oddly enough, there is every reason to believe it was this very man who wounded me. He intimated as much to Colin, and gave so minute an account of the transaction that he must have been present. He performed the feat with a double-barrelled gun, the plunder of some unfortunate officer. For his care of Colin, however, I have sent him word that if ever he falls into the hands of the '*Black Kafirs*,' as my men are called, to seek me out, and he shall be saved. . . .

As for me, I am pretty generally known; and, among other designations, rejoice in the title *Tor kalee Feringee*, and *Feringee Siyah posh*, which in Pushtoo and Persian signify 'black-coated Feringee:' this, from a velvet shooting jacket of Colin's which I *borrowed* in Cabool, and, having worn eight months, shall never return.

Regarding Colin there are many conjectures: that he is my brother is certain, but then his being Sir W. Macnaghten's son is

puzzling, seeing that I have no claim to that honour. The graver shake their heads at it, as confirming some strange stories of the domestic manners of the Kafirs, and doubtless conclude our expulsion indispensable to the preservation of Afghan morality from corruption by such examples, as there is little hope of our locking up our ladies as we ought.

Broadfoot's next letter to the same lady is quoted in full:

Jelalabad: May 20, 1842.

My dear Mrs. Bayley,—Last night I had the very great pleasure of receiving your letter of the 29th of April, and though this is our latest day for the overland mail and I have not yet written home, I cannot defer at least thanking you for your kind remembrance of me. Would that it had arrived but a few days earlier! for then poor Colin would have shared my pleasure; but he, alas! is once more among the Afghans, whom, however, barbarous as they are, his heroism and virtue have filled with admiration. I have just been visited by some leading men of the tribes westward of this valley, who spoke of his self-devotion as to them incomprehensible, 'for,' said they, 'he is not deceived, he is a wise man, and knows how Afghans observe treaties; yet he goes back, when he has it in his power to remain in safety.' When Colin was last here, we heard of Mahomed Akbar going to Cabool. Some, whose opinions are of weight, doubted Colin's obligation to return, but he would not listen to this. My own opinion was, though Mahomed Akbar's renewing hostilities showed how little he was sincere, yet that, as he was not bound to abstain from them, Colin was not free to remain; but I did think him entitled to remain till it was known whether the excitement of this new war would render his present escort insufficient to protect his passage, and above all to learn whether the same cause had produced any popular outrage on the other prisoners. Colin agreed, but urged but too truly that delay on his part might provoke these outrages, and he therefore departed.

We have not yet heard of him, but there has hardly been time even if he go only to Tezeen, though he will most likely have to go to Cabool. Anxious about him we cannot but be, yet I know the men with him are desirous to protect him, and I believe them able to do so, for they are relations of the principal chief, near relations, and the esteem they perceive Colin enjoys here has confirmed their opinion, already very high, of his value as a hostage in their hands. These men fought against us all the way from Cabool to Gundumuk, and then, returning to Cabool, fought there till they accompanied Mahomed Akbar to this place. They were a good deal with me, being fond of talking to us of any affairs where they had

chanced to see any officer they remembered, and they one and all spoke of Colin with unfeigned wonder. His defence of his fort and cutting his way after all to cantonments, whose occupants did not dare to go to him, and his brilliant valour to the last, made them doubt his being of the same race as those who, alas! but too often showed differently before them. 'Had he,' said they repeatedly, 'been ruler, the victory would not have been ours,' for they well know who did, and who did not, advocate vigorous measures. They also spoke with reverence of his wisdom; 'for,' said they, 'he speaks as kings and wuzeers cannot speak.'

But I must not forget to ask you to put for him a question to Thoby Prinsep, which, however, I am not sure anyone but Lord Ellenborough can answer; namely, whether, because of the general failure at Cabool, all who served there will be excluded from honours? Exclusion is in such cases very common, and with reason, in general, because disaster is usually owing to mismanagement, and it would not do to reward those who, having brought on a public misfortune, display courage, or even skill, in meeting it. This would almost induce men to get into scrapes in order to be honoured for getting well through them. But in cases where one set of men cause the misfortune, and others diminish its extent, or its disgrace, by their courage or skill, the latter surely should, and I believe usually do, receive their reward. But Colin has, besides the latter merit, a separate claim altogether from the others. On November 2 he was not in the cantonments, nor with Brigadier Shelton, but in a fort in the city. He was attacked—they were not; with them all was indecision, or feeble efforts the defeat of which demoralised the troops—with him a desperate defence (with less than 100 Jezailchees and thirty of my Sappers) for two days, and finally cutting through the enemy a safe passage, not only for his men, but for the *wives and families of my regiment*, who were left at Cabool, [and have] since [been] massacred.

Surely such an action as this will not miss its reward because the large force to which he fought his way failed in following his example. There may be delay for inquiry, but I feel certain that, under Lord Ellenborough, Colin will not, in the end, want the honours he has so nobly merited. He was with me when I received a most kind and flattering letter from Lord Ellenborough, and from it first conceived hopes that he would not be overlooked, and carried back to his fellow-prisoners the belief, which will lighten their captivity, that the new Government is one likely to excite their armies to the effort necessary to their deliverance. Unfortunately he left before Lord E.'s order was received, which would have greatly delighted him, for none felt more than he how bitterly dis-

couragement of the heads had prepared the Cabool troops to sink into misfortune.

You are, I know, almost angry that I should bore you with all this, which, you will perceive, is for Thoby, who ought to be greatly flattered by having such a channel of correspondence. But you will forgive me when you remember it is at Colin's request. One thing more he asked me to say; namely, that had we been able to advance on Cabool before the terror of the enemy had subsided, we should, by this time, have had every prisoner; but that their release is now indefinitely postponed. I will not farther plague you by writing *at* Thoby on this subject; but must say to yourself merely that I do much fear we cannot hope for their deliverance now, on any but terms not to be thought of, till we have renewed the enemy's terror by fresh victories; and these I hope soon to contribute *mon petit possible* to obtain. Easy, with such a force, they will be, and I hope early.

What you tell me of Lord Ellenborough's kind views with regard to me has greatly surprised me, as I cannot think how he could have thought me worthy of so much. I fear you are here not blameless, and all your most kind circle, with Thoby as the organ, in raising an opinion of *pauvre moi* that I shall find it hard to disappoint only moderately. Yet I will not say I am not greatly gratified thereby, as I was by his letter, for it is most kind; and above all, his last order shows not only the hearty understanding and value of their doings that soldiers rejoice at in their rulers, but a discrimination (in praising Gen. Pollock, for example) not of late years usual. I trust, however, the Governor-General will not think of placing me in any situation Bengal officers look on as exclusively their own; for it would bring on him a storm of unpopularity which rather than, in return for such kindness, be the cause of, I would descend, 'unsung, unhonoured, to the grave.' But talking of song, I am all impatience for Mrs. Cameron's letter, of which, pray, in my name, importunately remind her, with her husband's lines on the late action and Col. Dennie's fall. And I too, if I read your letter aright, am thought worthy to be at least alluded to by the Muse. If I be not already the vainest of men, nothing now can keep me from becoming so, for when the thought of my own unworthiness is about to save me, straightway it is expelled by that most irresistible and subtle poison, delicious poison of the soul, praise from beauty's lip or pen, the former being in reserve, I trust, till I bring *brother Colin* to help me to obtain it.

You are right in guessing I was disappointed in not being able to command the third column on the 7th, for such would have been my post, as commanding a regiment; but I was able heartily to

rejoice that my misfortune brought conspicuously forward one of the best officers in the service, Capt. Havelock, of the 13th, who that day, to the public advantage, took my place.

Only one of Thoby's letters has reached me; the other, like my *history*, has gone to enlighten Mahomed Akbar.

Poor Colin saw Miss Impey's death in the paper the evening before he went, and was much affected by it. He will be exceedingly glad to hear what you say of poor Mrs. Mackenzie's getting over the shock, when I can communicate with him, for he expressed much concern regarding this. Give my warmest regards to Bayley, to each of your sisters, and every member of your circle, and believe me, my dear Mrs. Bayley,

Most sincerely yours,

G. BROADFOOT.

I am greatly obliged by your making Capt. Hillier write, and was much pleased on hearing from him. I hope he will be permanently appointed to Lord Ellenborough's staff.

If I do not get an early answer to this, I shall conclude the length of it has frightened you, and that you are even too angry therewith to scold me; so write out of compassion. It is believed here that Mahomed Akbar is in possession of the Bala Hissar at Cabool; the unfortunate royal family being in his hands, or at least they can be so when he chooses, for the titular king is, in fact, a prisoner. They went up from Loodhiana, you perhaps remember, under my charge, and found me so good a *papa* that they occasionally sent me messages afterwards. The last was after I had left Cabool, entreating me to return, and take them back! They will now be reduced to starvation.

The following extract refers to the wound received in the skirmish of March 24:

I did intend to send you a long letter this month; but want of strength still compels me to lie down several times a day, and writing especially fatigues, so that my ordinary business, or rather the unusual press of it, after so long being shut out from the world, is more than I can well accomplish, working too every moment I can. To say the truth, too, I expected to have been more nearly recovered than I am; and therefore wrote some long letters I should certainly have deferred till after yours, had I known what was to be. My wound had healed where the ball entered, and was all but well where it was cut out; but after two days of uneasiness both wounds yesterday opened again; and to-day some threads &c. were extracted, and a splinter of bone is coming. It is now clear that there is much within

that has no business there, and that the haste it cannot help making to heal, is an annoyance; for each splinter of bone and each bit of thread or cloth will reopen it and till all are out, I shall not be quite well. In the mean time, as old Gen. Sale tells me, it is as good as a seton to my liver this hot weather, being on the right side. In spite of it, I daily gain strength; and should there be anything to do, I shall be in my place.

About this time there appeared in a Madras newspaper mention of the council of war and of the vote for treating with the enemy with the view to evacuating Jalalabad, which, now that the success of the defence was assured, it was wished to keep secret. Broadfoot's services and opposition to the vote were mentioned. Broadfoot saw the account, suspected Malcolmson of having furnished it, and was displeased. For Malcolmson wrote to Miss Broadfoot on June 17, 1842:

As there will now probably be no letter from George for this steamer, which sails to-morrow, earlier because of the monsoon, I shall copy his last, except some little mere official details connected with business. You must not, and I do not suppose you would, allow his views to find their way into the papers, as he wrote me in very ill humour last month when inclosing the letter to you and to Miss Sutherland, under the supposition that I had written *a memoir of the exploits of your brother* in one of the Madras papers, which I have never yet seen nor heard of except from himself. His news I always send on to Gen. Cullen as he directs, and the General to Lord Elphinstone, and of course part is caught up and finds its way to the papers. But they cannot keep it a secret if they would. You will see by the papers I send, that George will receive his honours, and no doubt more substantial rewards; for with all the faults of this Government real merit is sought out and made use of for its own sake.

In further explanation of this episode a letter from Dr. Malcolmson to Gen. Cullen of July 18, 1842, is quoted.

I received your letter in due course, and was sorry that I had mentioned the article in the Madras paper *before* I got your letter. I suppose it was our friend Ketchen who mentioned what, however, could not long remain a secret. He had written to me some time before and was most anxious to hear of Broadfoot, and I told him about the council, not thinking it requisite to be so reserved after Mr. Clerk had sent me, in a demi-official way, a copy of a note by Broadfoot fourteen days after he must have received it, from which I inferred that it was no longer a secret.

I have since heard from Broadfoot, vexed because he thought I was, and approving of what I had done. He seemed to have forgotten what he wrote, which was indeed only a few lines, sending on letters to his sisters. His letter of June 11 was written from the fort of a certain Mir Ali Khan, on the side of the river opposite to that on which Jelalabad stands. He says: 'I never seriously thought you imprudently communicative, but being annoyed, let out my spleen on the most intimate friend I have, as a man provoked carries home his ill humour to his wife. What vexed me at the moment was, that the letter being ascribed to me, seemed like boasting on my part, and also that I suspect the council of war has been burked. We had a second council of war afterwards on Shah Shoojah's reply coming down; the panic had ceased by that time among the members, and though the General and Political Agent were still for capitulation, even urgently for it, the opposition carried the day and broke it off. The Shah, by not promptly accepting our first offer to go, gave us an honourable opportunity of backing out; I implored them to deliberate a day, but Gen. Sale was obstinate and bullied; the Political Agent backed him, and we had a very stormy meeting. But the capitulation was got rid of, and the Shah's messenger despatched. Next day came news of the Government and Pollock being determined to relieve us, and great was the consternation of the capitulators.

'There had been no *dawks* to report it at the time, and I have a considerable suspicion the proceedings and my protest, or rather reason for vote, were not sent down in reply to congratulatory letters on the firmness evinced in standing out.

'This being the case, any publication of the matter by me would have made me the object of extreme ill will, which it is difficult to avoid if you do your duty faithfully, impossible if it be known you have chanced to do it when others took a different course. Did I send you any copies of papers about it? I had forgotten the note to Mackeson; I remember I wrote it thinking that of course he must know it from Macgregor.'

The note to Mackeson here referred to was copied by Mr. Clerk and sent to Dr. Malcolmson, who in turn had copies made and sent to Miss Broadfoot. There are evident discrepancies in the dates, but they are of no consequence.

In forwarding the copies in a letter dated December 31, 1842, Dr. Malcolmson remarked:

I do not think that I sent you a copy of his[3] note to Capt. Macke-

[3] Broadfoot's.



REFERENCES.

A. Kabul Gate
B. River Gate
C. Peshawar Gate
D. South Gate

JALALABAD

AND ITS

ENVIRONS

From Sketches by

F. CUNNINGHAM & J. B. BACKHOUSE.

J. Broadfoot Major

John Murray, London.

Ruddiman Johnston & Co., Ld., London

son, Political Agent at Peshawar, written the day of the capitulation of Jelalabad being decided on, and sent to Mr. Clerk, then and now envoy to Lahore, who sent it to me, and also, no doubt, to Mr. T. Prinsep, the member of Council. It will be well to preserve it, as this will one day be matter of history, and will be valuable should ever the matter be questioned, *as it may be*. The original I keep. My own note by the same opportunity came from Gen. Pollock, and was in size three-quarters of an inch by one-quarter. Do not let it get into the papers, however.

You must read the account of the dinner to Major Outram, of whom you will find mention in one of James's letters you read to me in London. He is a noble fellow, and spoke more than once in the warmest terms of James, of his talents and his virtues. He knew William also, and rejoiced in George's honours—or rather deeds.

Mr. G. Clerk, Envoy &c., to Mr. J. G. Malcolmson.

Amritsar: March 2, 1842.

My dear Sir,—As requested by Capt. Broadfoot, I have taken a copy, which I forward to you, of his letter of the 23rd ult. to Capt. Mackeson at Peshawur.

Capt. G. Broadfoot to Capt. Mackeson.

Jelalabad: January 23, 1842.

My dear Sir,—The bearer, Adil Shah, is a Jemadar of the Sappers and Miners, and will recruit for me if he can; he has behaved with great bravery in Cabool under Mackenzie. Pray assist him with money, and debit it to me.

We are, of course, looking your way for help, or we shall have little choice but an honourable death, and inshallah![1] it shall be honourable.

Macgregor will have told you of our council and its results. I was against the whole proceeding, but outvoted, save in a modification of the mischief, viz. *ne pas donner des otages*. Alas! that such matters should be debated among us; however, we shall trust yet to see you here with Gen. Pollock. The Government will avenge our slaughtered brethren before we are added to the number. May I beg you to forward this to T. Prinsep, through Clerk, sending a copy also to Mr. J. G. Malcolmson, of Messrs. Forbes & Co., Bombay? Letters to-day from Lughman. Mackenzie and all well.

[1] In God's name.

CHAPTER V.

1842.

Pollock's army at Jalalabad—Lord Ellenborough and Generals Pollock and Nott—Letter to Mr. Loch: services of Dr. John Forsyth—Besúd expedition—Letter to Mrs. Bayley—The prisoners—Bad equipment of Pollock's force—Colin Mackenzie's services—What led to Sir A. Burnes's murder—Successor to Mr. Hodgson required in Nepál—Letter from Lord Ellenborough—The Kabul disasters—Broadfoot's remarks on Eyre's narrative—Expedition to Fatehabad.

The forces at Jalalabad were delayed there during the summer and part of the autumn, mainly for want of carriage. Originally Pollock's force was intended solely for the relief and withdrawal of its garrison to a position of safety. This arrangement was made whilst Lord Auckland was Governor-General, and was for some time adhered to, and insisted upon, by his successor; who, however, could not refrain from expressing his desire that if possible such a blow might be struck as would restore the prestige of British arms in Afghanistan.

The inefficiency of Pollock's force, and the narrow escape of Kandahar when Gen. Nott went out after the enemy, who eluded him and suddenly assaulted the place, for the time confirmed the Governor-General in his opinion that our forces should be withdrawn at the earliest possible date.

Endeavour has been made by Lord Ellenborough's detractors to make capital out of the conflicting orders sent to Pollock and Nott. The two generals have been represented as anxious to advance, but prevented by the timidity of the Governor-General, and letters have been quoted which appeared to support the allegation. A laborious search has resulted in the discovery of many interesting letters from the Governor-General and the two commanders and others, which show the matter in a somewhat different light. It is to be regretted that want of space, and the desirability of confining the present work to

the scenes in which Capt. Broadfoot played a part, must prevent any extensive quotation from these documents.

What happened may be thus briefly stated. Pollock was authorised to procure carriage, and the Governor-General exerted himself to the utmost to help him. As soon as Lord Ellenborough's confidence in Nott was restored, which was very soon after the Kandahar episode above mentioned, and some progress had been made in the equipment of Pollock's force, he gave Nott the option of withdrawing his division by marching on Kabul, where he would meet Pollock, who would then retire the combined army by the Khaibar route. Correctly anticipating Nott's reply, he wrote to Pollock and intimated his wishes.

It was reported at the time from Kandahar, and the report seems to have been repeated in the Life of Sir George Pollock,[1] that on an occasion of receiving orders for withdrawal, Pollock wrote to Nott advising him to disobey them. Lord Ellenborough noticed the report, but added in a letter to Pollock that he did not believe it. The General replied, 'It is very gratifying to me that you have done me the justice to believe that I could not advise Gen. Nott to disobey orders. Any letters that I have written to Gen. Nott have been confidential; but he is a stranger to me, and, if I am correctly informed, jealous of his command; it is therefore most improbable that I could so far have forgotten myself as to have advised him to act contrary to orders.' To further exculpate himself from such a charge, he sent to the Governor-General copies of all the letters he had written to Nott, and expressed the hope 'that they will be found to contain nothing which could warrant the construction put upon them.'

The only other step taken by the Governor-General which need be mentioned here, was the withdrawal of power from the political agents, and their subordination to the military commanders. Lord Fitzgerald, then President of the Board of Control, in a private letter remarked: 'The Duke is delighted with your having withdrawn power from the political agents, and confided it to the military commanders. He attributes all our late reverses to the interference of civilians, fully as much as to adverse climate or professional incapacity.'

Referring to a recent attempt on the Queen's life, he said:

[1] P. 297.

'It was in every respect a childish affair, but it has naturally excited uneasiness and alarm in the palace; I do not mean in the breast of the Queen: hers is a spirit unconscious of fear for herself, but she is haunted with a notion of danger to her husband and her children.'

During the halt at Jalalabad, Broadfoot wrote many letters and was employed on several small expeditions. A selection from the former and some extracts regarding the latter may be permitted.

The Shah's service was abolished from the date of his death; the immediate result being that the officers in it were all suddenly reduced to half pay, whilst they were still favoured with double work and double expense. Dr. Forsyth, the superintending surgeon, to whose devoted service and attention both officers and men owed much, was in consequence plunged into serious difficulties. Knowing this, Broadfoot wrote to Mr. Loch, and after explaining the circumstances begged that a cadetship might, if possible, be given to Forsyth's son. The letter, it will be conceded, is an admirable one, and its result will hereafter appear.

Jelalabad: June 21, 1842.

My dear Mr. Loch,—I intended to have written you at length on various topics this month; but early in June, I was suddenly ordered with my own corps, a troop of horse, and 200 Native Infantry, to cross the river into the district of Besood, which was threatened by Azeez Khan, our first besieger, and Abdool Ghuffoor Khan, Barukzye, a cousin of the ex-Ameer's, who has figured on both sides in the late transactions. The river is wide and rapid, and our means of crossing it have been strangely neglected. It consequently took me three days to cross my party.

The enemy made off on our approach, and I was ordered to remain to collect supplies, and protect the collection and arrival of the revenue. These duties, and that of rendering a bad position safe, gave me pretty hard work till three or four days back, when I was ordered back to occupy the ground left vacant by a brigade gone to Pesh Bolak, under Brigadier Monteath. It has only, therefore, been to-day I have been able to write, and I have completed the abstract of Lieut. Eyre's narrative as more likely to interest you than anything else, seeing how few are the witnesses left of these transactions.

I had hoped to have sent you an outline of our own operations; but these *extra* duties throw me so much in arrear with my proper

work that I should not have felt quite justified in writing more than the narrative just now, had we not recently been somewhat astonished by learning that the Shah's service is abolished *retrospectively*; that is, from the date of the Shah's death. I cannot but hope there is some mistake in this, and Gen. Pollock, in that hope, has referred the case back to Lord Ellenborough.

This is a heavy inconvenience to us all, who had calculated our expenditure on the faith of its continuance, at least till we quitted Afghanistan; but it has fallen with such ruinous severity on one of the best and most useful men in the force, that it has completed the inclination to do what private gratitude and a sense of duty as commanding the corps had almost before induced me to do, viz. to make known to you Dr. John Forsyth, our surgeon in the Sappers, and late superintending surgeon of the Shah's force; and, though I know I have the very reverse of any title to use so great a freedom, to recommend to your patronage, provided it should be otherwise disengaged, his eldest son, who, if like his father, will never discredit it.

Dr. Forsyth is an officer of long standing and high character, but of little or no private interest. A sense of the strength of his claims on public grounds obtained him, however, from Lord Auckland's Government the appointment of superintending surgeon of the Shah's force; and he was doing all that an able and conscientious man could do to render his own branch efficient and economical, when the recent troubles broke out. Moreover he acted as a regimental surgeon also, thereby saving another salary to Government.

He was not bound to accompany the Sappers on this campaign, his station being at headquarters; but he volunteered to do so, and greatly has the service thereby gained. In times of great despondency, which you may hereafter hear particulars of, the Shah's troops never partook of it, and I have always ascribed this, in no inconsiderable degree, to the example held out by one so much respected as Dr. Forsyth, to the young officers, of a manly and gentlemanlike tone of thought, of cheerful self-devotion and submission to hardship, as well as chivalrous gallantry in the field. For in some of our hardest fights the Doctor, when no other officer happened to be near, joined our men in very perilous situations and animated their efforts.

Of his great skill professionally, young Orr and myself are grateful witnesses, for two more dangerous wounds were never cured; but his skill and tenderness with our sick and wounded are admirable; and to this do I, in no small degree, ascribe the fidelity and extraordinary exertions of non-commissioned officers and men of

the Shah's force. The heat and burden of the day fell on them, both in combat and in labour, and yet their pay is smaller and every advantage less than in the regular service; save in what, in war, weighs more perhaps than anything else, their medical attendance. Every man was sure among us, that if hit he would not be abandoned, and that succour was certain, and tender care. In situations of such peril, on the march, that we were tardily supported by other troops or not at all, our doctor, with his doolies and camels for the wounded, was never wanting; and however sudden the call on us, the first shot was sure to bring up the doctor and his establishment. To know the value of this and the confidence it gives the men, one must see the troops enjoying it, beside others less fortunate. The other day when we were across the river, the sick were left here; but they daily deserted the hospital, and made their way across to their own doctor.

He married early, and Mrs. Forsyth and a large family are now in England. He is the contrary of rich, of course; and his eldest son, now seventeen, is a source of both cost and exceeding anxiety to him, and the present reduction in his pay, I imagine, increases this anxiety. The youth's predilections are, I believe, for the military life; but his father has no acquaintance with, I believe, any director, or none sufficient to hope for a cadetship.

Now, though I have ventured to lay before you his claims on the service and my own obligations, I am far from the presumption of thinking you ought to pay public debts; still less that one already so much in your debt as myself, ought reasonably to trouble you for personal favours. Yet I remember you before, giving cadetships to young men, merely as the sons of gentlemen made known to you by Gen. Cullen, as old and deserving officers; and I am sure you will forgive my making so good a man known to you, in the hope that should you have a cadetship for which you have no particular claimant in view, you may be pleased to bestow it on his son. But for the necessity of asking the youth's name and address, I would not have told Dr. Forsyth of my purpose of writing to you; but I have told him that my intercourse with you has been a series of favours received by me, and that I have consequently anything but claims on you; so that he must not hope for anything unless from your having a spare appointment, and being so good as to give it on the ground of the father's worth.

The youth's name is Mr. Alexander Grigor Forsyth. His mother, Mrs. Forsyth, resided lately in Liverpool, No. 5 Grove Street, but may possibly have gone to Scotland. But a letter for her will reach if addressed to Messrs. Pryce, Griffiths and Co., Billiter Street, London. Should it be in your power to confer this great favour on this

family, may I beg you kindly to notify it to Mrs. Forsyth? to whom it would indeed be a grateful surprise, for I have cautioned the Doctor not to raise expectations which such poor advocacy as mine cannot hope to save from disappointment.

I take the liberty of again inclosing a few lines to Capt. Mackenzie's mother, which you will oblige me by forwarding. Since I wrote it, an offer to negotiate for the release of the prisoners has been made by Mahommed Shah Khan, in whose power they are; but the letter has no date, and is very vague, altogether wearing the appearance of a scheme to send a confidential spy here, more than of a real negotiation. I have not, therefore, mentioned it.

With best wishes to Miss Loch and the young sailor,

I remain &c. G. B.

The first sentences of this letter refer to an expedition across the Kabul river, organised and commanded by Broadfoot whilst his wound was still open. A piece of cloth was extracted from it on the day before he wrote this letter; he was even then unable to wear a sword or lie on the right side, which, with the right leg, had not recovered from the dangerous shock. Yet his extraordinary energy and determination enabled him to carry out his work with complete success; and his letters, in number, length, and vigour of expression, show no signs of a lassitude which he surely must occasionally have felt.

A few extracts from notes, dated June 4, 1842, about the Besud expedition are here inserted.

This evening received through Gen. Sale an order from Gen. Pollock to cross the river with the Sappers and Dowson's horse, Besood being threatened by Azeez Khan and Abdool Ghuffoor Khan. Saw Pollock at Macgregor's.

Broadfoot recorded that the conduct of the little force, what they were to do, where they were to go, and wherewithal they were to be fed, was left to himself.

I represented the state of the country as one difficult to move troops in, and that before I, posted at the Cabool river, could cross the rice-cultivated country [deeply watered and intersected with irrigating canals and small watercourses], the part near the hills might be plundered and the enemy safely retired. Moreover, I mentioned that it was a country I could not venture to cross at night, seeing that the narrow paths could be easily cut through and rendered as bad as the swamp on either side. It was also men-

tioned that the cavalry could not act till we crossed the cultivated tract into the stony plain rising to the hills. The sketch shows roughly the position of Besud, the irrigated cultivation, the stony plain, and the hills. The cultivation is a rich rice plain, now inundated, full of forts and gardens.[2]

We were to start next morning. Got in tents and ammunition, also arms for recruits. Spoke to Mayne about boats.

Broadfoot spent the whole night preparing for the start. When morning came he was disappointed, as Mayne had only



a boat and no rafts ready. Consequently the move could not be made. The Commissariat, a department in which the

[2] The following description of Besúd by the late Sir Henry Lawrence confirms what is said about its cultivation; the author is informed by Vol. H. Blair, R.E., who served in the war of 1879–80, that cultivation has greatly decreased, owing to a long-continued disturbed state of that part of the country. 'The district of Besud is a perfect garden, for which the Great Gardener has provided natural bulwarks of the strongest kind. North and west rugged hills, 1,000 feet high, with one pass into Kunar and another into Lughman. East the Kunar river, and south that of Kabul, both very rapid and for half the year unfordable. The valley is about six miles long and three broad, irrigated by cuts in every direction. Not less than thirty forts and villages, and as many gardens. Just now the crops are rice, with a little tobacco and Indian corn. Wheat, barley &c. are grown in the spring crop. The inhabitants are chiefly Arabs; their Malik is closely connected with S Shuja; his [the Malik's] great-grand-aunt having been married to Shah Ahmad; when he was a mere follower of Nadir Shah he saw the pretty lass filling her waterpot by the river-side. The said lady was the mother of Taimúr Shah.'

If the Sikhs took the country Lawrence had no doubt that the revenue as computed by Macgregor might be doubled.

machinery soon rusts if not kept constantly at work, failed to send cattle in time.

Much exhausted from being up all night. Wrote letter to Gen. Pollock regarding the means of crossing the river, and giving him a list of the places and their resources which could be made available by the evening. Mayne, who will make a good officer in the Quartermaster-General's Department, tells me that, on his telling Macgregor the boat could only make two trips a day, he was answered that he had known it make ten, and carry over the Sappers in one day. This is very gross ignorance, yet not surprising in a man whose business does not require him to know about these matters; but the 'political system' makes all depend on him, and already all of us are, I fear, looked on as making difficulties. The fact is, just now the boat cannot go at all from the high wind. When this is more moderate she crosses once, and when calm twice, a day. This last for a few weeks only. By good management in hauling up and loading, an extra trip a day may be gained.

Every day shows more plainly the ill consequences of the supersession of the Military by the Political Department. The latter do the work imperfectly or erroneously; they know no details. The former, seeing themselves set aside, neglect to learn duties they are not to perform, or to acquire the requisite local information; hence plans on false data, miscarriage, and recrimination.

All this is as true now as it was then; Lord Ellenborough did his best to reform the evil, and for a time with complete success; but it is one to which the Indian Government appears to be peculiarly liable, and which should be guarded against with the most jealous care.

Unless the circumstances connected with an expedition are peculiar and unusual, no political officer is required. There is no special *political* (i.e. diplomatic) work to be done, and the work in connection with supplies should be as well, if not better, done by officers of the Commissariat Department.

Where the special knowledge possessed by a political officer makes it desirable that he should accompany an army, he should be placed in every respect, including his diplomatic functions, under the general commanding, who should possess complete control.

It is hardly too much to say, that unless a general can be so trusted, he is not fit to command an army in the field.

Broadfoot's detachment took three days to cross the river,

on rafts floated by inflated skins, and three days to recross. The inhabitants of Besud had fled, but strict discipline brought all back; men, women, and children. Some revenue and grain were collected.

The next letter, addressed to Mrs. Bayley, but mainly for the benefit of Mr. Prinsep, who had the reputation of being the ablest member of the Governor-General's Council, will repay attentive perusal.

The incapacity of Lord Auckland's Government to face a crisis which their measures had created, to quell a storm which they had raised, is pointed out; the military errors, such as collecting soldiers at Peshawar, at the mouth of the dreaded Khaibar, instead of assembling the troops in our own territory and marching them through Peshawar, and the disgraceful state of equipment in which Pollock's force was sent up, are plainly denounced.

Begun 23rd, written in the intervals of work; no time to read it over, being sent for by the General, so you must excuse all mistakes.

Jellalabad: June 24, 1842.

My dear Mrs. Bayley,—Some days ago, while in Besood, I had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 23rd of last month as well as that of the 17th, forwarding letters to Colin. The day before yesterday I wrote to Mrs. Cameron, telling her all we know of the prisoners, and no fresh intelligence has since been received. Whether Mahomed Shah Khan's offer to negotiate will lead to anything is doubtful. An advance to the capital is our best chance for liberating the captives. But *perhaps* as the river falls and Lughman becomes more easily assailable, Mahomed Shah Khan, whose most productive estates are there, may be moved by the symptoms of vigour shown in the operations of Brigadier Monteath's force, to save his property by surrendering the prisoners for a heavy ransom. All this is very humiliating.

Had Lord Auckland's Government shown any of the energy to have been looked for in the men who undertook so mighty an enterprise as to advance our standards (which cannot with safety recede) into Central Asia, we should long ago have had the prisoners; the murderers would have been in our hands, or in hopeless exile, and the country in quiet subjection. Thoby, you tell me, says I complain of the insufficiency of Gen. Pollock's force. Surely I have not done so. I have complained, perhaps, of the way it was sent up; piecemeal, liable to be beaten in detail; and from being so long delayed

till it was concentrated, allowing the enemy's fear to change into contempt, and making our own troops exaggerate the difficulties before them; and I have probably mentioned the wretched way it was equipped and provided. Not a thought seems to have been bestowed on the nature of the country or the probable operations of the force. Swarms of cavalry are sent up among mountains, and a great force of field artillery against an enemy who can hardly be said to have any. I do not find fault with this: both are necessary, if not carried to excess; but why neglect the palpable requisite in a country of which the inhabitants all dwell in forts, viz. the means of taking those forts?

But I must not, because you are kind enough to send me Thoby's message, inflict on you a professional disputation; not, however, that I shall altogether refrain from *just noticing* his other messages. He truly says want of carriage is the great difficulty, but the difficulty is not so great as we suppose. Carriage exists in abundance enough to have been procured. There is plenty in the Punjab; above all, plenty in this country, provided we had only had energy and forethought enough to procure it, fertility enough of resource to devise substitutes for what is not procurable, and knowledge and skill enough to adapt our systems to our new circumstances. To go farther into the matter would require more of your patience than I can venture to demand; but tell Thoby that the difficulties here are not so great as those we should have had in a Burmese war; and he may remember, I had made preparations from which I had some reason to hope they would have been overcome. Say also that my experiences there and here have deepened the impression that our whole military system wants revising. In some things we must change to meet our altered circumstances; in others, we must go back, revert from Bentinck to Wellesley. Lord William was an able man, and did much good; but he also did great and lasting harm. He was a general in the army, yet rarely touched military affairs but to blunder.

Marquis Wellesley, a civilian, saw everything with the eye of a statesman and great commander. Thoby himself I would rather see in a cocked hat than most of the generals I have fallen in with; and this is why I now trouble you with all this. He is right in thinking that had Wild's brigade been pushed on in time, especially with a due proportion of artillery, cavalry, and sappers, with all requisites, above all a few heavy guns, he would have succeeded in joining us. I go farther, and say that, had we had then a single general fit to command, no disaster would have happened in Cabool, and all would now have been quiet. The dread of Lord A——'s Government to commit troops beyond the frontier, was eminently unwise.

Defensive (that is, *passive*) measures in India are as dangerous as they proved in Cabool, and for the same reason: the force to guard this empire is physically small, and (from financial causes) ever must be so. Our strength, to a greater degree than in other armies, is *moral*; terror of our fortune and constant success, as well as of our daring, must unnerve and disunite our enemies, or we are lost. Our army need not, here or in India, be large, but it must be efficient, well equipped, well commanded, and ever ready to crush by a *coup d'audace* the *first* symptoms of opposition. Partial reverses even then we shall have, but we must on their recurrence only redouble our efforts, and show the price of temporary victory over us to be utter ruin to the momentary victors and [to entail their] permanent subjugation. Thus only are we safe, and then only can we retard the dangerous spreading of our frontier; but ask Thoby whether we have acted thus since October last, or whether, for years before, pains were taken to keep our armies *fit* to act thus. Ask him also to compare what would have been the cost, had we thus acted, with what it will be, end how we please the present bit-by-bit operations.

Lord Auckland's fancy for stopping at Peshawur was worse than if he had stayed at home altogether. It bred despondency among the troops to see the Government they hitherto believed equal to every enterprise, shrink at the Khyber; and it produced a feeling among the Afghans which our generation will not see effaced—that we feared to encounter them, except in far superior numbers, and that we dreaded hills. The dread of the Punjab is childish *while we are victorious* here; but if the Afghans, whom they have beaten, can drive us out, the difference between the Sikh troops and ours is lessened. In all that Thoby says on that subject, I entirely agree. As to the down-heartedness of the native troops after Wild's foolish defeat, it happens in all armies; none more subject to it than our European troops. I have seen it to a distressing extent; and when Colin comes, he will tell what he has seen. Troops of every nation depend upon their officers; and these, much upon their leader. Victory sets all right in this respect, and that depends on the general and the Government. No fear of the natives if the *Europeans* keep right; above all, the officers; and Lord Ellenborough seems likely to infuse the proper spirit into them, or rather to revive it, after two depressing administrations.

What Thoby says of the importance of surveying the routes, is most just. Our apathy in this respect is disgraceful to our national character, and so is our ignorance of the institutions and manners of the country. When a country is invaded, its resources are always used by the conquering army, the leader of which assumes

the government. Lord Wellington administered the civil government in the South of France, collecting the revenues, and naming every functionary. After four years of occupation we are as little prepared to do that effectually here as in 1838; less so, for the desire to learn is diminished. All now think we are soon to quit the country; hence the whole burden of the war falls on India.

My recent studies in Besood comprehended the collection of part of the revenues, and our ignorance of the way we are deluded altogether amazed me. The fault is not with individuals, but with our system of political management. Thoby is wrong in thinking this valley cannot support the army; it has done it, is doing it, and has given us, I believe, three months' grain in store besides. And all this might have been done at one-third of the cost, and quicker, but for our wretched system. Poor Macnaghten should never have left the secretary's office. He was ignorant of men, even to simplicity, and utterly incapable of forming or guiding *administrative* measures. Indeed, he had defects that make me wonder at his success in the secretariat. The judicial line would probably have best suited him, and even that only in a court of appeal, judging only of *written* evidence.

He was by treaty forbidden to administer *directly* the government; yet he sent an officer to represent himself in every district. The state of the finances, the amount and collection of the revenue, were constant subjects of discussion between him and the Shah; in truth, he was Shah, and his political subordinates were hakims[1] whenever they chose to interfere, and it was the perpetual object of native intrigue to get them to interfere. Yet to acquire *accurate* information of the real resources of the country, the modes of collection, and the rights of the various classes in relation to the State and to each other, never seems to have been thought necessary, to those who decided in the last resort every case they chose. Consequently, when we try now to turn the resources of the country to our own use, we fail from our ignorance.

I believe I have already said my say as to what Thoby says of Colin not getting all the public honours he deserves, because he figured only in disasters. But we have all figured in disasters, and the balance is still *against* the English arms. Colin's defence of his fort, and subsequent saving of the garrison and all the women and children of the Sappers (who were absent with Sale), is a *separate* exploit, and it was brilliantly successful. His conduct in the Khoord Cabool pass, under me, was most distinguished; and he and Lieut. Dawes of the artillery were the only officers with me

[1] *Hākim*, a governor.

when we drove the enemy from the position [to carry which] all Sale's preparations for the whole force were directed. That was a complete success, and he commanded all the Sappers on one side of the valley. I reported his conduct officially to Capt. Seaton, who was in command of the advance guard; but Capt. Seaton's report was never forwarded or even published. In fact, it would have flatly contradicted Col. Dennie's; still, here are Lieut. Dawes and myself ready to testify to Colin's most gallant conduct on a trying occasion and in a signal success. So he must not lose his reward.

As to the honours (not the jocular ones) Thoby would intimate Lord E. (though, by the way, I only infer his Lordship's agency) may procure for me, I will not affect to view them with philosophic indifference; yet what I should most prize would be brevet promotion, and that is of little use till the lieutenant-colonelcy comes. That step (for the brevet follows Queen's *rules*) now, or soon, would make me a major-general before the grand climacteric. The majority will secure it for me about the vigorous age of seventy, for, by Queen's rules, the *lieutenant-colonelcy* alone is a line step. With *neither* step I must live to a patriarchal age to hope for the command of an army, or even a division. This is the increasing evil of the service, Queen's and Company's. This applies also to Colin; for would you believe that boyish-looking fellow is my senior in age?

You see the kind of answers you bring on yourself by giving your pen to Thoby. I wish I could find time to write once again the lost letters, as he might find the recollections useful in filling gaps in better sources of information about our late doings; but I have little hope, being thrown into sad arrears of all my proper duty by the extra work I have had to do. I *may* perhaps send him a few notes of the first outbreak. I sent him also, what I doubt if I could now recall to memory with tolerable accuracy, a summary of my discussions with poor Burnes, who was better than Macnaghten, yet only inasmuch as he would have better administered a faulty system. Burnes and I were intimate friends, but our views differed widely; and my poor brother William, though his destined military secretary, was in his opinions regarding the country quite opposed to him. But Burnes's views were, except in details, those of Macnaghten, and he was nearly as blind to what was passing round him.

Do you correspond with Mrs. Hillier? If you do, oblige me by offering my kindest remembrances. She was always exceedingly kind to me when I was on her poor husband's staff.

As to the motives leading to the assassination of poor Burnes, they were: the temptation of his unprotected situation, in which, against every remonstrance of my brother and myself, he persisted

in remaining; the wish, by such a blow, to encourage the natives to rebel; and hatred of him as the man universally believed to have guided the Kafirs to the country. His ability was also thought enough of to make it desirable to get rid of him. These alone were the motives: the leaders in the attack, poor Burnes absurdly believed attached to him, because he had befriended them with Macnaghten and the King, particularly Ameenoollah Khan of Logur. Some of the subordinate assailants, again, considered that Burnes's advice had weighed against them with the King. The Moolahs too, and the mob they led, detested Burnes from his making light of all religions, which he was imprudent enough to think they relished, because they laughed at his jokes. On the other hand, they hated Macnaghten because he had, with impure hands, touched the Koran, and read the glorious book, without being thereby converted; which in my own case, a Moolah, to the dismay of my men for a moment, pronounced the worst of infidelity. In this respect there is no pleasing them, and it is foolish to seek to do so farther than by abstaining from offence. Macnaghten was a little angry when I told him about my Koran, saying they never showed that feeling to him!

Tell Bayley with my kind regards I shall answer his letter very shortly. I am almost ashamed to send you such a Thobyish letter, but next time I shall try to do better. Give my best regards to all your circle, and believe me, my dear Mrs. Bayley,

Ever most truly yours,

G. BROADFOOT.

(From my den, six feet underground.)

We have already mentioned the absence of any information as to what first brought Broadfoot's services and talents to Lord Ellenborough's notice; and further, a remark in one of his own letters[4] shows that he could not account for the very high opinion of them which the Governor-General had formed.

The first expression of approval is to be found in his letter of April 25, written on the occasion when Broadfoot was wounded, and within two months from the date on which Lord Ellenborough arrived in Calcutta. The next mention of the kind which has been discovered is in a letter to Mr. H. T. Prinsep, on the subject of selecting a successor to Mr. Hodgson as Resident at the Court of Nepál. As usual,

[4] To Mrs. Bayley. See p. 105.

the Governor-General was most earnest in making inquiry as to the fitness of various persons for the post. He wrote on June 6:

In his place [i.e. Mr. Hodgson's] I will send some man afraid of nothing. I have half a mind to send Major Fraser. I have been thinking of sending Capt. Broadfoot, but he is too good an officer to spare. He deserves, however, more than anyone, and must be the first object of promotion.

On June 12, Mr. Prinsep replied:

With Capt. Broadfoot, the other officer named by your Lordship, I am very intimate, and have no scruple to say that he has all the requisite qualities, of which he has given proof sufficient in his short military career in Afghanistan; for he formed the corps he commands, which has so distinguished itself; and though a large number of the men are native Afghans, not one, as I hear, deserted in the midst of all the trials they were subject to. But I feel with your Lordship that Capt. Broadfoot has displayed such very high military qualities that in these times he would be thrown away in a post of pure diplomacy, however important it might be. Unless, therefore, he were disabled by his wound, I would rather see him continued in some important frontier post of command.

It is, therefore, clear that in little more than three months from the time when Lord Ellenborough became Governor-General, he had formed the highest opinion of Broadfoot's capacity, both as a soldier and as a candidate for administrative or political appointments.

Broadfoot had written to Government what he called a warm remonstrance on the subject of the treatment of the Shah's forces, in reducing their allowances, retrospectively, from the date of the Shah's death. The next letter refers to this incidentally, and contains further evidence of the Governor-General's appreciation of his services.

Allahabad: June 21, 1842.

Sir,—You will see by the letter addressed to-day to Gen. Pollock by Col. Stewart that I have done all I can properly do for yourself and the other officers who are attached to the force of the late Shah Shuja.

I am desirous on public grounds of testifying the high sense I entertain of your military services during the blockade of Jellalabad. There is no situation at present at my disposal which I can offer

to you, except that of aide-de-camp, on my personal staff. That is not a situation which you should permanently hold, but it may be agreeable to you to retain it until I can find some other appointment more adapted to you by which I may mark my sense of your distinguished services.

In anticipation of your acceptance of the situation of aide-de-camp, I have directed that you should be put into orders to-day.

Of course it is not necessary for you to join me until we meet after your return to India, whenever that may be.

I remain, Sir, yours very faithfully,

ELLENBOROUGH.

The endorsement is as follows:

My dear Malcolmson,—You will not wonder when we meet to find me agreeably improved in point of *vanity*.

Yours ever, G. BROADFOOT.

On the occasion of one of his visits on parole to Jalalabad to negotiate for the liberation of the prisoners, Capt. Mackenzie brought with him part of the manuscript of Lieut. Eyre's narrative of the Kabul disasters. It was shown to three persons only: the General, the Political Agent, and Capt. Broadfoot, who studied it closely and wrote some notes on it of considerable value. They are too long to be inserted here, but the concluding remarks will be found of interest.

The story of the Kabul disasters is so well known that the shortest possible sketch of them will be sufficient as an introduction to these remarks.

On November 2, 1841, the insurrection broke out, and in the early morning of that day Sir Alex. Burnes, his brother, and Lieut. W. Broadfoot were killed.

Weak and irresolute measures, resulting in defeat, caused a deplorable demoralisation of officers and men. Mutual recrimination between Sir W. Macnaghten and the military commanders followed, and eventually it was decided to try and secure the safety of the troops by negotiation, instead of resolving to maintain it by the sword alone. In the course of these negotiations Sir W. Macnaghten was murdered. His successor, at the demand of the principal officers of the force, continued to treat with the enemy; and under an agreement made, the unfortunate army marched forth, without food, without sufficient clothing, without discipline, an easy

prey to their fanatical foes, to perish in the passes exposed to the full rigour of an Afghan winter.

The concluding remarks by Broadfoot on that part of Lieut. Eyre's narrative, from the outbreak to November 23, 1841, are as follows:

Lieut. Eyre's narrative here closes, the rest not having been sent in. It shows that to our own mismanagement, in Afghanistan and in India, we chiefly owe our misfortunes. There is in the narrative a tone of bitterness towards individuals which would render its accuracy suspicious but for the fact of its having been compiled under the correction of so many survivors, active agents in the events, and fellow-prisoners of Lieut. Eyre.

As to the cowardice of H.M.'s 44th Regt. and other portions of the troops, it is only what will always result from feebleness and incapacity in the leaders, in situations so false, in a military point of view, as was that of the Cabool force. The 44th were of the same class of men as other British soldiers, and only gave way somewhat sooner from being in a bad state of discipline originally. The native troops, like other troops, gave way sooner or later as they had good or indifferent officers.

The military errors are plain and numerous; but it was the fault of the Government that our armies were so circumstanced that incapacity should lead to annihilation. As to Gen. Elphinstone, he had many disadvantages to contend with, and he was utterly broken by sickness in mind and body; in fact, he had actually sent in his resignation on these grounds.

After November 23 our troops cannot be said to have fought; the enemy insulted and harassed them with impunity, except from occasional efforts of individuals, especially Capt. Colin Mackenzie with a handful of Juzailchees and Sappers. The military authorities called on the Envoy to capitulate. The Shah early in December openly declared himself the chief Ghazee, and conferred honours on the champions of the faith. Negotiations were opened with Mahomed Akbar Khan, interrupted by this chief murdering the Envoy, and were resumed at the instance of the military leaders against the advice of the subordinate political officers (Major Pottinger, Capt. Mackenzie, &c.), and finally, on January 6, 1842, the force marched. The same feebleness and incapacity of the leaders, and misconduct of the troops, marked the march, and its disastrous end is known.

I had 300 Sappers there, very fine troops, which had been sent back from Tezin. They were ordered to bridge the watercourses near the cantonment for the passage of our camels, *and not allowed*

to take their arms. These were left under a guard in the cantonment. The men were kept at the bridges till night, when the enemy rushed into the cantonment, and seized their arms. Thus, by gross mismanagement, were these men delivered up helpless to slaughter. Some have made their way through all: most of them perished in the passes. They were, according to the custom there, transferred from one strange officer to another, but clung together to the last; and no small number reached Jugduluk, to perish in the last fatal march from that place. I give this to show the extent mismanagement had reached.

At Jugduluk the unfortunate remnant took up a position in a small table-land, at one corner of which rises a conical hill. This table-land was occupied by a piquet of Sir R. Sale's force on its march down, and I had to secure them, as we also were surrounded. The conical hill so completely commands the ground that I found it necessary to construct a small work by digging out the peak, where I put a party of our best men. It is a dangerous post to hold, inasmuch as it can only be entered or quitted under fire of many hills around, but safe [when] once entered. This post Gen. Elphinstone neglected, and the enemy seized it, making a terrible slaughter of our men from it. Major Thain proposed to the remnant of the 44th to storm it, and a number consented; but they had to volunteer for *officers*! and were led by Lieut. Macartney, S.S.F.,[5] Capt. Mathews commanding the Sappers S.S.F., and Capt. Hay, also of S.S.F. Two of these officers were wounded, but the hill was taken. The troops, however, could not be kept in it, and the enemy again seized it. In hopes of stopping this slaughter, Gen. Elphinstone, Brigadier Shelton, and Capt. Johnson were induced to visit Mahomed Akbar to negotiate. They found themselves prisoners, and the poor General vainly demanded to be sent back to perish with his men. He was already wounded. He contrived to send the troops information of the treachery, and they marched; but an abattis across the road caused irretrievable confusion. Had they been in hand they might still have forced the pass, not a very difficult one; but the above incidents will have shown disorganisation could go little farther. Brigadier Anquetil's death completed it, and the force then utterly perished under the knives of the neighbouring peasantry, for the Cabool troops had gone back.

We long had no accounts of these matters but from Lady Sale's letters, which, naturally, carried too great weight here. She, seeing the pursuit by the enemy's cavalry in the Cabool actions,

[5] S.S.F.: Shah Shuja's force.

and the way our troops, horse and foot, shrank from meeting them, formed an extraordinary opinion of them, and communicated it to the authorities here, where it did us much harm. An injurious timidity was shown that gave extraordinary confidence to the enemy, and tended to produce despondency among ourselves. Their cavalry is, like their infantry, composed of men severally brave, collectively worthless. The men are ill mounted, and, above all, without mutual confidence, which discipline and regular organisation alone can give. It was not till *repeated* examples, chiefly with our horse in foraging parties, and the sappers[6] in working parties, had shown that the merest handful of disciplined troops moderately supported could act in the face of any number of them, and defeat great odds, that their true value began to be felt.

But this spread farther, and the Afghan cavalry and infantry were, most erroneously, believed to be an enemy more formidable than any we had hitherto met. Nothing could be more unfounded. I have seen nothing like military skill among their leaders but once, [viz.] in a chief in the Jugduluk pass, who was killed at the time, and his efforts failed. Their troops are mere peasantry as far as the infantry soldiers are concerned; the cavalry soldiers are an ill-mounted mob, not to be compared to the Mahrattas, and still less to the troops of Hyder Ali and Tippoo. As to coping with disciplined troops, European or native, it is absurd, unless in cases of mismanagement so gross that it matters not who the enemy are. All we want are efficient leaders, and above all an efficient commissariat, and system of equipment adapted to the country. Would to Heaven, Gen. Cullen were here as Commissary-General with unlimited power from the Government, and all would go well. We have failed from ignorance, want of forethought, and the gross neglect of every rule of war and policy, in our governors and commanders. The difficulties of the force under Gen. Elphinstone, either with a view to suppressing the rebellion, or retiring to India, or rather the difficulty of invading and subduing the country through the Punjab, which is open to us, is not equal to that of the enterprise accomplished by the Duke of Wellington, when he marched from Mysore to destroy the Maharatta confederacy. He, also, had a long line of operation, poor and difficult countries to traverse, rapid rivers to cross, and mountains not merely to pass, but, as at Gawilgurh, to carry his siege train across. But see his foresight, timely preparation, and profound knowledge, and then see the results in his uninterrupted and then unparalleled march from victory to victory. Yet he had, besides natural obstacles, to con-

[6] They used to have no covering parties. Half worked, and were protected by the rest.

tend with armies that could fight a battle like Assaye, which the Afghans could no more do than the American Indians.

Set the Duke down at Ferozpore with *carte blanche*; both contempt of the enemy and timidity would disappear, and Afghanistan would soon be our own to keep or abandon.

I know not what is to be the future policy; but this I know, that however great (and it is enormous) is the evil of a poor dependency, or expensive war pressing on our finances, scanty at the best, it is but an inconvenience that time and prudence may remedy, compared with the evil of our superiority in arms being doubted in India; above all, if those before whom we are constrained to go back, are an Asiatic and Indian nation like the Afghans. Shake the belief in our invincibility, in our immeasurable military superiority rendering opposition hopeless, and you shake the foundation of our power.

Whilst Pollock's army was being got ready to advance towards Kabul, Broadfoot was sent out with a small force, on July 25, towards Fatehabad and Gandamak. He considered that his detachment was too weak to withstand an attack from the Afghans; and therefore he at once assumed the offensive. By making sudden and rapid marches he defeated his foes in detail with such effect as to cause the submission of all in the neighbourhood. These movements, though undoubtedly the wisest under the circumstances, alarmed Pollock, a cautious rather than a dashing commander. Broadfoot was forbidden to act on the offensive, which the General considered to be dangerous for so small a force far from support: at the same time reinforcements were promised. Of Broadfoot's doings, Capt. Henry Lawrence in a letter to Mr. George Clerk, dated August 7, 1842, wrote thus:

> Broadfoot is out here, doing good service in collecting grain and frightening the scoundrels. He went up the valley towards Kajar four days ago, where the inhabitants were all in revolt; but to-day the Malliks of the whole country round for ten miles have come in. He took his Sappers and 200 irregular horse, and has, I think, done great good; but he has got a damper from the General.

In the same letter reference is made to the destruction of Fatehabad by Broadfoot, as a grateful sight and a most just punishment. Two days later Lawrence contrasted Broadfoot's energy in command of a small detachment, with Sale's inactivity at the head of a large brigade.

CHAPTER VI.

1842.

Advance on Kabul—Mámú Khel despatches—Broadfoot's report—Col. Taylor's letter—Extract from the 'Englishman'—Broadfoot's reply to Col. Taylor—Sappers ordered to Mamu Khel—Instructions from Gen. Pollock—Description of the ground—Broadfoot attacked and carried the village—Pursued the enemy to Kúdí Khel—Partially cleared the hills beyond—Advance arrested by the arrival of a senior officer—Unfortunate result—Troops retired to Mamu Khel—Afghans skilful in mountain war—Letter to Mr. Loch—Gen. Elphinstone—Letter to Mrs. Bayley—Post of honour given to Broadfoot's Sappers—Affair at Jagdalak—Action at Tezin—Arrival at Kabul—Recovery of the prisoners—Gen. Nott—Capture of Istálif: Broadfoot wounded—Return of the army to Firozpur—Letters to Mrs. Bayley and Mr. Loch, and from Lord Ellenborough—Broadfoot gazetted brevet-major and C.B.

By the strenuous exertions of all concerned, from the Governor-General downwards, supplies and carriage were so far provided that a forward movement on the part of Pollock's army became possible. Baggage was reduced, the sick were left behind, and Broadfoot volunteered to take his Sappers without tents at all.

Pollock marched from Jalalabad on August 20, and arrived at Gandamak on the 23rd, where he intended to halt to collect further supplies and to await news from Gen. Nott. Gandamak was within the region in which disaster, destruction, and plunder had proved to the satisfaction of the Afghan his superiority to British troops. Consequently small detached bodies did not fear to approach Pollock's army, and endeavour by insult and provocation to bring on a fight.

Seeing that there was hard work to be done, and the importance of having it well done, Pollock sent that night for Broadfoot and his Sappers, and a squadron of H.M.'s 3rd Dragoons who were behind with Sale at Nimla. So promptly did they respond that they were with the General before sunrise. With Pollock, as with Sale on former occasions, there was no danger of Broadfoot and his men being forgotten in

the hour of peril, however faulty the Generals' memories might be when that was over and when the time came for mentioning their services in despatches. Gen. Pollock's despatch of August 25, 1842, is a remarkable instance of this. It records how, as above mentioned, Broadfoot was sent for in the night, and arrived before daylight; how at 4 A.M. he with his corps joined the right column, which he for a time commanded; how he cleared the hills of the enemy in one place, and in another captured their camp equipage, with its carriage cattle. And yet in the next paragraph, where the officers who specially distinguished themselves are thanked, Broadfoot's name is looked for in vain. Gen. Pollock published Broadfoot's report, and in the mention made in the body of the despatch of his services there is nothing to indicate an unworthy motive, or a wish to conceal their value. The omission of his name among the officers 'mentioned in the despatch' must therefore be put down to an oversight; but it is one deserving of severe censure. If there were any reasons why Broadfoot's name should not have been mentioned as one to whom the General was specially indebted on that occasion, they should, considering the tenor of the rest of the despatch, have been explained.

Broadfoot's report, or rather a review of the events of 1842 in Afghanistan by the 'Delhi Gazette,' based on that report, the accuracy of which was questioned by Col. Taylor of the 9th Foot, led to a correspondence which elicited from Broadfoot an account of the events of the day so complete and so accurate, that Col. Taylor was desired by high military authority to make no reply.

The report is as follows:

From Capt. G. Broadfoot, Sappers and Miners, commanding Right Column, to Capt. G. Ponsonby, Assist. Adjt.-General.

Camp, Mamoo Khel: August 25, 1842.

Sir,—Agreeably to orders, I have the honour to report the proceedings of the column entrusted to me by the Major-General commanding in the action yesterday.

I moved, as directed, with the Sappers (about 220 men) and the 3rd Irregular Cavalry (250) across the ravine on the right of the force. We found the enemy strongly posted in an orchard with some inclosures, and the usual fieldworks of loose stones in their front

were also occupied. This position flanked the approach of the main body.

Having formed an attacking party in front, I sent the rest of the Sappers in column, under Lieut. Orr, to turn the enemy's left flank, and Capt. Tait's horse still more to the right and in advance, to cut off their retreat. While we waited in this order the advance of the force, the enemy reinforced the orchard and moved out to attack us. I was therefore obliged to advance before the force arrived. The enemy's positions were quickly carried in succession. One party was driven towards the 3rd Irregular Cavalry, who pursued, and the remainder fled to the village of Mamoo Khel, into which the main body of the enemy were at this moment driven by the fire of our artillery. They opened a fire on us, ill directed, but so heavy that we were obliged to attack the village; they fled when we reached it, and the Sappers pursued to the fort, but were so exhausted by the march from Futehabad and the previous operations that the enemy was able to enter and barricade the gate; their fire was kept down by one party of Sappers, while the rest climbed on each other's shoulders over a half-repaired bastion about eight feet high and covered with thorns; the enemy fled over the walls on the other side, leaving the rear gate barricaded. This, and descending from the walls, lost so much time, that pursuit was nearly hopeless as far as our now exhausted men were concerned. We pressed on with the least fatigued, however, and keeping up to the hills forced the enemy into level ground; our cavalry was approaching, and we had the satisfaction of seeing the cavalry overtake and attack them.

Parties were now directed to destroy the forts abandoned on the cavalry approaching, while with a few men I pushed on to the last village near the hills, where we surprised the enemy, whose head-quarters were there, driving them out of the village and adjoining camp, and obtaining their tents, cattle, and ammunition, and a good quantity of provisions. The enemy (who were evidently the Juzail-chees from Cabool) fled to the hills, the fire from which swept the village.

I was now directed to take a party of H.M.'s 9th Foot, the Sappers being now worn out, except about six men, and attack the hills; the first and second heights were carried at the point of the bayonet, and flanking parties having turned the shoulders of the high range, we were advancing up it when the main force arrived, and our farther progress was stayed. My separate command now ceased, and I was soon after ordered with the Sappers to headquarters.

The conduct of the troops, officers and men, European and native, was admirable, and it is due to the 26th N.I. to mention that in storming the second height with a party of H.M.'s 9th Foot,

a party of the former corps joined us, and behaved with the same spirit as the rest. I have &c.

G. BROADFOOT, *Captain,*
Commanding Right Column.

From this report the 'Delhi Gazette' compiled the following sentence, which formed part of their review of the events of 1842:

The Sappers being completely knocked up except about six men, Capt. Broadfoot took a party of H.M.'s 9th Foot, carried some of the hills at the point of the bayonet, and would have driven off all the enemy, had not Gen. Pollock thought it prudent to recall all the detached parties, some of whom had gone more than two miles in advance of Mamoo Khel.

With reference to this, Col. Taylor addressed the editor of the 'Delhi Gazette' as follows:

Camp, Mobarakpore: February 20, 1843.

Sir,—Observing in your 'Gazette' of the 15th inst., in 'continuation of a review of the past year,' a narrative of the affair at Mamoo Khel between the troops of Major-Gen. Pollock and the Afghans on August 24 last, in which you state that Capt. (now Major) Broadfoot 'took a party of the 9th Foot, carried some hills at the point of the bayonet,' &c.; in correction I have to observe that on that day no party of the 9th Foot was placed under Capt. Broadfoot's command either by me or Gen. M'Caskill, nor did any soldiers of that corps act under his orders to my knowledge. In justice to two gallant officers, I have further to add that on the occasion alluded to by you, I ordered Major Huish, 26th N.I., and Capt. Ogle, H.M.'s 9th Foot (both senior to Capt. Broadfoot), to take two companies from each of those regiments, and dislodge the enemy from the heights over Kookey Kail, which they effectually did in a few minutes, and to those officers is due the credit of that gallant action. Capt. Broadfoot, I understood, accompanied them with three or four of his Sappers, but he could have no command of a superior officer, Major Huish.

I have the honour &c.

A. B. TAYLOR,
Lieut.-Col. 9th Foot.

This called forth from Broadfoot a letter which appeared in the 'Englishman and Military Chronicle' of March 23, 1843, on which that newspaper remarked:

We have much pleasure in giving publicity to the following communication from Major Broadfoot, concerning the carrying of certain hills at Mamoo Khel, in which the gallant Major incontestably proves that the whole work was done by himself, prior to his supersession by Lieut-Col. Huish; and that Col. Taylor's version of the affair does not invalidate his (Major Broadfoot's) claim to the chief credit due for the conspicuous part he bore in the transaction. The communication is written in the frank, manly, soldierlike tone, we should have expected from one of the most distinguished officers engaged in that memorable campaign, and as a mere personal narrative of a very gallant, brilliant action, we are quite sure will be perused with much interest by all our military readers. We have neither time nor space at the present moment to comment more fully upon the subject.

To the Editor of the 'Englishman and Military Chronicle.'

Sir,—With reference to Lieut.-Col. Taylor's letter and my own, in your paper of the 12th and 13th instant, you will oblige me by giving a place to the following:

About the middle of August last, Major-Gen. Pollock advanced from Jellalabad to Gundumuk, Sir Robert Sale being left at Futtehabad. A small Afghan force had come from Cabool to garrison Tatang, a fort of Mahomed Akbar near Gundumuk, but it was destroyed before their arrival by a detachment of Sir R. Sale's troops. The intended garrison, being joined by some neighbouring chiefs, took post at Mamoo Khel, about two miles from Gen. Pollock's camp at Gundumuk: they attacked his piquets, followed back small parties sent to look at them, and not being chastised, increased in numbers hourly. At length Gen. Pollock resolved to attack them and capture Mamoo Khel, the seat of one of the great officers of Shah Shooja's Court, and a leader in the movements against the English.

On August 23, Sir R. Sale was directed to send a squadron of H.M's 3rd Dragoons, and Broadfoot's Sapper corps, on to Gundumuk; the latter were at the moment some miles from camp bringing in supplies, but by evening they had returned, and after dark marched with the Dragoons under Major Bond, leaving stores and baggage with the usual guards (besides about a company in garrison at a fort a few miles off) to follow next day. They were thus only about 300 strong.

The march was only fifteen miles, but included an ascent of about 2,000 feet, and a descent of perhaps 500.

Major Bond arrived before dawn on the 24th, and found Gen. Pollock's force under arms to move on Mamoo Khel. The Sappers were ordered to join. They had now been four-and-twenty hours at

work or under arms with no food save dry pulse, eaten as they marched; and when at daylight a few minutes' halt was made, they sat down and nearly all slept from weariness. On Capt. (now Major) Havelock, however, summoning them to the front of the column, they received him with loud cheers. Gen. Pollock now told me to furnish such skirmishing parties as would be demanded by officers whom he named; I think (but am not certain) they were Brigadier Tulloch and Lieut.-Col. Taylor. The force moved on, but no skirmishers were asked for. Gen. Pollock after a time came up again, and with many kind expressions informed me he wished the men to share in a fight they had come so far for, and he desired me to mention any separate service for them my knowledge of the ground[a] might suggest; finally he sanctioned another column on the right to secure our flank and complete our success by getting on the enemy's best line of retreat; that, namely, towards Koodee Khel, an opening in the mountains two miles beyond and to our right of Mamoo Khel..

[a] I had been under Sir Robert Sale against the place the year before.

The country south of Gundumuk rises rapidly but uniformly for four or five miles to the foot of the first range of the steep and pine-covered hills of the Soofeed Koh. The hill streams flow to the Soorkhab river in deep channels which divide this tract into *strips* of irregular form stretching obliquely up to the hills. On one of these stands Mamoo Khel, an open village of flat-roofed houses of mud and stone, overlooking the stream on our right as we came from Gundumuk; about three-quarters of a mile beyond it, and towards the stream on our left, was the fort, a weak place, without a ditch, and surrounded with broken ground laid out in gardens and vineyards. The rest of the ground was cultivated in terraces for corn, and it narrowed towards Koodee Khel. Beyond the stream on our right was a tract of similar form, but stony and barren, save near the stream, where there were orchards. Across this stream I was directed to take the Sappers and Tait's horse as a subsidiary column of attack.

We moved rapidly to our new place, and found the enemy in some force on that side, and posted in the orchards; while on Gen. Pollock's side of the stream a considerable body was displayed in line before the village of Mamoo Khel, which, as well as the ground beyond, was occupied by numbers greater than expected. Their plan appeared to be to draw on our force against the men before the village, who would give way and leave our troops under the fire of the village in their front, and of the orchards across the stream on their flank.

Lieut. Cunningham carried information of their numbers and position to the General, and brought back his sanction to our attacking the orchards when he should attack in front. Dispositions were made accordingly, but delays in the main body brought us on the enemy single-handed. On halting we were attacked, while reinforcements from the village prepared to join our immediate opponents, and some of the people in front of Gen. Pollock threatened our flank; we were too few for defence on such ground, and retreat would have brought the enemy victorious on the flank of our main force; so the orchards were carried at once. While this passed, Gen. Pollock's artillery opened, and the advanced body of the enemy ran back into the village, from which a fire was opened on us, then in the orchards and adjoining works which were open to the village. Our main body was not visible, and we were again obliged to attack; the stream was recrossed, and the village carried. We were now directly in front of Gen. Pollock's right, and consequently the subsidiary column of attack had become a main one. This was unavoidable, but unfortunate from our feeble numbers, as well as from its leaving no infantry in a position to cut the enemy's line of retreat from the fort.

Musketry was now heard in rear on our left as if our troops were advancing, and Lieut. Mayne, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General to Major-Gen. McCaskill, joined us; he informed me that our main force was coming up, though slowly: so, begging his aid with the cavalry, I moved towards the fort, which fell into our hands as mentioned in the despatches.

The enemy was now scattered in flight, with our cavalry pursuing. Gen. Pollock's objects were gained with little loss; and here the action of Mamoo Khel, properly speaking, ended; the rest was pursuit or incidents arising from it.

I directed the Sappers to be collected and to rest at Mamoo Khel, not meaning to go farther; but seeing some of the 5th Cavalry follow the enemy among forts, I took out some of the least exhausted men to support them,[b] and went towards the hills to intercept fugitives. Lieut. Mayne now joined the cavalry; the pursuit began afresh and went far, leading us on in support: the forts were abandoned as the cavalry approached, and I put a few sappers in each to secure what grain &c. there was.[c]

[b] The officers and several sergeants came, perhaps forty men of all ranks.

This took time, and after it I found resistance was over in the open country, though there was a little firing along the hills by fugitives who

[c] These forts were strewed with clothes, books, music &c. belonging to the destroyed Cabool force and garrison of Gundumuk.

had reached them.[d] I heard, also, that a few of our cavalry had been briskly fired on at Koodee Khel, and obliged to withdraw. I went in that direction, having with me eight or ten men; on the way I fell in with Major-Gen. McCaskill and his staff, also moving towards the hills.

[d] One party rallied and returned to the plain, but was vigorously attacked and driven back by a native officer, Soobadar Aslam Khan, and some sappers. Several small parties of sappers, after a little rest at Mamoo Khel, went out skirmishing about the hill.

Koodee Khel is an open[e] village of stone houses with flat roofs, having on three sides gardens and vineyards, and on the fourth a narrow strip of bare stony ground, sloping up to the right into a small but steep and rugged hill, the termination of the high pine-covered range which forms one side of the Koodee Khel valley. The large and the small hills are united by a steep ridge, at the lower end of which is a small rocky protuberance which may be considered an intermediate hill.[f]

[e] It has the low thin wall round it, called Gao-bundee by Afghans, intended to keep the cattle from straying at night; but the gates were gone, and the wall ruined towards the hill, which, as well as the intermediate slope, commanded the place.

The village seemed empty; but when halfway through it, a sapper entering a courtyard found it occupied by some of the enemy. The camp, in short, of the Juzailchees from Cabool was in the village and on the slope adjoining the little hill, tents being stretched across many courtyards: the Afghans, in the belief they cherished of our fearing to approach high hills, were quietly resting after their labours. The sapper ran at them with his bayonet, followed by myself and the only other man at the spot.[g] The Afghans, doubtless supposing a large force was on them, snatched up their turbans and arms, and fled over walls and housetops; the alarm spread, and the camp was abandoned.

[f] All these really form but one hill, or rather the end of one long hill or ridge. I shall, however, for clearness call them the *small*, the *intermediate*, and the *large* hills.

[g] Neither man happened to have his musket loaded.

The men at the village followed the enemy with their fire to the top of the little hill, from which it was returned in a way that made it clear the village was untenable without taking the hill, and that, being too weak to attempt this, we must go away soon, if we wished our withdrawal to seem voluntary.

Two or three men were posted to fire occasionally, and the rest made to carry off or destroy all they could; a work camp followers and stragglers soon came to help them in.[h]

[h] All the enemy's horses were seized by camp followers or soldiers. Their ammunition I would not

then allow the people to meddle with for fear of accident; later in the day the enemy recaptured it, but in the confusion blew it, and some of themselves, up.

At this time Lieut. Mayne came up and asked how we were getting on. I gave my view of our position, adding that the hill was the thing if we could manage it. He said, 'Why don't you take it, then?' I told him I had no men. He asked where the Sappers were, and was told they were in Mamoo Khel and all the forts and country between. He asked if they could not be brought up. I said, 'No,[1] and if they could they are too much done up for hills to-day.' After a little more conversation as to our position, he said, 'If I can get you other men, will you undertake to take the hill?' I said, 'Yes, get me any other men, and I go at the hill.' He said, 'Very good, I'll see what I can do,' and rode off.

[1] The objection was the time it would have taken; too long to remain inactive under fire. I may here remark that remaining at all with so few men may seem imprudent, for I did not then know more infantry were coming up; but it was intended to be but for a very short time, during which we had only the enemy's *fire* to sustain. Had he come down and into contact with us, the fire from the hill would have ceased, our cavalry, who were masters of the plain, could have approached, and our retreat been secured.

He returned shortly and said, 'Here you are. I have got you some men of the 9th; they'll do, I suppose?' I said, 'Nothing better; how many?' He answered, 'A company,' or 'About a company,' and asked if it was enough. I said it was, but we must have support. He said, 'Oh, there's lots of support; the General's up, the 9th and 26th are close here, and in fact the whole force is coming up; you'll have plenty of support.' I begged him to see them spread to the right and left, which he promised to do. He then obtained me a sword[k] from one of his mounted orderlies, and we moved on, I again requesting him to look to our support. I had been sitting at a gap in the village wall, next the enemy. At the corner of the village we met the men of the 9th Foot coming up to the hill. Lieut. Mayne said, 'These are the men.' 'Very well,' I replied, 'up we go,' and the ascent immediately commenced, for we were under a fire which increased when the enemy saw our object. Capt. Havelock was there, but I am not sure whether he came with the 9th men or joined Lieut. Mayne and myself just be-

[k] The exhaustion from exertion in that country is inconceivable till felt. In the morning my horse knocked up beyond persuasion of spur, or even sword point, just as we were attacking the orchard. I had to abandon him, the syce being killed. The subsequent operations were all on strong ground, and at a rapid pace, and the heat too was intense. I was obliged to cast away successively belts, scabbard, and all clothes not indispensable. At Koodee Khel, just before Lieut. Mayne joined me, having no scabbard, I gave my sword to a sepoy to hold, but the plunder of the camp had made him a truant. To the credit of our people, these things were all brought back to me that day, though scattered over miles.

fore; I think the latter. At any rate, I spoke to him and asked his aid in keeping our men from firing and in getting a rapid advance with the bayonet. I believe also that I bespoke his aid in getting support and sending men round the flanks of the hill. He and Lieut. Mayne accompanied me, cheering on the men and preventing firing. There were several officers of the 9th present, not one of whom I knew, and I only remember speaking to one of them who during the ascent made a remark on something unconnected with the duty. All of them joined in making the men advance without halting to fire or load. Before we reached the summit the enemy ran to the intermediate height and ridge beyond. Capt. Havelock and Lieut. Mayne came as far as their horses could come, and went down on seeing us up. When I reached the highest point[1] there were with me only two or three men of the 9th, and as many Sappers.

[1] A little knoll of rocks in the centre of the summit.

After taking breath and giving time for more men to come up, we moved to the intermediate height, which the enemy abandoned. We were accompanied by a few men of the 26th N.I., who had come up while we were waiting; the first I saw of that regiment.

Beyond the intermediate hill rose the large hill; the enemy were now in full retreat up the connecting ridge, but as some had already gained the top, and the ascent was long and steep, I thought it prudent to wait till the subsidiary arrangements were made below. Leaving, therefore, the few Sappers[m] (about six) at the intermediate hill, I returned to the small hill, and saw the space below full of our troops, horse and foot, of whom considerable parties were stretching out to the right and left along the flanks of the large hill: more infantry, both European and Native, were also ascending the little hill; in short, all was going as one could wish.

[m] The military reader will see that so small a party was left in order to have few men under the enemy's closest fire; they sufficed to keep the enemy from creeping down the rocks to short musket range of the little hill, which was all we wanted for the present. A small number also could alone find cover. Some of the sepoys of the 26th who first came up remained there, and two or three of the 9th afterwards joined them: a thing to be encouraged as long as safe. I placed the Sappers there because they were used to close quarters with the Afghans, and not likely to think they were abandoned when we went back.

In due time the left flank of the hill was enveloped by troops, chiefly of the 26th Regiment; the right flank was not so well manned, but troops were going that way, among whom I perceived Lieut. Orr[n] of the Sappers, and the position of the men on the left flank was completely under the enemy's fire;

[n] I knew this officer would co-operate with vigour and judgment when he saw the assault begin. I knew also he would easily get troops from officers near, and if there were none the men would follow him.

They seldom fail, be they black or white.

so I resolved to attack at once. I went towards the intermediate hill,[o] and when near it made a sign to the party there to advance, and passed the word for the ascent of the large hill, moving on myself. Before many paces, some one called out, 'Halt! halt!' I called out, 'No! no! No halt! Move on!' and went forward more rapidly; but again the cry of 'Halt!' was raised, and a man of the 9th called out, 'Sir! sir! there is an order to halt.' I asked, 'Who said so? And who gave the order?' A very young-looking officer standing under a rock called out in answer to the last question,[p] 'I, Major Huish, give it, if you choose to obey it.' I explained to the Major my ignorance of any officer senior to myself being there, and informed him that I had been sent up with orders to take the hill: he said he also had been sent up with orders to occupy the hill we were on, but not to go higher. I said my orders were from the General, received through Lieut. Mayne. He said his orders also were from the General. I asked if I was to consider him in command on that hill; he said, only of his own men, but that his orders were positive against going higher. On this I called back the few Sappers, intending to proceed to headquarters and make my report.[q]

[o] This was from ten to twenty minutes after reaching the summit of the small hill; it seemed the latter or even more, but I had not a watch, and to a man waiting the time seems long.

[p] The Major's courtesy may not seem great, but I cannot be certain that my own manner was very bland.

[q] I, of course, asked Major Huish if he had any occasion for my services or those of my men, and was told he had not.

Seeing the little hill crowded with our men, however, I again went to Major Huish and said there was certainly some mistake in these contradictory orders, and urged him to complete the capture of the hill, pointing out its necessity. He objected its being too steep to ascend, its being out of shot, and not worth taking, and that its capture would cost many men. The enemy's bullets showed its nearness while we conversed: on other points, I mentioned the enemy's flight up it just before, and assured him stopping short would cost more men than taking it, as the enemy would ascribe it to fear, and not only fire on him then, but rally generally, and pursue him when he left. He seemed incredulous as to the rallying and pursuit, urging besides that if we did go up we must come back, and were just as likely to be pursued then as now. He said also the enemy would go to other heights, which we must take, and then others in endless succession. I pointed out the form of the whole hill, that once on the top, we had the Afghans comparatively on

level ground, where indiscipline and inferior arms put their standing against us out of the question, and they could not go to the other hills without descending first, no easy matter when pursued by us from above. I assured him Afghans never fought hopeless battles, and that when they saw no ground could stop us, they would disperse, and the terror of such a blow at the opening of the campaign would prevent all serious opposition in the passes.

He did not feel justified in making the attempt, and I then pressed him to withdraw at once from the hill; his orders preventing this, I advised his keeping very few men, a mere guard, upon it, and putting them into a 'sungur,'[r] having the rest in reserve below; and, above all, I urged him to withdraw the men below on the left flank of the large hill, who, besides being now not wanted there, were in a false position.

[r] The Pushtoo name of the rough field works of loose stones used by the Afghans. They are quickly made and useful.

After some discussion he agreed to diminish the number on the summit, and proceeded to do so, while I went down the hill. The enemy had, on the Sappers being brought back from their advance, crowded to the crest of the upper hill. Their fire too had since been getting steadier. I had not gone fifty yards down before Major Huish called me back, and, with some excitement, said, 'Capt. Broadfoot, this is all your doing, and I shall hold you responsible. I shall make it known to Gen. Pollock.' He then pointed out the enemy, who had come a little way down the hill, and planted a flag. He added, 'I sent down the men entirely by your advice, and trusting to your greater experience of hill warfare, and it has brought down the enemy upon us. I shall recall my men, and make known to Gen. Pollock this was your doing.'

I said this was just what I had been telling him, the Afghans thought us frightened, that flag would rally them over all the country round, and the longer he stayed the worse it would be; that of course he must use his own judgment; but I repeated my advice to take the hill or get out of its reach; or if he must stay where he was, to have a few men above and his reserves below, and well posted to cover his retreat. But I again suggested the removal of the men on the left below (his own men the 26th chiefly, if not altogether), or they would get into trouble. As to Gen. Pollock, I promised to tell him all about it myself; he said he hoped[s] I would; and for the rest, Col. Taylor was at the foot of the hill; and so with mutual good wishes we parted.

[s] The hope was expressed, I imagine, to get the General informed there were doubts as to the goodness of the position.

I shall not enter into details of the subsequent events.

At the foot of the hill I mentioned briefly to Lieut.-Col. Taylor my being prevented by the arrival of Major Huish from taking the high hill, of which I advocated the necessity and feasibility; adding that in twenty minutes from Major Huish stopping me the whole would have been accomplished. Col. Taylor disagreed with me, his reasons being similar to those of Major Huish, but the discussion was short. The Colonel did not seem to think I knew much about the matter; so I went away to Gen. McCaskill at the village.

Midway I met Capt. Havelock, who may perhaps recollect my complaining of the contradictory [t] orders, which sent me up to be superseded just as we were completing the victory of the day, by a lesson to the enemy as desirable as the reverse we were now certain of, would be dangerous, with our comparatively inexperienced troops at the opening of a campaign. I recounted what had passed between Major Huish, Lieut.-Col. Taylor, and myself, and urged the necessity of yet getting the hill captured, or reverses would follow. I had the gratification to find he agreed in the necessity of taking the hills completely, and I believe he tried in vain to get it done.

[t] My impression at the time was that the contradiction arose, as in other cases there, from different general officers exercising command at one time, and orders coming through all sorts of channels, and I may have mentioned this to Capt. Havelock.

To Gen. McCaskill I reported my supersession by Major Huish having prevented the complete occupation of the hill. I believe I mentioned my interview with Lieut.-Col. Taylor, and I certainly stated my opinion of our position, but no reply [u] was given.

[u] The truth, I believe, is, the General was *ordered* to hold the position that I was calling untenable.

Capt. (now Major) Macgregor was at the village on the part of Gen. Pollock, and I think I mentioned the matter to him. I certainly did to Lieut. Mayne, in very plain terms, who said he could not help it, but would now get the orders as to myself from Gen. Pollock, who was at Mamoo Khel. Meanwhile the officers and sergeants of Sappers were ordered to collect all men in that quarter for fear of any sudden change in affairs.

Orders came for me to join the Sappers at Mamoo Khel; but, in the interim, our troops under Lieut.-Col. Taylor had been driven with loss from some of their positions, and reinforcements sent for. When those arrived I took leave of Gen. McCaskill and repaired to Mamoo Khel.

In reply to Gen. Pollock's interrogations, I mentioned what I had seen, and stated plainly and fully all the opinions above given; and on his demanding my opinion as to the best course in present cir-

cumstances, I still advised the capture of the hill, but by a larger force than Gen. McCaskill had, as it was no longer held by a beaten fragment of the enemy, outnumbered and pursued, but by a fast increasing body flushed with success. This not being agreed to, I advised the immediate withdrawal of our troops from Koodee Khel, more troops, especially cavalry, being sent to secure their retreat.

I also mentioned the state of Gen. McCaskill's health.[x]

Captain Macgregor, however, seemed to think Koodee Khel tenable without the whole hill, and nothing was decided then, save that Gen. McCaskill was to remain.

I believe[y] it was finally settled that, the day being now advanced, Gen. McCaskill should retire, and the enemy be attacked next morning. Cavalry was sent out, and the troops at Koodee Khel fell back in good order to Mamoo Khel; pursued, however, to that place by the enemy, who fired for a time and then drew off.

Next morning the enemy took post at Hissaruk, some miles west from Mamoo Khel, a good position for impeding our commissariat operations, as well as for guarding both roads to Cabool. We, however, let him alone; but we met him again the following month at Jugduluk, and then with a different fortune as to hills.

Such are my recollections of the affair at Mamoo Khel, giving in great detail all that bears on my relations with Col. Taylor, and merely indicating the other and more important events.

Battles are notoriously the subjects on which the memories of those engaged, most widely vary, even to contradiction; and I have no hope of escaping the common fate. Some will remember what I have forgotten, and forget what I remember. Others would see what I did not, or see the same things in a different light, while much that I have seen will be unknown to them; and one man may be flurried where another is not; but I have named, as far as I remember, those who were present.[z]

[x] Gen. McCaskill was very ill, but came out for the action and pushed on, as has been seen. The heat and fatigue so reduced his strength, that I left Koodee Khel not without apprehension regarding him.

[y] There were many conversations before and after the retreat of our troops. I took part in some, but counsels changed, and I forget whether it was decided to attack the hill in the morning or not. I think it was, for I remember discussing the plan of attack with Capt. Havelock, who was present at some of those conversations; and I think it was a view to this decision that enabled me to meet Capt. Macgregor's arguments, viz. 'political reasons,' and 'moral effect' on the people and chiefs, of retreat. The former were not detailed. For the latter I suggested victory, but thought our chances of it were not improved by letting the Afghans belabour two of our best regiments all night in a bad post. No troops, however, were warned for the attack, and it may not have been determined on.

[z] Add to the list all the officers of the Sappers, who saw more or less of what went on, viz. Lieut.

Orr, Lieut. Cunningham, and Dr. Forsyth. Messrs. Kelly and Bruen, now adjutants of police corps, were conspicuously employed in the main action. The latter also joined Col. Taylor's party, and was severely wounded on his repulse; he was sent to bring back straggling sappers, but seeing our comrades of Col. Taylor's force hard pressed, joined them.

A copy of this number of the 'Englishman' sent to each will be the first communication on the subject from me. I have, as far as I remember, kept back nothing, softened nothing, and, I hope, aggravated nothing. Let the gentlemen named say whether and how far the general tenor of their recollections varies from mine. Now for Lieut.-Col. Taylor's contradiction of my statement.[a] Here it is, being the end of my report[b] to Gen. Pollock. 'I was now directed to take a party of H.M.'s 9th Foot, the Sappers being now worn out, except about six men, and attack the hills. The first and second heights were carried at the point of the bayonet; and flanking parties having turned the shoulders of the high range, we were advancing up it, when the main force arrived, and our farther progress was stayed. My separate command now ceased, and I was soon after ordered with Sappers to headquarters.'

First, 'I was directed to take men of the 9th, and attack the hills.' Lieut.-Col. Taylor denies this. He says, 'No party of the 9th Foot was placed under Capt. Broadfoot's command either by me or by Gen. McCaskill.'

They were placed under my command by Lieut. Mayne, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General of the Infantry Division, to which Lieut.-Col. Taylor and I both belonged, and his orders, I presume, were, in such circumstances, to be taken as those of the general officer on whose staff he was,[c] and that was Gen. McCaskill. I did not know but what Gen. Pollock was up and had sanctioned the measure, perhaps given the order through Lieut. Mayne, for such things happened up there. But I felt quite sure of Gen. McCaskill, and could

[a] With that of 'Delhi Gazette,' or any similar one, I shall not meddle, either in the way of contradiction or confirmation. Materials for any account of the operations in Northern Afghanistan approaching to correctness are not before the public.

[b] Taken from the 'Delhi Gazette,' which I have seen since my former letter. My original report was verbal, merely stating that the delay of the main force brought the enemy on us, and forced us to engage singly, that we beat them, but at the close of the pursuit Major Huish came up and superseded me. I mentioned also getting some men of the 9th at the end of the pursuit, and their good behaviour; but all about Major Huish I *detailed* at that officer's request. Sir Richmond Shakespear (I think) was sent to me afterwards at the Sappers' bivouac for a written report, as they could not get on with a despatch for want of it. Dr. Forsyth will remember its being written in all haste and weariness; still, recollections were fresh, and it cannot be far wrong.

[c] Orders under fire were oftener brought, at least when I was employed, by Capt. Havelock, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, and Lieut. Mayne, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, than by any other staff officers, and no man ever did or could question the authority of either.

scarcely do otherwise. After consulting as to an enterprise which one of his principal staff officers wishes me to conduct, the former goes off 'to see what he can do.' He comes back saying he has got me men, and aids in the arrangements. What could I suppose [d] but that he had suggested to his superior the capture of the hill and my leading the assaulting party, and that both had been approved: more especially when in assuring me of support he mentioned the General as being up, and the whole force as coming on? Nay, more; had I thought I commanded the whole, or that I did more than lead the party that was to crown the hill, I should have been sorry to undertake the duty. Powerful support was required, involving bodies of troops my rank precluded me from commanding: I took it for granted, and till I learn the contrary from a good source I shall continue to believe, that the extensive movements against the hill were at least sanctioned by the General. And in this belief it was, I asked his staff officers, one of whom (Capt. Havelock) was my senior, to see the necessary steps taken for our support. They were taken, and with a skill and readiness strongly indicative of experience and zeal like theirs.

[d] Lieut. Mayne may remember, when I first asked for a sword he did not hear; and my saying (I fear with a little irritation), 'If I am to lead these men, you must get me a sword.'

But Lieut.-Col. Taylor says Gen. McCaskill placed no men of the 9th under my orders. Being near the General, I conclude he has asked him the question, and that the General did not give the order or does not remember it. I have served under Gen. McCaskill on other occasions, actively enough, and in all kinds of work, but I never received an order from *himself* yet that I can remember; nor is such the practice of armies; yet the General, I dare say, will not disavow my doings. Save in rare cases of emergency, requiring me to use my own judgment, my orders were from his staff, his Adjutant-General, his Quartermaster-General, his aide-de-camp, or, in sapper's work, his engineer; and so it was on the present occasion. I received the order from his Quartermaster-General, his authorised instrument, disobedience to orders conveyed through whom is a military crime. Lieut. Mayne knows best where he got the men, but he went for men and brought them for me to take up the hill; and he assuredly did not tell me that though the attack was sanctioned, it was entrusted to other hands.

The Lieutenant-Colonel continues: 'Nor did any soldiers of that corps act under his orders, to my knowledge.' Who, then, led them, i.e. the party who first gained the little hill? The Lieutenant-Colonel tells us: 'In justice,' says he, 'to two gallant officers, I have further to add that, on the occasion alluded to by you, I ordered

Major Huish, of the 26th N.I., and Capt. Ogle, H.M.'s 9th Foot (both senior to Capt. Broadfoot), to take two companies from each of those regiments and dislodge the enemy from the heights over *Kookey Kail'* (a misprint, I suppose, for Koodee Khel).

Major Huish, then, commanded; but first, it appears I have been transferring to others some of the Lieutenant-Colonel's own laurels. My orders being through Lieut. Mayne, I considered them as Gen. McCaskill's; but knowing the Lieutenant served all masters, I was not sure whether Gen. Pollock might not be the author, and merely reported, 'I was directed,' &c.

This, however, excluded Lieut.-Col. Taylor, under whose orders I was not. Now that officer, I make no doubt, gave the orders he says, whether in consequence of an application from Lieut. Mayne or not is immaterial; they were orders any man coming there with sufficient troops was likely to give, and on such occasions the same orders are often given by various leaders; but I beg to remind the reader that what I wanted was *the whole hill*, or none of it; less, I thought an error.

Having told us he had ordered Major Huish and Capt. Ogle to 'dislodge the enemy from the heights over Koodee Khel,' Lieut.-Col. Taylor continues, 'which they effectually did in a few minutes, and to those officers is due the credit of that gallant action.'

Most undoubtedly it is due to them if they did clear those heights effectually.[e] They were not cleared by me farther than is mentioned above. Did Major Huish go farther, after I left, than I had been? Were the heights cleared at all? Did the enemy's fire cease for a moment? Was he ever off the crest of the hill till he came down to pursue us from the base? Would to God the credit of 'effectual clearing' on that occasion had been ours to dispute about! To secure that, I would gladly resign my claim to share in it.

[e] The heights of Koodee Khel are a long narrow hill with steep sides, lying between the narrow valley of Koodee Khel on one side, and the village of the same name on the margin of the open country on the other. This hill, or these heights, were the scene of the contest between us and the Afghans; they on the upper part, we on the lower.

The Lieutenant-Colonel proceeds: 'Capt. Broadfoot, I understand, accompanied them with three or four of his Sappers; but he could have no command of a superior officer, Major Huish.' As to my commanding 'a superior officer, Major Huish,' I never imagined I had done so, for I do not think he was present. He showed every proper readiness to assume the command when he did come up, but that was after the ascent of the little hill. He may, however, have been with the assaulting party, but he did not then make himself known to me, nor did he lead it, and will not, I think, say he did.

Neither do I think he will court the honour of commanding an assault *a tergo*. If he does, I am satisfied to have 'accompanied' it at the other end.

Capt. (now Major) Ogle was present, as I learn from an officer here who was in the affair:[f] the claim for him is not of command, but of having been second under Lieut.-Col. Huish instead of me. If that would have pleased him better, I regret it was not so; and, in every case, I deeply regret not having known at the time that he was there; or rather, that he was my senior.[g] Lieut. Mayne could not have known his presence either, or else thought me the senior; perhaps did not advert to our relative standing at all: from whatever cause it arose that I led where I ought to have followed, I regret it for the sake of an officer so generally allowed as Major Ogle to be one of our best. Had I even known it before giving in my report, that document should have terminated with the occupation of the village and the enemy's camp. Luckily Major Ogle has not lost much; the affair was a trifling one as far as we carried it, though I wish it had ended as well as it was beginning.

[f] I have also an impression, but an uncertain one, that Lieut. Mayne recently informed me, Major Ogle had been there, and spoke of my having commanded a senior. I know Capt. Havelock informed me of a similar occurrence in another action.

[g] I do not think Lieut. Mayne mentioned his name, but am not sure, for hearing it would have told me nothing, as I knew few or no officers of the force that relieved Jellalabad. I made my first acquaintance with Lieut.-Col. Taylor and Lieut.-Col. Huish that day. I was in another brigade, and had been very constantly detached from headquarters during Gen. Pollock's stay at Jellalabad. I had, indeed, dined once at the mess of the 9th Regiment with Gen. Pollock, who lived there; but I knew not the names of the officers I then conversed with. Lieut. Mayne may have mentioned Capt. Ogle's name, but did not certainly say he was in command, or my senior, and it could hardly occur to me under the circumstances.

This whole affair is evidently one of misconception, arising from causes frequent enough in such cases. Lieut.-Col. Taylor probably saw that at least a portion of the hill must be held, if only to divert fire from the village, and ordered four companies under Major Huish to seize the part I have called the little hill; but arrangements he knew not of were previously made for the total dispersion of the enemy by their pursuit to the summit if they went there, and before Major Huish arrived the little hill was taken[h] by men procured by Lieut. Mayne for the greater scheme; but these men seem also to have been warned for the little plan, and to have been taken away for the other without Lieut.-Col. Taylor's knowledge; all likely things

[h] Major Huish is gone or going home, but an officer, I think, of his own regiment, whose name I do not know, was with him when he first addressed me; if he sees this he will remember (if he was present at any of our subsequent conversation) my informing Major Huish of the Afghans running up the ridge he thought impracticable, and of

the slight loss (one man killed) in taking the little hill, when he objected to attacking the summit. Our whole conversations were, on his part, in the style of one who had *not* come up at first, and therefore I doubt his presence in the attack; but I may be wrong. I saw only a few of the very foremost men; people do not look back on those occasions.

enough to happen on service of that kind, and probably all explicable (mistakes as to seniority and all) by five minutes' conversation among the parties concerned. Now this Lieut.-Col. Taylor might have had: Generals Pollock and McCaskill, Lieut.-Colonels Taylor and Huish, Majors Havelock and Ogle, Lieut. Mayne and myself were all together for nearly five months after that, but not a hint escaped the Lieutenant-Colonel on the subject. He and I served together, and became acquaintances, but he never mentioned the matter, nor did anyone else; yet my report was read at the Adjutant-General's Office, by various parties, before it was sent away, and even gave cause of complaint to myself by some who thought I underrated their services.[i] The events of the action were much discussed, my share of it and my opinions especially; and in due time my report appeared in print; but it was never noticed till now,[k] and then not by letter, but in a way that compels me not only to prove I had reason for what I said on the controverted points, but to set myself right with my professional friends, who otherwise could not but think so great a departure from courteous usage on the part of an officer of Lieut.-Col. Taylor's rank and reputation impossible, save to a man notoriously capable of arrogating to himself the honour due to his fellow-soldiers. Let them read this detail, and apply to it, as far as their judgment allows, the corrections or contradictions it may call forth. Then let them read my report to Gen. Pollock, and say if there be a trace of desire to overstate the services of my own corps or myself, or to shine at others' cost. I am conscious of having throughout the war in Afghanistan gone to the opposite extreme, of having scarcely done justice to the men and officers who served under my orders (at least as to affairs where I was myself present), in suffering without remonstrance their services to be slightly

[i] It was usual there to praise catalogues of officers. I was in the early part of the action dissatisfied with certain parties, but the arrangement for a separate column was suddenly made and imperfectly understood. Above all, inexperience mainly caused what I disliked; it was the first action for a good many. I would not praise, nor would I pointedly except. All the rest had done well. I said so, and named no one; but the officers with me will see I was not ungrateful to them.

[k] I do not, however, say that by lapse of time Lieut.-Col. Taylor forfeits his right to claim what he considers due to his officers, his men, or himself, when it has been otherwise given in despatches, or passed over in silence. Far from it. Some day I may perhaps follow his example; but I complain of his having without personal inquiry for so long a period, and without reference even by letter for explanation, written as he did to a public paper.

noticed, or kept altogether out of sight,[1] or in letting others reap where they had sown. I may suffer this, but I will not also be openly treated, and by a man of some mark, as guilty of the opposite baseness.

I owe an apology to the officers whose names are mentioned. I deeply regret that they and I should be dragged into controversy, a thing which, I fear, seldom raises our profession in the public estimation; but when attacked, one must defend.

I regret, too, that some things mentioned may not be agreeable to all. I differed from Lieut.-Col. Taylor at Koodee Khel, and did my best to get other plans adopted, as I thought this could only end in evil; but this was a public matter, publicly conducted. I gave my opinions freely to the General, the Lieutenant-Colonel knew them at the time,[m] and the military reader can judge whether, hold-

[1] From first to last they slipped strangely out of mind when despatches were writing: not at other times; indeed, as far as kind words and employment went, they seemed favourites.

I must here acknowledge, however, first, that Sir R. Sale having by accident discovered in Jellalabad some curious things of this kind, made the amende by referring generally to past services in the next laudatory order, which has not of course been published; and secondly, that in Gen. Pollock's Tezeen despatch he mentions me with some dragoons instead of Capt. Tritton, whom I only *accompanied* (not in Col. Taylor's sense) *en amateur* and as a guide; he commanded his men, not I; and right good work he made of it. I spoke not to the men except to pass Capt. Tritton's orders, unless that on first reaching the enemy I warned those near me to be cautious, that these fugitives were *ugly customers*, and got off their horses to fight, not escape. I mentioned this mistake in the proper quarter when I found it out, and would have done so officially, but that the account refutes itself. Sappers could not keep up with dragoons in a gallop of several miles, which the *first* business was, and then had I meddled with that despatch at all, I must have noticed other matters.

[m] One opinion I am not certain he knew at the moment, but he probably heard of it, as it was publicly given. I was present when Lieut.-Col. Taylor reported the success of the enemy, first to Gen. McCaskill at Khodee Khel, and afterwards to Gen. Pollock at Mamoo Khel. It was done publicly; Gen. Pollock was in a crowd under trees in the garden at Mamoo Khel. The Lieutenant-Colonel ascribed his misfortune to want of due firmness on the part of a portion of his troops. The Major-General spoke to me of it shortly afterwards, and I told him I thought there was no reason to distrust the troops for this check, that no troops whatever could have stood their ground in such a position. Those on the left at Koodee Khel had a steep and rocky hill in front occupied by the enemy, while their flank was in the air (to speak technically), and beyond it lay a rocky ravine amidst broken and commanding ground, the ravine leading down from the enemy's position to the country on the left and rear: the enemy from above, and from the continuation of the hills on the left, had only to occupy this, and, themselves secure, envelop this body of men in fire; and if troops so posted be assailed, the moment must come when a vigorous charge will rout them, be they who they may. That moment Afghans are quick to discern and resolute to use.

They are masters in mountain war; individually brave, yet cautious, and watchful; skilful in [choosing] ground, and of a coolness never to be disconcerted; swift to advance, timely in retreat, and expert in both; their masses were seldom shown, hardly ever uncovered to our fire, yet never far away when a blow could be struck. This will apply to all Afghans, but pre-eminently to the eastern Ghilzies and Eusofzies. Better arms, orga-

nisation, and leaders would make them troops of the highest order: the want of all three rendered their largest assemblages unworthy of the name of armies, and they knew this. I have seen in the field nearly all the chiefs who fought against us in Northern Afghanistan, but I only remember two who showed anything like military talent, and they were of very subordinate rank One, a brother (or cousin) of the petty Ghilzie Khan of Saroobee,[1] showed some skill and much courage against Sir R. Sale's rear guard in the Jugduluk pass in 1841; he fell in that fight. The other, Haji Ali, the commandant of a corps of Juzailchees in Mahomed Akbar's service, was at Mamoo Khel, but did not command, for several Barukzye and other Afghan chiefs of high rank were present. He was a Tajik of Cabool, formerly a shoemaker there, and of diminutive stature, all circumstances lowering his influence: religious zealotry and great valour scarcely saved him from the open ridicule of the lower Afghans and the good-humoured contempt of the Khans. He was in the village of Mamoo Khel in the morning, and as we crossed the stream to assail it, the usual taunts and reproaches between our Afghan sappers and their opponents turned from our side on the Haji's stature and former occupation. The advantage he took of the delay of the main force, to assail our right column, was judicious and prompt; the means employed, too, might have succeeded had time been given. At Koodee Khel he commanded on the heights, but the repulse of our troops from the ground they were on would have been effected as quickly by any Afghan peasantry. The prompt resumption after his success of a post on the line of operation was, however, due to him. His influence rose for the time, but Jugdulluk destroyed it. The greater Afghan chiefs were, as soldiers, one and all below mediocrity.

ing the opinions I did, it was or was not my duty to utter them plainly, in hope, first, of averting the dreaded evils, and afterwards of remedying them;[n] for with the latter object I ventured to recommend the attack of the heights at Koodee Khel, and consequent occupation of the valley; and on its being found the enemy had left Koodee Khel, I suggested their immediate attack at Hissaruk.[o] And be

[n] These evils, however, must not be overrated. Gen. Pollock's victory was still complete as to its primary object of expulsion of the enemy from Mamoo Khel, where he could not be tolerated by an army preparing at Gundumuk to enter the passes. Had the hill been taken, the enemy's rout would have been total, and we masters of all east of the passes; as it was, he was able with recovered courage to take up the next injurious position of Hissaruk. In itself, the mishap was but very partially absolute reverse; only in the first repulse from the untenable ground: our troops rallied when clear of that, and occupied gardens &c., keeping the enemy at bay, and they finally retired in good order; but it was unfortunate from pursuing to be put on the defensive, and finally to be pursued; with old troops it would have mattered nothing but the lives lost; with troops only once (I believe) in action before, it risked loss of confidence; but so excellent were those corps, that it did little or no harm, or if any the Jugduluk fight set all right. This check caused, however, nearly all the loss sustained in the 9th and 26th that day, a loss not great, but to be regretted as useless.

[o] Towards Hissaruk was the line of retreat of an army from Cabool, beaten at Mamoo Khel by one from Jellalabad; but no Afghan army could retire before regular troops across an open country; they therefore retreated on Koodee Khel, off the Cabool road, out of the line of operations altogether, and, of course, leaving it undefended; but they found shelter in Koodee Khel valley, which was too narrow to be safely entered without first seizing the hill between it and the village. Had we taken that, the valley also was ours with much of the grain of the neighbouring country there stored, and the enemy had no further refuge,

[1] Sarubi, a fort sixteen miles from Tezin.

no choice but destruction or utter dispersion. Hence my anxiety for the hill to be carried. The enemy, however, knew his true point, and, finding us checked, went to Hissaruk. The country in that direction is not so open as farther east, and was irrigated; but there was nothing to stop an army.

it remembered, though junior (and no two soldiers can be equal) to Lieut.-Col. Taylor, I was not under him. He commanded a regiment, and so did I; when we were on the same duty, I, of course, obeyed; and he never, I believe, found me reluctant. In fact, when I have been under him, it was in most cases voluntary. When the Sappers were distributed in detachments I might have ridden in dignity with a nominal headquarters, but I went where I could be most useful, though as a subordinate, and always put myself under such an officer as Lieut.-Col. Taylor with pleasure; yet I was in a position without impropriety to do as I did in recommending the completion of the work.

After all, the difference between us is one of opinion; and if he has made a mistake, all soldiers do the same; the best alone learn by them. The general voice, however, was with him at the time. Beyond the Sappers and some of the Staff, who had served in the previous campaign, I know not if any officer at Mamoo Khel sided with me then. Even at Jugduluk the attack of the upper range [p] was only ordered after much delay and a vain [q] cannonade, and then Gen. Pollock [r] went against eminent advice. It settled the hill question, and Lieut.-Col. Taylor, soon after, at Tezeen, the day before the action with Mahomed Akbar, showed, in a brilliant hill affair of his own, that the lesson had not been lost.

[p] This was, however, so distant as to be almost a separate range, just within cannon shot of the lower heights. At Koodee Khel the village was within long musket range of the top of the upper hill. Had the little hill been in the same line, the fire directed at it would have made the village a very uncomfortable post.

[q] My artillery comrades of Afghanistan know how highly I valued them and their arm; and at Koodee Khel I longed for Major Backhouse and his mountain train; but we used sometimes to forget that, save in breaching and other exceptional cases, it is a *co-operating*, not a *main* arm, still less to be used singly. Indeed, we were too apt to make one arm attempt the work of all, or to use them successively instead of together.

[r] On Gen. Pollock telling me his resolution to attack, and ordering me to join it, I expressed my happiness thereat; when he mentioned its being opposed by the officers of rank he had consulted.

If anything now written gives pain to Lieut.-Col. Huish, I shall regret it; he is not the assailant, but he is the assailant's battle horse, and the one cannot well be repelled without the other. If our acquaintance at Koodee Khel began a little roughly, it soon became friendly. In our conversations, he may remember I sought neither command nor credit for myself, but urged *him* to take *his*

men on to finish the work;[s] and if I presumed to remonstrate or advise, he will not perhaps forget that I excused and illustrated what I said by reference to our own errors, and their punishment in Gen. Sale's force the year before: though differing in opinion, we parted as friends. Later in the day I heard with sorrow of his wound; and rejoiced when we met again as comrades in Kohistan, where, and in the passes coming back from Cabool, I ever found him the active and gallant commander of a brave and willing corps.

[s] Major Havelock will bear witness that in our many conversations at this time, I urged only the performance of the service by the officers and the troops nearest the place, not my being employed or the Sappers. Once only I volunteered the latter for the main attack on the following day, on hearing some talk of 'a mere sacrifice of men.' Throughout the war I was much employed in separate commands, but I never asked for them.

To Lieut. Mayne I offer no apology for using his name. He will see it is unavoidable. I have little doubt of his remembering the main facts, but I am going across the sea, and reference would cause much loss of time; our conversations are given, therefore, in considerable detail, lest any link in the chain of circumstances should have escaped his memory, which these may recall.[t] He will, I doubt not, tell Lieut.-Col. Taylor where he got the men, as well as whether or not he led me to understand I was to lead them; and I feel perfectly sure it will turn out that he obtained the men in a proper way, and never exceeded the limits of his duty, whether he acted by direct orders from his superior, or by using the discretion left in such circumstances to all staff officers, and especially to one in whom all above him justly placed so much reliance as they did in him.

[t] This is also the reason of my giving so many other details.

I cannot ask editors of other papers to insert all this, but I trust those who copied Lieut.-Col. Taylor's letter will inform their readers that something has been said on the other part, and tell them where to find it.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

G. BROADFOOT, *Major*,
A.D.C. to the Governor-General,
late commanding Sappers and Miners.

Spence's Hotel: March 18, 1843.

This letter, besides being useful as a complete account of the operations at Mamu Khel, shows the high soldierly spirit which animated Broadfoot on all occasions.

After this affair, Mamu Khel was occupied for a few days, and the troops returned to Gandamak on August 30.

Broadfoot wrote many letters during the halt at Gandamak, of which two, addressed to Mr. Loch and Mrs. Bayley, are here reproduced.

Camp near Gundumuk: September 5, 1842.

My dear Sir,—I have, as you know, usually addressed a few lines each month to the mother of my poor friend, Capt. Mackenzie; and I purposed doing so this month, but I can only give news of him so disheartening, that I think it best to put you in possession of all we as yet know, with a view to your making Mr. Butterworth Bayley acquainted with it, and he, I doubt not, will communicate to Mrs. Mackenzie so much of it as may be desirable.

Mahomed Acbar has removed the prisoners towards Bameean, except two, Captains Troup and Bygrave, whom he retains near himself; and two ladies, Mrs. Eyre and Mrs. Anderson, too ill to be removed. With them he has left Dr. Campbell. Whether their husbands are also left, is not, I believe, known.

Poor Mackenzie last month had a very severe illness; from which, however, he has since recovered. When the captivity of these unfortunates will end, it is now impossible to say.

It was my intention to have written you at some length before now, but I have been prevented; first, by being sent out in this direction six weeks back, with a detachment so small as to be somewhat unsafe. It could not, however, be reinforced at the time; and I was consequently obliged to break up the confederacy of the surrounding clans by rapid and unexpected movements against them severally, while they believed we were on the defensive. In this way we managed to bring the whole country round us into submission; but the fatigue to men and officers was excessive, and is now telling on us in great sickness.

I was next detached to a place, Tatang (not that of our maps), abreast of this (about five miles south), to destroy a strong fort, belonging to Mahomed Acbar.

On Gen. Sale coming out to Futehabad, I joined him; but being now known to all the people for many miles round, I had to act a good deal as interpreter, &c. Nearly a fortnight back Gen. Pollock came out here and sent back to Futehabad for the Sappers, who arrived just in time to take part in an affair with the enemy on the 24th ultimo.

For the last few days I have been unwell from fatigue and exposure, which, with very constant work in my commissariat capacity

(for I feed my own people and cattle), has prevented me from writing any private letters.

Our force is now concentrated here. The troops are abundantly numerous, and of a quality equal to meet any enemy; but an inefficient commissariat cripples us. There is no excuse for it. Had Gen. Cullen been here, difficulties would scarcely have been heard of.

We march, if possible, to-morrow. Two days ago, I strongly urged the formation of a depôt here, and I hope it will be done. The officers most about the General to whom I spoke, agreed; but the General himself was naturally anxious to carry as many troops as possible to Cabool. But I shall be apprehensive as to our communications if this end of the passes be left unguarded.

I also urged the General to abandon all tents, and put the native troops on half rations, which are ample for mere subsistence. He had before reduced the tentage one half, and has now yielded as far as three-quarter rations. The tents will never be pitched in the passes; and at Cabool there is nothing to prevent our occupying the inhabitants' dwellings as in Europe. The carriage of the tents would convey more sick and wounded than we can now accommodate, and warm clothing for the cold weather now at hand; two points of first-rate importance. The General would do this, but that he is perhaps a little too sensitive to the murmurings, which are only heard from those who are undeserving of notice or consideration.

There is no difficulty before us that a moderate share of foresight and good management cannot overcome; and I am, therefore, in hopes, notwithstanding our deficiency in carriage, that all will go well. We ought to be getting over what have much injured us heretofore, a foolish contempt of the enemy, causing rashness, and then a miserable timidity, almost panic, on finding this rashness produce its inevitable effects.

You are perhaps aware that Lord Ellenborough has paid me the very flattering compliment of placing me on his personal staff. In fact he has in every way shown me the most distinguished kindness. I suspect that in this I am indebted not a little to Lord Elphinstone's kindness, which has been very great indeed, and unremitting. I shall probably never again meet him, but I must ever feel grateful to him.

Gen. Nott is now well on his way; but any combination at such a distance, and with a communication so completely closed, is out of the question. Each force ought to be strong enough to do the work singly; and then the want of perfect concert is harm-

less. We are strong in all but heavy artillery, engineers' tools, and gunpowder.

The enemy, however, is fortunately not a formidable one. Still, I should have liked greater preparation for every event, and, above all, a better supply of carriage; in one word, an efficient commissariat. However, my next will, I trust, be from Cabool, and announce ample success.

The Governor-General has provided for young Cunningham (a son of Allan the poet), one of my officers, who, on the close of hostilities, goes into the Mysore Commission. I am now anxious to see something done for Orr and for our surgeon, Dr. Forsyth, regarding whom I ventured to write to you; and these will doubtless also be provided for, seeing that Lord Ellenborough seems resolved to pick out for promotion those he considers working men.

I was very sorry lately to hear your health had been affected in the early part of summer. I trust it is now re-established, and that Miss Loch and the *middy* are also well. Give them both my very best wishes, and believe me &c.

G. BROADFOOT.

You will, of course, hear from other channels of Futeh Jung, the son of Shah Shoojah, and lately nominal king at Cabool, having escaped to this camp.

Gen. Nott is said to have defeated the enemy at Mookoor, about five marches south of Ghuznee.

I was pained to see that poor Gen. Elphinstone was accused at home even of personal cowardice. No one could less deserve so base an imputation. As a high-spirited, honourable man, his family need not blush for him. Than his military measures, nothing could be more feeble and ill judged, but, as he himself said to me, before the rebellion broke out in Cabool, he was gone in body and mind; and had it been otherwise, incapacity as a commander—errors, that is, in judgment—is scarcely a fit subject of vituperation.

The following may be added as additional testimony in favour of the unfortunate General.

Eldred Pottinger, in a letter to Col. Buller Elphinstone, announcing Gen. Elphinstone's death, and forwarding a memorandum found among his effects, remarked that the opinions of the unprejudiced in the army coincided with those expressed in the General's memorandum. Further, he continued, that he and his companions in misfortune were at a loss which more to admire, the noble fortitude with which the General bore his

great reverse of fortune and excessive bodily pain, or the constant self-denial he showed during his prolonged illness in regard to the wants and cares of others in preference to his own.

Next day Broadfoot wrote to Mrs. Bayley:

Camp near Gundumuk: September 6, 1842.

My dear Mrs. Bayley,—We were to have marched this morning, and however much I regret on other accounts our delay till to-morrow, I rejoice that it gives me an opportunity of thanking you, before we move into the passes, for two letters which nothing but an unseasonable attack of illness, conjoined with the bustle of preparation for the journey, has prevented me from duly answering. Not that I have been very unwell, but from having been for the last six weeks detached, we had fallen into arrears of pay, and these accounts, with all preparations crowded into a few days, made a very little illness indispose me more than a much severer attack at other times.

. . . . . .

I began this letter in the morning, and have continued almost word by word amidst incessant interruptions, till it is now dawk hour, and I must close.

The day's delay has caused an entire change in the order of advance, and has thrown apparently all into Gen. Sale's hands, which has not raised the hopes of the poor Company's men, of fame at least in despatches. However, time will show. The poor old General (Sale, I mean) has, I fear, prejudiced advisers around him, a thing very mischievous at all times, and especially now. But you must really pardon me for all this camp gossip, with which, to say the truth, I am so stunned, that it runs from my ears to my pen, almost without my knowledge. In fact, you cannot imagine what barbarians we are in camp, positively all men *à une idée*, or monsters *à mille idées*; and I do seriously apprehend that I shall never again be able to comport myself decently in civilised society. You must at any rate take me in hand for a time; tame the bear, in fact, for such you will doubtless style me.

Again interrupted, but now by a man three days from Cabool, who says our poor prisoners and the royal families were carried off by night; that the force sent to succour Ghuznee had returned; that Mahomed Akbar was in vain trying to assemble a force to meet us in the passes, but that the troops we beat the other day, with Ghilzye reinforcements, were awaiting us on this side of Jugdulluk. I apprehend no opposition we shall not easily overcome; for Gen. Pollock, if not a Napoleon, is superior to any general

officer I have yet chanced to meet in these regions. But I am falling back to the *one idea*, so I must, with promises of future amendment, beg you to offer my kindest regards to all your circle, and to believe me ever, my dear Mrs. Bayley, most truly yours,

G. BROADFOOT.

P.S. I used to write to Colin's mother about him, but could not last month or this; the news was too cheerless. He is, I believe, safe, and will eventually be restored, but when is uncertain.

The day after this letter was written, Pollock's force marched for Kabul.

Again, as before with Sale's brigade, the posts of honour were assigned to Broadfoot's Sappers; they led the advance and were the last in the rear guard.

The first half of Broadfoot's Sappers were immediately followed by the 5th company of the Bengal Sappers and Miners, Backhouse's mountain train, nine companies of a Native Infantry regiment, four guns of Abbott's battery, and three companies of a European regiment. It is believed that this order was followed in the advance guard throughout the march to Kabul; except when the disposition had to be varied for purposes of attack.

The march to Surkhab, nine miles, took over five hours, though the troops were unmolested by the enemy. Traces of the unfortunate Kabul army were everywhere to be seen, but most frequent near the conical hill close to Gandamak, where the last stand was made. Snow had fallen after the Kabul army was destroyed, and the severe frost, together with the snow, had in instances preserved the bodies, so that recognition was possible. These silent yet eloquent witnesses to the value of a convention with Afghans, appealed to their comrades for retribution. Some of the troops had already sworn, at the request of the wives of the destroyed men, to avenge their husbands.

Next day, September 8, the force marched for Jagdalak. Defective intelligence resulted in Pollock finding the enemy in considerable strength where he was ignorant of their existence. Broadfoot evidently considered the fighting in the passes on this occasion so very slight in comparison with what he had seen when Sale's brigade fought its way through, that he left little on record concerning these marches. It is sufficient to say that on this day there was fighting, and where that was

thickest there were to be found Broadfoot and his men. Briefly, when Pollock saw that the enemy, mostly on this occasion Ghilzis, could not be dislodged by artillery from their positions on the hills which commanded the road, he resolved on attacking them by infantry.

For this purpose Capt. Broadfoot was detached to the extreme left of the enemy's position, and his Sappers commenced ascending a steep hill on the top of which the enemy were entrenched in a 'sungah.'[2] . . . Capt. Broadfoot had completely succeeded in the attack he made, and the enemy were dispersed in every direction, a large body of them retiring to the summit of a high mountain. On this apparently inaccessible height they planted their standards and showed every demonstration of maintaining it. As the achievements of the day would have been incomplete were they suffered to remain, I decided upon dislodging them. The following troops advanced under cover of Capt. Abbott's guns and those of Capt. Backhouse's mountain train: H.M.'s 13th L.I., one company 26th N.I., one company 35th L.I., 5th company Bengal Sappers and Broadfoot's Sappers. Seldom have soldiers had a more arduous task to perform, and never was an undertaking of the kind surpassed in execution: these lofty heights were assaulted in two columns led by Captains Wilkinson and Broadfoot.[3]

The discomfited Ghilzis fled, carried off their standards, and their position was occupied by the assailants.

Another event of the day deserves to be recorded. Backhouse has stated that the enemy having opened rather a warm fire on the left flank, Sale ordered him to draw up his battery on that flank, not to fire, but to use them 'as a parapet or traverse to intercept the enemy's fire.'

It is probable that the mountain train was unnecessarily exposed by Sale's order, and its commander was with reason indignant. The Afghans had used our dead soldiers as a protecting rampart, but it is by no means to be accepted that an English officer deliberately put a living corps to a similar use.

[2] 'Sungah,' *sungur*, properly *sangar*: a breastwork usually made of stones, or stones and the trunks and branches of trees, behind which the defenders can fire on assailants with comparative immunity. In the passes on this occasion, the bodies of our destroyed army formed no inconsiderable part of the works. See marginal note, page 141.

[3] 'Pollock's despatch.'

The next marches, to Kata Sang on September 9, and to Seh Baba on the 10th, were made without fighting.

On the 11th, Pollock marched to Tezin; a few parties of the enemy posted on the heights were dislodged by the fire of the artillery of the advance guard.

Here he was joined by the 2nd division of his army under Gen. McCaskill, and the combined force halted to give the carriage animals much needed rest. The immediate effect of this halt was that Muhammad Akbar and the Afghans, attributing it to indecision, determined on a final struggle. He sent the majority of the prisoners towards the Hindu Kush and Turkistan, collected his forces, and marched to Tezin.

On the 12th, towards evening, the outposts were assaulted by the Afghans with great courage. Backhouse has related that a piquet of Broadfoot's Sappers was very vigorously attacked, and its defenders were getting the worst of it, at a stone's-throw distance from our main body, though on a very high steep hill, when a company of their old comrades, the 13th L.I., came to their assistance, and the Afghans were dispersed.

Col. Taylor of the 9th, to whom reference has already been made, was sent out to drive back another party of the enemy; he had about 250 men of his regiment, and was joined by Major Huish and a small party of the 26th N.I.; with this little force he attacked and drove them before him up the hills. When the Afghans arrived at the top, they established themselves there and kept up a heavy fire; but Col. Taylor, with skill and gallantry, brought up unperceived a small part of his little force, and then suddenly attacked the Afghans in flank, who, surprised, fled incontinently down the steep hill, and during their flight suffered severely. Lieut. Elmhirst of the 9th distinguished himself greatly on this occasion.

Next day, September 13, the force marched to Khurd Kabul, through the Tezin pass. A party was detached to turn the hills far to the right of the advancing army.

On the advance guard arriving about the middle of the pass, and turning a projecting rock, the enemy were discovered quite close in front, swarming on the hills right and left of the pass, and brisk

firing instantly commenced on both sides. 'We had advanced without due precaution, the heights not having been crowned, and were in consequence somewhat taken by surprise, and considerable delay in attacking the enemy for a time followed.'[4]

Gen. Pollock in his despatch dated September 14, 1842, has recorded that on the morning of the 13th 'it was perceived that the Afghans had occupied in great force every height not already crowned by our troops.' The effect was, therefore, that the heights to which Backhouse refers, were crowned by Afghan instead of by British troops. The former had been first in the field, and had occupied the place of vantage. The Afghan force on that day is computed to have amounted to 16,000 men, led by the principal chiefs, among whom Pollock mentions Muhammad Akbar Khan, Aminulla Khan, chief of Logar, and Muhammad Shah Khan, Ghilzai. When the British troops ascended the hills to drive the Afghans off, a determined struggle ensued; the Afghans came down to meet them, and in more places than one on that day there was a practical exhibition of sword *versus* bayonet. Eventually the latter carried the day, and the enemy was driven from one position to another, till the Haft Kotal alone remained in their hands. Here they made a final and resolute stand, but it availed not. 'The finest sight of the day was Capt. Broadfoot and the diminutive Ghoorkas of his corps of Sappers pursuing the enemy from crag to crag, and climbing heights which appeared inaccessible, till they stood on the highest point of the Haft Kotal and were enabled to look down on the enemy they had chased.'[5] Lieut. Cunningham with a party of sappers captured a 24-pounder howitzer, and another was taken by a party of dragoons under Capt. Tritton, and horse artillery under Major Delafosse.

The rear guard was under Col. Richmond, who afterwards held the appointment of Governor-General's Agent on the North-Western Frontier, one of the most important in India. His arrangements for the protection of the baggage were described by Gen. Pollock as judicious and admirable, and deserving of the greatest credit.

[4] Backhouse's journal.

[5] Marshman's *Life of Havelock*, chap. iii. p. 128.

Capt. Broadfoot on this occasion was mentioned in despatches.

Khurd Kabul was reached without further opposition, and shortly after dark the army was encamped there. The march on the 14th was through the Khurd Kabul pass, across which, about the middle, the enemy had erected two breastworks. They were found unoccupied.

The sight of the remains of the unfortunate Kabul force in this pass was fearfully heartrending. They lay in heaps of fifties and hundreds, our gun-wheels passing over and crushing the skulls and other bones of our late comrades at almost every yard, for three, four, or five miles; indeed, the whole of the marches from Gandamak to Kabul, a distance of about seventy-seven miles, may be said to have been over the bodies of the massacred army.[6]

Pollock's force reached Butkhak unmolested, save by one solitary Afghan, who, placed to his satisfaction high among the rocks, amused himself and vindicated his patriotism by maintaining an unequal combat. History does not tell whether he was killed or wounded; not improbably, he that evening, in the capacity of peaceful villager, visited the British camp and sold chickens, or such other property as he possessed, at an extravagant price.

Capt. Troup and Dr. Campbell, two of the prisoners, joined the force on this day.

Next day, September 15, 1842, Pollock marched unmolested to Kabul, and pitched his camp three miles to the east of the city on the old racecourse. The second, or it may be called the first, instalment of the prisoners arrived, as Capt. Troup and Dr. Campbell appear to have returned on the night of the 14th to bring in the others. These were Mrs. Trevor and eight children, and Capt. and Mrs. Anderson and three children.

On the 17th, Gen. Nott arrived from Kandahar, and encamped about three miles to the west of Kabul. On the same day the prisoners, who had virtually effected their own liberation, mainly through the exertions of Eldred Pottinger and Capt. Johnson (a favourite of the Afghans and proficient in their language), met Sir Richmond Shakespear, who had gone out in quest of them. On September 22, they were all

[6] Backhouse's journal.

safe in the British camp, except Capt. Bygrave, who did not come in till the 27th. Thus the objects for which the Governments of India and England had striven were accomplished, and all that remained was to inflict a measure of punishment which should be felt by the Afghans, and to withdraw the army to British India.

Gen. Nott arrived at Kabul on September 17, having with his well-equipped and efficient little force defeated the Afghans wherever they could be induced to oppose him. He was very angry when he ascertained on arrival that Pollock had only one week's supply of provisions, for that fact made delay at Kabul probable, and such delay was contrary to the wishes of Government. He also saw that whilst delayed, the provisions for his own force, calculated to last till they arrived at Jalalabad, would be consumed. Pollock, on the contrary, seemed in no hurry to move. Influenced apparently by Macgregor and Lawrence, he proceeded to install Fateh Jang on the throne of Kabul. All this was intolerable to Nott, who understood his instructions, and estimated at their proper value the ceremony of installation, and Afghan professions of devotion. He believed he could leave a lasting mark of retribution on Kabul, and retire before the enemy had time to collect, and before the approaching winter should arrive to aid them. His feelings on this subject are expressed in letters to his daughters, dated September 26 and October 7, 1842.

Why we are remaining here I know not. In fact, I know nothing, and am not admitted into the State secrets of a set of boys, by whom Gen. Pollock seems to be surrounded. . . . I do not think that any disaster can possibly occur to such an army; but this I *do* know, that if it were possible the people in power here would accomplish it; whether their want of energy and decision will bring it upon us, a few days will show.

What we are staying for I am utterly at a loss to know, unless it be to be laughed at by the Afghans and the whole world. . . . Had I commanded, I would have blown up the famed Bala Hissar, and at this moment should have had my little veteran army at Peshawar. Fortunately, the season as yet has been unusually mild, or our men would have suffered greatly; but what man of sense would have run the risk, for the sake of following at the heels and dancing attendance on a set of Afghans, whose hands are still red with the blood of our murdered countrymen?

The chief of Logar, Aminulla Khan, had, during the fortnight after the battle of Tezin on September 13, collected a number of chiefs and their followers in the neighbourhood of Istálif, a town on the road from Kabul northwards to Chárikár, in that part of the country called Koh dámán. He was one of the most inveterate foes of the British, and it was considered advisable to despatch a force to take Istalif, and to disperse his adherents. Gen. McCaskill was selected to command, and a suitable force, including Broadfoot's Sappers, the 9th Foot, the 26th N.I., and Backhouse's mountain train, was placed at his disposal. Havelock accompanied the force as Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, and in his Life[7] it is claimed that he not only designed the operations, but directed and exclusively controlled them. Without conceding this in the full meaning of the words, it is probable that Gen. McCaskill was greatly indebted to Havelock's high soldierly qualities for the brilliant victory which was gained. Eldred Pottinger, who was present, and whose services on that occasion were of great value, recognising Havelock's worth, said to him that his presence at Kabul during the time of trial there would have altered the aspect of affairs. To him Havelock replied, 'I will not undertake to say that I could have saved Cabul, but I feel confident that George Broadfoot would have done it.'

The town of Istalif is beautifully situated on the slopes of the hill to the west of the Kabul road. It has a somewhat pyramidal form; the larger terraces being at the foot with others above, as the different ledges of ground permit, gradually diminishing in width. In front are orchards, vineyards, and gardens, walled and affording excellent cover for defence.

Gen. McCaskill's force encamped in the plain three or four miles from the town. Major Sanders, an able officer of engineers, afterwards killed at the battle of Maharajpur, reconnoitred the position the evening before the attack. He was fired on from the gardens, but conducted his reconnaissance with perfect coolness till ordered to retire.

The night was intensely cold; a strong bitter wind was followed in the very early morning by hard frost. The attack commenced soon after daylight; Brigadier Tulloch on the left,

[7] Marshman's *Life of Havelock*, p. 133.

and Brigadier Stacey on the right. Of the former or left attack the General wrote:

I cannot express in adequate terms my admiration of the style in which the former column, covered by skirmishers, rushed upon the gardens filled with bold and skilful marksmen. H.M.'s 9th, the 26th N.I., and Capt. Broadfoot's Sappers vied with each other in steady courage, and their rapid and unhesitating advance soon left the enemy no resource but flight.

The lower part of the town was then stormed, and soon the Afghan belief in the impregnability of the virgin fortress began to be dissipated. From the top of the pyramid, first a few, then more, and lastly all who could get away, began to stream up the hill in flight. One of the first to go was Aminulla, the chief, and after him the crowd was mainly composed of women and children. To their flight no opposition was offered; but when afterwards parties of the Afghans occupied the heights, and fired down on the town, now in the hands of the British, Backhouse was deputed, with his mountain guns, to dislodge them. This he did in gallant style.

Lieut. Elmhirst, of the 9th, again distinguished himself by capturing a gun, and at once opening fire with it on the enemy.

Though most of the women escaped up the hill, yet many were in the town when it was abandoned to fire and sword. Of the contents of the houses, much turned out to be plunder from the unfortunate Kabul force. The women were respected: there were many anecdotes concerning them, among others the following:[8]

Capt. Broadfoot at Istalif saved a young girl from death, in the midst of a furious combat in a narrow street. She had the exquisite beauty of the Kohistani women, both of form and feature, and appeared about seventeen.

She clung to his feet and poured out her gratitude with all the fervour of an Oriental, whose blood runs like fire through their veins; she said she would never leave him, when a sound struck her ear; she started up, listened for an instant, and then cried out, 'Oh, my child! Oh, my life!' and notwithstanding all Capt. Broadfoot's entreaties and assurances that he would himself seek the infant, the young mother rushed back into the deadly conflict, and there doubtless perished.

Another is, that two men of the 9th, having captured a

[8] Received from Mrs. H. C. Mackenzie.

very pretty girl, not wishing to fight about her, agreed to toss, it being provided that the winner should marry her when they could find a priest. No sooner said than done: triumphant, the winner marched off with his prize, when he was disagreeably interrupted by an order to make the young person over to the political officer. The man remonstrated, but in vain, and he parted from the girl exclaiming, 'By Jasus! it's a hard case, and I pledged not to offer her any violence till I married her.'

McCaskill's force proceeded northwards and destroyed Charikar, where the Shah's Gurkha regiment had been cut to pieces, and where William Broadfoot had erected a stone to the memory of James, killed at the Parwan pass. The force returned to Kabul on October 7.

Broadfoot was wounded in the hand at Istalif, where his conduct was again most distinguished, and added to a reputation which was rapidly distancing all competition.

The business now before Pollock was to leave a signal mark of British power on the Afghan capital, and to get away as fast as possible.

For the former, he selected the destruction of the bazaar, and a mosque in which, it is believed, Macnaghten's body had been exposed.

This was carried into effect by Capt. F. Abbott, the commanding engineer; and the army, in three divisions, left Kabul on October 12, 1842. By November 6 they were encamped at Chamkanni near Peshawar, having halted for a few days at Jalalabad, and employed the time in destroying the fortifications raised by Broadfoot during the memorable siege.

Proper precaution having been neglected, the army suffered some loss on the march; amongst those wounded was Lieut. Neville Chamberlain, then known as a brave and good officer, afterwards the most conspicuous member of a family of fine soldiers.

Broadfoot wrote to Dr. Malcolmson from Chamkanni on November 6:

> My first attempt at writing with a pen: I can as yet only use forefinger and thumb, and that gives pain to a slight extent.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> I believe Nott is now through the pass. The army came in three divisions: the first lost some baggage and a few men; the second

suffered a serious disaster; the third, as far as I know, has come well through.

I am much grieved at seeing the lustre of our arms thus tarnished by our own mismanagement, for by this alone can we lose either baggage or guns. I mean against Afghan enemies. Poor Wild is again the unfortunate, but from all I hear the blame is neither with him nor with the troops. In days of yore, you and I used to hold being a good officer cheap enough. I now begin almost to reverence one, not for any extraordinary difficulty in being able to command moderately well, but from the rarity of those who can do it.

Had I been Gen. Pollock, I would have turned back with the whole force and subdued the Khyber, a thing never yet attempted by us, and punished the Khyberees throughout. Ten days would easily do it, and this item would but lead to our military reputation being brightened. Nothing of the sort, however, will be done.

I precede the force, I believe, a day or two, to make ghats (approaches to fords) at the rivers.

There is an incomplete sentence in the letter noting the various losses of the three divisions since they left Kabul, and saying that all of them might have been avoided. The copy of this letter was made by a clerk in Messrs. Forbes & Co.'s house in Bombay, and is accompanied by a few hurried lines to Miss Broadfoot from Dr. Malcolmson.

I have no time to add more, or to correct the copy. I heard from Colin McKenzie, George's friend and mine, the day before. He tells me truly that besides George there is none worthy to lead in that army. If I can I shall send a copy, but the mail closes in an hour, and I have yet much to do.

The copy does not appear to have been sent; allowance will be made for the language of enthusiastic friendship such as Mackenzie's and Malcolmson's; but others not by nature disposed to exaggeration, among whom was Havelock, held much the same opinion; that is, they looked on Broadfoot as the man among them all best fitted for command, though there were others with the force not only fit to lead armies, but capable of doing it well; and among the younger men none more so than Henry Havelock. His expressed opinions will be found farther on.

Whilst on the march towards Firozpur, through what was

then the independent Punjab, Broadfoot wrote from Camp, Jhanjali,[9] December 12, 1842:

Accept my best thanks for your letter: you must judge how I value it, when I tell you that this is, I believe, the latest day for the January packet from Bombay, and I take from pressing work, time to thank you, though I thereby show my ingratitude to *more punctual* correspondents. . . .

The Jellalabad garrison has been reunited, and this day marched from Gen. Pollock's camp at the Ravee in order to enter Ferozpore separately, and after a few days to be dispersed for ever.

Gen. Pollock's force follows, and then Gen. Nott's. There is already there an army of reserve; when all are united the force will be 35,000 or 40,000 men. A Sikh army nearly as numerous will, it is said, assemble on the opposite bank of the Sutlej; and as the followers, that is men and women of every conceivable description and rank, will not be less than 200,000,[1] our canvas city will not be a small one.

Such a demonstration is by no means needless after a measure so liable to be misrepresented as our abandonment of Afghanistan. Sher Singh, the son and second successor of old Runjeet, is coming to meet Lord Ellenborough at the Sutlej. There will be nothing but reviews and entertainments, such as perhaps since the Romans, Bŭonaparte alone has, out of India, been able to exhibit. Alas! all this is rendered to me at times painful, and always far other than it would have been a few years back, by the losses we have since then suffered.

I shall meet Lord Ellenborough for the first time at Ferozpore; but whether I shall become one of his family, as it is technically called, at once, or superintend the dispersion of the corps I have raised and in such stirring scenes commanded, I know not.

Lord Ellenborough has indeed been a most kind friend, and he is most considerate. It is a rule in general, that the pay of a new situation begins only on joining it. But an old exception existed in favour of the Governor-General's aides-de-camp. Lord E. took the trouble to have this proved against the offices of account, and I was duly apprised of it, without any hint or application from me, direct or indirect. So I have now not lost by the abolition of the Shah's service; nor shall I do so till I separate from the corps. I shall do this with sorrow, for nobly indeed have they stood by me. William's portion of it I broke up at Peshawur, except a few individuals, who,

[9] Four marches from Firozpur on the road from Shekhopūra to Kasūr.

[1] The figure seems large, but without doubt the number of camp followers was very great.

having served under James and William, *would not go*. What I am to do with them I know not.[2]

To settle all the accounts of the corps gives me no slight labour, considering that it must be done on a march.

A few days afterwards Broadfoot wrote the following letter to Mrs. Bayley:

Camp, right bank of the Sutlej: December 16, 1842.

My dear Mrs. Bayley,—Your kind note of the 3rd came yesterday, and to enable me to acknowledge it, I have risen at 3 A.M., the day being sure to be occupied more than enough in preparation for to-morrow's tamasha, and for the breaking up of the poor Sapper corps, which is now approaching dissolution. Hitherto we have been distributing medals, which, with the gay ribbon, have thrown the garrison, and above all, the men of the Sappers, into a very amusing state of joy. The latter worthy corps amused themselves till a pretty late hour last night, with periodical cheers, just so timed as to prevent each interruption to sleep being forgotten before another came; and as it would have been cruel to interrupt them, I suffered patiently, but am now in consequence so abominably drowsy, that had I the slightest chance of being alone half an hour, for some days, I would delay saying how glad I was to hear from yourself, of your being *so far* recovered, and that the little beauty was well. Master Bayley is a very fortunate youth, is he not? As to Colin, he left us at the Ravee, and has since been here with Mr. Clerk. He is better, but still unwell; and he has amazed the people here, I understand, by a display of velvet and gold almost equal to Shah Shoojah himself when in his glory. The ladies say 'he is a love of a man,' &c.—all which Colin takes meekly. Only fancy his having planned this great success even in Cabool, and his having always with us worn dresses a fakeer would have pitied. Pray tell him his glory has reached the capital, but do not spread it abroad, for he has still another change of raiment wherewith to dazzle your Calcutta bright eyes. Thus far had I proceeded when interruption the first occurs. A gentleman, seeing a light in this tent, hopes to be forgiven, &c. I cannot forgive, but I must endure him, and finish this note in the next tent.

[2] The following anecdote, communicated by Mrs. H. C. Mackenzie, is illustrative of the influence, amounting almost to fascination, which Broadfoot had with these wild savages.

Capt. Pelly in 1860 told me that in Afghanistan he encountered a man who had been Broadfoot's servant, and asked him about his master. 'Do you think,' shouted the man, in the presence of all the Afghans, 'that if Broadfoot Sahib were alive, I would be the servant of the son of Dost Muhammad Khan?' Capt. Pelly offered him service. 'No,' he said, 'I will never serve another sahib; Broadfoot Sahib was a father to me; I shall never see another like him.'

We cross the Sutlej to-morrow, and are followed speedily by Generals Pollock and Nott in succession. The 13th and 35th will look very grand; but alas! for the Sappers, who have never received their uniform, and must even appear in sable (not fur) as before. However, we have never been remarkable for beauty, and must even endure to be told by ladies fair, as I was the other day, that we could only be taken for *coolies*! I remembered that in Calcutta, charity, like beauty, would abound, and was consoled.

Believe me, my dear Mrs. Bayley,

Yours very sincerely,

G. BROADFOOT.

Give my kindest regards to all your circle; I have not yet seen Lord Ellenborough, and know not whether I join him at once or not.

On December 17, 1842, the Jalalabad garrison crossed the Sutlej, and were received by the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief with the honours due to their exceptional services; and of those thus received, Lord Ellenborough selected Major Broadfoot as the special object of distinction. He remarked that as Major Broadfoot had customarily led the army in action, he, at the head of his Sappers, should lead it on its triumphant return, and be the first to cross the river.

Next day, Gen. Pollock's force crossed, and on the 23rd it was followed by the division under Gen. Nott; with the latter arrived the gates of the Somnath temple.

There was much feasting and rejoicing, much marching about and reviewing, much speech-making, and the firing of many guns, much joy in welcoming the return of friends, and much sorrow for those who could return no more.

Broadfoot's letter to Mr. Loch asking for a cadetship for Dr. Forsyth's son will be remembered. The following is in acknowledgment of the very kind way in which the request was granted:

Camp at Ferozpore: December 20, 1842.

My dear Mr. Loch,—I have just learned that an express for the overland mail is closing, and I avail myself of the opportunity of assuring you of my gratitude for the cadetship you have so generously conferred on Dr. Forsyth's son. The Doctor is now with a cavalry regiment, and received the first intelligence of your goodness from Mrs. Forsyth. The opening sentence of a note announcing it to me will, I am sure, give you pleasure. He says: 'I am a

happier man at this moment than I have been for years. Mr. Loch has in the most generous manner given my son a cadetship, and has written a most kind letter to Mrs. Forsyth announcing it.' If the youth is at all like his father, he will do credit to your patronage.

You will know better of all the doings here from other sources than I can tell you, even if time allowed me to enter on them.

Gen. Pollock's force is now all here, and Gen. Nott's is at hand. The army of reserve was drawn out to meet the Jellalabad garrison, and a magnificent body of troops they are. No continental army could show so large a force of such men. We, of course, made but a sorry figure beside them. The troops are delighted to enthusiasm with the honours conferred on them.

My own corps, for a night or two after getting their medals, I believe, hardly slept; and awoke us also by their frequent cheers. Lord Ellenborough certainly knows how to deal with soldiers. A measure of retreat, for the first time in our history, has been made to produce the feeling of conquest; and this was needed, for, notwithstanding our successes, I at first apprehended that our withdrawal from Afghanistan might injuriously affect the troops.

Lord Ellenborough has been most kind to me: he has announced his intention of sending me to the Tenasserim coast as Commissioner. On this topic I should enlarge, but have no time. There were, I believe, attempts at something like *jobbing* the succession to Mr. Blundell, which *partly* led to my appointment. The situation is one I may be proud to fill; yet I look with much anxiety to taking it up. My experience there leads me to think there is much reform needed, and that it will be painful and difficult either to accomplish or leave untried.

Orr is here, and receiving the honours due to his distinguished gallantry. In fact he and Lieut. Cunningham are not in that respect to be surpassed by any of the younger men of the army. Lord Ellenborough is kindly disposed towards him, and I have made known to the private secretary his wish to enter the cavalry of the Nizam's service.

Offer my kind regards to Miss Loch, and believe me, my dear Mr. Loch, Very sincerely yours,

G. BROADFOOT.

Allusion is made in the preceding letter to Broadfoot's appointment as Commissioner. After careful consideration, Lord Ellenborough had selected him to succeed Mr. Blundell, and had written to him:

Simla: October 10, 1842.

Sir,—I had reason to suppose that Mr. Blundell, the Commis-

sioner in the Tenasserim Provinces, intended to resign his appointment and to go home in the ensuing winter, and I had intended to appoint you his successor. I have to-day had an intimation that Mr. Blundell hesitates about carrying that intention, which he had announced, into effect. I have written a letter to him, which will, I think, induce him to adhere to his original plan, and in that case you should take possession of your government by the middle of February. In any case, I intend that you should succeed Mr. Blundell as Commissioner in the Tenasserim Provinces.

You will not make any change in your movements on account of this probable event, but return with your corps as you would do if you had no employment in prospect on your return.

If your men would go over the sea, as I dare say they would with you, I will try to make an arrangement for your having 100 or 150 of them at Maulmain, where they will be very useful to you.

I congratulate you sincerely on all the honour you have acquired.

I remain &c.

ELLENBOROUGH.

This was a very handsome acknowledgment of Broadfoot's ability and services, on the part of the Government of India: the higher reward and more valued honours came from the Queen.

He received brevet rank of major from October 4, 1842, and the 'London Gazette' of that date contained his appointment to be a Companion of the Bath.

Broadfoot had been recommended for these honours with the other officers at Jalalabad, by Sale, for his services on the march from Kabul, and during the defence of Jalalabad.

CHAPTER VII.

1842.

Selections from Lord Ellenborough's correspondence—Marquis of Wellesley to Lord Ellenborough—Principles which guided Lord Wellesley—All civil authority to be subjected to the General in command—An efficient army an effectual guarantee for peace in India—Protest against any permanent occupation of Afghanistan—Education in India: Lord Brougham—Lord Ellenborough's notification—Policy announced generally approved—But condemned by Lord Palmerston—Real question at issue.

THE news of the victories and the liberation of the prisoners diffused universal joy. The English Government congratulated Lord Ellenborough, and expressed the opinion that his signal exertions were beyond praise. At the same time the destruction of the bazaar and mosque in Kabul was blamed, and attention was invited to excesses said to have been committed by our troops. This imputation was denied by Pollock and by Nott with warm indignation, but the accusation was forgotten in England before the denials came to hand.

Among many letters received by Lord Ellenborough about this time, none surpassed that addressed to him by the Marquis of Wellesley in interest and value. Lord Ellenborough would seem to have asked for his advice and opinion on the state of India, and the principles to be followed in governing the country. The reply arrived in two instalments; the first was acknowledged on August 16, and the second on October 5. The memorandum will be read with the respect to which it is entitled; whilst the coincidence between Lord Ellenborough's acts and Lord Wellesley's opinions cannot fail to be observed.[1]

[1] The letter and the first half of the memorandum will be found in *The Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough*, pp. 171–176; the second half has not, it is believed, been previously published.

Kingston House, Knightsbridge: July 4, 1842.

My dear Lord,—No less powerful cause than severe and repeated illness would have prevented me from sooner obeying your Lordship's very flattering commands, so obligingly communicated to me, 'to give you my opinion on the present condition of the great empire,' now happily committed to your Lordship's charge, and so long entrusted to my hands.

Your Lordship is so well acquainted with the general affairs of India that it would be presumption to suppose that I can add anything to that knowledge (so little the study of most British statesmen). But I can explain the principles on which I acted, the causes of my success, or failure wherever I failed, and I can thence derive some rules of conduct which may be found useful for the consideration of my successors. These statements I now submit to your Lordship in the inclosed paper, with the most sincere good wishes for the prosperity and glory of your Lordship's government and with the most confident expectation of your final and triumphant success. Ever, my dear Lord,

Your faithful friend and obliged servant,

WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM.

(*Secret and confidential.*)

When I took leave of Mr. Pitt at a great dinner which he gave to all our friends, Lord Cornwallis and Mr. H. Dundas (afterwards Lord Melville) were present. In the month of November 1797, Lord Cornwallis assured me that I should have no trouble, that *he had settled everything*, that I had nothing more to do than to send for Barlow (now Sir George, then Secretary to the Government), and to follow his advice in everything. I could not resist the temptation to ask what I was to do if Barlow were dead? or sick? or gone to Europe for health? This question produced a general laugh, which greatly discomposed old Cornwallis, then tottering on the brink of the grave. Before I arrived in India, at the Cape of Good Hope I had the good fortune to meet Col. Kirkpatrick, a most able military servant of the Company, who prepared me, by his knowledge of the real state of the native powers and of our military situation, for what I was to encounter; and how vain and idle was poor old Cornwallis's reliance on the good faith of Tippoo! and on the strength to be derived from the treaties with the Mahrattahs and the Nizam; both being already under the influence of France, with a French army ruling the state at Hyderabad, in the Dekan, and in Hindostan, Delhi, and Agra, &c. &c.

I had not been a fortnight in Calcutta when I received the

account of Tippoo's treachery with the French and all the native powers, and also with the Affghan power, then in the hands of Zemaun Shah.

I called out the army immediately, with the universal resistance of every authority in India. I was told from Madras, that not a man or a gun could be moved sooner than in *six* or *twelve* months. But I persevered, and I was nobly supported by the Government at home (then in the hands of Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas), who, on the very day I issued my order, signed a despatch to me directing me to do what I had actually done; namely, to put the army into a state of preparation for action.

The present condition of our Indian Empire is certainly not so perilous as it was at that crisis; treachery and bad faith on the part of enemies and native allies, combined with weakness and imbecility in our own councils, had exposed us to the greatest dangers on all sides, without any adequate means of meeting them. Now we have a great and adequate force at our disposal, and the dreadful blows which have been inflicted on the spirit and discipline of that part of our army employed at Cabul have not been felt in other quarters to any great extent; and it may be considered certain, that the noble army now on its way and arriving from England will arrive untainted, and fully prepared with its usual superiority to repel any foe that may attempt to meet it.[2]

From what has been already stated, it is evident that I did not arrive at the Cape on my way to India imbued with a spirit of conquest, and an ambitious desire of extending our territorial possessions by violence and war. I arrived in the full hope and expectation of finding and of preserving, not merely peace in India, but permanent security, and with a general disposition to preserve tranquillity and goodwill among the native powers. What I had begun to fear from Col. Kirkpatrick's statements, was sadly confirmed by the event, and no war ever was more strictly necessary and just than the war with Tippoo Sultan in 1799!

Although I never viewed a warlike policy in India as suitable to our condition, or calculated either for our safety or our glory, I was not ignorant that our tenure of India originally rested on a military basis, and must be preserved by the maintenance of our military strength. The condition in which I found our army was therefore a total departure from the first necessary principle of our existence

[2] Some slight verbal differences exist between the letter as it is here quoted, and as it was printed by Lord Colchester.

The additional words were introduced by Lord Wellesley in his duplicate copy, which was forwarded to Lord Ellenborough the mail after the original letter was despatched.

among the powers of India; and I proceeded instantly to correct that vital defect. This is the first object which must be brought under the consideration of the Governor-General of India.

Your Lordship, however, is under no difficulty in this respect. I need not to your Lordship observe, that an army unequipped with all the necessaries for its prompt movement is no instrument of war, but a mere useless burden. At all times, therefore, the British power in India should possess and maintain, in activity and discipline, an adequate army (as it was termed in my time) 'in the field.'

The principal station of the army should be on our northern and western frontier. My brother Arthur has communicated to me, with his usual kindness, some very able papers addressed to your Lordship and to Lord Fitzgerald, in the whole of which I entirely concur. In these papers he points out the proper stations and distribution of our forces, availing himself, most judiciously, of Lord Lake's conquests of Agra, Delhi, &c. &c., by which such strength was added to our frontier in that quarter. No further extension of our territory is ever desirable in India, even if war for conquest could be justified or were legal, as the law most wisely now stands.

Your Lordship, I am satisfied, would reject Affghanistan and Cabul, with their rocks, sands, deserts, ice, and snow, even if Schah Soujah had bequeathed them as a peace offering to England; although perhaps the ends of criminal justice may require the presence of a British force there for some time. I hope this point will be left entirely to your discretion. In a case somewhat similar I was enabled at Benares to bring the murderers of Mr. Cherry and of other officers to justice. If your Lordship can do the same by the murderer of Sir W. Macnaghten, I shall rejoice.[3]

One of the main causes of my success in the operations of the army, was my entire undivided confidence in the officer placed in the chief command of the troops employed. So far was I from the enormous absurdity of intermixing the civil and military authorities, or the still greater of permitting the civil authorities to embarrass the military by direct interference and by usurpation of command, that I subjected all civil authority to the general officer in the chief military command. This will appear fully in my published despatches, in one of which I have used the phrase, 'The General carried with him the full authority of the Governor-General[4] to the gates of Seringapatam.'

The appointment of my brother Arthur to the command of the garrison of Seringapatam was censured, as an act of criminal par-

[3] The first half of the memorandum ends here.

[4] In the original the word 'Government' was used; in the duplicate 'Governor-General' was substituted.

tiality; but it was no act of mine; I never interfered in any of the Commander-in-Chief's subordinate appointments, as he and all his family and friends well knew, and must now remember. But the appointment of Arthur on that occasion was most judicious and correct. Baird, though a very brave fellow, was an officer of no temper nor judgment.

. . . . . .

Your Lordship's superior knowledge renders any advice on such a subject superfluous and almost impertinent; but the complaints against Sir William Macnaghten's influence and exercise of direct command, both by himself and even by his inferior civil agents, over every branch of the army in Affghanistan, have been so loud and so just, that it is as impossible not to regard them as it is (admitting their truth) not to ascribe to that cause the main source of all our calamity and disgrace. In my brother's letter to your Lordship, I perceive that he has particularly pointed out this most fatal error. I refer to it as being diametrically opposed to my example; and as, in my judgment, viewing all its collateral consequences, an evil which leads directly to the destruction of our power in the East.

The maintenance of our army in a constant state of vigour (and of active motion, the foundation of all vigour) is no warlike, but a truly pacific, policy in India; for if the British power of active military movement should decline, war of the most terrific nature, accompanied by confusion and anarchy, must ensue. The peace of India is maintained by the military strength of the British power. Nothing can tend so directly to impair the vigour and activity of our armies, as the interference of subordinate civil agents in the detail of their movements; it would be strange to see a British army commanded by clerks and secretaries from the official bureaux; but still more strange to see such a body appointed and authorised by the State to usurp and to exercise the military power of the generals and other officers, which the State had regularly confided to their hands. This evil can be corrected only by the discretion of the Governor-General; and as I am confident that your Lordship's hand will have corrected it before this despatch can reach you, I will not dwell longer on the subject.

By accident, while I was writing the above paragraph, a newspaper entitled 'The Friend of India,' published at Serampore, under date March 17, 1842, was communicated to me. It contains, in a letter signed *Veritas*, an extract stated to be taken from a letter of the late Sir W. Macnaghten. This extract sufficiently proves the extreme danger of the practice to which I have requested your Lordship's attention. It is a violent attack on the character of the British army serving at Cabul; and it is stated to proceed from no less an

authority than Sir William Macnaghten. The person who made me (within these few minutes) acquainted with this document, acquainted me also with (what I was certain must follow) your Lordship's immediate censure of the person who had been so incautious as to give circulation to this most dangerous paper.

This is among the worst consequences of the employment of civil servants in military commands. It tends to create and to foment reciprocal jealousies, and in place of uniting, to divide the services. I need not add how much I admire the promptitude of your Lordship's interference.

I always considered the honour of the troops acting under me as my own; and I viewed their interests in the same light. I think those gallant men, whose memories I must for ever venerate and love, really returned my sentiments; and that a part of their ardour in service was to be ascribed to their confidence in my gratitude and affection.

I always disapproved the inclination of the Court of Directors to reduce the allowances of the military to the lowest scale, and I incurred much disfavour, but felt no repentance, nor remorse, on that head. I confess, I *loved* (that is not an expression of sufficient strength), I *adored* that army, which, in the execution of my orders, had raised my name to such an eminence of glory, and has so much extended and strengthened the empire of my country. After this true exposition of the deepest feelings of my heart, your Lordship will fully appreciate the anxiety with which I have viewed the whole course of the late disastrous and melancholy scenes in Affghanistan.

In my time two great military failures occurred: the retreat of Col. Monson, and the abandonment of the siege of Bhurtpore. Monson advanced rashly in disobedience of orders. He was a brave officer, who had done good service. Your Lordship will find on record my reasons for sparing his character. The failure at Bhurtpore was entirely a question of practical details of the science of fortification.

Neither of these failures in the least affected the spirit or discipline of the army. Monson immediately afterwards distinguished himself very highly; and the troops employed at Bhurtpore, in subsequent operations under Lord Lake manifested the same courage and order which had always been the character of the whole British Indian army.

With regard to some recent imputations on the army, and with every indulgence to the memory of a clever but not very discreet Secretary to the Indian Government, I reject the evidence of him and of all his followers on this matter. Whatever of calamity

befell us I ascribe to the first fatal error, '*the employment of civil clerks*[5] *in high military commands.*' I have not heard that either of those truly British officers, Sale or Pollock, has complained of this failure of courage in the troops under their command.

I am ignorant of the intentions of her Majesty's Government with regard to the future policy of the British power in India. Your first object must of course be to recover your prisoners, especially those of the female sex, and of high rank (whose detention is a shocking disgrace); and to take up the natural stations of your strength, so ably described by my brother Arthur. Whether, in the course of this proceeding, you will be able to bring any of the traitors and murderers who surround all your stations in Affghanistan to justice, is certainly an important consideration. Perhaps without such a display of power no settlement can promise security; of this matter your Lordship will form the best judgment, but at this early moment I must protest against any notion of a permanent occupation of Cabul, or of any permanent settlement in Affghanistan. On this matter I trust I am not mistaken in believing that your Lordship concurs in my sentiments, and therefore I will not lengthen this already too long letter. But if I should find myself mistaken, I shall feel it to be my duty to urge the reasons which appear to me to demonstrate that any plan of settlement in Affghanistan would lead to the greatest calamities, and must (if it ever terminated) end in disgrace and ruin.

I hope your Lordship will not take the trouble to answer this letter. I shall not write again unless you desire it, but I shall always be happy to answer any questions you may propose.

Your Lordship, I believe, will find the Protestant Church respectably established in India. When I arrived there it was in a disgraceful and lamentable state; I laid the foundation which has since been nobly and greatly improved by the Church of England.

With the most sincere and ardent wishes and expectations of your Lordship's prosperous government of a country whose interests and happiness must ever be dear to me, I remain, my dear Lord,

Your Lordship's obliged and faithful servant,

WELLESLEY.

Kingston House: August 4, 1842.

Postscript.—Your Lordship is better acquainted than I am with the recent internal administration of our Indian Empire; I have not therefore written anything on that subject. But I will here make one observation.

[5] The expression 'civil clerks' is inaccurate; Lord Wellesley means members of the Civil Service.

I was concerned to hear that some inquiry had been commenced respecting the validity of some of the tenures under the permanent settlement of the land revenue. This is a most vexatious and surely not a prudent measure. Here the maxim of sound ancient wisdom occurs most forcibly, *Quieta non movere.* We *ancient English settlers in Ireland* have felt too severely the hard hand of Strafford in a similar act of oppression, not to dread any similar proceeding.

W.

August 4, 1842.

Amongst Lord Ellenborough's numerous correspondents may be mentioned the great Elchi, Sir Stratford Canning, afterwards Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, our ambassador at Constantinople; Baron Brunnow, the Russian ambassador; and Lord Brougham. The latter took much interest in education in India, and was so much gratified by the King of Oudh having translated his treatise on the objects, advantages, and pleasures of science, and having sent him a copy, that he acknowledged its receipt in a *legible* autograph letter. 'A compliment,' Lord Ellenborough remarked, 'which I did not think he would have paid to any sovereign in the world.' Lord Brougham's handwriting was ordinarily execrable.

As to education, Lord Ellenborough considered that our system in India began at the wrong end of society. Sons of clerks and baboos in the revenue or judicial departments, and of other persons belonging to the lower classes, were taught to read Milton, Pope, and Shakespeare! In writing to Lord Brougham he advocated a favourite idea—the establishment of a noble college and a noble guard: that is, a college and body guard, in which the sons of the native aristocracy might be educated and employed. He also wrote in the same letter: 'There is indeed no limit to the prosperity of India generally, which the eye of the most sanguine statesman can reach, if people in England will only have the goodness not to insist upon governing India according to the latest London fashion.' It would be well if it were more generally realised that English fashions do not suit the Indian climate; and that the public abuse of public men and Government, here a pastime, is there a danger.

The views and general policy of the Government of India are expressed in Lord Ellenborough's notification.

Secret Department, Simla: October 1, 1842.

The Government of India directed its army to pass the Indus in order to expel from Afghanistan a chief believed to be hostile to British interests, and to replace upon his throne a sovereign represented to be friendly to those interests, and popular with his former subjects.

The chief believed to be hostile became a prisoner, and the sovereign represented to be popular was replaced upon his throne; but after events which brought into question his fidelity to the Government by which he was restored, he lost by the hands of an assassin the throne he had only held amidst insurrections, and his death was preceded and followed by still existing anarchy.

Disasters unparalleled in their extent, unless by the errors in which they originated, and by the treachery by which they were completed, have, in one short campaign, been avenged upon every scene of past misfortune; and repeated victories in the field, and the capture of the cities and citadels of Ghuzni and Cabul, have again attached the opinion of invincibility to the British arms.

The British army in possession of Afghanistan will now be withdrawn to the Sutlej.

The Governor-General will leave it to the Afghans themselves to create a Government amidst the anarchy which is the consequence of their crimes.

To force a sovereign upon a reluctant people, would be as inconsistent with the policy as it is with the principles of the British Government, tending to place the arms and resources of that people at the disposal of the first invader, and to impose the burden of supporting a sovereign without the prospect of benefit from his alliance.

The Governor-General will willingly recognise any Government approved by the Afghans themselves, which shall appear desirous and capable of maintaining friendly relations with neighbouring states.

Content with the limits nature appears to have assigned to its empire, the Government of India will devote all its efforts to the establishment and maintenance of general peace, to the protection of the sovereigns and chiefs its allies, and to the prosperity and happiness of its own faithful subjects.

The rivers of the Punjab and Indus, and the mountainous passes and the barbarous tribes of Afghanistan, will be placed between the British army and an enemy approaching from the west, if indeed such an enemy there can be, and no longer between the army and its supplies.

The enormous expenditure required for the support of a large

force, in a false military position, at a distance from its own frontier and its resources, will no longer arrest every measure for the improvement of the country and of the people.

The combined army of England and of India, superior in equipment, in discipline, in valour, and in the officers by which it is commanded, to any force which can be opposed to it in Asia, will stand in unassailable strength upon its own soil, and for ever, under the blessing of Providence, preserve the glorious empire it has won, in security and in honour.

The Governor-General cannot fear the misconstruction of his motives in thus frankly announcing to surrounding states the pacific and conservative policy of his government.

Afghanistan and China have seen at once the forces at his disposal, and the effect with which they can be applied.

Sincerely attached to peace for the sake of the benefits it confers upon the people, the Governor-General is resolved that peace shall be observed, and will put forth the whole power of the British Government to coerce the state by which it shall be infringed.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India.

T. H. MADDOCK,
Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor-General.

Generally speaking, the policy announced in the proclamation was approved both in England and in India. In both countries the restoration of peace was welcomed; whilst the defence of Jalalabad, combined with the marches of Pollock and Nott, had seemed to restore the lustre of our arms, sadly tarnished by the Kabul disasters. The recovery of the prisoners and the relaxation of the strain on Indian finance completed the general satisfaction.

The wisdom and propriety of the course adopted by Lord Ellenborough were loudly praised by the Conservative newspapers; and such was the feeling of triumphant joy, that it was proclaimed that all now saw 'the utter absurdity of any fears of an invasion of India through Afghanistan, whether from Russia, Persia, or indeed at all.'[6] It was gravely stated that such an invasion could not be made by more than 20,000 men, who could with ease be disposed of, even if reinforced by as many more Afghans. In another newspaper,[7] the satis-

[6] *Standard*, Monday evening, November 28, 1842.
[7] *Times*, January 9, 1843.

faction with which the news had been received, of the safe withdrawal of the British forces from the inhospitable regions of Afghanistan, was noticed. It was stated that the liberation of the prisoners was the main object of Gen. Pollock's expedition; and a hope was expressed that the Governor-General of India would, in future, confine the operations of British armies within the frontiers of his dominions.

On the subject of the policy of withdrawal, however, Lord Palmerston was explicit; he spoke of the eternal disgrace the abandonment of the country would affix on England:

> I never was more convinced of anything in the whole course of my life, and I may be believed when I speak my earnest conviction, that the most important interests of this country, both commercial and political, would be sacrificed if we were to sacrifice the military possession of the country of Eastern Afghanistan.
>
> Rely on it, if you abandon the country, though you may have a less arduous duty for the present, and though you may relieve yourselves from some little difficulty by a retreat, the day will come when you will be compelled to reoccupy that country at an infinitely greater expense of money, and at an infinitely greater sacrifice of human life, than would enable you to retain it now that it is, as I trust I may say now, in your possession.

In reply to this Sir R. Peel stated that he would not adopt the objects of the noble Lord, nor make war for the sake of promoting the study of Adam Smith among the Afghans.

The 'Times' condemned Lord Auckland's policy:[8] 'We believe their policy to have been wholly false. We believe that the attempt to establish *by force* a British influence in Afghanistan, was itself an error.'

It is curious in studying the newspapers of that time to notice how precisely reversed are the attitudes of the two great parties in England. Then the forward policy was undertaken and advocated by the Whigs, and by them were the appeals mainly made for vindicating our honour, and re-establishing our prestige, grievously damaged by the Kabul disasters.

The Tories, on the other hand, were not ashamed to deny all necessity for such vindication, or that there was danger to India from the Kabul disasters, and to proclaim as monstrous the idea that it was necessary to avenge upon the Afghans the result entailed by our own folly, by our own crime.

[8] *Times*, January 7, 1843.

The despatch written by Lord Ellenborough about the gates of the temple of Somnath has been generally condemned. Much more was made of the matter than it deserved; and were it worth while, something might be said in its favour. As far as is known, the natives were profoundly indifferent to the gates, yet Lord Ellenborough's enemies endeavoured to make out that their restoration was an error of the first magnitude in a ruler. Though this is not admitted, yet the Somnath notification is less judicious than most of his Lordship's orders.

Before leaving the subject of Afghanistan and our first war there, it may be advantageous to glance at the question which was at issue.

This was not whether Amir Dost Muhammad or Shah Shuja should reign in Kabul, but whether Afghanistan should be in the interests of England or of Russia. Since then, Russia has advanced with great rapidity towards India. Britain, too, has advanced to meet her, less rapidly, but it may be hoped has, in the Punjab, secured a more valuable acquisition than Russia's more extensive conquests. The advance will continue till the boundaries meet; any idea of a permanent barrier between the two great nations is delusive, and to reckon on its existence for ever, or even for a long period of time, would be unwise and dangerous.

Now these questions may be fairly asked: How did the first Afghan war affect the interests of England and Russia in the East? Had Russia furnished just cause for the war?

Let the latter question be first considered. Russian advances in Central Asia had caused disquietude to English statesmen; but Russia cannot on that account be held to have given such provocation as to justify the war. Even if she had, to make war on another state not over friendly to her, was a curious way of settling the dispute. It would seem less likely to damage Russia, or to deter her advance, than to make Britain unpopular in the attacked country: unless, indeed, that country were conquered and annexed. Such an attack, moreover, could be pleaded as a justification for the next advance which Russia desired to make. The fact should be realised that if Russia threatens India, England must be ready to attack her in Europe, or elsewhere, as well as to defend the Indian frontier, or else be prepared to submit to great national humiliation.

Let us return now to the first question: How were the interests of England and of Russia affected by the war? It can scarcely be doubted that the reply must be: Those of England were injured, those of Russia but little affected. In the first place, England appeared in the country as an enemy, and unfortunately, in the instance of the Kabul army, as a defeated enemy. All Nott's victories, the defence of Jalalabad, and Pollock's victories, count for little in the Afghan, possibly in the Indian, mind, in comparison with the complete destruction and plunder of an army of soldiers previously believed to be invincible. And further, our 'retiring but victorious' troops were harassed and plundered on their way out of the country. It is difficult to say what good resulted from the expedition, if we except the experience which should be learnt from failures. The Russians certainly abandoned their advance on Khiva, and gave England a number of satisfactory assurances, of which the supply is and will be ample until the challenge to fight is proclaimed. But all these could have been obtained diplomatically without the war.

Two distinct and serious evils resulted: the prestige of invincibility, of enormous importance anywhere, but specially in dealing with Orientals, was lost; and the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan was construed as a proof of weakness. Any movement to the rear, however strategic, is dangerous in the East.

The necessity for the step is not here discussed; but the objection to locating troops there, with the Punjab possibly hostile, is obvious. Lord Ellenborough's measures mitigated the evils as much as was possible, when withdrawal formed the basis of our policy. Still these evils had their effect on our Indian fellow-subjects: the native soldiers of the class then principally enlisted, seldom fought afterwards for us as they had fought before, and there are people of experience who attribute the mutiny greatly to the disasters of the Kabul force. If this be so, it is instructive to consider the effect of the *annexation* of the Punjab on the same event. The Sikhs remained faithful to us, shared our combats, and enabled us to achieve our victory.

This part of the present work may be appropriately closed by quoting the opinion expressed in the 'Times' on Lord Ellenborough's conduct of affairs to the end of the war.

We believe that all concerned in the preservation of our Eastern Empire, owe to Lord ELLENBOROUGH no ordinary debt of thanks for the energy and skill which furnished the means of movement, and therefore of success, to our armies with a rapidity and completeness far beyond what would have been, or in fact were, anticipated by any who really knew the extent of what was necessary, and the difficulties of procuring and rendering it available. We believe that, whatever absurdities he may have committed, he has, on the whole, performed the part of an able, active, and successful ruler, amidst circumstances well calculated to appal, paralyse, or disorder the judgment of an inferior statesman.[9]

[9] *Times*, March 10, 1843.

CHAPTER VIII.

1843-44.

Lord Ellenborough's impartiality in the exercise of his patronage—Letter to Lord Ellenborough—Broadfoot's arrival in the Tenasserim Provinces—Letter from Havelock—From Francis Cunningham—Extracts from Lord Ellenborough's letters: to the Queen, and Duke of Wellington—The native press—Letter from Havelock: from Mr. and Mrs. Cameron—Letter to Lord Ellenborough: reply—Death of John Malcolmson—Letter from Lord Ellenborough transmitting the Order of the Bath: reply—Lord Ellenborough and the Court of Directors—Duke of Wellington's opinion—Correspondence between the Cabinet and the Court—Lord Ellenborough recalled: Sir H. Hardinge appointed—Letters from Lord Ellenborough on the subject—Broadfoot's reply—Letter to Miss Sutherland: Capt. W. C. McLeod—Letter from Havelock: Broadfoot appointed to the N.W. Frontier.

THE camp at Firozpur was broken up early in 1843, and the Governor-General, with an escort furnished by the 'illustrious garrison,' marched to Delhi. Major Broadfoot's letters at this time naturally refer chiefly to the important appointment for which he had been selected, and to the marked kindness shown to him by Lord Ellenborough. An extract or two may be of interest; they show a consideration for others which has not, it is believed, been generally recognised as a prominent feature in his Lordship's character.

Lord Ellenborough has been kind to me beyond measure; my only fear is that one of these days he will find he has overrated me. On being appointed to the Tenasserim Provinces, I waited on him to resign being aide-de-camp, but he would not hear of it, though it has put and still puts him to inconvenience, for I do no duty that way. He says he intended it to keep me as far as he could from loss, and I must not resign till I embark from Calcutta. Now the considerateness of all this makes it more valuable in my eyes than even the great appointment. . . .

Lord Ellenborough has given me Ghuznee medals for William and James. I shall most likely send them home for fear I lose them.

I came down with Lord Ellenborough to Kurnaul, and preceded him thence to Delhi, where I arrived on January 31. Having made over the remnant of the Sappers to their new commander, I continued with Lord Ellenborough, who reached Delhi on the 5th, till the 15th, receiving every day fresh proofs of kindness from him. . . .

Lord Ellenborough has most kindly provided for all the officers with me throughout the war; except Dr. Forsyth, who I hope will not be forgotten. Orr is appointed to the Nizam's cavalry; and Cunningham to the Mysore Commission; both good appointments, and what they asked. Lord Ellenborough is also going to do something for the two most deserving of my sergeants, Kelly and Bruen. In fact he is an extraordinary man with his patronage. Family interest is useless, almost injurious with him; and so is even party interest. One of his last appointments was to a nephew of O'Connell! He is unceasing in his inquiries as to fitness for the different appointments, in energy and integrity. Above all, or at least above all but integrity, he seems to value a kindly feeling towards the natives. This system, however, has suddenly taken power from the hands of all who have hitherto held it, and disappointed all who looked up to them; the unpopularity, therefore, of the new system is very great.

In due course Broadfoot arrived in Calcutta, where he tried to learn all he could regarding the provinces he was about to govern, and the policy by which he was to be guided. Before his departure for Maulmain he wrote to Lord Ellenborough:

Calcutta: April 8, 1843.

My Lord,—My approaching embarkation for Maulmain terminating my appointment on your Lordship's personal staff, I have this day reported the same to the Military Secretary and requested him to convey to you my sense of an honour which, conferred as it was and when it was, I must ever feel grateful for.

I am now setting out for the new duties your Lordship's kindness has called me to; and I do not enter on them without many anxieties. Disputes small in themselves, but irritating, have assumed a form which, considering local prejudices and interests, is not reassuring. To heal these I was desirous of somewhat detailed instructions from the Government, and my anxiety on this head has somewhat delayed my departure. If I have not quite succeeded, the Government is informed of the course I propose to follow if affairs are unchanged on my arrival.

I cannot command success, but I can answer for unwearied exertion, and a firm purpose to maintain tranquillity; and by seeking the public good in those provinces to justify in some degree the kindness which has raised me to their administration.

G. BROADFOOT.

The 'Maulmain Chronicle' of April 19, 1843, announced the arrival of the 'Enterprise' at 'Amherst on Sunday last, having on board Major Broadfoot, appointed to the Commissionership of these provinces. He came up to town and landed on Monday under the usual salute. . . . Mr. Blundell, our former Commissioner, embarked this morning on board the "Enterprise," to proceed to Calcutta, and from thence to his appointment as Governor of the Straits.'

It is not intended to describe minutely Broadfoot's administration of the provinces. The details of civil government, such as the assessment and collection of revenue, the trial and punishment of offenders, the making of roads and consideration of finance, though all most necessary, are not so picturesque, and cannot be so attractive to the general reader, as the more stirring incidents of war and diplomacy.

It will here suffice to say that the Government of India was seriously dissatisfied with the state of the provinces, and a reformer was required. Broadfoot was selected, and succeeded, in spite of strenuous opposition, in sweeping away many abuses, and in introducing sound measures of reform.

He received many letters at this time, some of which will be quoted. The first of these, from Havelock, refers to a certain injustice done to the Jalalabad garrison in excluding them from rewards for Pollock's campaign, and contains an allusion to memoir writing. This refers to a proposal by Havelock to publish an account of the recent war and the defence of Jalalabad. Broadfoot pointed out to him that if he told the truth honestly he would have to quit the army; and that if he withheld the truth, in the case of Sale for example, his memoir had better not be published.

Kussowlie: May 6, 1843.

My dear Broadfoot,—I now sit down according to promise to answer at length your very kind letter of the 15th ultimo. I am glad you were pleased with Marshman; for I can say with perfect

sincerity that it is in the good opinion and friendship of such men as you and he, and a very few others, that I have found the best compensation that this world can offer for no small portion of harassing wrong and ill success; and the organised opposition of knaves and brutes and sciolists.[1]

I have to thank you for the interest which you take in the matter of my professional advancement. I was pretty sure that you were right when you mentioned to me your notion of Sir J. N.'s views regarding the military rewards of those who had served in Afghanistan. It was so like the imbecility of the man, most fully developed in the papers which have been laid before Parliament, and of which I see Sir Robert Peel has availed himself to set up a plea for Lord Ellenborough. He quotes the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief against acting promptly and vigorously to retrieve our fortunes, to show that the Governor-General, from the first, went as far as his military adviser. Sir J. N. was doubtless shocked at the prodigious mass of preferment and honour which had been heaped in a moment on the defenders of Jellalabad, and would never have forgiven himself if in his time they had got more. The thing, however, is so irrational and contrary to precedent, that the weight of no name can suffice for its justification. If exertions after April 7 deserved reward, and Gen. Pollock's officers have been promoted and ribboned for ulterior exertions, Jellalabad men who shared in these labours and dangers have a right to look for something for them. If, however, my brother, now in England, has formed a correct opinion, the Iron Duke has taken another view of the matter. He seems to have laid it down that the merits of all the officers employed from the first outbreak in October 1841 to the end of the campaign in 1842, are worth a step for some, and a step and an honour for others, and that it is his duty not to recommend any for more. I must tell you, however, that whatever I may have been on former occasions, I have not been quiescent on this. Gen. McCaskill wrote very strongly and handsomely in my favour from Ferozepore; and since the last brevet appeared, Gen. Smith addressed Lord Fitzroy Somerset, I have no doubt in language warm and energetic enough, in favour of Wilkinson of the 13th, Simmons of the 41st, and myself; and I forwarded through Gen. McCaskill to Gen. Pollock a letter which I desired might go to Sir J. N. with the recommendation of both, for transmission to the home authorities. Sir Willoughby Cotton had previously been endeavouring to do me a good turn in his kind of way by breathing some words in my favour into the ear of the Duke of Beaufort, Lord Fitzroy

[1] This word is doubtful in the original letter.

Somerset's brother. This the Duke told my brother, who knew him in Spain and France, as Marquis of Worcester, and had been hunting with his hounds the last season. Now from any one of these representations I do not form the shadow of a hope, because, from all I can learn, the Duke of Wellington's mind is made up to the mode of treating the matter of which I have already spoken. The best I can expect is, if ever I become a regimental major, to have my claims considered for employment as deputy in a department in India or the colonies. The step of major would, however, in itself satisfy me; for if I obtained it, I would run home with the battalion, see my few surviving friends in England, look to the interests of my boys, and endeavour, if nothing was stirring in Europe, to get back on good terms into a corps in India.

I am a very bad hand indeed at a bargain, but I am told that a majority in Prince Albert's would be worth to a young aristocrat as much as would pay a poor man's passage, with all his *impedimenta*, back to this first of lands for the exertions of that class of officers. However, the majority in the 13th is sooner desired than gained. Old Pattison, whom you will remember, went home with the purpose of retiring on his full pay. But owing to official blunders his papers did not reach Horse Guards, and he can now please himself instead of being tied down to his first resolution, and may take a fit of obstinacy and defer his military decease *sine die*. Rumour strongly asserts that Sir R. Sale is to be the colonel of the 44th Regiment; but then again, perversity on perversity of fate, the 13th being on the eve of returning home, the Iron Duke may decide not to fill up the vacancy of second lieutenant-colonel. Thus you see my prospects are not very brilliant. But to speak seriously, all this is in the hands of Providence, and I ought not to disquiet myself about it. There is a faint chance of a real turn of poetical justice. You perhaps have heard that I have been purchased over by three drunkards and two fools. Four of these have paid successively, by disease or in the field, the debt of nature; and the survivor (I will not say to which class he belongs) had opportunely withdrawn his name from the purchase list. It is just possible that Lord Fitzroy Somerset, being moved to do something in my favour, might on Taylor's death have brought in an old retired officer to sell, and thus put me in my original place. This is, I say, just possible, but I think will not have come to pass. Had I too been the son of a duke, it would inevitably. You may suppose I am very weary of all this, and of captaining in time of peace, and often meditate the military suicide of retiring myself on full pay, and vegetating in a corner in Switzerland the remainder of my days; but a sense of my duty to my boys, and the hope of more stirring

times, and the determination not to be driven from my post by any amount of neglect or misadventure, still keep me on the other tack.

But now, before quitting this subject, on which I have too much dilated, let me ask, my good friend, what is it you mean exactly by *prejudices* against me, the mention of which you reiterate? Tell me plainly. I am not aware of any. Old Willoughby Cotton, indeed, and others used to tell me that it was believed at Horse Guards and in other quarters that I professed to fear God, as well as honour the Queen, and that Lord Hill and sundry other wise persons had made up their minds that no man could, at once, be *a saint* and a soldier. Now I dare say such great authorities must be right, notwithstanding the examples of Col. Gardiner, and Cromwell, and Gustavus Adolphus (all that I can think of just now); but if so, all I can say is, that their bit of red ribbon was very ill bestowed upon me; for I humbly trust that in that great matter I should not change my opinions and practice though it rained garters and coronets as the rewards of apostasy. So if these be the grounds of the *prejudices*, they are like to be sempiternal; but if they be any others that I know not of, tell me, my good friend, plainly and roundly. *Quo lapsus, quid feci?* It is well to be upon one's guard.

As I intimated in my last, I think Taylor brought the storm upon himself. He or some of the 9th must have seen your report, and if he deemed it erroneous, ought then to have urged the necessity of correction, or afterwards to have written to you. You will have heard that Sir J. N. has interdicted his rejoinder, and he is off to England. Huish is certainly the person most likely to be nettled; but if he is a man of sense, he will soon get over it. After all, much of the blame rests on Gen. Pollock, who, after the first success, seemed to think he had nothing more to do with the matter, but let his troops go where they would in pursuit, which indeed was his custom as far as my observation went. . . .

I believe your advice is quite sound as to memoir writing, and I have almost resolved finally to act upon it and publish nothing for the present. I have nothing, indeed, finished, or nearly so, though my brother has written me urgent letters by every mail to appear 'early in the field,' as it is called. I have a good deal of leisure now, and in the course of a fortnight expect to be at Simla (if my wife arrives), when I shall have even more; and this I will employ in writing down my recollections, which I will send to you for correction. I shall esteem yours most valuable. Having been at more than one period a good deal behind the scenes, I might with the aid of the parliamentary papers, and such documents as Lord Ellen-

borough would perhaps on due persuasion permit to be seen, have the materials for a tolerable book, which is better than a hasty, showy thing, to please those who can digest nothing beyond a nine days' wonder. Believe me &c.

H. HAVELOCK.

P.S.—I should like to have your Sapper proceedings from Bootkhak to Jellalabad to begin with.

We have just heard of the death of poor Troup at Allyghur.

The only officer of Broadfoot's Sappers who had not as yet got an appointment was Dr. Forsyth; but he was not forgotten. On May 14, Lord Ellenborough wrote on his behalf to Mr. Bird, the Deputy-Governor of Bengal, and expressed a hope that he might be suitably provided for.

The next letter from which extracts are quoted is from Francis Cunningham, already often mentioned as quartermaster of Broadfoot's Sappers. He wrote from Bangalore, May 27, 1843:

I have for some time past intended writing to you, but have heard of no ships about to sail to Maulmain. I cannot now have the conscience to put it off any longer, so here goes, and it must lie waiting in the Madras post office till an opportunity offers to convey it to your dominions.

. . . You must not forget to send me a copy of your memo. regarding the Jellalabad council. I should prefer the one in your own hand. I am the more anxious about it as I hear that Abbott has been stating everywhere that it was *your* advice that we should have abandoned Jellalabad and made our way to Peshawar; dexterously availing himself of an opinion you once expressed, that it would have been a good plan for Sale to have made his way to Peshawar when we first came into the valley; to have refitted there; and on returning have been in a fit state to take the field. It was from Joe[2] that I heard this, and in writing to him I explained the circumstance, but it has only made him the more anxious to obtain what you promised him about the councils. You know him well enough to be able to place reliance on his discretion.

You have, of course, read all about the Khytul business, which ought to have cost Greathed his appointment. Clerk recommended the Governor-General to appoint my brother to the charge of Khytul on 1,200 rs., but Lord Ellenborough's answer was that

[2] His brother, Joseph Davy Cunningham, of the Bengal Engineers, author of a *History of the Sikhs*.

Mr. Thomason considered Lawrence better fitted for it (they are old friends).

The arrangement, therefore, now is, that Lawrence goes to Khytul on 1,000 rs., and my brother takes Umballa, keeping his private secretaryship. This place pleases him more than the other, as it gives him equal pay, and in the event of an officer being called on for detached employment, he is obviously the one to be sent, as he can be best spared. . . .

You can have no notion how high your reputation stands in the Madras Army. By the bye, I got to high words with Sir E—— W—— about the Mamoo Khel affair. You know he belongs to the —th, and as I was in plain clothes, he took me for a Bengal civilian, and was not a little astonished when, in reply to some curious assertions of his, I said *à la* Julius,[3] 'It is very unlucky that I was there and saw the contrary.' Sir E—— is a blustering bully, and I was not sorry to raise a laugh against him.

Have you got hold of a copy of the blue book? . . . Pollock evidently lost himself after he got through the Khyber, and writes at first as if he had not *pice*[4] enough to make his way to Cabul.

. . . . . .

The Marquis of Tweeddale is commonly called 'Bumble;' he looks much more like a prizefighter than a nobleman. He asked me several questions without looking me in the face, and wrote down my answers. He did the same to Webb, and put him into the Commissariat. The Marchioness is what Mayne would call 'a real lady, hat and feathers.' She looks as young as her son, and has the most pleasing manners of any woman I have ever spoken to.

I cannot tell you anything yet about my prospects in this Commission. I have only yet been employed in reading the records, and have not seen Gen. Cubbon, who is in Coorg.

Some extracts from Lord Ellenborough's correspondence will now be quoted. As regards the communication of information, officially acquired, to persons other than those entitled to be made acquainted with it, it is interesting to record the Governor-General's orders:

The rule with respect to official correspondence is, not that an officer is allowed to divulge all that he is not specially directed to keep secret, but that he is not allowed to divulge anything which he is not specially directed to communicate.

[3] Reference possibly to Julius B. Backhouse.

[4] A small copper coin; *pice* is used here instead of 'money.'

The enforcement of such a rule did not tend to make his Lordship popular with the press.

In May 1843, the Governor-General contemplated going to Sind; in a letter to Mr. Maddock the first mention of the appointment of Col. Richmond, Major Broadfoot's predecessor on the North-West Frontier, is found.

One advantage of going to Sind is, that until the beginning of January, I shall be on the Sutlej; and really things look more shaky than ever in the Punjab, and Mr. Clerk's temporary retirement will be like striking away a leg from the Maharaja's chair. He wants me to go up to the hills now, and I think I should, if I could house myself at Kasauli or Subáthu. . . . I have offered to Col. Richmond the officiating appointment in Mr. Clerk's place. I could make no arrangement at short notice and at this season quite satisfactory. I hope this may answer.

In a letter to the Commander-in-Chief, dated June 3, 1843, the following sentences occur; the sentiments they contain apply to a great extent to his Lordship's career.

Depend upon it there is no such thing as strict justice in the opinion of contemporaries. All is exaggeration. Men are rated too high or too low; but where the events are great, where they are cardinal points in history, those who come after them do them justice, which is in the highest degree satisfactory to men in their graves..

The following extracts[5] refer to the appointment of Major Broadfoot to be Commissioner, and to the first results of his administration.

Lord Ellenborough to the Queen.

Agra: April 20, 1843.

Lord Ellenborough, with his most humble duty to your Majesty, humbly acquaints your Majesty that . . . some improper transactions at Maulmain have apparently placed us in the wrong, and occasioned some risk of hostilities; but Lord Ellenborough hopes that the new Commissioner, Major Broadfoot, will arrive in time to prevent collision and restore peaceful dispositions.

Allahabad: June 8, 1843.

The apprehensions of collision with the Burmese, which had arisen out of the misconduct of the late Commissioner, Mr. Blundell,

[5] From *The Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough*, by Lord Colchester.

who has been removed, have been nearly done away with since the arrival of his successor, Major Broadfoot, C.B., the officer who so much distinguished himself at Jellalabad.

Allahabad: June 27, 1843.

The misunderstandings with the Burmese on the Salween river, which have arisen out of the misconduct of the late Commissioner, do not appear to be yet entirely overcome by the good sense and ability of his successor, Major Broadfoot; but Lord Ellenborough still hopes that everything will be settled amicably in that quarter.

Lord Ellenborough to the Duke of Wellington.

Delhi: February 18, 1843.

My dear Duke of Wellington, . . . Major Broadfoot, whom I have sent to Maulmain, seems to be a very sensible man. He knows the place and the country, and I am happy to tell you that, while he promises me some civil reforms, he bids me to be under no apprehension of being ever obliged to send a large force to defend Maulmain.

Agra: April 22, 1843.

. . . At Maulmain there has been, and is, a risk of collision, in consequence of our having put ourselves in the wrong. The whole thing arises out of encouragement given to a low mercantile speculation by a Commissioner in the hands of merchants and their press. I am in hopes that Major Broadfoot, the new Commissioner, will be in time to stop the mischief and bring things right. He is the best man to prevent hostilities, or, if they cannot be prevented, to carry them on; but he will prevent them.

Allahabad: June 9, 1843.

. . . I have fortunately got a bold, able, and, above all, an honest man into the government of Tenasserim, in the person of Major Broadfoot. He will, I trust, avert the war his predecessor had nearly matured, and he has already prevented an insurrection his predecessor had provoked. Yet I have little doubt that the supersession of Mr. Blundell by Major Broadfoot will give the *coup de grâce* to me with the Court, if the entire change of officers in Saugor has not already done so.

Similar sentiments are repeated in other letters to the Duke; but these are sufficient to show how Broadfoot's services were valued by the Governor-General. Lord Fitzgerald, President of the Board of Control, to whom Lord Ellenborough often sent copies of Broadfoot's letters, remarked: 'Major

Broadfoot's letters show him to be a man of sense, and I trust he will put all to rights.'

Referring to one of these letters, Lord Ellenborough wrote to Broadfoot:

Allahabad: June 8, 1843.

My dear Major Broadfoot,—I received here to-day your letter of the 10th ult. I have had it copied for transmission to Lord Fitzgerald. You may depend upon my full support in putting down bad government in the provinces under your charge. I shall soon be at Calcutta myself, and at hand to give you the aid to which you are entitled.

I have excellent accounts from Scinde, where I hope all will remain quiet. At Gwalior there has been a palace intrigue, ending in the deposition of the Regent, who was set up with our acquiescence and approval.

This may give trouble. I have made Mr. Clerk Lieutenant-Governor, and Col. Richmond his successor as Governor-General's Agent, on the North-West Frontier. Believe me &c.

ELLENBOROUGH.

On the same day Lord Ellenborough wrote to the President of the Board of Control:

Major Broadfoot must tell his own tale, so I send you his private letter to me. Mr. Bird informs me that he thinks all will now go on well in Tenasserim; i.e. we shall have no war. Mr. Blundell's appointment to Singapore will be cancelled. Depend upon it, the picture Major B. gives of the province of Tenasserim is not unlike that which might be given of all India. Everywhere the public is altogether disregarded. The interests of individuals only are considered. Major Broadfoot will hit rather roughly, but very honestly, and he is an able man as well as an honest one; yet I think I can anticipate that the displacing of Mr. Blundell and the nomination of Major Broadfoot will be very unpopular with the Court.

A few days later he wrote to Mr. Bird:

Major Broadfoot seems to have been acting with most useful energy and prudence. The charge he will prove against Mr. —— . . . can only be followed by that gentleman's dismissal. It is evident that if we wish to have an honest government in Tenasserim, or any government at all, we must fully support Major Broadfoot.

Mr. Bird, who, as Deputy-Governor of Bengal, was Broadfoot's immediate superior officer, in writing to Lord Ellen-

borough, forwarded a copy of a notification by Broadfoot forbidding British subjects to pay tax or duty to anyone for the privilege of rafting timber on the Salwin river, and promising them the protection of the Government from the consequences of refusal. He intimated that he had cautioned Major B. to avoid any step calculated to bring on hostilities. At the same time he forwarded a memorandum on the native press. He said the first native newspaper was the 'Samachar Darpan,' published at the Serampore Press twenty-five years ago (i.e. in 1818), contemporary with the movement in the cause of public instruction which was made under Lord Hastings. He further remarked that at no period during the last twenty-five years had native papers acquired 2,000 subscribers in town and country; and that a newspaper was not reckoned among the wants of the people.

Although there are now (1888) many native newspapers, which have in the larger towns a considerable circulation, yet, as regards the largest and best part of the native population of India, the owners and cultivators of the land, it is still fairly true that a newspaper is not reckoned amongst their wants. And this is not a matter of regret: it is better that the people should be healthily employed on work which they understand, and from which they can acquire an honest competence and profit, than that they should spend their time in the study of newspapers, and in the acquisition from them of imagined grievances, of discontent, and of disloyalty, to the neglect of their more profitable duties.

We now resume Major Broadfoot's correspondence.

Capt. Durand wrote to him on August 30, on the subject of the recent Afghan campaign. After alluding to the fact that Havelock had decided not to publish, he said:

> Backhouse has been, in some way or other, talking of his journal of events at Jellalabad, or others have for him. It is spoken of as containing matter curious and surprising. I have seen nothing as yet, however, in the shape of disclosures of what went forward during the blockade. . . . I should not be much surprised at Backhouse startling the community by speaking out and telling the truth.

Havelock too wrote at this time, in better spirits than before, having just got his regimental majority.

Simla: August 30, 1843.

My dear Broadfoot,—Though only purporting to be an excuse for not writing, your letter, without date, but yesterday received, gave me infinite pleasure.

It has found me with prospects substantially improved, by the blessing of Providence, in the attainment, in the 'Gazette' of June 30 brought by last mail, at length, of a regimental majority. This perhaps was not a great boon after twenty-eight years' service, twenty of them in India, but it was conceded with the air of one, it being urged that the retirements were nearly all filled up, and the applicants for them men of very low standing. Pattison being allowed to go out in my favour, was therefore made an act of grace to me, with the innuendo, I expect, that it closed the door to all further claim for the last Afghan campaign.

To travel at once from the Horse Guards to the Tenasserim coast, I sincerely rejoice in the decided part you have taken as a negotiator and reformer, and the fruits and promises of such energy. It is one of our first duties in India, within and beyond the Ganges, to render ourselves respectable in the eyes of the Asiatic powers; and to compel them to respect the treaties they have made with us. Even up to the point of a Resident at Ava, I would say, let it either be insisted upon, or surrendered only for a *quid pro quo*. I cannot bear to hear of a subsisting treaty with one article disregarded. But as regards the other clause of my proposition, what were the Burmans and Talaings to think of us, whilst our newly acquired conquest was a den of intriguers and speculators, in league with corresponding nests of iniquity in Martaban and Rangoon? Therefore I trust you will persevere in an unsparing clear out, 'counting it all joy' when you are abused to the echo by the 'Moulmein Chronicle,' and those whom it can influence to join in the cry in Calcutta.

I have been enjoying here amongst the cedar trees such *aram*[6] for three months as has scarcely fallen to my lot for twenty years. . . .

Sir R. Sale goes down the Ganges to England, which he ought to have done (putting Indus for Ganges) last year; and the 13th, Lord Ellenborough writes him, march in November to Sukhur, and embark at Curatchee for England in March 1844, or 1845, as circumstances may dictate. I think the latter, for much has been left undone in Scinde. The 'Friend of India' has adverted more than once to our council in Jellalabad, led to do so by the 'Hurkaru,' and followed by the 'Delhi Gazette.'

[6] *Ārām*, rest or repose.

Mrs. Havelock, though unseen, sends her regards. Marshman will gladly accept your remembrances; and I remain, ever &c.

H. HAVELOCK.

P.S.—Toonee, the little orderly, and one Gurboo, a Goorkha non-commissioned officer, often visit me here, coming in the rain from their cantonment at Jitogue. The latter thinks he has still some letter of recommendation to get from you regarding past services, which would be useful to him, and keeps looking towards Moulmein. I fear the poor fellows transferred from the Sappers cannot get promotion in the Nusseeree battalion, having come into the midst of older claims in a new corps.

The next two letters are from Mr. and Mrs. Cameron. Mr. Cameron was, it will be recollected, legal member of council, and from him Broadfoot got advice on matters connected with the study of law; a subject on which he was, necessarily, somewhat ignorant.

Calcutta: September 7, 1843.

My dear Broadfoot, . . . You will see in the newspapers that the Jellalabad parliaments are on the *tapis*, and that somebody with a fictitious signature has given an account of their proceedings not very much like yours. Have you any notion who this is?

We go on here in an unsettled sort of way; the time-servers (a large class) puzzled and not knowing how to shape their course. Certainly it is worth while to be honest and sincere, were it only for the sake of tranquillity. The Governor-General is civil to me, and continues to show those good qualities which we both agreed in thinking he possesses; nevertheless, I wish he may not remain here, for he is not steady enough for enterprises which take a long while in the concoction and in the execution.

I had a long letter from Colin [Mackenzie] by the last mail. He complains much of his health; but appears well satisfied with the consideration shown him at home.

Gen. Smith[7] called here yesterday, and we talked of you. He seems to know your value. Always &c.

C. H. CAMERON.

September 11, 1843.

My dear Major Broadfoot,—Unfortunately the 'Siren' stole away without giving any notice of the day of her departure, so that

[7] Sir Harry Smith.

the Governor-General's despatches were even, I am told, left behind; but I hope these letters if despatched per 'Patriot' will reach you with equal speed and safety.

In the hurried lines you sent me (in answer to mine per 'Kitty') you did not tell me whether the little sea trip you had taken had been beneficial to your health. I earnestly hope that it has been so, and that nothing now interrupts the success and interest of your new position. You seem to be an intellectual Hercules, and to undertake, and successfully to undertake, the load and labour of the whole government; and to accomplish in six days the work of six years. Lord Ellenborough, a very short time ago, spoke of you to me in the highest possible terms; and I assure you I listened and answered with enthusiasm.

He spoke to me of the devotion of your corps to you; and said that you might any day have made yourself a king, so devoted was every soul around you to your order, and so willing to raise every arm at your command. I remarked (what I have often heard my husband remark of you) how rare it was to see a man who could distinguish himself equally in council and in action, in the cabinet and in the field; but, modest as you are, I will not tell you more of what was said, for fear of your accusing me of quizzing you. All I have to enforce upon you is the entreaty of your friends not to sacrifice yourself entirely to your zeal to promote the public good; for I (although a woman) am a lover of public good, and still maintain that useful good men, being rare, ought to bear in mind how precious they are, and to remember that the untiring, unceasing exertions of a few years, by wearing out their energies and resources of mind and body, are not in the end so desirable as the less active but more steady and lengthened efforts of a long life, throughout which the same philanthropic, devoted, upright spirit is felt, though subdued and tempered by the conviction that when there is no rest given to mind or body, both must suffer an early decay.

. . . . . .

It is amusing to see how things are going on now. The Council has a very meagre aspect (not *meagre* in the literal acceptation of the word, for the Deputy-Governor alone, always a Falstaff in appearance, is now so blown out with the dignity of his position, that he might represent a whole body of men!); but Mr. Maddock is, you know, absent in very precarious health; and poor Sir William Casement is seldom spared to attend Council.

Lord Ellenborough, if it be not treason to say so, is flighty and unmanageable in all matters of business; shrewd enough, but wholly without ballast; violently enthusiastic on all military subjects, and they alone seem to occupy his interests or his attention. A soldier,

as a soldier, is the thing he worships; and the whole substance of every public speech he has made since he returned to Calcutta, has been thus versified by my husband, and a literal versification it is.

> Long as I fill imperial Akbar's throne,
> Long as the Eastern world my sway shall own,
> Him, Him alone, in power will I place,
> Him, Him alone, with trust and honour grace,
> Unmoved who listens to the whizzing ball,
> And sees serene his slaughtered comrades fall.

His words literally were: 'Who behaves well under fire.' Now it is for this opinion that I quarrel with him.

Courage, however admirable in the field, however worthy of our respect, admiration, and gratitude, cannot alone entitle a man to promotion and distinction in offices of trust and honour, if he has not, besides courage, the mental and moral qualities required to do justice to that office. Again, his favourite public declaration is that we owe India to, and can preserve India through, the *army*, and the army alone. He does not think that there is more credit due to a body who can maintain an honourable peace, than to a body who can always wage war, though it be a successful war. But so exaggerated is his folly, for I must call it folly on this subject, that I can best describe its extent to you by telling you of the speech he made to me at the Fancy Ball, when I was remarking to him how gay the Calcutta ballrooms were made by the number of men in uniform. 'Oh, yes,' he answered, 'military men have so much the advantage; it is such a pity that the civilians have no uniform. I wish we could contrive some sort of uniform for them!' And this he literally feels. The golden bullion of the aide-de-camp's jacket he desires as much as a young coquette desires pink roses whilst a season of mourning prevents her from wearing them. . . .

And now I must wind up this long letter by saying, God bless you. You have, you know, our best wishes for your health and happiness; and must ever write to and think of me and my husband as warm friends. Ever &c.

JULIA CAMERON.

The overwork, bad climate, and effects of his wounds in Afghanistan had seriously affected Broadfoot's health, which seemed to be never good, at any rate in Southern India or on the Tenasserim coast. Rumours of war too had reached him, and he, for these various reasons, addressed Lord Ellenborough as follows:

Mergui: December 13, 1843.

My Lord,—For some days I had resolved to bring, on public grounds, the state of my health to your Lordship's notice; but the news of your having gone to join the Army of Exercise, and consequent rumours of its being employed in the field, have led me to resolve on something more, viz. of saying how grateful I should feel if in any way I could be allowed to join that army if it takes the field.

The state in which I found these provinces has *forced* me to work to a degree that would need much strength in a good climate. My health has never been restored since I was wounded at Jellalabad, for I was ordered out, before the wound healed, on detachment, and never again had a day's rest; then here there has been no rest, and now, in December, a coat is a burden; at night every window is open, and even a sheet too warm to be borne. I have had some severe illnesses of late, but recently have had slight apoplectic attacks, which make it almost certain that I must for a time, if not permanently, quit the coast. Rest, or a change to military service with the climate of Northern India, would speedily restore me, and I could then either return here or serve elsewhere as your Lordship might desire. Had my health not thus given way, I could not have ventured to make this request, greatly as your Lordship knows I desire to serve again in the field, especially during your Lordship's government; but should the turn my illness has now taken force me to leave at any rate, I should be miserable. I could not recover if the army were in the field, and I an idler elsewhere. I have endeavoured to do good here, and I hope have been able to do a little, and, above all, to carry it so far that anyone supported by your Lordship may carry it on in my absence. A letter from the Revenue Board informs me they see the evils existing, and my reports from this place will show them still more strongly, and I trust their remedies also. All will then depend on the Government. I would earnestly request, therefore, that if there is any chance of the army taking the field, I may be allowed to join it in any way I can be useful. Notwithstanding the distance, I think I could be with your Lordship before any campaign closed.

Begging your Lordship to forgive me for thus troubling you,

I remain &c.

G. Broadfoot.

To this, and one or two subsequent letters on questions connected with his work, the private secretary and the Governor-General replied:

Camp, Gwalior: January 11, 1844.

My dear Broadfoot,—Your letter of the 18th ultimo and inclosure I lost no time on receipt in communicating to the Governor-General.

His Lordship is sorry that you can speak in no better way of the state of your own health.

Your letter only arrived this morning. You will have heard of the actions of the 29th at Maharajpore and Punniar; on the 29th both took place. That at Maharajpore was a combat of guns against infantry. The latter did their duty bravely, but our loss was severe. I inclose the 'Gazette' and despatch on these actions, in case you should not before have received them. Sanders fell in leading a party of the 40th against the guns.

Yours sincerely,
H. M. DURAND.

Camp, Hirdoon: February 1, 1844.

My dear Broadfoot,—I only received here to-day your letter of December and of January 9. I very much regret the state of your health; but I still trust you may be able to remain and to perfect the good work you have begun.

You give a sad picture of the state to which maladministration has reduced your provinces. I always believed things were going very wrong there, but I had no idea they were so bad.

I am afraid my going to the Tenasserim coast would be misconstrued by the Burmese and lead them to expect aggression, while I could not satisfactorily do much in a very short time, and I could only be absent for a very short time under any circumstances. Under present circumstances I cannot venture to leave this part of India.

You will have heard that our campaign was of one day; I am now on my return to Calcutta, having settled all at Gwalior. I have sustained a great loss in Col. Sanders.[8]

If there should be at any future time a prospect of our having more important operations to carry on, I will, if possible, have you with me.

I have made every proper representation with respect to your having promotion for your services after April 7, 1842. I can do no more than I have done.

I shall be very anxious to hear how your health is after your voyage to Tavoy.

I have written to Mr. Bird about your having a steamer. I thought you had one.

[8] Col. Sanders, of the Bengal Engineers, has been more than once mentioned in these pages. He had served in Afghanistan, visited and surveyed Herat, had distinguished himself at the taking of Istalif, and at the time of his death was Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department.

I hope the arrangements I have made will enable the Madras Government to execute the original intention of relieving their 44th Regiment now with you. I have been obliged to place at the disposal of the Madras Government the regiments I had brought up, or was bringing up, to the Nerbudda. One of them mutinied at Jubbulpore, and I am stronger without mutinous troops than with them. It is very inconvenient, however, to have to place Bengal troops there just now. I want them all, or may do so.

Let me have a good account of your health, and I shall then feel satisfied that all the affairs of your Government will go on well in time. Believe me, my dear Broadfoot,

Yours very sincerely,

ELLENBOROUGH.

Broadfoot's friend John Malcolmson, to whom most of the letters from Jalalabad were addressed, died on March 23, 1844. A few words respecting his services may be permitted. He entered the Madras Medical Service in 1823, and before long distinguished himself in his profession, and became known as a man of considerable scientific attainments.

In 1833 he won a prize of 500 rs., given by the Madras Government for an essay on *beriberi*,[9] an obscure but distressing and virulent disease.

As a geologist he was thus described by the late Hugh Miller: 'A man of high scientific attainments and great general knowledge. Above all, I found him to possess, in a remarkable degree, that spirit of research almost amounting to a passion, which invariably marks the superior man.' Darwin pronounced that there could not be a higher authority on the geology of India.

He left the army in 1840, and joined the house of Forbes and Co. in Bombay, his brother being a partner in the London house Forbes, Forbes & Co. In 1842, he became secretary to the Bombay branch of the Royal Asiatic Society; in February 1844, he went to examine the valley of the Tapti, caught jungle fever from over exposure, and after nearly a month's illness died.

The decoration of the Order of the Bath, to which Broadfoot had been admitted for his services with Sale's brigade, was thus transmitted and acknowledged:

[9] Compare Yule's *Glossary*, p. 66.

Government House, Calcutta: March 1, 1844.

My dear Major Broadfoot,—I send you the decoration of the Order of the Bath, which his Royal Highness Prince Albert, acting Grand Master of the Order, has transmitted to me for you.

If you and I could remain in India some years, I think I should have a similar duty to perform more than once. However, I am a civil governor, and I ought to wish the golden age may return, when there will be no more wars. Yours &c.

ELLENBOROUGH.

Maulmain: April 10, 1844.

My Lord,—I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 1st ult. conveying the decoration of the Order of the Bath, transmitted to your Lordship for me by his Royal Highness Prince Albert, acting Grand Master of the Order; and I beg that your Lordship will be so good as to convey to the Prince, and through his Royal Highness to her Majesty, my dutiful acknowledgments of the honour so graciously conferred on me.

At the same time I request your Lordship to accept my thanks for the kind and flattering terms of your letter. It adds another to the many obligations under which you have laid

Your Lordship's &c. G. BROADFOOT.

It is necessary to advert briefly to the quarrel which existed between the Governor-General and the Court of Directors. As in most quarrels, there were faults on both sides. Lord Ellenborough's reforms, though for the most part, if not entirely, wise and honest, were rendered unpalatable to the Directors by the tone of the letters in which they were announced. He further did not exhibit a paternal solicitude for the interests of the Civil Service, and was credited with an undue bias in favour of army men. It is right that the Governor-General should select for the highest appointments the person best fitted to perform the duties, irrespective of whether he be soldier or civilian. It is also right that in doing so the strictest impartiality between the two services, in all dealings in which their interests are involved, should be maintained.

On the other hand, the Court of Directors exhibited singular ungraciousness and pettiness in the endeavour to depreciate the great merits it was impossible to deny to Lord Ellenborough's administration.

A curious anomaly existed at that time in respect to the powers of the Court in connection with the Governor-General. The ordinary rule as regards any appointment is, that the power competent to appoint is competent to dismiss.

An inferior power cannot dismiss a person appointed by a superior authority. In the case of the Governor-General, the Court could make the appointment, 'subject to the approbation of his Majesty, to be signified in writing by his royal sign-manual,'[1] and countersigned by the President of the Board of Control. Ordinarily, therefore, they should have been under a similar restriction in the matter of recall or dismissal.

For some unknown reason it was not so provided in the Act: his Majesty was empowered to remove any officer of the Company's service in India;[2] whilst in the next section, the liberty to remove, recall, and dismiss their servants, was preserved to the Court of Directors.[3]

The quarrel having become acute, the Court decided to avail itself of the power which was thus legally its own; and, contrary to the wish of her Majesty's Government, decided unanimously on recalling the Governor-General.

The following extracts from a large correspondence refer to this subject.

The question of recalling Lord Ellenborough had arisen on more occasions than one; but for various reasons had been abandoned or postponed. On April 6, 1844, Lord Ripon, who became President of the Board of Control in succession to Lord Fitzgerald, who died on May 11, 1843, informed Lord Ellenborough that the Court was tending towards recall; but that the Cabinet did not concur in their view, and would not share the responsibility. The Court complained of the tone of defiance which characterised certain letters, the spirit and tendency of which were such as to necessitate a change in the Government of India. It was pointed out by the Cabinet to Lord Ellenborough that on more than one occasion he had expressed himself, in respect to the Court and its authority, in terms which were unnecessary, and could only excite irritation.

Inclosed in this letter was a memorandum from the Duke

[1] India Bill, 3 & 4 William IV., dated August 28, 1833. Section XLII.

[2] *Ibid.* Section LXXIV.

[3] *Ibid.* Section LXXV.

of Wellington. In it he remarked that though aware of complaints against Lord Ellenborough's conduct, policy, and despatches, yet he understood that the reasons against exercising the power of recall were so strong that even the most incensed members of the Court admitted the impolicy of using it.

The Duke further expressed the opinion that there was no British subject more capable, or even as capable, as Lord Ellenborough of governing India, and he considered the moment of his return from victory at Maharajpur as a most unfortunate one to select for his recall.

On May 5, 1844, Lord Ripon announced to Lord Ellenborough his recall, and that Sir Henry Hardinge had been selected as his successor. He also gave an outline of the views of the Court, and those of the Cabinet on the question. The Court complained of the tone of Lord Ellenborough's letters, and of the numerous instances in which they had found it their duty to disapprove of his proceedings. In reply, the opposite view held by the Cabinet was expressed; the difficulties of the Afghan question, and the success with which he had treated them, were mentioned; in Sind,[4] though the Court condemned the policy followed, her Majesty's Government did not hold the same view, and confirmed Lord Ellenborough's action; the self-devotion to his many and arduous duties, and the personal disinterestedness exhibited in the exercise of patronage, were commended; and the opinion was expressed that the recall would be 'inconsistent with justice and sound policy.' The Court replied that the main ground of the measure they had resolved to adopt, was the habitual disregard by Lord Ellenborough of the nature of the relation existing between him and them, and that his conduct was calculated to bring them into contempt. The various services performed by Lord Ellenborough were disparaged, and reference was made to the appointment of military men to civil and political employment as damaging to the interests of the Civil Service, upon which the internal administration, and consequently the welfare of the people of India, so essentially depend.

As soon as Lord Ellenborough heard definitely of his recall, he wrote to most of the officers in a high position under

[4] A current *mot* at the time was, that Lord Ellenborough's friends must admit that he had sinned (Sind) at last.

him, announcing the fact, and informed them that it would not cause a change of policy in dealing with important matters; that his successor, Sir H. Hardinge, would continue the policy in force, and that the selection of Sir Henry was in all respects a fortunate one.

His letters to Broadfoot on the subject may be appropriately placed here.

Calcutta: June 17, 1844.

My dear Major Broadfoot,—You will have heard that the Court of Directors have thought fit to recall me. My successor will carry out all my views. He is my most confidential friend, with whom I have communicated upon all public subjects for thirty years.

I will not fail to make him acquainted with your merits and services. He will, I know, always place the most favourable interpretation upon your conduct, and give you full support.

I must not wish you to return to England soon; but whenever you do, you will, I feel assured, let me have the pleasure of welcoming you home, which I shall do most heartily.

Yours ever most sincerely,

ELLENBOROUGH.

Barrackpore: July 5, 1844.

My dear Broadfoot,—I have to regret that my sudden (but by me not unexpected) departure from India will prevent my seeing again in this country, and probably for a long time, many excellent friends I have had the good fortune to make here, and I regret this with respect to none more than yourself.

You know my successor, Sir Henry Hardinge, only as a good soldier; but you will find him a thoroughly straightforward man of business, doing justice to all, and supporting all who endeavour faithfully to serve the State as you do.

I trust, and indeed have no doubt, that he will, on Mr. Bird's departure in September, take the Government of Bengal into his own hands.

Every success attend you where you are and in the field.

Yours &c.

ELLENBOROUGH.

P.S.—I know you study your profession in books as well as on service; and as you may not have the Archduke Charles's military work, I send you the French translation of it, and hope you may some day have the opportunity of applying its principles.

Attention is invited to Broadfoot's reply: making every

fair deduction for the influence exercised by Lord Ellenborough's personal kindness, enough remains, when the honesty and ability of the writer are considered, to make it a strong testimony in favour of his Lordship's administration. There are letters from many officers in high appointments which might be quoted in support of what is said by Broadfoot. Amongst the rest is one from Henry Lawrence, who was then Resident at the Court of Nepal, and another from Sir George Pollock, whose testimony is of special value as regards the Indian army. In his letter, dated June 22, 1844, the following sentence occurs:

> The army of India owe to your Lordship a deep debt of gratitude, which is not likely ever to be effaced from their memory; and yet, I believe, only very few are informed of all your Lordship has done and has desired to do in their behalf.

Maulmain River, steamer 'Enterprise:' July 3, 1844.

My Lord,—A few days ago I heard the news of the unprecedented step lately taken by the Court of Directors. It would be very presumptuous in me to give opinions in such a matter to you; but one thing I may be allowed to say, which is, that no power whatever can recall the glory of your short but memorable administration—memorable beyond all precedent since Marquis Wellesley's, exceeding that in glory, for, difficult as was his position on reaching India, what was it to yours?

My Lord, I was then in a situation which made me weigh well our chances, and I know what India and Britain owe to you.

There is no treason, nor is there disrespect to the many good men who doubtless belong to the party opposed to you, in saying that they have fallen into bad company. There is not an idle, a corrupt, or incapable man in India who will not rejoice at your departure; and setting aside those blinded by corporation feelings, there are few, indeed, who look on a just, able, and vigorous government here, as essential to the happiness of India and the power of England, who will not grieve over it.

For myself, the kindness I, unknown, without connection, or interest of any kind, have received at your hands no doubt sways me. Yet, setting that aside, I feel deeply the injury your removal must cause here. I found here corruption disgraceful to the British name; supported by you, and by you alone, I grappled with and overthrew it partially; and now, just as some of the reports of this incredible corruption are going up together with reports of

lowered taxes, increased receipts in the treasury, improved police, and friendly relations with our neighbours, I hear that the author and sustainer of all this good is removed in a way not only calculated to [make], but which already has made, men again hope for a renewal of their pillage, who lately did not hope to escape its punishment.

I feel every confidence in Sir Henry Hardinge. His own character, and the Cabinet which sends him, demand that. But how can he have the familiarity with India, and that intimate knowledge of its administration and relations, which can make him independent of those who, by long prescription, regard a Governor-General, who will be more than their speaking trumpet and pen, as a usurper?

I had announced my belief that in a few years these provinces might cease to be a burden to Bengal; but I think that time is now far postponed. Still regretting this, I shall ever look on it as a great honour to have been the instrument, under you, of arresting the evils in progress, and showing the officers of Government here a system which, for the future, they cannot venture quite to abandon.

As to yourself, who have raised an empire in two years from the verge of despair to unequalled prosperity, every attack will but show your contemporaries the fullness of glory which otherwise only posterity might have known. And I hope all this will tend to make still more sure the destiny I have always looked on as yours, viz. that of guiding the momentous change of 1854.[5] If that year were not so near, I should predict that the East India Company themselves would yet vote you statues and rewards, as they did to Clive, Warren Hastings, and Wellesley, whom, also, they first thwarted and persecuted.

I ought to apologise for so long troubling you, but having begun I could not help expressing something of my feelings.

Believe me, my Lord, with gratitude and respect greater than ever,

Your Lordship's most faithful servant,

G. BROADFOOT.

With reference to the appointment of military men to posts previously held by civilians, Lord Ellenborough, in a letter to Lord Ripon, remarked that it was desirable at Maulmain that the 'office of Agent or Commissioner should be held by a military man of known judgment and experience,' who might be trusted 'to lay before the Government a sound and correct view of the actual state of affairs, and may avoid

[5] The reference is to the expiry of the charter in that year.

creating unnecessary alarm by exaggerated reports of coming dangers, while he, at the same time, remains free from the unsuspecting confidence which might produce yet more injurious results.'

Surely if this was true of Tenasserim in 1844, it follows that if we wish for security and strength in the newly acquired province of Burma, the administration should be in the hands of a skilled soldier, who would, on occasion arising, direct the movement of its garrison. In after years perhaps, when the people are reconciled to our rule, the appointment may, with safety, be permitted to swell the list of prizes which are held to be ordinarily the rewards of successful civil servants.

In adverting to the instances in which a military officer had been substituted for a civilian, Lord Ellenborough wrote:

> The honest energy, the fixedness of purpose, and the untiring activity with which Major Broadfoot has applied himself to the investigation, the exposure, and the correction of the flagrant abuses which had grown up under civil management in the province of Tenasserim, can surely not have incurred the disapproval of the Court.
>
> That officer's former acquaintance with Tenasserim, and his position as one of the most distinguished officers of the Madras Army, recommended him to me as a very fit person to be placed at the head of the administration of that province, garrisoned by Madras troops. The personal communication I afterwards had the advantage of having with him, while he accompanied my camp from Ferozpore to Delhi, satisfied me that I was entrusting the province to one of the first men in the public service; and I really do not know one civilian who could, on the ground of personal qualification, have advanced a special claim to the administration of a province where nothing resembles what he could have seen in India.

These quotations are recorded here, not merely to show how well prepared Lord Ellenborough was to justify his selection of a military man in preference to a civilian, but because of the high testimony to Major Broadfoot's abilities and character which they contain.

The last letter of Lord Ellenborough, before he left India, from which quotation will be made, was written to Mr. Currie,

then his Foreign Secretary. It contains the following simple maxims, with which many seem to be unacquainted.

The first is:

Do but one thing at a time. . . .

Never make a demand you cannot at once support by an adequate force.

Never take one step without having considered what your second is to be.

The next letter, from Broadfoot to Miss Sutherland, exhibits another phase of his character in contrast with that of the stern reformer whose part he was then playing.

Some of his remarks about the changes of fashion in India, and the typical old Indian, will be found interesting by those who have had more recent experience of life in that country.

Maulmain: August 20, 1844.

I came here with little but the clothes on my back; but a man must eat, and custom requires plates and dishes. Nay, modern Indian custom, introduced by steam, requires plates and dishes of china as in London. Having none, I borrowed from my Principal Assistant, Capt. McLeod, till I could get my own from Calcutta. This borrowed ware was sadly damaged, I fear, by careless servants. Now I want to make Mrs. McLeod a present of a nice set of china, say a dinner set for eighteen or twenty-four—eighteen, for they must not give large parties, unless there be a nice set not to be broken. If I send to Calcutta I shall have no choice; indeed, if I were there, the choice is limited, and I might get down some tasteless enormity at great cost. So I come as usual to you, and leave the whole to you. I know you will forgive the trouble, and I know, too, what I want will be better done than anyone else would do it. I send by this opportunity an order on Forbes & Co. for 50*l.*, which I hope will cover all. My own set is as follows: dinner set for twenty-four, cost 45*l.*; breakfast set for twelve, cost 20*l.* Could I have waited to write home to you, I suspect that money, or less, would have given me something far handsomer, though it is quite good enough for me. I want to save money if I can.

It is astonishing how India is changed since I saw you, and it is changing more every day. You may, perhaps, remember hearing of the rough way we lived. Now every mess eats from the finest china. My own is inferior to many of them;—hot-water plates still remain, however;—but the manufacturers now know this and make them. So also private families are in everything copying London.

Ten years back they would as soon have copied Pekin. Old Indians, such, for example, as Col. Warde, are now as rare here as at home. In fact, I doubt if in a short time one will be found out of the Oriental Club, which will become one of the London shows; an Asiatic museum of the remains of extinct species.

McLeod is an old friend of mine, and almost the only honest man I found here; but he is a very honest and excellent man. A little too kind-hearted for the people he has to deal with, and requiring some one with more—what shall I call it?—obstinacy in him to support him; and that is his only failing; a very venial one indeed, yet it has kept me on this coast when I would fain have left it to seek health. But he cannot stand alone, though with good ability and great zeal; so now you know him. He is the son of a captain in a Highland regiment, but his mother married Col. Sim of the Madras Engineers, of whom you will perhaps remember having heard. Excellent people all.

Mrs. McLeod is the daughter of a very kind old man I knew in Calcutta, Dr. McLeod, the Inspector-General of Hospitals for the Queen's troops in India. I knew her as Miss McLeod, when her husband was falling in and out of love with her, two or three times a day, according to an old bad practice of his; and it would have come to nothing, had not the poor old doctor suddenly died. . . . Poor Miss McLeod was left destitute; but Willie, as her husband is called, forthwith did what I, then a thousand miles off journeying to Afghanistan, said he would do: he found out he was over head and ears in love, and proposed and was accepted, married and a', as Kitty's song used to say; and from all I see, they are likely, as Kitty's stories said, to live happy ever after; for, except that he is from six to seven feet high, and she not much above half that length, they are excellently matched. They have 1,000*l.* a year here; but he was in debt, and she had nothing, so they are living very quietly to get clear. So now you know all about them, to the size of their hands and mouths, and can tell exactly what to send.

And here is a sheet full of gossip. I must come home, I think, soon, or we shall not live long enough to have all the gossip out that is accumulating.

I close this now without another word, as I hope to write again by this ship, though it be but a few lines.

Ever &c.

G. BROADFOOT.

I really do not know how you are to get it shipped; perhaps the dealers will do that, paying freight and insurance. Address to

Capt. W. C. McLeod, Principal Assistant to the Commissioner, Tenasserim Provinces; care of Messrs. Line & Co., Madras. They will of course send an invoice, and tell them to send a number or something by which they will know how to supply breakages from time to time.

It was told of Col. Sim, who is mentioned in this letter, that he wished the permission of the Marquis of Tweeddale to pull down an old wall which was past mending; the Marquis, however, accompanied by his Irish private secretary, Dr. Lane, determined to test the accuracy of his professional adviser by inspection. 'I think it can be repaired,' said the Marquis; 'what do you, think, Lane?' 'Certainly, my Lord, I quite agree with you,' the doctor replied. 'Perhaps,' said Sim, 'Dr. Lane would prescribe a *plaster* for it!'

The next letter, from Havelock, is the last of that part of Broadfoot's correspondence which is included in the period during which he governed the Tenasserim Provinces. A few days after it was written, and probably some time before it was received, Capt. Durand arrived unexpectedly at Maulmain. He announced that Broadfoot had been appointed by Sir H. Hardinge as Agent for the North-Western Frontier, then, next to the Governor-General's, the most important political post in India, and that he himself was to succeed to the vacancy thus created.

Headquarters, Simla: September 9, 1844.

My dear Broadfoot,—I was much gratified by the receipt of your letter of July 5, which, however, did not reach me until August 22, and I was devising to make time from the midst of my avocations to write you a long letter, giving you the story of our short but brilliant campaign beyond the Chumbul, when I heard from Sir H. Gough news that I hope will render epistolary communications unnecessary between us. I trust he is not misinformed when he tells me that he understands it is arranged that Col. Richmond is to go to Lucknow, Durand to Moulmein, and that you, my friend, are to have the North-West Frontier. I cannot say how much I should delight in such a change both on public and private grounds.

Doubtless you must have commenced upon many things on the Tenasserim coast, the completion of which you would rather carry on yourself than see it entrusted to any other hand; but I should hope Durand would be an honest and able successor; and, to put emolument out of the question, our North-West Frontier is the point

of all others the most attractive to a soldier. You are wanted there; for not only is our information defective, but Col. Richmond, though a very fair regimental officer, is by no means a man of calibre for such a charge, and an agent ought to be at Umballa who would communicate, in accordance with sound military views, with the Commander-in-Chief (whose task now seems to be to watch the frontier) on the state of affairs. So, if the news be true, I hope soon to see you in the West, and to have the opportunity of talking at large, instead of writing on a thousand matters in which we both take an interest. You must endeavour to see Marshman on your way up. My wife will be happy to make your acquaintance, especially after being disappointed of seeing you in 1848 at Serampore, though I fear she will not accompany me to the plains this winter.

In case of the Sikhs coming across the frontier, it seems to be intended (between ourselves is this) to concentrate to meet them at Sirhind, a point, as it appears to me, much too far in advance. My own notion is that there should be nothing at Ferozpore or Loodiana except within walls: that the force at Umballa should be increased, and that the point of concentration should be *in rear* again of Umballa.

I consider myself favoured in having got the step of lieutenant-colonel for the Gwalior business; and being far too poor to think of England, I have made up my mind, though with many regrets, to leave the old 13th, and am now major in the 39th.

Believe me &c.

H. HAVELOCK.

CHAPTER IX.

1843-44.

Sir Henry Hardinge—Sketch of Punjab history and politics—Ranjít Singh—His chief officers and courtiers—Maharaja Kharrak Singh—Death of Kunwar Náo Nihál Singh—Indus flood in 1841—Insubordination in the Sikh army—Murder of Maharaja Sher Sing and Raja Dhyán Singh; accession of Duleep Singh—Col. Richmond, C.B.—Hostile policy of the Darbár—Return of Sardár Attar Singh to the Punjab—Sikhs protest against the action of the Government of India—Suchet Singh's treasure: Capt. Saunders Abbott—Correspondence about the treasure—Major Broadfoot, C.B., appointed Governor General's Agent—Dispute regarding village of Mowran.

BEFORE accompanying Major Broadfoot to the Punjab, it is desirable to record briefly the previous services of the new Governor-General, who succeeded Lord Ellenborough on July 23, 1844.

Sir Henry Hardinge was born in 1785, received his first commission in 1798, and joined his regiment, the Queen's Rangers, at the early age of fifteen. He served under Sir Arthur Wellesley in 1808, and was present at the battles of Roleia and Vimiera, where he was severely wounded. He distinguished himself in the rear guard during the retreat on Corunna, and was with Sir John Moore when that gallant general was mortally wounded.

The value of his services at Albuera is acknowledged by history. The occasion is thus described by Alison and Napier:

In this extremity the firmness of one man changed the fate of the day, and in its ultimate effects, perhaps, determined the issue of the Peninsular War. While Beresford, under circumstances which not only justified, but perhaps called for the measure, was taking steps for a retreat, an officer on his staff, endowed with the eye of a general and the soul of a hero, boldly took upon himself the responsibility of venturing one more throw for victory. Col., now SIR HENRY HARDINGE, ordered Gen. Cole to advance with his

division on the right, which was still fresh, and, riding up to Abercrombie on the extreme left, ordered him also to bring his reserve brigade into action.[1]

The carnage was frightful, 'and then was seen with what a strength and majesty the British soldier fights.'[2] The French at length gave way, and 'like a loosened cliff, went headlong down the ascent. The rain flowed after in streams discoloured with blood; and fifteen hundred unwounded men, the remnant of six thousand unconquerable British soldiers, stood triumphant on the fatal hill.'[2]

Col. Hardinge was again severely wounded at Vittoria, and was present in nearly every battle and siege during the memorable war. For his services he was made K.C.B., and was appointed to command a company in the Guards.

When war broke out again, he was attached to the Prussian army under Blucher as Quartermaster-General, and took a distinguished part in the battle of Ligny. Late in the afternoon his left hand was shattered by a bullet, but he did not leave the field, and it was midnight before his hand was amputated. Rough treatment in the first instance caused much additional suffering, but he was able to rejoin the army in Paris. In acknowledgment of his great services the King of Prussia, at a review at Sedan, decorated him with the Order of Merit and of the Red Eagle; and Wellington presented him with the sword from his own side.

In 1821 Sir Henry married Lady Emily Jane, sixth daughter of the Marquis of Londonderry, and thus became related by marriage to Lord Ellenborough. He entered Parliament, and held office twice as Secretary of War, and twice as Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. That his services in the latter capacity were marked by honesty, ability, and devotion, is confirmed by his having endured the rancorous hostility of the Irish members, and the foul language of their leader.

Sir Henry was the Duke of Wellington's second in the duel with Lord Winchilsea.

This brief and imperfect sketch of Sir H. Hardinge's career is sufficient to show that his experience and qualifications as a

[1] Alison, *History of Europe*, vol. viii. p. 321.

[2] Napier, *Peninsular War*, iii. 541 to 548.

soldier were of a very high order; as a member of Parliament and holder of office he has been described as of a temper warm but generous: 'Plain, sincere, straightforward, just and considerate; . . . understanding what he undertakes, and undertaking nothing but what he understands.'[3]

Such was the man who, when fifty-nine years old, undertook the duties and responsibilities of the Government of India.

A retrospective glance at the history and politics of the Punjab is now necessary, in order that events which happened whilst Major Broadfoot was answerable for the conduct of our relations with that country may be correctly appreciated.

Examination of much information, collected with considerable labour, appears to justify the division of the subject into three parts:

I. From the rise of the Sikh sect to the death of Maharaja Ranjít Singh, say from 1469 to 1839.

II. From the death of Ranjít Singh to the murder of Maharaja Sher Singh on September 15, 1843; during which period the Sikh Government tried to maintain the traditional policy of friendship with the Government of India.

III. From the death of Sher Singh to the outbreak of the first Sikh war.

The necessity for keeping a digression of this kind within suitable limits, prevents more than a very cursory allusion to the events which fall under Parts I. and II. Yet they are of very great interest, and of such a nature as to lend themselves to picturesque description.

The Sikh sect was founded by Guru Nanak, a true and sincere reformer of religion. He preached glory to God, peace and goodwill to man; and endeavoured to reconcile Moslem with Hindu. For a time his attempt seemed to be successful; but before long the increasing importance of the sect led to their persecution, and persecution to reprisal. The apostle of retaliation was Guru Govind, the tenth spiritual chief in succession to Nanak. He preached steel and its application to the Musalman, and altered the distinguishing title of his followers from Sikh (learner or disciple) to Singh (lion or warrior).

After his death the Sikhs were separated into many parties,

[3] *Calcutta Review*, No. xvi. vol. viii. art. vi.

each under a Chief or Sardár; but all were united as equal members of the Khálsa. The Khalsa is the commonwealth of the Sikhs; the word has for them a mystical meaning, salvation, equality, and government according to the principles of Guru Govind being implied.

These parties were united into a nation by the energy and talent of Ranjit Singh, about the commencement of the present century.

For a time it was doubtful whether he would be content with conquests to the north and west of the Punjab, or whether he would dispute with the English the sovereignty of India. He decided, however, to restrain his soldiers from aggression in that quarter; and once having made up his mind, he most scrupulously adhered to a policy of friendship and trust in British moderation and honour.

The position was a delicate one, for although the Government of India was perfectly sincere in its desire to uphold Ranjit Singh's power, there were complications which under a less determined and less sagacious ruler might at any moment lead to rupture. Of these the principal was that, although the Sutlej was the boundary between British India and the Punjab, the Maharaja had extensive estates on the British side of the river. He was therefore an independent chief on one side, and a protected chief on the other side, of the Sutlej.

In person Ranjit Singh was of short stature, blind of one eye, and marked by smallpox; but evident energy and ability amply compensated for these defects. He affected great simplicity in dress, whilst he insisted on his courtiers being gorgeously arrayed. He was plain even to coarseness in his speech, and permitted great freedom in reply. Almost all Europeans who had interviews with him were greatly struck with his intelligence and talent; but perhaps the most remarkable quality he displayed was an insatiable curiosity. He questioned his visitors on every imaginable subject, was delighted when they were confused or unable to reply, but was even more pleased when the reply was apt. M. Victor Jacquemont, who travelled in India from 1828 to 1832, thus described him:

Maharajah Runjet-Sing est un vieux renard près de qui le plus rusé de nos diplomates n'est qu'un innocent. . . . C'est un cauche-

mar que sa conversation. Il est à peu près le premier Indien *curieux* que j'aie vu; mais il paie de curiosité pour l'apathie de toute sa nation. Il m'a fait cent mille questions sur l'Inde, les Anglais, l'Europe, Bonaparte, ce monde-ci en général et l'autre, l'enfer et le paradis, l'âme, Dieu, le Diable, et mille autres choses encore.'[4]

He was illiterate, but had great respect for learning, and was most particular in his correspondence, especially with the Government of India, to weigh with care every important word or expression used by his secretary, Fakir Azízuddín.

He was addicted to drink and debauchery, and lax to an extraordinary degree in the rule of his zenana. He had, as far as is known, only one son, Kharrak Singh, who bore a strong resemblance in face to his father, but the likeness ended there. There were other reputed sons, amongst whom may be mentioned Sher Singh, Tara Singh, Kashmira Singh, Peshora Singh, and Duleep Singh, of whom the Maharaja may be said to have adopted the first named.

A few of the principal persons about Ranjit Singh must be introduced; they will appear hereafter more or less prominently in Major Broadfoot's letters.

The most able and powerful men about the court were undoubtedly the Jammú brothers, Guláb Singh, Dhyán Singh, and Suchet Singh, to whom may be added Híra Singh, son of Dhyan Singh.

Volumes might be written about these men, so eventful were their lives; but here the briefest description must suffice. Gulab Singh was a soldier, but possessed of much ability as a statesman. Dhyan Singh was a statesman, with many qualities of a soldier. Suchet Singh was a soldier only. Hira Singh in after times gave proof of both wisdom and courage.

Fakir Azizuddin, originally a barber surgeon, latterly in charge of the correspondence with the Government of India, was a man greatly valued and respected by the Maharaja. He was simple in dress and retiring in manner, a master of style, conciliatory but of great energy, gifted with a retentive memory, and always ready with an apt quotation.

Diwan Díná Náth was a prominent figure during the de-

[4] *Correspondance de Victor Jacquemont*, tome premier, pp. 363 et 374. Paris, 1833.

cline of the Sikh power. He was employed by Ranjit Singh in matters of finance, which he managed with ability tainted with corruption. He was rich, hard-working, and accomplished.

The Vakils attached to the office of the Governor-General's Agent were persons of much importance. They were all of one family, and were well inclined towards the Jammu party. Rai Kishen Chand was the ablest of them; he possessed great tact, cunning, and presence of mind, concealed under the disguise of a mild, deferential, and yielding manner.

There were many other persons who deserve to be termed conspicuous in the court of Ranjit Singh, such as Diwan Mokam Chand, Jemadar Khushhál Singh, Diwan Sáwan Mall, Bhai Ram Singh, and Misr Beli Ram; not to mention the principal Sardars, such as Sham Singh of Atari; Fatteh Singh, Mán; Desa Singh, Majithia, and his sons Lahna Singh and Ranjur Singh; the Sindhanwalia chiefs, and others; but the scope of this sketch does not admit further description.

The principal foreign officers were Gen. Ventura, in charge of the infantry; Gen. Allard, who commanded the cavalry; and Gen. Court, who was chiefly employed with the artillery. Gen. Avitabile [5] was a successful and unscrupulous ruler of wild savages, and is best known as governor of Peshawar and Yusufzai.

Ranjit Singh is said to have died on June 27, 1839, and next day his body was burnt outside the gates of the Hazuri bagh, on the spot now occupied by his mausoleum. He was succeeded by Kharrak Singh, from whose weak hands his ambitious and able son, Náo Nihál Singh, soon endeavoured to wrest all power. Raja Dhyan Singh was the wazir or prime minister, and as long as his advice was followed the business of the State did not suffer; but he was distrusted, especially by Nao Nihal Singh. Complications with the Government of India arose on the question of permission for our convoys to march *viâ* Peshawar to Kabul. The Court of Lahore was disquieted by the reports in English newspapers of the assembling of troops at Firozpur, and they regarded with apprehension the expected return of the army from Afghanistan. They tried to oppose the march of our troops through the Punjab, and Mr. Clerk was sent to arrange the matter. The instructions given to him were explicit: the Government of

[5] See p. 14, note 4.

India must have a safe passage for convoys and escort when necessary, but would restrict the number as much as possible. Maharaja Kharrak Singh's health was in a very weak state: his doctors prescribed 'pounded emeralds and other astringents and tonics,' but without good effect. He died on November 5, 1840. After the cremation of his corpse, Nao Nihal Singh, on foot, accompanied by Dhyan Singh, and Miyan Udham Singh son of Gulab Singh, and followed by some servants, returned from performing the usual ablutions towards a gateway in which he sought shade. As he entered, it fell. Udham Singh was killed on the spot, Nao Nihal Singh was desperately wounded, and Dhyan Singh was slightly struck by the falling *débris*. Nao Nihal Singh never spoke again, and soon died.

Raja Dhyan Singh at once sent for Kunwar Sher Singh, the reputed son of Ranjit Singh, and, with the unanimous consent of the Khalsa, placed him on the throne, whence he was desired to rule in concert with the ministers and in some kind of conjunction with Kharrak Singh's widow, Rani Chand Kawar.[6] This lady did not approve of the arrangement, and succeeded for a time in causing Sher Singh to depart to his estates and quit the government. Her administration was weak, and her acts were those of a grasping and indiscreet woman. Robbers began to infest the high roads, and insubordination appeared in the army.

In 1841 Sher Singh returned to Lahore, obtained the assistance of Ventura and some of the troops, and besieged the Rani in the fort or citadel, which was defended by Raja Gulab Singh. His assaults were unsuccessful, but terms of evacuation were concluded, and the garrison, laden with the spoil of the treasuries, marched out unmolested. The Rani remained in the fort, and Sher Singh, after having been installed as Maharaja, went by advice of the Darbár[7] to call upon her and beg her pardon. The Rani rose to receive him, and, having seated him by her side, congratulated him on his succession to the throne of Lahore.

[6] There is some obscurity regarding the use of the title Kawar, Kowr, or Kooer, applied to ladies of a certain rank. Kunwar is the title by which a Maharaja's sons are addressed, and its feminine form is Kunwári.

[7] *Darbár* or *durbar*, the court, or assembly of the chief persons of the State.

Insubordination among the troops was making alarming progress, and robbery and murder were daily committed in the streets of Lahore. The army acted under the direction of their panchayats or regimental committees. These were elected by the men, and to them were referred all important questions, such as what pay they should demand, where they would serve, and what officers they would obey. Later on they practically decided questions of government and policy, and appointed or dismissed those called by courtesy their rulers. In 1841 the mutiny had spread to Peshawar, and the road to Kabul was no longer safe. It will be recollected that the convoy of the wives and attendants of the royal families of Kabul, under an escort commanded by Capt. Broadfoot, marched through the Punjab at this time. There is reason to believe that a number of the mutineers who threatened the convoy, perished in the extraordinary flood of May 1841, caused by the bursting of an obstruction or dam in the Indus, the result of a landslip on an enormous scale. As far as we have been able to discover, the dam lasted for at least two months, when the accumulated waters of the Indus at length carried it away. The consequent flood was of unprecedented magnitude, and disastrous in the extreme. Trees, villages and their inhabitants, and even the surface soil of a considerable tract of country, were swept away, and the desolation which resulted remains even unto this day.[8]

In June 1842, Rani Chand Kawar was killed by her slave girls during a temporary absence of the Maharaja from Lahore.

The defence of Jalalabad attracted the attention of the more thoughtful in the Darbar, and did much towards removing the unfavourable impression caused by the disasters in Afghanistan. On one occasion, when a courtier made some remarks disparaging to British power, Raja Dhyan Singh replied, calling attention to the fact that there were but a thousand of our troops in Jalalabad, yet how bravely did they oppose Muhammad Akbar. They had saved the place

[8] The information regarding this flood rests greatly but not entirely on tradition. High-water marks have been observed. In July 1847, Lieut. Ralph Young, B.E., saw distinctly the high-water mark of this flood at the Makpon-i-shagron, a considerable distance up-stream of Acho, near which place the obstruction happened. He estimated the high-water mark to be forty feet above the ordinary high-level surface of the river.

simply by their own courage, and were again holding it in force. Similarly he alluded to Kandahar, and told his antagonist that he did not at all comprehend the courageous character of the British.

In an evil day for himself, Maharaja Sher Singh listened to the advice of the Indian Government, and consented to be reconciled with the Sindhanwalia Sardars, and to reinstate them in their possessions. They evinced their gratitude by murdering him and his son Partáb Singh, a youth of great promise, on September 15, 1843. On the same morning, and by the hand of Ajit Singh, Sindhanwalia, who had killed Sher Singh, fell Raja Dhyan Singh, the wise wazir of the Punjab. Hira Singh his son, and Suchet Singh his brother, determined to revenge his death. The former gained over the troops, the latter led them, and the fort of Lahore, in which Ajit Singh had taken refuge, was captured. Hira Singh was enabled to lay the head of Ajit Singh at the feet of Dhyan Singh's widow, Rani Pathani, who had declined to burn herself till she had obtained that satisfaction. When that was accomplished, she said, 'Now I am fully satisfied; now I am ready to follow my lord and husband;' and added, turning to Hira Singh, 'I will tell your dear father that you have acted the part of a brave and dutiful son.' Having spoken thus, she calmly mounted the funeral pyre and perished in the flames.

Duleep Singh, a mere child, whose birth had been considered of so little consequence as not to merit report to the Agent till some years after its occurrence, was proclaimed Maharaja.

Part III. of this sketch of Punjab history must be described at greater length, for Major Broadfoot was one of the most conspicuous actors in its stirring scenes.

In June 1843, Col. Richmond, C.B., an officer who had served with distinction in the war in Afghanistan, was selected by Lord Ellenborough to succeed Mr. Clerk, whose reputation as our Agent and Envoy was deservedly great. The selection was not entirely fortunate; the Colonel had no special knowledge or experience of the kind of work he was called upon to perform, and was moreover in bad health. In his private remarks on the appointment, Lord Ellenborough did not express the certainty, which he sometimes recorded, that he had

got the best possible man for the place; he said it was the best he could do at the time, and he trusted that the appointment might turn out well.[9] He sent Col. Richmond instructions to the effect that the British Government desired to adhere to the policy which it had all along followed, and to maintain the relations of amity which had so long subsisted between us and the Sikh nation. He considered that the presence of the Sikhs as a strong and friendly nation between the Indus and the Sutlej was most beneficial, and greatly to be preferred to contact with Afghanistan. At the same time, he pointed out that all the news from the Punjab indicated an early dismemberment of the Sikh State, and that therefore, in common prudence, defensive measures must not be neglected, and information which would be of use if war were forced on us must be collected.

In Lahore affairs were very unsettled. In October 1843 the Jammu party were in the ascendant, Hira Singh being minister. Against him were arrayed the Sikh chiefs as a body, and Rani Jind Kawar, or Jindán, as she was commonly called, the mother of Duleep Singh. But the real power had passed from the rulers to the army. Hira Singh was greatly under the influence of Pandit Jalla, an able and vigorous man, dreaded and disliked by the chiefs, whose wealth he taxed for the benefit of the treasury. He was also the prime mover in the anti-English policy. He foresaw that the time must come when he could no longer raise money to satisfy the rapacity of the army, and believed that his chance of safety then was to incite the soldiers to march against the British. At first the Khalsa penetrated his design, but afterwards they were so far guided by him that the troops marched out to Kána Kachha, one of the stages on the road to Firozpur. This was the first patent departure from the traditional policy of Ranjit Singh. Sardar Fatteh Singh, Man, appealed pathetically against the innovation. He referred to the benefit the Sikhs had derived from maintaining friendship with the British, and deprecated the adoption of any measures which indicated suspicion, or might be considered provocative of war. And he asked the Darbar to weigh his words well, and with the respect to which he was entitled on account of his age of seventy-five years.

[9] P. 194.

and of his services to the State. It was of no use; the Sikh troops were marched still nearer to the Sutlej, and Pandit Jalla urged the generals to send men to Firozpur to tamper with the fidelity of the sepoy regiments.

When Lord Ellenborough heard this, he desired that our friendly attitude should be reaffirmed, but accompanied by a plain warning that if one Sikh soldier crossed the Sutlej in hostility, the aggression would not be forgiven. The Agent's reports at this time exhibited the acts of the Sikhs in the most favourable aspect, and unduly blackened the characters of the Jammu Rajas, a process which was unnecessary. These letters had the effect of eliciting from Lord Ellenborough expressions of horror at the revolting crimes and atrocities by means of which Hira Singh had raised himself to power. That opinion was based on a misconception of the case. The atrocities by which Hira Singh had risen to the highest position under the Maharaja, could not with propriety be laid to his charge. His father had been murdered by the conspirators, and he, a young and somewhat effeminate man, appealed to the troops, and, with a remarkable amount of skill and determination, avenged his father's death. That Hira Singh was much better than his neighbours it would be idle to assert, but neither was he worse.

The Sikhs were superstitious, and there were evil omens in the camp of their army, which had moved towards the British frontier. Their tallest flagstaff was broken in a storm, and the tent of Miyan Lábh Singh, one of their commanders, was literally torn to pieces by an infuriated elephant.

Bhai Gurmukh Singh, who had latterly exercised considerable influence over Sher Singh, and who is believed to have directly recommended Ajit Singh to murder Dhyan Singh, and Misr Beli Ram, who was generally opposed to the Jammu party, mysteriously disappeared when Raja Hira Singh came into power.[1]

It is probable that they were included in the punishment he dealt to his father's murderers, and that the Bhai deserved his fate: no direct evidence regarding their death has been found. MisrBeli Ram was for a long time in charge of thetosha khana.[2]

[1] *Calcutta Review*, August 1844, art. v. p. 500.

[2] *Tosha khána*, the repository of Government or State presents given or received.

It has been recorded that attempts to tamper with the fidelity of the East India Company's sepoys had been ordered by Pandit Jalla; whether resulting in part from these it is difficult to say with certainty, but serious insubordination was manifested by certain sepoy regiments which were ordered to proceed from Firozpur to Sind. Prompt measures were taken, and the mutiny was arrested.

Raja Hira Singh for a time seemed to be so securely seated as minister, as to afford a reasonable prospect of stability for the Government. Sardar Jawáhir Singh, the drunken and debauched brother of Rani Jind Kawar, had tried to supplant him, but was seized by the troops and imprisoned.

These appearances, however, were deceitful; the troops, the real masters of the situation, were determined to exercise their power, and Raja Suchet Singh openly encouraged Kashmira Singh and Peshora Singh to revolt.

Pandit Jalla had greatly offended the chiefs by taking every opportunity to fine them and resume their estates, in order to supply the treasury. He now fell under the wrath of the army, who discovered that though he constantly professed his devotion to them, and though it did not appear that he had recommended reduction in their pay, yet he had secretly advised Hira Singh to save money, and reduce the power of the troops, by not filling up vacancies as they occurred.

At the Darbar four delegates from the panchayats appeared and said that they came on the part of the whole Khalsa to him, Raja Hira Singh, who regarded himself as a very Emperor; that the order of the Khalsa was as follows: After recapitulating events since Sher Singh's death, they said that now Misr Jalla had been made wazir, a man guilty of conduct the most atrocious and debased. The Khalsa had pointed out these things, but Raja Hira Singh had closed his ears, therefore were they displeased.

Hira Singh observed that they should put forward their wishes plainly in the form of a petition.

The delegates replied that they were no petitioners, but the bearers of the message of the Khalsa; they addressed petitions to no one except to the throne. They again directly formulated their complaint, and the Raja deprecated their anger, and confessed himself grievously in error. The delegates said he must

surrender Pandit Jalla, Shekh Imamuddin, and Lal Singh; and that if he hesitated or refused, he would himself be seized. The Raja promised compliance, and the delegates departed.

Pandit Jalla, a clever fearless man, seeing this state of feeling, remarked, that when they could no longer control the army, they must send it to plunder the English; to which Raja Hira Singh replied, that would undoubtedly be the final act. Lord Ellenborough expressed his concurrence with the Raja, that war with the British would probably be the result of the present anarchy, and that therefore preparation was prudent. On March 27, Raja Suchet Singh with a small force arrived at Lahore. He had been led to expect that the army would join him against his nephew; and when he found out his mistake, with characteristic rashness, he and his small band determined to oppose Hira Singh with twenty thousand men and artillery. First he allowed all those of his followers to go who desired to do so, and then, with the equally brave Rai Kesri Singh, at the head of some sixty or seventy men, he charged the Sikh army, and perished.

The immediate result was that Hira Singh became still more dependent on the will of the soldiers.

The next event of importance, one of the very few cases in which the Sikh Government had a just cause of complaint against the British, was that Sardar Attar Singh, Sindhanwalia, who had taken refuge in the cis-Sutlej states, was permitted to leave them with a considerable band of followers, and join Bhai Bír Singh, Kashmira Singh, and Peshora Singh, who were encamped on the north side of the Sutlej. Raja Hira Singh, with great promptitude, turned the mistake of not restraining Attar Singh to good account. He pointed it out to the Khalsa as evidence that Attar Singh had the support of the British: he expressed great regret that the Bhai, whose religious character and position caused him to be much venerated by the Sikhs, should meddle with State affairs, and by leaguing himself with the enemies of the Khalsa forfeit its protection. He also protested formally against the action of the Government of India in allowing this known enemy of the Lahore Government to leave their territory in order to disturb the peace of the Punjab.

Hira Singh's appeal to the Khalsa was successful. They

listened to his impeachment of the Sindhanwalia chiefs, to his denunciation of them for having invoked British aid, and said that they were the servants of the Maharaja, and were ready to march to Delhi. The Raja replied: 'First punish Attar Singh.'

Lord Ellenborough pointed out the impropriety of not having detained Sardar Attar Singh, and prevented his crossing into Punjab territory to stir up strife. For future guidance he informed the Agent, that if satisfied that a person was proceeding through our territory with hostile designs against Lahore, he was empowered to use any degree of compulsion required to prevent his purpose.

The Khalsa army marched from Lahore and came up with the rebels near Sarehâli, which is on the road from Amritsar to Harîke patan.[3] An effort was made to detach Bhai Bir Singh from the others, in order that he might not be involved in their ruin. It was unsuccessful, and the Khalsa troops proceeded to do their duty. Their superiority in numbers was so great that the issue could not for a moment be in doubt. Attar Singh, Kashmira Singh, and the Guru were slain; Peshora Singh escaped, it is believed, before the commencement of the slaughter.

The death of the Guru by violence made a great impression on the minds of the superstitious Sikhs; the troops engaged were thereafter called Gúrúmár;[4] and when, shortly afterwards, they suffered severely from cholera, it was considered to be a Divine punishment for their sacrilege.

There was another question, regarding the early treatment of which, the Government of India was not as fortunate as usual. Raja Suchet Singh, shortly before his death, sent a considerable amount of treasure, said to exceed fourteen lakhs of rupees in value, then approximately equal to 140,000*l.*, to Firozpur for safety.

Capt. Saunders Abbott, who was Assistant Agent at Firozpur, on hearing that the treasure had been discovered, went immediately to ascertain its amount, and provide for its safe custody.

He found it buried in three huge copper vessels, one of

[3] *Patan* (*puttun*) is the word used in the Punjab to denote a ferry or ford.

[4] Slayers of the High Priest.

which only was opened. In this were found 63 brass lotas or vases, supposed to contain gold, closed with lead on which the Raja's seal was impressed. Gold mohurs[5] were visible through two defective seals. A guard having been placed in charge of the treasure, next morning Capt. Abbott had it dug up in the presence of the Lahore Vakil and others. There proved to be seventy lotas of gold and thirty bags of silver; the former were sent to the magazine treasury, and the latter to the old treasury. So far good; but unfortunately, in a communication from the Agent, the Darbar were led to expect that the treasure would be made over to them on application. This reply would seem to have been the result of regarding questions between the two Governments mainly from a Sikh point of view, with which in reality we had little concern; and neglecting to consider as the primary matter how they were affected by British law and custom, which must be held to guide the action of the British Government and its agents. From a Sikh point of view, the reply was perhaps correct; for they considered that they were entitled to the property of a subject who had been killed in a rebellion. They further held that they were the true interpreters of their own laws, and could best decide to whom the treasure belonged; that as no British subject claimed the treasure, it unquestionably belonged to a subject of the Lahore State; and that such subject could communicate with the British Government, or Agent, only through his own Government.

The Governor-General regretted that hopes had been held out to the Darbar that the treasure would be made over to them, as it seemed to belong to Raja Suchet Singh's heirs. It is useful to record that at the time to which this sketch of Punjab history has been brought, viz. the end of July 1844, Lord Ellenborough had been succeeded by Sir Henry Hardinge as Governor-General, and the latter was therefore responsible for the orders of the Government of India hereafter quoted.

In due time a letter from the Maharaja was received by the Agent, in which his Highness asked that the treasure might be made over to him in order that he might give it to those to whom it belonged, Rajas Hira Singh and Gulab Singh.

[5] A coin, value sixteen rupees.

The Agent recommended compliance, as a means of getting rid of a troublesome question. The Governor-General considered it necessary to take a legal opinion as to the course he should follow. He therefore referred the question of law to Mr. Cameron, saying that he would be glad to get rid of the treasure, and asking if he could with propriety follow the course proposed by the Agent; or if he should not, before he parted with the treasure, have a document from the owners intimating their acquiescence.

Mr. Cameron pronounced in favour of the latter proposal, and an order was sent to the Agent to explain this, and the views of the Government of India on the subject of the treasure, to the Maharaja. He was also desired to inform the heirs or owners, Gulab Singh, Hira Singh, and Suchet Singh's widow, that unless they at once came forward and claimed it, the money would be paid over to anyone named by Maharaja Duleep Singh. In conclusion, the Agent was directed not to part with the treasure until he had received not merely the reply of the Lahore Government, but the orders thereon of the Government of India. The foregoing instructions were issued on August 10.

After a considerable lapse of time the Agent reported that Suchet Singh's widow had claimed the treasure directly, and Gulab Singh indirectly; and that in consequence he had not addressed the Maharaja, as desired.

This was an unfortunate error calculated still further to complicate the question, already unnecessarily involved by the admission previously mentioned.

The Governor-General was naturally surprised and displeased. Explicit orders were sent to the Agent to write forthwith to the Maharaja, and explain that the delay was caused by his misapprehension; he was to add that as the widow had claimed the treasure, it could not be given up without her sanction or that of her adopted child, Gulab Singh's son. Further, he was told to express the regret felt by the Governor-General in Council, that obstacles had arisen to the immediate transfer of the treasure; but the British Government was under legal obligations not to transfer the property without the consent of the parties to whom it belonged.

It is necessary for the elucidation of much that will follow to explain thus at length and precisely what took place regarding

this treasure; the course followed by the Government of India with respect to it has been alleged as one of the causes of the outbreak of war.

With the correspondence here referred to, was a despatch reporting the arrangement whereby 'the services of Major Broadfoot, C.B., have been substituted in the Agency of the North-West Frontier for those of Lieut.-Col. Richmond, whose state of health obliged him to apply for leave of absence on sick certificate to proceed to sea.'

Another matter, not in itself very important, must be explained, as briefly as possible, because the action and orders of the Government of India regarding it have been set forth as Sikh grievances against the British.

This was whether the Raja of Nábha was justified in resuming his part of the village of Mowran, which had been granted through Ranjit Singh of Lahore to one Dhanna Singh, a subject of the Nabha State.

It appeared that the Raja of Nabha had given his part of the village to Maharaja Ranjit Singh; but the gift was invalid, because the Raja, a protected chief, did not inform the British Government, nor obtain their consent. The Raja became displeased with either Dhanna Singh or his son Hukm Singh, who was in the Sikh service, and desired to resume the gift. Mr. Clerk recognised his right to his own half of the village, but feared he might, in resuming his own, seize the other half, which belonged to Patiála. The Raja asked the Agent if he might resume the gift, and the latter replied, as he seems to have considered, evasively, to the effect that Mowran appeared to belong to Nabha, and that if the Raja pleased he could take it back. The Raja did not consider this at all an evasive answer, and acted accordingly. He collected troops, took the village by force with some loss of life, and seized such property as belonged to Hukm Singh, who had succeeded his father.

The Lahore Darbar remonstrated; the Government of India upheld the right of the Raja of Nabha to resume his village, but desired that he should compensate Hukm Singh for the loss of personal property, unless it should appear that force was not used till peaceful means to resume the village had failed.

CHAPTER X.

1844.

Sir H. Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough—Frontier arrangements—Letters congratulating Broadfoot on his appointment—His first interview with the Lahore Vakil—Diplomatic fencing—The frontier—Suchet Singh's treasure—Village of Mowran—Letter to Lord Ellenborough—Lahore news—Raja Hira Singh's policy—Rani Jindán—Mangla, the slave girl—Flight and destruction of Hira Singh—Anarchy at Lahore—Broadfoot's orders to his Assistants—Instructions from the Governor-General—Sir H. Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough: Punjab affairs—Broadfoot's reports—Letters from Sir H. Gough and Sir Charles Napier.

BEFORE proceeding with the private and other correspondence during Major Broadfoot's tenure of office as Governor-General's Agent, a few extracts from a letter written by Sir Henry Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough will be made; they are interesting as showing the matters which at the time chiefly occupied the attention of the Governor-General.

Sir Henry wrote very fully and with great regularity, considering the stirring events of the time, to Lord Ellenborough about the more important matters, civil and military, with which the Government of India was concerned. The letters are now of great value and interest, as events are described with greater freedom than is compatible with official reserve.

Calcutta: September 17, 1844.

My dear Lord Ellenborough,—We[1] are expecting our English mail every hour; and before we are in the hurry of despatching our answers, I may as well give you the outline of what has passed since you left us.

I have appointed Col. Richmond to Lucknow, Broadfoot to the North-West Frontier, and Durand to the Tenasserim. The latter I sent off by steamer, and I expect Broadfoot every day.

. . . . . .

On the North-West Frontier I am in correspondence with Gough[2]

[1] 'We' may mean the Governor-General and his Staff, or the Governor-General and his Council.

[2] Sir Hugh Gough, Commander-in-Chief in India.

to get all our troops of horse artillery and batteries in complete order; and we propose to send four companies of Europeans, picked men, to fill up vacancies, and weed the old and infirm. The same weeding must take place in the infantry, where we have, on an average of a thousand men, two hundred unfit for active duty. . . .

We are in the greatest want of infantry barracks on that frontier; we can only concentrate five and a half battalions, including Meerut, which is eight days, forced marches, from the frontier.

We must have barracks for another wing at Loodhiana, and an entire battalion either at Ferozpore or near Sirhind. The first is somewhat too forward, and I have written to Gough to say I am determined not to build at Ferozpore, *at the present moment*, on account of the alarm which it would create, and that I am anxious to treat the Lahore Government with all the friendly consideration which good faith and a desire for peace can require. Agra and Cawnpore can only hold a regiment each, making seven and a half infantry regiments of Europeans. In the event of military operations, two of these would have to march long distances from Cawnpore and Agra to the Sutlej, and the remainder could not be brought up till the season for military operations was nearly over.

Unless you had built the barracks at Kussowlie,[3] Subathu, and Umballa, any concentration of a European force would have been impracticable. Another battalion and a half are absolutely necessary to insure a vigorous use of the force at the disposal of the Government; and in this, as in other cases, I cannot, if I were so disposed, but assent to the accuracy of your military judgment.

. . . . . .

There are appearances of dissensions, likely to lead to blows, between the Heera Singh party and the hill tribes under Goolab Singh. But Richmond gives us nothing but the reports from the newswriters in the Durbar, and we shall have no very open demonstration until the dussehra.[4] . . .

September 21. . . . I expect Broadfoot every day. . . . Sir George Pollock arrived yesterday, and was sworn in.[5]

. . . . . .

I will keep this open for the last hour. Sir G. Pollock is very decidedly of opinion that Ferozpore is the true point for a barrack for a thousand men; the foundations are already laid. A wing at

[3] Kasauli as now officially spelt.

[4] *Dasahrá*, the ten days' festival at the beginning of October, after which the Sikhs usually set out on their yearly expedition. See also Yule's *Glossary*, p. 256.

[5] As military member of the Governor-General's Council.

Loodhiana is absolutely necessary; there is great inconvenience in having a Queen's regiment with one wing on the Sutlege and the other at Meerut, nine days' march asunder.

As may be supposed, Broadfoot received many letters of congratulation on being appointed Agent.[6] The office was at the time one of the most important in India after that of the Governor-General.

Major Lawrence, afterwards so well known as Sir Henry Lawrence, wrote as follows:

Nepal: October 24, 1844.

My dear Broadfoot,—I have more than once thought of writing to you at Maulmain, but now that you are again a *Bengalee*, I must give you a line to congratulate you, which I do heartily, on the honourable post you have obtained; it is one that if offered to me I should have been proud to accept; as it *has not*, I am very glad you have got it, as I am sure you will do it full justice, and a noble field it is for an energetic man.

I hope your health is good; give me a line and tell me about yourself. This is a delightful place as far as climate, *idleness*, salary &c. goes; indeed, if I could be content to do nothing, it would be preferable to anything in India; it came very opportunely to me, for my health was such that I must have gone home; I am now much better. Yours &c.

H. M. LAWRENCE.

The next is a fragment from Lieut. Orr, who had been, it will be recollected, adjutant of Broadfoot's Sappers. It commences thus in the middle of a sentence:

. . . on being in the finest appointment in all India. I look upon your situation, in regard to importance and responsibility, as being the next only to the Governor-General of India, and I was not a little proud and gratified to see my former leader appointed to it. I hope your health keeps better than it used to do, and that I shall see you some day Governor of the Punjab.

From Mr. Cameron to Major Broadfoot.

Calcutta: November 2, 1844.

My dear Broadfoot, . . . The Governor-General said the other day that he had at first supposed you to be rather too prone to war; but that his intercourse with you had convinced him that he was

[6] Governor-General's Agent on the North-Western Frontier, is the complete title.

mistaken, and that he had now full confidence in your discretion (or words to that effect); he said this at the council table in a manner that led me to suppose it was meant for me to hear and perhaps to repeat.

From Vincent Eyre to Major Broadfoot.

Gwalior: November 7, 1844.

My dear Broadfoot,—Welcome to Bengal again! May your shadow increase!

You have made a giant's stride from south-east to north-west. I wonder whither in the world your next stride will take you. I wish our friend Colin Mackenzie were employed in the same Agency.

The writer proceeded to bring to notice the services of Husain Khan, who is mentioned in Lieut. Eyre's 'Journal of Imprisonment in Afghanistan' as having displayed devoted heroism when Colin Mackenzie was besieged in the Kila i-Nishan Khan at the breaking out of the insurrection, and who had not been adequately rewarded.

The ceremonial visit of the Sikh chiefs and other local celebrities to Major Broadfoot is said by Mr. Cust, who as an Assistant to the Agent was present, to have been a very striking and picturesque scene.

At any time a crowd of Punjabis is a much brighter sight than an ordinary crowd of Hindustanis; for, apart from their superiority in physique, the colours which they affect, especially in their turbans, contrast most favourably with the prevailing dirty white, with which is mingled occasionally the equally dirty but more sacred shade of terra cotta worn by certain priests, which is characteristic of an ordinary crowd south of the Punjab.

On an occasion of this kind the contrast is even greater. The chiefs were semi-independent, and had retainers of their own, some resplendent in armour; whilst elephants, camels, and horses, with highly ornamented howdahs and saddles, all added to the general effect.

Broadfoot's knowledge of the languages of India was unusually exact, though of course not equally so in each language or dialect. Thus in what is called Urdu and in Persian he was proficient. He could speak and understand both, even to the

niceties of the languages, and could read an ordinarily written petition, or a letter from the Lahore Darbar, couched in the flowery language of the East, without the assistance of a munshi. He was thus enabled to dispense with the presence of an interpreter, and to receive natives alone and listen to their information, which was more readily and freely given in the absence of inconvenient witnesses.

He considered his knowledge of Punjábí deficient, which cannot be thought remarkable by anyone conversant with that dialect, when the short time during which he had an opportunity of learning it is taken into account. There are indications in his correspondence that his familiarity with it was rapidly increasing.

One of the earliest reports he made to the Government of India, was of his first business interview with the Lahore Vakil or agent, Rai Kishen Chand.

It would have been a curious sight to see the wily Oriental, guarded as he believed on all points, gauging the character and abilities of the new Agent with whom he would have to deal; watching carefully for the smallest sign of weakness, whether in want of knowledge of the language and its delicate capacity for conveying more to the mind than what reached the ear; or in want of ability, skill in argument, or courage resting on the complete assurance of support from his Government. The Vakil also no doubt reckoned on comparative ignorance of Lahore affairs on the part of the new Agent; he himself having for many years held his present post.

The interview is fully described in a letter dated November 11, 1844, the substance of which will now be given.

The Vakil commenced business by mentioning some matters of routine of small importance, which, he said, he concluded were known to the Agent, as he had mentioned them to one of the Assistants. This of itself was a rather ingenious and wholly native mode of ascertaining the relations which existed between the Agent and his Assistants, and the amount of power and influence the latter were likely to enjoy.

The Agent replied, that the matters referred to had not been mentioned to him; that he was very busy and had little time to listen to current rumours even from his Assistants. The Vakil then said, that he presumed he need not speak to anyone but the Agent

himself. The latter answered that he was at liberty to speak to everyone he pleased; but that no value was attached to anything save what was communicated in the proper way from the Lahore Darbar to the Governor-General's Agent. 'In that case,' said the Vakil, 'I can speak freely and mention everything, a course which the Darbar will approve, when it is directly to yourself.' This preliminary over, the Vakil mentioned that the announcement of Major Broadfoot's appointment had been received in Lahore, and that a letter would come soon on the subject. He intimated that even the appearance of quarrel between Raja Hira Singh and his uncle Raja Gulab Singh had vanished; whereupon the Agent congratulated the Vakil on the prospect thus opened of firm rule in the State, at which the Governor-General, as a well-wisher, would be pleased.

The Vakil next mentioned his own long connection with the Government of India as the agent of the Lahore State, which had extended over a period of thirty-five years. He further referred to Broadfoot's knowledge of the Punjab, of its chiefs, and especially of its army, and to the march of the convoy of Shah Shuja's wives; but said that, though his confidence in us was as great as Ranjit Singh's, still the Agent would not be surprised to learn that he (the Vakil) got angry demands for explanation regarding our military preparations. 'But,' he said, looking earnestly and anxiously at Broadfoot, 'I replied, that from my long knowledge of the English, I was prepared to say they would not attack an old ally,' especially under present circumstances.

The Agent replied that he knew the circumstances, and was aware of the Vakil's appreciation of the British; that in the latter Ranjit Singh was pre-eminent, and see how he rose from a simple Sardar to be Maharaja of Lahore; whilst, on the other hand, observe Holkar, who would not rely on us. Where was he now? and what had not Ranjit Singh risen to? and how steadfast had been our friendship! The Governor-General was anxious it should so continue.

The Vakil then assured the Agent that order had been introduced into the State, and that Raja Hira Singh greatly esteemed the Governor-General, and had a great regard for his Agent: to which the latter replied, that when governments are friendly, their servants must be friends; that the Governor-General had the sincerest friendship for the Maharaja, and that the Agent recollected with pleasure his acquaintance with Raja Hira Singh. The Vakil then mentioned his official intercourse with Mr. Clerk, whom he could trust, and who always spoke without the intervention of anyone, as they were now doing, and who assured him of the sincerity

of our good wishes. 'You,' he said, 'were intimate at that time with Mr. Clerk, and no doubt felt the same, and can give similar assurances.' I told him I could; Mr. Clerk's and my feelings were friendly, both from inclination and duty; but we were only servants: what was more to the purpose, I could assure him of the Governor-General's earnest wish that friendship might continue. I told him that he might, on my word, seal a declaration to that effect.

He expressed great joy and said: 'But you better than any man know our army, can remember events, and have exercised forbearance.' I said, 'I perfectly know and remember, and so do you and we; but all men know, and must in no circumstances forget, that our bank of the Sutlej is sacred. Those whom we are bound to protect we will protect. I did exercise forbearance, but there was a line beyond which it could not go, and never has gone; and that was the sacredness of the frontier. Ranjit Singh never forgot this, and no one must hope to neglect what so old a friend kept so scrupulously in mind.'

He said this was all just, and that all earnestly desired to respect the frontier, and no doubt it would never be violated. I told him that its violation was a thing not to be spoken of: it was too absurd to be contemplated. He said it was, and the matter dropped.

The Vakil next brought forward the cases regarding Suchet Singh's treasure, and the resumption of Mowran; he stated that the Lahore Government was dissatisfied with the decisions at which our Government had arrived in both cases; that with regard to the treasure, Col. Richmond was a wise man, and had advised his own Government well, and the Darbar greatly regretted that we had not followed his advice.

'I answered that the Colonel's ill health and speedy departure had prevented me from becoming acquainted with much of his opinions; but in the present case this mattered little, as I had the orders of Government, which I was not only bound but glad to obey, for I considered them wise and just; that it was the very knowledge of our uprightness which had induced Suchet Singh to put his money in British territory, instead of in his own forts; that British territory was, in this way and for this reason, the asylum of those oppressed, or who felt distrust; that Suchet Singh was not the only one who had thought justice inviolable in British territory, and I asked him to say where in the Punjab and the protected Sikh states not only suspicion, but utter dismay, would cease, if for the first time property was given up by the British to any but those believed to be the rightful owners. I

asked him if the very demanders of the money would not feel this, if gratified; for they knew fortune was inconstant, and if the British territory gave no refuge, where were those engaged in the struggles of life to look?

'The Vakil looked as if he agreed, and said nothing; but he could not conceal his satisfaction, as he has much of his own property, as nearly every man of eminence in the Punjab has, invested[7] as a resource in case of need.

'In such a case, I told him, Ranjit Singh would have made no such demand, but would have assisted the heirs to get the property and bring it to Lahore, when he would have taken his measures. He laughed, and said that it was true.'

The Vakil, after a fruitless attempt to get Broadfoot to assist in making a new reference to Government on the subject of the treasure, tried whether he could more successfully work the Mowran grievance. Again he proceeded to quote opinions alleged to have been those held by Col. Richmond.

'I stopped him by saying when once a matter went to Government, subordinates' opinions were of no consequence; that in the matter of lapses on this side of the Sutlej, the Government of India was supreme.'

He complained that compensation had not been paid, and asked the Agent to read all the records connected with the case, and see if he did not then conclude that the Governor-General had arrived at a wrong decision.

The Agent assured him that compensation would be paid, and that he would carefully study the case; but that the Governor-General did not decide till after full and deliberate inquiry, and therefore the Vakil must hold out no hope to his court of a reversal of the decision.

The Vakil said that Suchet Singh's treasure was a trifle, but that the question about Mowran was a serious affair.

To this the Agent replied, that whatever concerned the happiness of subjects, or the intercourse of governments, was serious, and was always seriously considered by our Government.

It may be imagined that after this fencing the Oriental diplomatist retired somewhat impressed with the skill of his opponent.

The following letter to Lord Ellenborough contains an outline of Punjab news at the time. The last paragraph being partly destroyed, restorations are shown in brackets.

[7] In British territory.

Amballa: November 18, 1844.

My Lord,—I have foolishly delayed writing in order to write at length on some matters, until I have now scarcely time to write at all.

Having an impression that objection had been taken in some quarters to my appointment to the Tenasserim coast, or at any rate to its results, known only through the local press, which was in the hands of corrupt public servants, I was desirous of stating those results to your Lordship; but they are now recorded before the Board of Revenue, the Sudder Adawlut,[8] and the Government of Bengal. What existed before may be seen in the proceedings of the trials of Messrs. X and Z, and of the various inquiries at Tavoy.

I have never been able yet to thank your Lordship for the Archduke's work which Capt. Smith brought me down. I feel deeply the kindness which caused you to send it, and do not the less value that mark of it because it has been so speedily followed by another of a different kind. I thank you also for the flattering letter which accompanied the work, though I fear even were I able to command armies as they ought to be commanded, the hope is not to be cherished; the course of the service places sufficiently high rank at too great a distance.

My appointment to this situation I cannot but consider as being as much due to your Lordship as if directly made by you; for to Sir Henry Hardinge I was, of course, unknown, save through your Lordship. My only anxiety is, that I may be able to do justice to the nomination. I took charge on the 1st inst. Col. Richmond, much broken in health, left on the 3rd. Heera Singh and Goolab Singh have become in appearance reconciled; the latter having submitted and sent his son as a hostage to Lahore; but his previous intrigues were probably never discontinued, at any rate they have produced a serious revolt in Moozuffurabad and the other hill states bordering on Cashmeer. It has taken the form of a religious war, and the insurgent peasantry have overpowered several Sikh garrisons. In the mean time the Lahore rulers had begun vigorously to confiscate the jageers[9] of the greater chiefs, who are all therefore malcontent; and the restoration of discipline in the army had also been attempted; the regular troops about the capital are therefore discontented. It will require no ordinary ability, means, and fortune for the present rulers to escape dangers so various and

[8] *Scdr adálat*, till 1862, in Calcutta and in the N.W.P. the chief court of appeal from the district courts. Yule's *Glossary*, p. 653.

[9] *Jágír*, a grant or assignment of land and its revenue as annuity.

great. They show, however, much promptitude and energy, and these do much. The whole Mahomedan population of the West is excited, and little is wanting to make revolt beyond the Jhelum general, which would at once bring in the Afghans. The death, also, of Dewan Sawun Mull, the able ruler of Mooltan, removes another guarantee of stability, so that the danger to the Sikh empire was probably never so great as at this moment.

Still I think we shall, perhaps, be able to preserve peace for the present. All rational men in the Punjab fear a quarrel with us, and will seek to avoid offence; and on our side, though there is in general a desire for war, yet the considerations I find in one of your Lordship's letters to my predecessor are weighty indeed; for war here should be no half measure; that would but prolong and double every evil. We must go to the top of the Himalayas, or stop in a false position; but once across the Punjab we enter on that great mass of unmixed Mahomedanism which extends from the Indus to the Mediterranean. To this we undoubtedly must sooner or later come; but whenever we do, we cannot stop, and going on in such countries is only just less ruinous than stopping.

[Cap]tain Durand I was delighted to [find] my successor in Tenasserim; the fittest man in India for [the situa]tion, able, and benevolent. The [provinces] will, in a few years, [pay their] expenses, [and] eventually add to the general wealth and strength; and this is undoubtedly your Lordship's work. [I h]ave written this whils[t] the [camp is setting] out for Loodeeana, where at present [I remain]. I address this to the House of [Lords, where it will be] sure to find your Lordship. [I] shall continue to write occasionally. If your Lordship will, however briefly, [reply and say] you have not forgotten me, for whom you have done so much, you will gratify [me] in the highest degree. From Sir Henry Hardinge I have received the greatest and most marked kindness. It is to you I owe it, and I felt on that account the more pleasure in it; being more generally than any else but Durand known as *an Ellenborough man.*

Instead of sending mere translations of the newswriters' letters, which were of little value without confirmation, Broadfoot forwarded to the Government of India a careful summary of the information he collected, both from newsletters and from other sources.

In November and during the first half of December 1844, he reported that Raja Hira Singh and Pandit Jalla were following a bold course, which if successful would tend to-

wards stability; but it was at first encompassed by many and serious dangers.

The Raja and his adviser were trying to destroy the power and influence of the chiefs, and to restore discipline in the army. They had partial success. The Raja managed the army, and is said to have brought it more under control than it had been since the reign of Maharaja Kharrąk Singh.

The civil administration of the State was managed by the Pandit, who, finding that expenditure exceeded income, declared that they must balance. By compulsory offerings, and by means of fines, he replenished the treasury for the moment. But to preserve financial equilibrium either increased taxation of the people, or a reduction of the cost of the army, was necessary. In the former case there was the danger of rebellion; and in the latter the probability was that the army would overthrow any government which did not meet its demands.

Raja Hira Singh's policy failed at last, partly from uncontrollable circumstances, and partly because success had made its authors underrate their remaining antagonists.

The Sikh chiefs, seeing their destruction imminent, were strongly opposed to the Raja's measures. They found a powerful ally in 'the Maharaja's mother, Jind Kawar, commonly called Rani Jindán, erroneously pronounced Chandán by many of our Hindustanis.' She was very beautiful, and then quite young; she had been married, it was said, about 1835 to the sword and arrow of Ranjit Singh. She was very fond of Raja Suchet Singh, and never forgave Hira Singh for his death, and that of the brave Rai Kesri Singh. Raja Hira Singh seems not to have sufficiently appreciated her power and her talent. She was permitted to intrigue at her pleasure, and to rail unchecked at the ministry.

A revolt in Kashmir was suppressed with a rapidity and vigour which would have done credit to any government.

The Raja, seeing the financial crisis at hand, sent for the officers of the army, and, in Darbar, explained to them the state of the case. He either convinced them of the necessity for retrenchment, or intimidated them to the extent required for the admission of such necessity.

But the Rani, with, in this instance, a clearer perception of where the power lay, went to the men. Her brothers, and the

slave girl Mangla, visited the troops openly and gained them, so that little hope remained for the ministry.

The Raja and Pandit 'had made enemies, dangerous and silent, who knew their counsels and precipitated the crisis. The secretariat of that Government is composed of men despised by the ignorant Surdars, but influential, and able with the cunning of a depressed class. At the head of them is Dewan Dinanath,' who, offended by Pandit Jalla's retrenchment, secretly joined the other faction.

The crisis was not long delayed. On November 17 and 18, 1844, Raja Hira Singh reviewed some of the troops and ordered the issue of pay; but he discharged on the spot above 500 men, and confiscated their pay. The boldness of this measure, and its contrast with his former prudence, inspired a suspicion that he meditated flight.

During November 19 and 20, negotiations between the Raja and the officers were in progress; they were delayed, it was thought, in the hope of the arrival from Jammu of hill troops, with whose aid Hira Singh might emerge triumphant from his difficulties.

But the Rani again appealed to the men; she sent her brother and Mangla to the camps to say that her life was in danger; 'and finding the troops still waver, she took the bold step of ordering out her tents in the night in order to join the army. The troops at once declared themselves her protectors,' and some men were sent into the fort of Lahore.

It was arranged that Raja Hira Singh and Pandit Jalla were to be attacked in their houses on the afternoon of November 21. On that morning Miyan Jawahir Singh, son of Raja Dhyan Singh, at the head of 7,000 men, set out from Jammu for Lahore. But that same morning the Rani with the young Maharaja, attended by her brother Jawahir Singh, Sham Singh of Atári, and other chiefs, formally appealed to the troops, and asked whether Duleep Singh or Raja Hira Singh was to be their king. The troops, with loud shouts and with bands playing, declared for Duleep Singh.

The noise revealed to Hira Singh and Jalla that they had no time to lose; they announced their intention of joining the Maharaja and his mother, but in fact mounted their elephants, crossed the river Ravi to Shahdera, and, joined by a

small body of their adherents previously sent across, retreated at once on the road to Jammu.

As soon as this was known, salutes were fired, the Rani was congratulated, and Sardar Sham Singh of Atari with about 6,000 men started in pursuit of the fugitives. Some of Raja Hira Singh's followers deserted him and joined in the pursuit. The Khalsa troops soon came up with the Raja's small body of hill men, attacked them, and put them to flight. Miyan Lábh Singh, to give Hira Singh and Jalla more chance of escape, dismounted and fell fighting, after having killed five or six of the pursuers. The flight was continued for about fourteen miles from Lahore, when, finding their horses exhausted, Hira Singh, Jalla, and some others, dismounted and entered a village. When Sham Singh came up he set it on fire; on which the pursued 'came out and, after a desperate resistance of about an hour, were overpowered and slain. Their heads were carried into Lahore and exhibited hung in chains.'

Then all parties gave themselves up to rejoicing; the prisons were thrown open; fines were remitted; increased taxes were reduced; and for two whole days the Rani reigned supreme.

Again the scene changed; debauchery and licence were followed by anarchy. The Rani repeated her experiment of a personal visit and appeal to the troops, but with diminished effect. They told her that Duleep Singh might reign, provided he paid them as regularly as Hira Singh had done; whilst they significantly reminded her that Peshora Singh had prior claims to the throne, and recommended her to send for Sardar Lahna Singh, Majithia, to be wazir, a man, as they said, who dared not lift his eyes in their presence.

The Surdars all this time had to stand with joined hands as suppliants before the troops, and finally, with the terrified Rani, returned to Lahore amidst the laughter and hooting of the drunken crowd.

By the latest accounts the disorder of the troops was little abated: they had even plundered a young woman of condition, about to burn as a suttee, and already at the pile; tearing the rings with violence from her nose and ears. She was burnt praying for the ruin of the Sikhs, who stood by laughing. She was the widow of Heera Singh's dewan, who perished with him.

About this time a messenger, bearing news for one of the Agent's Assistants, was seized by the Lahore Government, and his despatches taken from him. The impossibility of convincing the Darbar that the man was a private servant, and not an emissary of the Government of India, and the inconvenience likely to result therefrom, rendered it necessary for Broadfoot to issue an order to his Assistants forbidding them, without express sanction, to employ any agents whatever in the Punjab, and to recall every agent they might have there at the time. They were likewise desired not to correspond with parties in the Punjab or Afghanistan without sanction; and if they received letters from chiefs, or other persons of these countries, they were desired, save in case of emergency, to refer the writers to the Agent.

In another case it was reported at the Lahore Court that one of the Assistants had expressed to the Lahore Vakil attached to his office, sorrow for the fate of Raja Hira Singh, indignation with Jalla, and other sentiments. The Agent, in asking what foundation there might be for the report, repeated his instructions that the Vakils with the Assistants were there purely for local purposes; that if they spoke on any other matters they were to be referred to him, and Assistants were to abstain carefully from all expression of opinion on political subjects. The serious evils which might result were pointed out. An unguarded expression of opinion was never considered as private, but rather to be that of the Agent; and when, as must often happen, the language of the Governor-General at some future time was found to be very different, a suspicion of insincerity or bad faith arose, as difficult to dispel as it was mischievous in its effects. These orders caused some dissatisfaction in the case of one or two of the Assistants, and it is not to be greatly wondered at; for when, for any reason, discipline has been relaxed, and the reins of power and influence have dropped into subordinate hands, reform and rectification cannot be carried out without readjustment, which entails a loss of influence among subordinates, certain to be keenly felt if not resented.

The instructions were, however, approved by the Government of India, and received the special commendation of the English Government.

The Agent further reported that the Sikh soldiers had extorted from the Darbar pay at the rate of 14 rs. a month, which was twice as much as the Company's sepoys received. The probable evil effects of this contrast were predicted, as was also the impending collapse of the Sikh Government.

Major Broadfoot was informed that this part of his despatch had received special attention, and it was observed that the state of affairs reported might lead to serious complication with the Lahore Government.

He was reminded that the instructions as to the line of policy to be followed were explicit; and it was intimated that he was expected to prove by his conduct that it was the desire of the Government of India to evince the strictest good faith with the Lahore Government, and that our recognition of the Maharaja was no empty form, but a measure by which we were prepared to abide.

It was further remarked that the Agent's proceedings were in perfect accordance with these principles.

He was informed of the regret with which the news of the recent revolution had been received; but it was pointed out that our position towards the nominal government of Duleep Singh was not thereby changed, and that our course must be plain and decisive. As long as the Maharaja retained his position, we must continue to act towards him with friendship and good faith, and abstain from interference with the internal affairs of his state.

The frontier must, however, be maintained inviolate, and the measures taken by the Agent for its protection, and his correspondence with the Commander-in-Chief on the subject, were considered to be expedient, and such as to deserve entire approval.

The following letter from the private secretary of the Governor-General to Major Broadfoot corroborates unofficially the statement that his reports and measures were approved.

Calcutta: December 7, 1844.

My dear Major,—As I believe Wood has answered the letter you wrote to him a short time ago, I will not take up your time except to let you know, by Sir Henry's desire, that he finds your reports on the state of affairs in the Punjab &c. most satisfactory, and quite refreshing after those of Col. Richmond.

From the last accounts affairs seem to be still unsettled there, although the period when any outbreak might have been expected has now passed.

We are all going on as usual here. Mayne is married this afternoon. Yours &c.

C. S. HARDINGE.

When the news of the revolution at Lahore, and of Raja Hira Singh's death, was received in England, the condition of the Punjab had attracted the attention of the Government, as the most important matter connected with India at that time. During the years 1842, 1843, and 1844, the Kabul disasters, and the victories of the armies under Generals Pollock and Nott, Sir Charles Napier's victories, and the annexation of Sind; the short Gwalior campaign, and Lord Ellenborough's recall; had occupied the somewhat limited attention devoted in England to Indian matters.

Early in 1845, when the reports by the Agent, and the orders on them, of which a brief summary has been given, were received in England, the principles laid down, the language used, and the course pursued by the Government of India, were entirely approved. Gratification was expressed at noticing 'how thoroughly Major Broadfoot enters into the spirit of your instructions, and how judiciously he conducts himself in a crisis of much delicacy. This has been in no manner more strongly or properly evinced than in the observations made, and the instructions given, in his circular letter of December 18, 1844, and in the letter which he addressed to . . . his Assistant at Ferozpore on the 28th of the same month.'

The following letters from Sir H. Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough are interesting. Part of the first letter is omitted, as in it events already described are recapitulated or predicted.

Calcutta: December 23, 1844.

My dear Lord Ellenborough,—I received your letter of October 30 in the bustle of making up our despatches for England.

First, as regards yourself. I do not despair of seeing you in the Cabinet with Peel and the Duke, notwithstanding the failure of the first overture. It is not only in his department that a statesman has the power of useful distinction, but in the general affairs of the

Empire which are discussed and decided upon in Cabinet. Rely upon it, you are made for public life, and will not be happy in a private station. At this distance between us it is useless to discuss matters of this description.

You will be glad to hear that Durand succeeds admirably, as well as Broadfoot did; whilst Broadfoot is in his element on the frontier.

Calcutta: January 8, 1845. 6 A.M.

My dear Lord Ellenborough,—The affairs of the Punjab are more unsettled than ever. Heera Singh and Pundit Julla have lost their lives and about 1,000 of their followers in the struggle.

The army sold Heera for 800,000*l.* and a rise in their pay to 14 rs. a month, being exactly the double of the B.[1] sepoys' pay. This contrast, and the example of a large army in a successful state of mutiny, is the greatest danger we have to apprehend; but I anticipate no immediate necessity for interference. We have 20,000 men pretty well up for defensive objects, and 36,000 for offensive operations. I have sent Sir J. Littler to Ferozpoor. Broadfoot does admirably on the Sutlege.

Forbearance will be pushed to the utmost limits justified by safety. The steamer has announced an earlier hour of starting, and I must close this hasty note or lose the opportunity.

Ever &c.

H. HARDINGE.

It was part of Broadfoot's duty to keep the Commander-in-Chief and the principal military officers in his neighbourhood acquainted with events on the north side of the Sutlej which might lead to a violation of the frontier, and consequent collision with our forces. He accordingly addressed Sir Hugh Gough, who was then in camp at Ambála on a tour of inspection, on December 24,[2] and reported the recent disturbances at Lahore. He said that for the moment the Rani and her brothers were the ostensible and active heads of the administration; but, though important events might arise from this change of government, yet it did not necessarily affect our relations with Lahore, and that he did not think there was more cause for anxiety now about the frontier than there had been for the past year. He further informed Sir Hugh that Capt. Nicolson had been desired to carry on his work at

[1] B.: common abbreviation for British; here it may stand for that or for Bengal.

[2] This and the next letter have been deciphered with difficulty from a nearly illegible rough draft.

Firozpur as usual, giving the customary shelter to refugees, but disarming them if they came in large bodies; and that Gen. Gilbert had been asked to assist him should the necessity arise.

To Gen. Gilbert he wrote as follows:

Loodeeana: December 24, 1844.

My dear General,—I know that with you I am writing more for form's sake than from necessity, in order to say that the *coup d'état* which has taken place over the water is, as concerns us, a mere change of ministry effected after the usual Asiatic method.

There is no need for the present of more precaution on this frontier than is necessary at all times with such neighbours. That suffices to make surprise always impossible, and I know, from our former conversation, that you agree with me in thinking that with your force, supported as it is, nothing more is wanted; and, indeed, I must repeat the expression of my gratification that we do agree on this point, for really the occasional fits of excitement or irritation provoked by any stir at Lahore produce effects anything but desirable on either side of the Sutlej.

We can be perfectly vigilant without either showing or feeling fear; and, if I may take the liberty of saying so, I rejoice at your being on this frontier, as it is a security for this sort of vigilance.

Capt. Nicolson has been directed to permit fugitives to cross as usual to our side; and should any large bodies of men come and refuse to disarm he may need your aid, which will, I know, be effectual; but though its being called for is possible, it is unlikely.

Believe me &c.

G. Broadfoot.

This is Sir H. Gough's reply to the letter addressed to him.

Headquarters Camp, Umballa: December 26, 1844.

My dear Broadfoot,—I had last night the pleasure of receiving your private letter and note of the 24th, and this morning your official letter announcing the official communication to you of the recent massacres near Lahore. It was just what might have been expected, when an attempt was made to restrain an unruly soldiery.

I entirely concur in your opinion with regard to any open demonstration of military preparation, and consider such demonstration, at the present moment, would be very prejudicial to the formation of a government in the Punjab. On the contrary, I have not made, nor do I intend to make, the slightest movement indicative of distrust on our part. The only change I shall make is that of retain-

ing the 31st here until the actual arrival of its relieving regiment (the 62nd).

I have again pressed on the Governor-General the expediency of placing a European regiment permanently at Ferozpoor. These frequent outbreaks may lead to a state of things requiring our interference, and the more European troops we have on the frontier the better shall we be prepared to act, especially at so detached a position as Ferozpoor, where there is no possibility of immediate support.

I shall remain for some days here longer than I contemplated, to watch events, and shall be happy to hear from you as frequently as you conveniently can write; and I shall feel obliged for, and anxious to know, your opinions on passing events at a crisis of such importance to our future relations with the Punjab. . . .

Believe me &c.

H. GOUGH.

Sir Charles Napier, Governor of Sind, who at this time was about to attack the Búgtis to punish certain acts for which they were responsible, wished to obtain permission to march through part of the Multan territory, or to secure its closure against the Bugtis as well as against his troops. He accordingly addressed Major Broadfoot, and as the letter is a characteristic one it is here reproduced.

(Confidential.) Sukkur: December 28, 1844.

Sir,—Will you allow me first to explain in a few words the outline of what I am about? The tribes in the Boogty hills, including the space between *Poolagee* and *Deyrah*, have committed atrocities upon our frontier all the past year. These men I am trying to punish. My plan (it is yet crude, as certain circumstances may change my projects) is to enter these hills in two divisions, one from *Poolagee*, the other from the most northern point of our frontier (marked *Bara* on Walker's map), while by an alliance with the Murrees, who have a blood feud with the Boogties, I shall bring them down on the Boogties from the north, or rather I am more likely only to shut the Murree hills against the Boogties, for there is no confidence to be placed in these barbarians, though they are good fellows in their way. Thus you have my outline [see next page].

Well, so far is simple; but there is a difficulty. The *Ameer's* territory runs up to *Omercote* on the Indus, as marked in Walker's map. But the late chief of Mooltan took from the Ameers this ground down as far as *Kusmore*. Now, I fear that the road to Deyrah from Kusmore runs through this bit of *Mooltan territory*. Of this

I am not sure. If I can avoid touching on the Governor of Mooltan's territory, I will; indeed I must, unless he gives me permission; but I wish you to gain this permission for me if possible; we shall injure nothing, pay for everything. If the Governor will allow us, ask him to send some one to meet us and attend us through his territory, and I should be glad that you would do this as soon as possible.



I have been led to form this scheme only a few days ago, but I ought to have written sooner. However, it is time enough yet if you will be quick. I think I have a right to demand that if Mooltan refuses me leave to march through his territory, he should also refuse Beja Khan and the Boogties, who would fly from me in that direction. If one side is refused entrance, so should the other. This is according to the law of all nations. If he acts honestly and equally to us both, he will do me all the good in the world, for he would put Simpson's column at my disposal!

The only reason why I put 'confidential' at the top of this letter is, that it is as well to speak of these things as little as we can. I was obliged to enter into the outline to enable you to understand why I make this request and to interest you in my movements. By this if any difficulties arise you may be able to help me, and if any complaints are made you will easily answer them. Excuse this long story, and believe me to be &c.

C. J. NAPIER, *Major-General,*
Governor.

CHAPTER XI.

1845.

Decline of the Sikh Government—Letter from Sir C. Napier—Insubordination of the Sikh army—Courage of Rani Jindan—Effect on our sepoys of successful mutiny of Sikh soldiers—Governor-General's memorandum—Scare caused in Lahore by the issue of certain orders by the Commander-in-Chief—Movement of Sikh troops towards the Sutlej—Interview between the Agent and the Vakil—Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India—Letter to Lord Ellenborough: Punjab news—Relations between a Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief in India—Sir H. Gough's letter about the orders he had given—Letter from Mr. Currie: the political situation—Inquiry regarding disaffection among the sepoys—Overtures to the Agent from Gulab Singh—Letter from Sir C. Napier: Bugtis defeated—Sir H. Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough: Punjab news—Instructions to the Agent—Letter from Gen. Ventura.

THE year 1845 is memorable as being the last of real Sikh independence. Towards its close the Sikhs invaded British territory, war was declared, and two battles were fought, the latter of which was the most desperate struggle in which our troops have ever been engaged in India. The correspondence which will be quoted or condensed will show the continued anxiety of the Governor-General to preserve relations of friendship with the Lahore State, and the steps taken in consequence; it will also show how the Darbar, with the instinct of self-preservation, and in order to be relieved from the intolerable pressure of the insubordinate army, encouraged the troops to attack the British.

As a letter from Sir Charles Napier closed the correspondence of last year, so that of 1845 may be commenced by another from the same pen.

An officer serving in Sind had addressed one of Broadfoot's native agents in a somewhat peremptory manner, desiring him to act in a matter affecting the traffic on the Sutlej in a way neither expedient nor in conformity with usage.

Broadfoot, on being referred to by the native, gave him

suitable instructions, and then asked Sir C. Napier, who was Governor of Sindh, whether his subordinate's action was approved by him, pointing out the objections. The matter is altogether too trivial to deserve any notice, but it serves to introduce a characteristic letter.

(Private.) Sukkur: January 2, 1845.

Dear Sir,—I cannot lose a moment in replying privately to your official of the 20th ultimo. I have only had time to get the Persian letter of Capt. —— translated, and I really have seldom read a more impertinent production. I know nothing of it, or what it means. It was unauthorised by, and unknown to, me. It is moreover perfectly out of rule, contrary to all the principles upon which I am acting, and to existing treaties, and also most offensive in its style. I beg of you to feel assured that such a letter never issued from my pen.

You must, till you receive this, think me a strange being. I have demanded an official explanation of his apparently unwarrantable conduct from Capt. ——, and it shall be forwarded to you when received. In the mean time allow me to thank you for the good nature and self-command which made you write to me with so much politeness; when the letter of Capt. —— warranted your sending it on to the Governor-General without further ceremony, as a *sample of the Sinde correspondence.*

May I request of you to assure the native agent that I never knew of the letter, and that I beg of him not to consider me capable of writing, unprovoked, in such a style to any gentleman whether native or European, or to any man, be his rank what it may, in style so unbecoming and so injurious to the service?

Believe me &c.

C. J. NAPIER, *Major-General.*

Since I wrote to you about asking Mooltan for the leave to traverse a portion of his territory, I have heard of the new disturbance and confusion in the Seikh Government. I have, therefore, thought it *unsafe* (even *with* the Governor of Mooltan's permission) to risk any collision with his disorderly gang. I have therefore broken up the camp at Subzulcote, and ordered the Bundlecund Legion to continue its march to Sukkur, and I propose to enter the Boogtie hills at the [pass][1] near Poolajee. These movements will begin in about a fortnight, I think; but as yet I have no exact knowledge of where Beja Khan is.

[1] The name is illegible in the original.

If any complaints reach you I beg you will reply distinctly that my movements are purely those of reprisal on the Boogties, the Doomkies, and Jackrannies; which tribes have, during the whole of the hot weather, and without provocation, entered our territory, and murdered numbers of our people, plundering and devastating in all directions. C. N.

The policy of distrust and unfriendliness towards the British inaugurated by Raja Hira Singh, and the gross insubordination of the army of the Khalsa, made the violation of the frontier a not improbable contingency. It was not expected that the Sikh army would cross, but it was thought possible that detached bodies of men might cross, either for the purpose of plundering, or by degrees and so as to evade notice, of assembling a considerable body of Sikh troops on the British side of the river. The Agent therefore addressed Major-Gen. Gilbert as follows:

Should you hear of bodies of troops crossing the Sutlej, I request you will, if military prudence allows, take the following measures:

If they have not my permission, they cannot be looked on as the troops of an *allied state*; they can only be regarded as robbers or refugees.

In either case, if they attempt to cross into the British territory . . . they should be disarmed if refugees; and if not refugees, forbidden to cross, and if necessary repulsed by force.

If they cross into the protected territory, it will be better merely to watch their movements until you hear from me, except in the following case. If you think the crossing of the river by such a body compromises the safety of either of the frontier forces, and that you can by attacking such armed body save your own force, then you are justified in attacking them without waiting to communicate with me. If the Government such men profess to serve is friendly, they must be rebels; and if not, they are enemies; and in either case their destruction is a duty to ourselves and no disservice to any friend.

The Adjutant-General pointed out to Gen. Gilbert that under less urgent circumstances than those indicated by the Agent, the Commander-in-Chief desired that no offensive operations should be attempted unless success were perfectly certain. If threatened he should remain on the defensive till

reinforced, and in a position to act with vigour, and to insure victory.[2]

The troops at Lahore showed their insubordination in a variety of ways. Sardar Attar Singh, of Kala, had succeeded Raja Hira Singh in charge of the army. His family were, before they became Sikh, by caste barbers. When the men of Ventura's regiments brought the usual reports, they told him that the administration of justice by barbers was a novelty, and they recommended as a preliminary to hearing the reports, that he should send for razors and scissors for the beards of the Musalmans. This was followed by such demonstrations of compelling the Sardar to resume the trade, that he mounted his horse and fled.

They also completely controlled the Darbar, and are said, early in January, to have proclaimed Peshora Singh as Maharaja; but, on promise of a small increase of pay or a present, they recommended him to retire for a time.

The Rani had more spirit than most of the chiefs; she declared she meant to govern like Begam Samru; and on one occasion, when the Darbar was terrified by a crowd of drunken and disorderly soldiers, she came out from behind her curtain, threw aside her veil, and addressed the people. The men were delighted, for she was young and handsome. But the effect was merely temporary.

The Agent reported that the army used the Rani and Peshora Singh as two pumps of the treasury, the one in use, the other in reserve.

The Rani, with the advice of some of the principal chiefs, made overtures to the British, through the Agent, for the restoration of order by our intervention.

Broadfoot, in sending such papers for the orders of the Government of India, was very careful to insure complete secrecy; so that those concerned or those who gave him information should not on that account suffer. In a letter to Mr. Currie, then Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, he said: 'You may perhaps observe that in most things you have my own handwriting or Cust's. It is to this, and to my reading every paper except routine myself, and in cases of

[2] This letter was signed by Major P. Grant, Deputy Adjutant-General of the Army; now Field-Marshal Sir P. Grant, G.C.B. &c.

news putting them into the fire when read, that he attributed the freedom with which natives supplied him with information, or consulted him about delicate difficulties.

He mentioned that he wished to write about distrust among the chiefs caused, first, by unrecorded negotiations in Mr. Clerk's time or previously, with the object of making them tributary; second, by the very contrary course taken lately, of treating them as unfortunate sovereigns about to be plundered by a greedy Company; third, by reopening cases once settled; and fourth, by the publicity of the most secret documents.

On receipt of the despatches, containing all this news, the Governor-General desired the Agent to inform the Darbar that in the event of the young Maharaja being deposed, he (the Agent) could in no way recognise a new chief of the State until he had received instructions from the Government of India. The Commander-in-Chief was instructed to take certain steps towards rendering the force on the frontier more efficient; and the usual commendation of the measures taken by the Agent, with an expression of complete confidence in his discretion, was repeated.

It will be recollected that Broadfoot had brought to the notice of the Government of India the dangerous example to our sepoys of the Sikh soldiers, who had successfully extorted a rate of pay nearly double what was paid by us; and that he was informed that the subject was occupying the serious attention of the Governor-General.

The following memorandum on the subject was addressed to the Agent:

(Confidential.)

Memorandum. January 12, 1845.

The Governor-General wishes Major Broadfoot to make the most accurate inquiries on the following subject:

What was the influence on the minds of our sepoys in January 1844, by the example of the Sikh army successfully extorting high rates of pay and controlling the Government it professed to serve?

The Governor-General's attention has been drawn to this subject on account of the impression which the mutinies in the vicinity of Ferozpore made on Lord Ellenborough's mind at the time; and although much of the discontent which was then manifested may be attributed to the dislike of the troops to proceed to Scinde, still a

variety of circumstances appear to justify the apprehension that the example of the power exercised by a large Sikh army had to a certain extent disturbed the minds of our men and predisposed them to hope for the same licence by the same means.

The recent revolution brought about by the Sikh army, and its present unmanageable state, render it expedient to omit no means of ascertaining the truth as regards the *past*, and by the most vigilant scrutiny for the *future* to be at all times well informed as to the temper and disposition of the sepoys on the frontier.

Major Broadfoot's knowledge of the sepoy, combined with his means of using political resources, render him the person best qualified to be charged with this important inquiry. He will, of course, impart to Sir John Littler his sentiments as to the degree of caution to be used in such an inquiry. The very suspicion of such a supposed apprehension would in its effects be most mischievous. It ought not to transpire, and this communication ought to be considered strictly confidential.

In the Governor-General's opinion the mutinies of last January proceeded more from the panic of marching to Scinde, and the refusal of the former extra allowances in that country, than from any seduction effected by Sikh emissaries or Sikh example. On the other hand, in conversation a few days ago with Gen. Ventura, that officer stated as of his own knowledge that the British sepoys were then in such a disaffected state that they had made proposals to cross over to the right bank of the Sutlege, and that he, the General, had given an intimation to this effect to Gen. Vincent, then commanding at Ferozpore. At the present moment the Governor-General is aware that there are personal considerations now pending which may incline Gen. Ventura to exalt the importance of his own conduct and services on that occasion.

Capt. Nicolson some months ago wrote to Mr. Edwards proposing to obtain a letter, said to be in existence in the Lahore offices, showing the interference, if not the actual approval, of the Lahore Government in the allurements then held out to our sepoys. The existence of any such letter is very improbable; but Col. Birch, the Judge Advocate-General, who was at Ferozpore for some days during the period in question, states that he was informed the Sikh emissaries, on pretence of bringing letters to the Vakil, with the knowledge of the latter had meetings with delegates from our sepoy regiments at night, and that it was not deemed prudent to institute any proceedings, the mutinies for[3] disobedience then occupying more prominently the attention of the Government.

[3] *Sic* in original. The mutinous refusal of some native regiments to go to Sind is referred to.

The disbandment of the 34th N.I. took place about the same period. The men went in considerable numbers to the right bank of the Sutlege, and were not enlisted into the Sikh army. This discouragement may have had its effect on our sepoys, and probably the preponderating cause in provoking those mutinies was the Scinde panic and refusal of pay already adverted to.

Be this as it may, it is expedient to adopt the means of accurate information as to any attempts which may be made by Sikh emissaries, and the effects supposed to be produced on the temper and feelings of the British sepoys.

The Governor-General also desires to be informed of the probable number of Hindostanee troops in the Sikh army, also of men trained in our army who have risen to rank in the Sikh army. He also wishes to have in detail as much information as can be collected of the comparative pay, allowances, pensions, clothing &c. of the two armies.

It would also be desirable to have information as to the system under which it would appear that delegates of Sikh soldiers attend the decisions of the Durbar on matters connected with the pay of the soldiers, what prospect any government has of controlling these pretorian bands, bearing in mind that one of the consequences of the Sikh example of extorting higher pay has recently been successfully imitated by the hill troops under Jowahir Singh; their pay, according to Major Broadfoot's report, having been nearly doubled to secure their allegiance to Golab Singh.

These events in a large Eastern army undoubtedly are calculated to destroy the preconceived notions of the superiority of the pay of the British sepoy. The longer this state of things lasts, the more regularly the Sikhs are paid, the greater their licence and their impunity, so much the more vigilant must the British Government be in watching, and if necessary in counteracting, the contagion of such a state of things, infinitely more inconvenient than a well-organised army of equal strength, ready to risk a struggle with the paramount power in the East.

The Governor-General therefore requests that Major Broadfoot will turn his attention to this subject, and address his answers direct to the Governor-General.

HENRY HARDINGE.

Mr. W. Edwards, then Under Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, wrote to Broadfoot on January 15 to complain of irregularity in the receipt of his despatches, and to say that some of them arrived open, and therefore a suspicion existed that they might have been

tampered with on the road. After intimating Sir Henry Hardinge's orders with a view to prevent this, Mr. Edwards wrote:

All that you have done hitherto has elicited not merely approbation, but admiration. I venture to send you a little extract from a note from Thomason . . . which shows his opinions. I beg your attention to the first few lines, as completely bearing out, though unintentionally, what I asserted to you in my last letter—the falseness of our position here. If it be useless to speculate down here, much more is it useless to attempt to issue orders.

The extract from Mr. Thomason's letter is as follows:

Camp near Suharunpoor: January 6, 1845.

My dear Edwards,—Thank you for your letter just received. You forget that we are a little nearer the North-West Frontier, and that the events of one month in that unhappy country wipe out the events of the preceding month most completely. I could not help feeling amused at your speculations on things at Lahore. I am very glad that Broadfoot is appreciated. I hear from him constantly privately, as well as receive copies of his public despatches. The latter seem to me most able. I have seen little of his work in my department yet, for he has been too busy with more important events; but from what he lets drop in his private letters, I have no doubt he will do great good, if he has time and opportunity. I am just now afraid that I may not see him at Khythul, which I expect to reach at the end of this week; for the far more important events passing across the Sutlej will most probably keep him on the frontier. I shall probably make a run over to Umballah if he can meet me there.

The Lahore Darbar had newswriters in most of the principal stations in British India, in order that they might be informed of what took place there. One of these, either stationed at Ambala or attached to the Commander-in-Chief's camp, wrote that Sir Hugh Gough had issued orders for the troops to be ready for immediate service, and that consequent preparations were being made. This report caused extreme excitement, and the Agent, anticipating a demand for explanation, wrote to Sir Hugh to ask whether anything of the kind described had happened, or whether it was not mere idle rumour. He further informed his Excellency that, in consequence of the appearance of preparation, 'our position with

respect to the Darbar is materially and unfavourably changed,' and that the risk of collision was increased.

In spite of this the Agent did not think that the rupture would then occur, and considered that the usual vigilance on the frontier would suffice.[4] On January 16 he reported to the Government of India, that the troops in the provinces of Kashmir, Peshawar, Muzafarabad, Hazara, the Derajat, and Kot Kangra, had mutinied, expelled their officers, and committed great excesses. The rejected officers were received back after making due submission to the men.

In the hills, it was stated that Raja Gulab Singh continued to make public profession of abject submission to the Darbar, of being broken-hearted on account of the violent deaths of his brother and nephew, and of desiring nothing more than to be allowed to die in peace; but at the same time his preparation for war was continued with unwearied energy.

The Rani had seemed disposed to trust the English; but her confidence was shaken by the presence of the Commander-in-Chief on the frontier, and was lost when the rumour, alluded to above, reached Lahore.

In spite of the remonstrance of her more cautious advisers, she laid the report before the Darbar. The greatest excitement prevailed; the matter was referred to the panchayats, and with every expression of reproach, insult, and defiance which occurred to a drunken soldiery, it was decided to move troops towards the Sutlej forthwith, and to desire the Vakil to call on the Agent for an explanation.

He accordingly waited on Broadfoot, and said that he had three messages from the Darbar to deliver.

First. That, owing to the scarcity of forage near Lahore, a few troops had been sent towards the Sutlej.

Second. That he was desired to express the warm concurrence of the Darbar with respect to a message which the Agent had sent.

Third. That he was directed to ask for explanation why his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief had issued orders for the troops to be held ready for immediate active service.

[4] The Political Agent to the Commander-in-Chief, January 15, 1845. See *Papers &c.* printed February 26, 1846, p. 16.

To the first I answered that it could only be cavalry that could require forage. The Vakeel looked confused, but readily enough asked if I had not observed that he had added 'fuel' to the forage; he had not done so, but I told him I had not heard it, and asked what troops were going to move. He said he did not know. I said I hoped no evil advisers had recommended the movement of any to the Sutlej.

To the second I merely expressed satisfaction.

The third was the subject of a long conversation; for the Darbar had a very minute account, whether accurate or not, of the military proceedings [at headquarters].

Having heard the whole story, and been warned that my answer was for the Darbar, I said that I knew nothing at all about the matter, that the Commander-in-Chief was the head of the army, and that it was his business to inspect and exercise the troops in every way, and that it was possible that he might have looked into their readiness for movement at Amballa, seeing that to be so ready was part of their duty; but whether he did or not, I knew not, and was not likely to know or concern myself, for, though I was very far below his Excellency in rank, I was for the present serving exclusively under the Governor-General, with whom alone, and with the Government, I had anything to do; and I added that the Darbar also had only to do with the same authorities.

The Vakil admitted the truth of this, but said, as the Commander-in-Chief was a 'Lord,'[5] the Sikhs could not help anxiety as to his doings.

I told him to undeceive the Darbar; that they should no more concern themselves about the Commander-in-Chief than about the Lord Bishop; who, also, had recently been here; or the lord judges of Calcutta. That each had his own sphere of duty, and could in no way interfere with the Punjab without the sanction of Government.

The Agent further pointed out the inconsistency of the assurances of confidence in the sincerity of the Governor-General, which they continued to express, and the action of despatching troops towards the Sutlej, which indicated suspicion; and in this way endeavoured to allay the excitement which the newswriter's report had caused.

[5] In India the Governor-General is called the Mulki Lāt, the lord of the country; the Commander-in-Chief, the Jangī Lāt, or lord of war; and the subordinate governors or lieutenant-governors are called Lāt Sāhib.

On the subject of the correspondence with Sir Charles Napier about permission to march some of his troops through Multan territory, Mr. Currie, Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, addressed a letter to the Agent, dated January 13, 1845, from which we give the following extracts:

Although the aid desired by Sir C. Napier is in reality merely the neutrality of the Dewan of Mooltan in an intended attempt by the Scinde Government to chastise the Booghtie tribe of Beloochees, who have committed many acts of atrocity upon the inhabitants of our villages in the neighbourhood of Shikarpore, still the measure involves the application for the free passage of a British force through the Sikh territory, and such a proceeding at this time might have a very mischievous effect, and might result in circumstances very embarrassing to the British Government.

The Governor-General in Council therefore entirely approves of the course so judiciously taken by you, as described in these papers.

The Governor-General in Council desires that you do not proceed one step beyond what you have already done, which his Excellency observes will answer substantially all Sir C. Napier's objects. According to Sir C. Napier's letter, the passage by Gen. Simpson's detachment through the Mooltan territory is not required, in the event of Dewan Moolraj Mull [6] acting as the interests of his own possessions will dictate, and as the desire which he is known to profess to propitiate the British Government, will doubtless induce him. You should consequently rather recede than advance in the matter, and, treating the whole affair as one of the utmost indifference to us, you should give the Dewan to understand that the communication which you have already made has been merely in the spirit of friendship, and out of regard to the relations which exist between us and his Government.

You are acting entirely in accordance with the spirit of your instructions, and with the wishes of the Governor-General in Council, in avoiding any step by which the Lahore Government, or the Sikh army, which is perhaps truly the Government, may take alarm. British interference in the internal affairs of the Punjab must not only be strictly abstained from, but every act on our part that could be laid hold of by the Durbar, or by any faction in the Lahore territory, as a plea for expecting British aid, must be studiously avoided.

[6] The name is so spelt in the copy of the letter: Diwan Mulraj, son of Diwan Sáwan Mall, was Governor of Multan.

To require the co-operation of the Governor of Mooltan in a military movement of the British army of Scinde, might justly be assumed as giving the Lahore Government a right to expect the reciprocity of British co-operation on some future occasion; any such expectation the Governor-General in Council has desired may be entirely discouraged.

Military aid in the settlement of the affairs of the Punjab is withheld, not from the existence of feelings inimical to the Maharaja or the Sikh Government, but upon principles of justice and policy. If the Governor-General in Council could by advice or the manifestation of any act of friendship assist the Lahore Government in its difficulties, he would gladly do so; but he can on no account sanction any measure which may give to the Lahore Government the appearance of a claim to our active interference in Punjab affairs by the aid of a military force.

A copy of this letter will be sent to Sir C. Napier for his information. His Excellency was doubtless in ignorance of late events which have occurred in the Punjab when he addressed you on the subject of his expedition.

At the risk of incurring a charge of unnecessary repetition, the following letter from Major Broadfoot to Lord Ellenborough is inserted: there is much in it which deserves careful consideration.

Camp near Loodeeana: January 17, 1845.

My Lord,—Accept my hearty congratulations on the honours which have attended your return to England. I rejoice at them on public and private grounds. None were ever better earned, and I hope to see them still increased. Your Lordship will have heard of the revolution at Lahore on the 21st ultimo. Pundit Julla and Heera Singh ended their government and lives fighting desperately.

They had shown remarkable ability and courage, but the difficulties were insuperable. The great Surdars on the one hand, and the disciplined army, or rather the *drilled* army, on the other, suffice severally to swallow up the revenue. Both together devour the country. Pundit Julla tried by rigorous economy and punctual pay to keep the Government going, while he reduced both these formidable bodies, using the one against the other; but he left out of his calculations the mother of the nominal sovereign, and she was suffered in contempt to intrigue against him; or rather the task undertaken was impossible, and both Surdars and army, suddenly uniting, overthrew the Pundit and the Raja, and revived anarchy.

This still continues. The civil officers of the Government are

embezzling all they can, the soldiers are in a state of mutiny, and are pillaging everywhere. The Surdars are helpless amidst the confusion they have raised; and Rajah Goolab Singh is professing submission and daily offering terms, but really preparing to the utmost for war. Feeble hostilities are going on in the hills at Jusrota, and the Government is emptying the treasury to keep the troops quiet.

Peshora Singh, a son of Runjeet Singh, was lately here as a fugitive; he has gone back, and after one unsuccessful attempt to gain the government is preparing another.

The Government is a caricature; they have formed a council: the leaders of the mutinous troops, and a few of the old servants of the government there, debate every question with the Ranee, a young and handsome woman, behind a curtain, whence she scolds them heartily. Her brother, Surdar Jowahir Singh, was nominated Regent; but the Ranee acts for herself, and is now nearly at open issue with her brother. She has lovers and slave girls, who, of course, bear their part; so also do the common soldiers who attend the Durbar, and whom on one occasion the Ranee had to come from behind the curtain and address.

They have sent for Lena Singh, Majeeteea, but the Ranee has heard he is a coward, and spoken of him with open contempt. She seems to consider courage the highest quality; and assuredly without it a man had better not try public life in the Punjab at present.

There has been a disturbance at Cabool, and names of noted men are given as slain; but though this is believed at Lahore, I do not think the details are yet to be trusted. This has, however, prevented insurrection at Peshawur.

Before next month we shall probably have a change of government. The troops will, perhaps, set up Peshora Singh as sovereign or minister, and something decisive as to Goolab Singh will be known.

As concerns us, all was confidence in us till a few days ago, when some reported arrangements of the Commander-in-Chief threw the Lahore Government into a panic, and they called on the army to support them. I regret this; they will give us somewhat more insecurity, but will scarcely attack us; and unfortunately the movements of his Excellency do not tally altogether with what I had said, and gave them occasion to demand explanations. I had previously taken the liberty of giving my opinion to his Excellency; and the Governor-General, I am delighted to say, approved of it. My opinion was that we ought to show no sign of alarm by extra preparation, seeing that, thanks to your Lordship, we have a force equipped in the Sirhind Division for service at an hour's notice.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has, however, made some requisitions of a small but alarming kind, such as not only detaining her Majesty's 31st Foot, which was useful and unnoticed, but sending for their recruits from Cawnpore, and causing baggage to be weighed.[7] (This latter I do not, however, know from his Excellency, and it may not be quite correct.)

The Sikhs have, in consequence, ordered troops to the Sutlege, which will produce insecurity and tampering with our native troops, if it is not put a stop to. Now, in my view, if this division of 16,000 British troops needed reinforcements, it would be by divisions and brigades, not by a few hundred recruits. The former ought not to be done except with intention of war, and by the Governor-General; the latter, I think, had better have been let alone. It indicates and excites alarm, and in both ways is objectionable.

I mention this as the event of the moment, though a small one; but it touches a very delicate part of the Indian Government, as your Lordship must know—I mean the relations between the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief *before war breaks out.*

The Commander-in-Chief is above everyone but the Governor-General; yet he is neither the author nor the instrument of the policy of the Government with foreign states in time of peace, and when away from Council can know nothing of its details; but his measures may embarrass this policy unless regulated so as to accord with it; and I do therefore think he ought never, when a separate officer, to be absent from the Governor-General, who alone can even advise him without something of presumption. Certainly I think he ought not to be on a frontier without the Governor-General, unless indeed the whole affairs of it are put into his hands; for on frontiers, especially near a revolution, reports are innumerable; and are not always listened to with the apathy one acquires after hearing many of them.

Sir Henry Hardinge has throughout treated me with a kindness and confidence which make it very pleasant to serve under him; they would make me vain did I not know I owe them, as well as that I am here, to your Lordship; as it is, they only make me grateful for your great kindness.

Poor Sir John McCaskill has had a paralytic stroke at Amballa, but is better. Of your other friends you doubtless hear directly from themselves, and at any rate I am here out of the world.

Believe me &c.

G. BROADFOOT.

[7] See Sir Hugh Gough's letter, next page.

The remarks about the relations between the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor-General, and the possible embarrassment caused by the presence of the former on the frontier, are worthy of attention.

Sir Hugh Gough's reply to the Agent regarding the rumours which had been reported in Darbar, is as follows:

January 18, 1845.

Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th inst. mentioning the extraordinary excitement which prevailed at Lahore in consequence of reports from the newswriter at Umballa respecting orders which it is said I had issued to the troops there, to hold themselves in readiness to march at four hours' notice; and you request that I will say 'whether there has been anything of the kind described as having occurred.'

Your knowledge of our military system must have pointed out to you at once the absurdity of such reports: a British force, being always ready to move at an hour's notice, would not require such orders; but as you request a definite reply, I will give it. Such reports are totally without foundation. No orders were ever given to the troops, nor intended to be given. On the contrary, having received distinct instructions from the Governor-General in Council as to the wishes of the Government to abstain from all interference in the affairs of the Punjab, and to preserve a line of conduct exhibiting the wish as well as the determination on the part of the Government to preserve the most perfect good faith towards our ally, I have scrupulously avoided the slightest overt[8] act towards any manifestation of interference, and discouraged it in others.

The only circumstance that could have given rise or the most distant countenance to such reports is, that whilst at Umballa, wishing to curtail as much as possible the kits of the army in India, and to establish a uniformity of system as to the quantum of necessaries a European or a native soldier should carry, both in light and in heavy marching order, I had (as an experiment previous to my issuing any G.O.[9] on the subject) ordered the kits, as also the bedding of a European and a sepoy, to be weighed; I need hardly add this measure had as much reference to the troops now in Calcutta as it had to those at Umballa; and so little idea had I of any such movement of troops for any aggressive or even defensive purpose, that I left Umballa on the 14th, according to my previous arrangements, to visit Kythul and Kurnaul, at neither of which places is there any body of troops.

[8] This word is somewhat illegible in the original. [9] General order.

But as the Lahore troops *have* moved towards our frontier, indicating what I feel conscious no act on our part would call for or justify, I shall consider it my duty to press upon the Government, without whose orders you are aware I cannot act, to strengthen our frontier stations, not for the protection of these stations alone, which have ample means for that purpose at present, but to give security to the states south of the Sutlej, under the protection of the Supreme Government of India. I have &c.

H. GOUGH, *General*,
Commander-in-Chief in India.

The following letter from Mr. Currie is interesting because the writer's official position specially qualified him to express an opinion on the foreign policy of the Indian Government. The handwriting is so execrable that in parts it may be doubtful whether the precise word used by Mr. Currie is here reproduced. The meaning, however, is generally sufficiently plain to make this of slight consequence.

Calcutta: January 19, 1845.

My dear Broadfoot,—You have done very well in keeping us so constantly informed of all that is passing in the Punjab; and all your proceedings have, as you have been officially told, been entirely approved. It is a great pity that we are so far off at the present time, and it is very lucky that you are on the frontier, and not your predecessor.

Sir Henry wrote to you the other day about the example to our sipahees of an army demanding higher and higher rates of pay, and combining to coerce its Government. He lays more stress on this matter than I think it is worth. Our sipahees are, so many of them, the sons or relatives of retired and pensioned soldiers, that they know the real value of our service does not consist in the rate of present pay so much as in the system of providing for the soldier under all circumstances and contingencies. They see also the state of confusion to which insubordination has reduced the Sikh troops; and they have sense enough to appreciate the present state of things, and to know that it portends the destruction or dissolution of the army, which they will shortly witness.

I think the instructions you have received in late letters will enable you to see your way through any circumstances that may arise, pending specific orders on any state of things that may turn up.

If a genuine descendant of Runjeet were on the throne, with a capable minister, or even a tolerable aristocracy out of which to form a government, it might be a question with us whether, in

return for Runjeet's steady friendship, and his forbearance from taking advantage of us at times when he might have done so with present impunity to himself and infinite damage to us, we should aid his descendant in putting down the opposition of his own army and destroying hostile factions in his country. But in the present state of affairs in the Punjab such a measure is quite out of the question. It would be madness in us to think of expending blood and treasure to bolster up the puppet Dhuleep Singh, or to set up such a government as could be formed out of the elements that now exist at Lahore, which must owe its continuance henceforth to our power alone.

Though I would rather see a strong Sikh or Hindoo Government in the Punjab than that the British dominions should extend to the Indus, yet I should indeed grieve to think that such power was of our creating and maintaining, so that for all its iniquities we should in fact be responsible.

Armed interference, therefore, in the internal settlement of the affairs of the Sikhs is out of the question, even though the withholding the aid that may be solicited must bring about the destruction of the Sikh power.

Again, to take advantage of the weakness or prostration which must follow the present extraordinary position of affairs, to go in and seize the country, is what we never should for a moment think of; and it is doubtful how far we should be justified in holding the nominal Government responsible for excesses committed on our frontier and districts by a lawless soldiery in open rebellion to its own Government, and equally their enemies as ours, and saying, If you can't rule your country with a strong hand, we must.

For the present, therefore, abstinence from all interference or aid, by whomsoever solicited, and defensive measures for the protection of our territory, and the destruction of those who violate it, must be our only policy.

The protected Sikhs should be assured that no proceedings on the other side the Sutlege, or any results in which they may terminate, will alter their position with us as long as they remain faithful. We do not want their tribute, and we will not (at least if *I* have any influence, and you must consider this a private letter) make any compromise [1] with them of present customs; least of all will we yield to them the mischievous right of adoption, which will perpetuate the existing anomalies in these territories.

The most important question which presses at this moment is, the light in which we are to view the Lahore districts on this side

[1] This word is very illegible in the original.

the Sutlege. Are they *national* or *family* property? Will they attach to any Sikh Government we might recognise, or will they belong to Dhuleep (whom we have recognised as heir of Runjeet) should he take refuge on this side, or lapse to us in the event of his death? I hope to get this question, as far as our records throw any light on it, or on circumstances that can elucidate it, before the Government next council day. I incline at present to think it *family* property. I should like to know your view.

I imagine we shall be forced across the Sutlege sooner or later, and you will see that we are sending up troops to be ready for whatever may turn up. We must not have a Mahommedan power on this side the Attock. The Rajpoots of the hills could not hold the Punjab; and if it can't be Sikh, it must, I suppose, be British. . . .

I record most of your private notes to me, and send them to the secret committee, leaving out such parts as are of no public interest.

I have had two or three long conversations with Gen. Ventura; but we can do nothing for him more than to allow our Agent to use his *personal* interest to prevent the seizure of his property. The General put the notion, I think, into Sir Henry's head that our sipahees have an understanding with those of Lahore, and that ours are likely to be led away by their example. The old Frenchman wished to give some valuable information to Sir Henry to make him friendly to his interests. . . . Yours &c.

F. CURRIE.

The possibility of disaffection in our native army, induced by the example of the Sikh troops, and encouraged by emissaries from that State, was much more serious than Mr. Currie imagined.

The Governor-General sent a letter from Major Carmichael Smyth, in which disaffection was said to be very extensively spread in the native army, and remarked that:

The extensive disaffection alluded to is not credited by the Governor-General; but it [the letter] is sent in reference to the preceding communication. If any system of delegates be suspected to exist, it must be traced in all its ramifications.

The active participation of the Sikh Government in any attempts to seduce our sepoys would be an unpardonable piece of treachery; the clearest evidence of the fact should be obtained with the greatest circumspection.

The Governor-General is satisfied no efforts will be spared to ascertain the real state of the case, and to be prepared at all times to be well informed of what is passing between the two armies.

After the last recorded interview with the Vakil, Broadfoot addressed him, asking for further explanation regarding the movement of Sikh troops towards our frontier. At another interview, all the old ground was gone over again with variations. The Agent told the Vakil that when alarm was felt in consequence of anything that happened on our side of the Sutlej, if explanation were asked for, confidence was increased; but if, instead, indiscreet measures were adopted, and the passions of the mob inflamed, confidence could with difficulty be maintained. He also insisted on getting a written answer to his written demand for explanation, because as there were no witnesses to the conversations, if serious results occurred, the Vakil would unhesitatingly declare that neither remonstrance nor warning had been tried.

The Governor-General's instructions to inquire into the state of the native regiments on the frontier, already quoted, were forwarded by the Private Secretary, Mr. C. S. Hardinge, to whom Broadfoot wrote the following letter:

Camp, Sirhind: January 20, 1845.

My dear Hardinge,—I am much obliged by your kind note of the 12th inst.

Will you kindly say for me to the Governor-General that the subject of his memorandum has, ever since my arrival on the frontier, occupied my most serious attention; that I have made and am making all the inquiries possible without showing that such a thing is seriously suspected by us, that I shall soon write on it as desired, and that I have for some time considered this point as the most important in our relations with the Punjab, but scarcely know how to write on a matter so delicate? Yours &c.

G. BROADFOOT.

In case of any little delay, you may say that what I shall write will be, in general, only a confirmation of the Governor-General's opinions. Further, that my views on this have in no small degree influenced my conduct of late, but I hope before many days to write fully.

G. B.

The Rani's share in the Government was reported as daily increasing. She was influenced considerably by Raja Lal Singh, and still more by the girl Mangla, who was placed in Darbar at

the opening of the curtain behind which the Rani sat, and was the channel of communication for all but the great chiefs. This slave girl appeared to be in a measure a recognised officer of the State, as well as the minister of pleasure and of riot. She signed one of the treaties with Raja Gulab Singh; and at will affixed the seals of the Rani and her brother, which she carried at her girdle, to any Government documents except those connected with the English.

Day by day the scandals caused by the behaviour of the Rani and her brother, alike in their love of pleasure if in little else, became worse and worse.

Overtures to the Agent, on behalf of Raja Gulab Singh, were made by Bhai Ram Singh, for aid; in return for which it was proposed to cede the cis-Sutlej Lahore estates, with some territory on the north side of the river, and to pay 50,00,000 rs. equal at par to 500,000*l*. Broadfoot, though he reported the offer, and remarked on the terms as being similar to those proposed in Mr. Clerk's time, did not even acknowledge its receipt to the party by whom the proposal was made.

On the arrival in Calcutta of this information, the Agent was desired to remark to the Vakil, that a regard for the difficult circumstances in which the Maharaja's Government was placed, had hitherto induced the Governor-General to abstain from making a formal remonstrance on the subject of the unruly and ungovernable condition of the Sikh army.

'We considered it right that this intimation, though cautiously and incidentally, should be distinctly, delivered; for we cannot but feel that the state of this army so close upon our frontier may become an intolerable nuisance; and although it would be a mockery to expect that the Lahore Government' in its present state of anarchy and weakness, . . . 'can regulate the conduct of an army which exercises over that Government daily acts of coercion and tyranny, nevertheless we deem it expedient that a notice in the most guarded terms should be given of the great inconvenience to which the British Government is exposed, and of which, if the Lahore Government were in a state of greater strength and responsibility, we should have just cause of formal complaint.

'We put Major Broadfoot, in whose judgment and discretion we have the utmost confidence, in possession of copies of correspondence with his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief relative to strengthening our force on the North-West Frontier.'

It was left to the Agent to say whether the extra troops should be at once posted on the frontier; unless he was convinced of the necessity, it was considered to be preferable that their arrival should be deferred till April, when the periodical rise in the river Sutlej would prevent the Sikhs from being thereby alarmed.

When these papers arrived in England, they were pronounced to be of high interest. They did not remove the anxiety felt, but the hope was cherished that under the judicious instructions of the Governor-General, 'carried into effect with so much propriety and talent by Major Broadfoot,' the necessity for hostilities might be averted, and order re-established.

It is one of the drawbacks to a work of this kind, that the thread of the historical narrative is constantly broken by the introduction of letters not immediately relevant. This becomes more obvious in proportion to the strictness with which the sequence of letters, according to the dates on which they were written, is maintained. The reader must, therefore, transport himself now from the presence of the Agent on the frontier, to the camp of Sir Charles Napier, where that General will speak for himself.

Headquarters, Ooch: January 22, 1845.

My dear Sir,—Having been fortunate enough to surprise the robbers and to defeat them, we are now pursuing Beja Khan along the southern side of the hills by which he flies, instead of by (as I expected) the [pass near Poolajee].[2] He means to fly to the Mooltan territory to join Shere Mahomed. Now he is a robber, a murderer, a rebel to the Khan of Khelat, and entered our territories to pillage and ravage them, though we were at peace, and in strict alliance with his prince. He chose, very foolishly, to make war upon us without the slightest provocation, but he had a right to do so if he chose it, nor could we, without a want of generosity, complain of his being received by a neighbouring Power as a private gentleman. But I think Beja Khan has no right whatever to be received by the Governor of Mooltan, and I wish you would write to him to beg that he may not be received. If I catch him I mean to hang him at once. I will quiet the Sinde frontier for a hundred years!

My Sinde jaghirdars[3] are behaving very well; one of them took

[2] The name is illegible in the original.

[3] Persons to whom an estate has been granted in annuity.

Poolajee, and to-day marched upon Tonge, a village on my left flank, out of which Beja retreated yesterday morning, and I should have cut him off, but I was obliged to wait for provisions.

The necessity of keeping all quiet to surprise the enemy prevented my commissariat from making the requisite preparations; however, we march to-morrow *en route* towards Deyrah, in nearly a direct line.

I think the Boogtiés will fight us as we enter the hills at a pass called Gundoooe, not marked in Walker's map, but it is ten miles due south of the *b* in the word 'Tomb,' which you will see in Walker's map on the river 'Illiassee.' If not here, they will at a place north-east of Deyrah, called 'Meerzakee Ghunsee,' that is to say, if the rascals mean to fight at all, which I hope they do not, and I think I shall end this war without the loss of any more men.

Hoping you will be able to prevent the cutthroat Beja Khan from being received by Mooltan, I remain &c.

C. J. NAPIER, *Major-General.*

The following letter from Sir Henry Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough, which was shown to the Duke of Wellington, contains an interesting epitome of the news of the day.

(Private.) Calcutta: January 23, 1845.

My dear Lord Ellenborough,—Affairs in the Punjab are in the same state of confusion and anarchy as when I last addressed you.

The Sikh army will neither fight its enemies nor obey its Government.

Peshora Singh is used as the pump by which the soldiery drain the treasury. They declare him their sovereign when the Ranee refuses any demand; and when conceded, put him aside for the next occasion.

The worst feature is the success of mutiny; the infection has spread to the hill troops; they threatened to desert, and did desert until Golab Singh doubled their pay. Any visible tangible danger can be boldly grappled with. Disaffection and mutiny are dangerous in proportion to the success and the duration of a bad example. I need make no comments to you on this subject.

If, however, the contagion should reach Ferozpoor, the safest remedy would be active operations in self-defence. No such alternative will, in my opinion, happen.

We have reinforced Ferozpoor by one European regiment, two troops English horse artillery, two Native Infantry regiments, and a third regiment if desirable.

Sir J. Littler to command this advanced post, which consists of 7,000 men. It is impossible in the face of this force to cross the river at Ferozpoor. The more distant fords would give us timely notice of any attack; and with the works we now have and some heavy guns, I consider this post perfectly secure.

The defensive force exceeds 20,000 men and 60 guns, including seven of H.M.'s regiments.

We can collect 33,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, and 100 guns in about six weeks; all the reinforcements have been taken from our extremities, nothing on the great trunk road, and six of these regiments are troops on which Sir H. Gough did not reckon, such as a regiment from Barrackpore, Midnapoor, Bherampoor, Dinapoor, and two from the Saugor country &c.

. . . . . .

The next three months will be occupied in emptying the treasury at Lahore, and, if the troops can be prevailed upon to move in hostilities against Golab Singh, I see no probability of the latter being able to do more than defend himself in his hills. He will not undertake the enterprise of setting up for himself at Lahore. He has not the popularity;[4] he may bribe the Sikh sirdars, but the troops detest him, and the hill petty rajas whom he has despoiled equally detest him. I believe he has recently sent money and jewels to our bank of the river.[5]

We shall have 500 elephants in the course of the summer between Cawnpoor and the Sutlege, and 7,000 camels, exclusive of tattoos and hackeries;[6] and if ever we do move across, Ferozpoor will be a most useful point on which to concentrate our resources, limiting the baggage, and only moving across in light marching order, having 25,000 cavalry against us, between the river and Lahore.

The battering train would be drawn by elephants, two to each 24-pounder, occupying a short space on the line of march. Two batteries of your iron 12-pounders would also be drawn by one elephant each, and in action by bullocks; double shafts are provided; and a rocket company with the proper apparatus for firing and carrying the rockets.

With regard to the 9-pounders to be converted *out* of the 6-pounders horse artillery, the opinion is adverse to the plan, and Col. Gowan himself has withdrawn, and no longer advocates the measure. However, I have insisted on Major Abbott taking Capt. Grant's troop of 6-pounders, and with eight horses on the detachment

[4] Means, he cannot reckon on the support of the people of the Punjab.

[5] The right bank of the Sutlej was Sikh; the left bank, British.

[6] Ponies and bullock carts.

system if he likes, turning out the most complete 9-pounder troop that his ingenuity can invent. We have given him *carte blanche*, and the practical trial will be fairly made.

In the midst of this anarchy on the frontier, you will ask why am I here?

The longer I can stay here, the better our chance of keeping the Sikh Government on its legs. Even if we had a case for devouring our ally in his adversity, we are not ready, and could not be ready until the hot winds set in, and the Sutlege becomes a torrent. Moderation will do us no harm, if in the interval the hills and the plains weaken each other; but on what plea could we attack the Punjab, if this were the month of October, and we had our army in readiness?

Self-preservation may require the dispersion of this Sikh army; the baneful influence of such an example is the evil most to be dreaded; but exclusive of this case, how are we to justify the seizure of our friend's territory, who in our adversity assisted us to retrieve our affairs?

H. HARDINGE.

When Broadfoot's letter[7] to the Commander-in-Chief, dated January 15, inquiring what foundation existed for the rumours of military preparations at headquarters, was received by the Government of India, the Secretary in the Foreign Department was desired to address the Agent and direct him to tell the Darbar the exact truth as follows:

That a barrack for a European regiment of infantry had for a length of time been ordered to be constructed at Ferozepore, of which the foundations are already laid; that the Governor-General in Council, perceiving during the autumn the state of weakness in which the Government of the Maharajah had been for some time under his Highness Wuzeer Rajah Heera Singh, had postponed to give orders for the completion of this building, in order that no question might arise, exciting any doubt or jealousy of our intention, on the part of the Government of the Maharajah or of the Sikh army.

That the British force stationed at Ferozepore has remained of the same strength as before, notwithstanding the recent violent proceedings of the Sikh army against its own Government, which conduct it is unnecessary now to comment upon, otherwise than to repeat that it is conduct utterly repugnant to British feeling and British policy; and that this army has become so notoriously beyond

[7] Referred to, p. 260.

control, that the Governor-General in Council, always anxious to preserve the tranquillity of the Sikh states under his protection, will, under existing circumstances, now proceed to complete the buildings at Ferozepore according to his original intention, and also to reinforce that post by an additional force of Native Infantry.[8]

Broadfoot was further directed to impress on the Vakil that the British policy of friendliness had remained unchanged, in despite of the movement of the Sikh army towards our frontier, and that no desire existed to interfere in the internal affairs of the Punjab.

Whilst the Agent was to do all he could to convince the Sikh Court of British good faith, he was to take the opportunity, should it occur, of giving the Darbar the warning already mentioned.[9]

The following letter from Gen. Ventura to Major Broadfoot has a certain interest as a genuine relic of one of the best known of the foreign officers who served the Sikh Government. It is printed as it is written, unaltered and uncorrected. The General had the revenues of some villages in the Lahore cis-Sutlej estates assigned to him. He feared that the Sikh Government would resume the gift, and wished to obtain the support of the Government of India in resisting the seizure of his property.

Calcutta le 25 janvr. 1845.

Mon cher Major,—Quelque fut mon desir de vous écrire j'ai différé de le faire jusqu'à ce jour. Je voulais attendre une solution à mes affaires et pouvoir vous en faire part; si celle que j'ai obtenue n'est pas tout à fait telle que je l'eusse souhaitée j'ai lieu néanmoins d'être satisfait et surtout reconnoissant.

Après plusieurs entrevues avec S.E. Le Gouverneur-Général dans lequelles il m'a temoigné le plus veritable interet et la plus haute bienveillance, j'ai reçu de lui l'assurance positive que l'honorable gouvernement dont il est le chef ne pouvant m'accorder une protection officielle me la donnerait cependant de fait; nous soutiendrons m'a-t-il dit, vos droits avec toute la force de notre influence faisant valoir toute la justice de votre cause, je ne puis vous garantir officiellement la proprieté de vos villages, mais je vous assure que vous ne les perdrez point à moins, a-t-il ajouté en riant, que votre affaire ne devienne un casus Belli, je vais écrire à cet égard de ma propre main au Major Broadfoot. De semblables paroles de la

[8] *Papers &c.* printed February 26, 1846, pp. 14, 15. [9] See p. 272.

bouche de S.E. sont faites pour inspirer pleine confiance surtout, mon cher Major, quand c'est vous qui est chargé d'en assurer les bons effets.

L'excellent accueil qui m'a été fait par le chef, et tous les membres de l'honorable gouvernement dans mes démarches au sujet de cette affaire a été, je ne l'ignore pas, admirablement préparée par vos rapports favorables, ce sont vos Lettres qui ont excité ces sentiments d'interet que j'ai rencontrés par tout; enfin c'est un plaisir bien vrai pour mon cœur de vous le dire, c'est à vous que je dois le succes que j'ai obtenu; vous avez pratiqué à mon égard ce beau principe, promettre peu, et faire beaucoup. Je ne saurai vous exprimer avec trop de chaleur toute ma gratitude toute ma reconnoissance, et je puis ajouter toute celle de ma famille; si elle conserve cette majeure partie de sa fortune c'est à vous qu'elle la devra.

S.E. m'a assuré que les choses seront maintenues telles que Mr. Clerk les a établies, que les Villages seront administrés par les employés du Gouvt et les revenues versées dans le trésor et mis à ma disposition, je prends donc la liberté de vous transmettre ci joint une petite note pour vous faire connaitre les charges dont sont grévées ces revenues. Veuillez avoir la bontè d'ordonner que ce chiffre ne soit pas arbitrairement depassé c'est à dire que vous seul puissiez l'augmenter si vous le jugiez necessaire.

Permettez-moi mon cher Major de vous prier de completer pour l'avenir votre bonne œuvre en reglant mes affaires de telle sorte que lorsque vous quitterez la place que vous occupez pour monter à une nouvelle et plus haute encore position, celui qui vous remplacera, dans l'amitié et l'interet duquel je n'ai pas lieu d'esperer comme dans les votres, ne puisse pas detruire votre ouvrage comme Mr. Richmond l'avait fait de celui de Mr. Clerk.

Ce n'est pas ici le moment de vous rappeller que vous m'avez promis de vous adresser à moi pour ce dont vous pourriez avoir besoin en France, cependant je tiens à vous renouveller que ce sera une veritable jouissance pour moi de me charger de vos commissions et de pouvoir vous être agréable, ce sera en la faisant une veritable preuve d'amitié que vous me donnerez.

Je partirai le 8 du mois prochain par le Paquebot à Vapeur le Précurseur et je me rendrai en Angleterre avant de rentrer en france ou je serai dans le courrent du mois d'avril, lorsque vous voudrez bien m'écrire mon adresse est

Gen. Ventura, chez Mr. Prévoteau notaire, rue St. Marc Feydeau, No. 20.

Adieu, mon cher Major, veuillez agréer ici la nouvelle assurance de toute mon estime et de mon reconnaissant attachement.

Votre tout dévoué, VENTURA.

CHAPTER XII.

1845.

Sikh troops withdrawn from North-West Frontier—Interview between Agent and Vakil: Sutlej the limit of supremacy of the two Powers—Mulla Ahmad—Sir H. Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough: Punjab news—Letter from the Private Secretary: the boats for a flotilla or bridge—Sikh expedition against Jammu—Deputation to Gulab Singh—Letter from Sir C. Napier: the Bugtis—Letter from Havelock—From Lord Ellenborough—Sir H. Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough: Punjab news—Gulab Singh's negotiations with the Sikhs—Troops available for frontier defence—Jammu: fighting between Sikhs and hill men—Negotiation—Gulab Singh virtually a prisoner—Violation of our frontier by Sikh troops—Resolute and prompt steps taken by Broadfoot—His action commended by the Governments of India and England—Letter to Lord Ellenborough: Capt. W. Smith of the 'Siren'—His services in the fight with the 'Chesapeake;' and in Burma—Letter from Lord Ellenborough—Broadfoot in Simla—Lahore news.

EARLY in February the Vakil was able to report that the troops which had been sent towards the Sutlej had been withdrawn, and that a considerable number of men had marched to Jammu against Raja Gulab Singh. In giving this information he intimated that the withdrawal of the Sikh army was owing to his exertions, and said he hoped that dissatisfaction would cease, and that the friendship which existed in Ranjit Singh's time would be preserved.

The Agent assured him that in the friendly feelings of the Governor-General to the Maharaja, and in his desire for the preservation of the former mutual confidence, there was no change, and that because of this, and because of the alarm and injury which might result at Lahore, the necessary reinforcements for the frontier had not been demanded.

Yet, on a report from Ambala, which on inquiry turned out to have been groundless, the Darbar had suspected the Government of India of treachery, and, instead of asking for explanation, had adopted steps which need not be re-

capitulated, and had followed those steps by marching troops towards our frontier.'

Broadfoot after saying he was glad that the troops had been recalled, added: 'It would be deceiving the Durbar to say that I felt the same confidence in them as before; and that in all future arrangements for the frontier, it must be my duty to bear in mind what had already happened.' The Vakil asked if he was to communicate this reply to the Darbar, and whether it was to be considered as an expression of the views of our Government, or merely of those held by the Agent.

The reply was, that every word might be reported; but that, as the Agent had not yet heard from the Governor-General on the subject, he must be personally responsible for the reply.

The Vakil then hinted at the necessity under which the Darbar laboured of conciliating the troops; on which Broadfoot remarked that this fact merely added strength to what he had said, and rendered more grave their recent movement.

He further took occasion to state what the Vakil well knew, and what Ranjit Singh never for a moment forgot, that from and after the conclusion of the treaty in 1809, the Sutlej had limited the supremacy[1] of the two Powers, and consequently the protection of all, high and low, south of the river devolved on the Governor-General. That in any government the protection of its subjects was a first duty, and that, therefore, the Agent's most important duty was 'to provide against every risk, from whatever quarter arising, of injury to any man on the south of the Sutlej; and I repeated that in doing so I must bear in mind the occurrences showing that Ranjit Singh was no longer reigning.'

The Vakil assented to all this, and after some less important conversation took his leave.

One of the consequences of the employment of natives in certain negotiations which were carried on in Afghanistan during the Kabul disasters was, that the men employed had found intrigue so profitable that they devoted their attention solely to practising on the credulity of British political officers. Of these men a certain Mulla Ahmad was an adept, and Broadfoot discovered that he was in correspondence with two of his

[1] The words used were riyāsat, ḥukūmat, and ikhtiyār.

Assistants. He pointed out the harm which resulted in the Punjab, and in every other country up to Persia, from the belief that the Government of India was connected with intrigues and intriguers so disreputable and unprincipled. He cautioned an Assistant to be careful, lest by his mode of receiving such persons he might encourage this belief, and give the natives reason to suspect that there was foundation for the falsehoods by which they lived.

On his own part he determinedly discouraged all intercourse with them; unfortunately the necessity for this had not been so evident to his predecessor, who had written letters to Mulla Ahmad, in themselves, it is believed, absolutely innocent, but which in the hands of an unscrupulous man could be used with evil effect. He naturally did make use of them, and the whole correspondence had to be submitted to the Government of India. The incident need not be more minutely followed; it is sufficient to record that the entire approval of the Government of India was conveyed to Major Broadfoot for bringing the matter to notice in the way he did, and of the course he pursued in regard to Mulla Ahmad.

The following extract from a long letter, dated February 9, 1845, from Mrs. Cameron is interesting as a record of the impression Broadfoot's conduct as a political officer was making on the Governor-General, and as corroborating opinions somewhat differently expressed in other letters.

I have not often dined at Government House since you were here, but I *never* have dined there without mention being made of you, and made in those terms you would have most liked to hear; I will not call them flattering terms, but terms of perfect *confidence*. On the last occasion Sir Henry Hardinge told me—I do not know whether it was a secret—that he was very anxious to procure for you your lieutenant-colonelcy as soon as possible. I suppose he has told you as much. He has once or twice said to me, 'I was led to form a wrong impression of Broadfoot, and have been told he was a rash and excitable man; on the contrary, I see that he is calm and resolute, and when he displays energy it is not to make, but to avoid, a war.'

The general news of the first half of February will be found in the following extract from a letter from Sir Henry Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough.

Calcutta: February 20, 1845.

My dear Lord Ellenborough,—There is no abatement in the anarchy and mutiny of the Sikh army. They go where they please, and every military operation depends upon their temper and caprice at the moment.

Golab Singh has again written to us, delighted to enter into terms with us. The first overture was a voluntary offer of his own, through a confidential emissary. The letter I now allude to is in answer to the intrigue of a Frenchman, a Mons. de St. Amand, a great scamp, who took it into his head to go to Jummoo from Loodiana, and after two days' delay, finding he could get no employment, pretended he came on a mission from Capt. Mills to propose an alliance with the Raja and the conquest of the Punjab. The Raja's letter by his own emissary had been previously received and rejected. The Frenchman impudently wrote to Capt. Mills from Jummoo that his proposals were accepted, and the Raja has now sent us a letter entreating us to lose no time. Broadfoot will show up the impostor, and M. de St. Amand will have his nose cut off or be hanged.

The Sikh troops in Jesrota and the neighbourhood have burnt several villages, and carried off 1,000 women and boys. The hill tribes are roused to vengeance, and, in spite of their hatred of Golab Singh, may rally round him to gratify their vengeance, and prevent further horrors from being perpetrated by the Sikhs in their country.

Evidently Golab Singh is greatly alarmed. Lahore is stripped of troops, and we hear they have not 12 lacs in the treasury, but rely upon their reserve treasure at Govindghur. The grand *dénouement* will be postponed until the treasure be exhausted.

The Ranee continues her debaucheries in the grossest style. The army threaten to place Peshora Singh at their head, and I believe my threat has saved Dhuleep Singh's life—that if he were deposed by violence the Sikhs must not expect us to recognise his successor.

Our Assistants on the frontier will persist in dabbling in the intrigues of the Punjab, and I fear I must withdraw ——, and perhaps ——.

We received last night a curious letter from the confidential secretary of the Raja of Puteala, stating that the Raja of Nabha was convinced he was the eleventh incarnation of Vishnoo, and at twenty-four years of age was to rise against the English and vanquish them. Several details of the preparations making are given, and the letter is remarkably well got up if, as I expect, it is a hoax. I therefore do not send it home.

There has been sad bungling in the military operations against Sawunt Waree.[2] I should have withdrawn Gen. Delamotte had he not had some flashes of ability and decision in the storming of Summunghur and Punalla, for which the Bombay Government gave him their thanks. Col. Outram has done very well at the head of his column, marching through the jungle in every direction, whilst the other columns have been frittering away their time in shelling jungles and ravines before they would permit their troops to enter them. I have written in strong terms to Bombay on this subject.

Napier, with his characteristic energy, is hunting the Boogtie tribe, and chastising them for their cruelties during the summer in plundering our villages near Shikarpoor.

I expect to hear the result of a combined movement he is making in the hope of catching them in his net; I doubt this part of the enterprise, but it will be a very useful operation, and if he can capture or destroy two or three hundred of these miscreants he will give the preponderance of power to the Murries, a friendly tribe of robbers, whom the Boogties had conquered.

All your friends here are in good health, and constantly inquire after you with the most affectionate interest.

H. HARDINGE.

The following letter from the Private Secretary to Broadfoot on the subject of boats, which had been ordered in 1843 partly for purposes of traffic, and also to be available for use as a bridge if necessary, has a special importance. The measure has been alleged as one of the causes of the outbreak of war,[3] and it is well, therefore, that the principal facts concerning them should be plainly recorded.

(Confidential.) February 20, 1845.

My dear Broadfoot,—The Governor-General has desired me to address you on the following subject:

2. Sixty boats, built at Bombay, have just been conveyed into the Indus to serve as a river flotilla, and also as a bridge of boats.

3. They are of equal dimensions, each carrying a gun, two grappling irons with strong chains, and 100 men; the sixty boats would therefore for short distances, such as the passage of a river, carry 6,000 infantry at one trip.

[2] Sāwantwārī.—Native State in Bombay, under the charge of a political superintendent; situated about 200 miles south of Bombay city. The administration was made over to the British Government in 1838, and there were rebellions in 1839 and 1844. (Hunter, *Imperial Gazetteer*, vol. xii. p. 295.)

[3] Cunningham's *Sikhs*, secon edition, p. 286.

4. Each boat has its separate proportion of timber ready for the flooring of a bridge of boats, and capable of being laid down in two or three hours.

5. It is not desirable that the purposes to which these boats can be applied should unnecessarily transpire. The Governor-General does not desire to create alarm which might be prejudicial to the Maharaja's Government. These contingent preparations, which policy and prudence dictate, are required by the disgraceful state of turbulence in which the Sikh army has so long remained, and which amply justifies this and every other preliminary arrangement. I need scarcely observe that in the state of the Indian press entire secrecy is the proper course to pursue.

6. But if any inquiry should be made hereafter, your answer will be that this flotilla of boats is not at present required on the lower Indus, that our commissariat arrangements do require the employment of boats between Ferozpore and Sukkur for the supply of the latter place with grain, and that these boats are purposely adapted for military as well as trading purposes, and form part of our military means and establishment on the Indus applicable to any purposes for which they may be required either on that river or on the Sutlej; to which you may add several iron steamers which it is convenient to the Government to employ on these rivers for the conveyance of troops, stores, and supplies; and of course available for offensive as well as for defensive objects, not unnecessarily entering into these explanations, but stating the truth if explanation be proper.

7. On the other hand, you will distinctly understand that our only object in desiring secrecy is at all times and under all circumstances to do nothing which can weaken the Maharaja's Government by exciting alarm or raising discussions in the Indian newspapers.

8. Orders have been given for these boats to move up to Sukkur; and further orders may be hereafter given for their movement towards Ferozpore later in the year. Twenty days must elapse before an answer can be received from you to this communication; but as some preliminary arrangements ought to be made, the Governor-General has desired me to apprise you of what his intentions are in this respect.

9. The Commissariat Department have from economical motives proposed that the Bengal troops at Sukkur should be supplied with grain sent down in boats from Ferozpore. The Government has approved of this arrangement. The Commissariat will be enabled advantageously and permanently to employ a certain number of camels in bringing the grain to Ferozpore, and to have boats and crews at all times in their service regularly paid and under their command.

10. The trade on the Sutlej, however small, will tend to keep open

this communication between the North-West Frontier and Sind, and afford the means of having a command of boats on the river; and the European officers and troops, by the return of the boats employed by the Commissariat, will have all their wants supplied at the cheapest possible rates.

11. The Governor-General observes in a newspaper—'The Friend of India' of February 6—that a Mr. Charde is stated to have established at Ferozpore an Indus boat agency.

12. It appears to the Governor-General that this speculation should be encouraged, if the individual be of a respectable character, and that the first step should be to give him the assistance of Government by building a ghaut or wharf for the loading and unloading of goods; the means of securing the boats at all seasons, with a road leading to the banks of the river. This wharf should be the property of the Government, and be constructed in reference to objects of commerce as well as of military convenience in the event of a bridge of boats being placed across the Sutlej. It might have a house attached to it, for purposes of trade, capable of holding a guard, gradually establishing a few houses close to the bank of the river.

13. In reference to par. 8 the Superintending Engineer would be placed in charge of the flooring, timber &c. of each boat, arranging them in store according to the most approved method of keeping all the parts of one pontoon together, and at all times in order and readiness.

14. The report of the Bombay Committee will at some future time be sent to the officer in charge, so as to enable him to calculate with precision the exact time required for laying the bridge across the river, which by previous arrangement ought not to exceed two hours by day or four hours by night, on all which details future instructions will be furnished.

15. The Governor-General has ascertained by the scanty information hitherto sent to him that the boats &c. are ample in space and flooring &c. for the object proposed; but he particularly wishes you to turn your attention to the best mode and time of bringing the boats up to Ferozpore. The inclosed plan and dimensions of one of the boats will enable you to form an opinion whether it will be more advisable to bring up the boats gradually during the summer, unloading the flooring &c. at Ferozpore, and then handing over the boats to the Commissariat Department to be used in carrying grain down the Indus, and thus establishing a navigation up and down the river in our own boats; or whether it will be a preferable decision to keep the boats and their timbers at Sukkur, not divulging their object until the last moment, if ever the necessity should arise. In this latter case an officer of the Bengal Sappers and Miners should

take charge of the boats at Sukkur, and be well informed on all points relating to the construction of the bridge.

16. The quieter mode as regards reports of their ultimate destination, would be to bring up and to store all the timbers at Ferozpore, being prepared with artillery waggons belonging to the batteries at Ferozpore to transport them in an hour to the riverside whenever required.

17. It will be desirable to ascertain the probable time which one of these boats would take in coming up from Sukkur to Ferozpore, say during the months of June, July, and August.

18. The Governor-General therefore wishes you to take all these matters into your consideration, and to give him your opinion at your earliest convenience.

19. Adverting to par. 5 of this letter, you will clearly understand that this preparation for a movable bridge is a part of the military establishment of every army, and is to be considered in no respect a departure from the policy of maintaining a Sikh power permanently in the Punjab by every possible means consistent with existing treaties. In devising the best mode of proceeding regarding this bridge, care must be taken to avoid publicity by which the Maharaja's interests might be damaged, or the confidence of the Sikh army in his Highness's Government shaken by British preparations, which when known are inevitably of a character to excite suspicion. Yours &c.

C. S. HARDINGE.

To this letter Broadfoot replied, that he was glad that the boats were coming, as they were much wanted; and that unless they were required at Sukkur, they should be sent at once to Firozpur. If the Darbar asked about them, explanation would be given as desired; and the sooner the better, for the Sikhs were already aware, for reasons which had been explained to them, that the British Government was strengthening its force on the frontier, and that the means of crossing rivers formed part of our equipment.

For the last ten to fourteen years the Sikhs had kept nearly all the boats on the north side of the river, thereby causing inconvenience to the villages on the south side, and giving rise to considerable complaint.

Broadfoot's view regarding the river was, that it was an open highway, and that we, as well as the Sikhs, had a right to use it; consequently, that we were entitled to have the

means of using it. This was more than ever necessary since the annexation of Sind.

The Darbar, as has been mentioned, had sent part of the Sikh army to coerce Raja Gulab Singh in his capital, Jammu, to make him part with money which he loved so well, and to agree to conditions which he disliked.

His old opponent Sardar Fatteh Singh, Mán,[4] and some others, were deputed to arrange terms, whilst the army halted near Jammu. The Raja received them with great honour, and amused them for several days with alternate professions of submission and hints of defiance. A deputation from the panchayats then arrived. The Raja treated them as masters of the State; placed his sword and shield on the ground at their feet, and stood before them with his hands joined. He expatiated, *more Asiatico*, on the bounty of the Sikhs to his family,[5] whose long-tried loyalty and devotion were recognised, and during whose tenure of office the State had enjoyed prosperity. He contrasted this with the present deplorable state of affairs; the wealth and property of the Khalsa embezzled by the present rulers, the treasuries exhausted, and the consequent imminent inability to pay the troops. He enhanced these arguments by making lavish presents to the deputation, to evince his gratitude and admiration. At length, after much argument, on February 28, the Raja consented to certain terms, and, as an earnest of sincerity, agreed to hand over to Sardar Fatteh Singh and Wazir Bachna four lakhs of rupees. The money was duly paid, and they with their escort departed. Just outside Jammu a party in ambush fired on them. Fatteh Singh and the Wazir were killed, many others were wounded, and the treasure was recaptured.

In spite of Gulab Singh's protestations of innocence and grief, the army was incensed at the deception practised, and all his skill was required to avert the dangers by which he was surrounded. How he managed this will in due course appear;

[4] The full name and title appear to be Sardar Fatteh Singh, Mān, of Mānanwālā. The village Mānanwālā is said to have been destroyed about the year 1720. (Griffin's *Punjab Chiefs*, p. 177.)

[5] The Sikhs had murdered his brother and nephew, and his son was killed along with Kunwar Nao Nihal Singh.

meanwhile Sir Charles Napier thus described the expedition against the Bugtis which has already been mentioned.

Deyrah: February 24, 1845.

My dear Sir,—I have yours of the 11th instant. The Mooltan authorities are behaving apparently very fairly. The hill Mazarees are the people I referred to; but I have reason to think that his Highness Ali Morad did them injustice in accusing them of honesty and humanity towards brother robbers.

They have sent to me all assurances to the contrary, and I incline to think that they would take great pleasure in a little pleasant practice upon any property he[6] took with him, and feel no weakness or sentimental tenderness as to his throat. Where he is I am unable to discover. I nearly came upon him on the 20th. We took a quantity of baggage and grain to the value of some thousand rupees, which he had not time to load.

I have now formed a cordon from this to the Mazaree boundary. The Murrees have sent to say they are coming to make their salaam, and I have offered them this fine country, which is now in our possession. This plain is quite beautiful, and has a fine stream of pure water running through it. Every part might be a rich garden. Yet, with the exception of a few patches round the fortress, there is no sign of cultivation. [It is] a regular den of robbers. You cannot enter this superb valley but through such passes as I never saw before. Why they let me in I know not, but *here I am*, and *hold the pass to get out again too*, or I should not feel satisfied, I assure you.

I think you will ere this have received my letter to say that I had given up coming to Deyrah from the river, for fear of any collision or inconvenience to the General Government. However, had I done so, the total destruction of these tribes would have been accomplished a full month ago. We have pretty well done for them as it is!

Believe me &c.

C. J. NAPIER.

Major Broadfoot had written in February to congratulate Havelock on the birth of a daughter, and appears to have apologised for not giving him Lahore news because that was treated as confidential. Havelock, who was then with Sir H. Gough, replied as follows:

[6] 'He' probably refers to Beja Khan, already mentioned in Sir C. N.'s previous letters as the leader of the Bugtis.

Headquarters Camp: March 1, 1845.

My dear Broadfoot,—Your welcome letter of the 13th ult. was long on the road, and longer still has been my delay in answering it. Many thanks for your kind congratulations on the birth of my youngest daughter.

. . . . . .

I have as perfectly apprehended as if you had before written it, the impossibility of your giving me any details of the result of your observation of affairs beyond the Sutlej. I only wish the Government always to be served in the same spirit of honourable reserve by its political servants, and that all my friends, when they think of me, may be guided by the same principle of duty in the first place. But I venture to hope that you will visit Simla soon, and that we shall be able to enjoy long chats *de omnibus rebus et quibusdam aliis*, without any rub to the conscience of either. This, I trust, is not so distant an expectation as that of my excellent master when he said to the Chinese mandarin, 'Sir, if either business or pleasure shall ever bring you to the county of Limerick, I hope we shall renew our acquaintance at my country seat at Rathronan.'

I am glad the fellow Duriya Khan has been *chupao-ed*.[7] I recollect my old Mooftee giving me a description of him at Jellalabad. He enlarged much on his Afghan virtues of liberality, courage, and hospitality, and wound up with: 'Oh! he is a noble fellow. I have seen the man. He wears armour, and is a regular hero; and he plunders everybody.'

The late feat of a surprise so sudden and bold appears to justify Lawrence's character of Tej Singh the Governor, who told me he was one of the best of the remaining Sikh Sirdars. When I referred to Ventura, however, for his character, the Frenchman shrugged his shoulders, and said, 'C'est un animal!' Lawrence, I suppose, was right.

I am pleased to hear that my old friends of the Sappers remember me. I am writing at the table which one of them made for me, and which I always regard on that account as a piece of furniture beyond price; and thereon lies the writing desk, which was taken out of Akbar's tent, on the morning in which they carried his encampment with me. You must care for them[8] certainly; but I trust, my good friend, that neither the duties of chieftainship, nor any other thing,

[7] *Chapão*, a sudden attack, a surprise.

[8] Certain Afghans are referred to, who were in Broadfoot's Sappers, and who, on the incorporation of that regiment with the Bengal Sappers and Miners, refused to leave their leader. They were known as Broadfoot's bodyguard, and were with him to the last.

will make you forget the expediency of providing for the future whilst you hold your present good appointment.

Sir Robert [9] came to us three or four days ago, looking as well as ever after a fatiguing dāk journey; and desires me to send you his sincere regards.

I am glad you think well of the Lieutenant-Governor, or rather of Thomason; for I knew him as a boy in his father's house at Calcutta in 1823, and augured well of him there. A disappointment in such cases is painful; and therefore I triumph in his honest success in after life, as I do in that of Talfourd the lawyer, Sir W. Norris, Hare the archdeacon, and Connop Thirlwall, now a bishop; because I witnessed the first steps of the career of all and each, and thought that they were good. Of soldiers whom I knew when young, old Harry Smith is the only one who has come nearly up to the mark of my expectations.

You are quite right; in public affairs, as in matters eternal, the path of popularity is the broad way, and that of duty the straight [1] gate, and 'few there be that enter thereby.' I shall have been half a century in the world if I am spared another month, and end in opinion where I began. Principles alone are worth living for or striving for; and of all the animals, the most ill-judging, ungrateful, and opposed to their own true interests, are men, that is mankind. Of that race the best portion are the women, as those of the lords of the creation will ever confess whose hearts God has guided to a right choice from amongst them.

I had intended to mention something which Marshman wrote me about your Maulmain Government, all favourable; but I have exceeded due limits, and must stop. Hoping soon to write again, and to hear from you, I remain, ever &c.

H. HAVELOCK.

In the next letter, the only part that requires remark is that in which Lord Ellenborough alludes to Mr. Clerk being ready to go to the Punjab under certain circumstances. It will be shown hereafter that some such proposal was made, but was declined by the Governor-General.

London: March 7, 1845.

My dear Broadfoot,—Many thanks for your letter of January 17. It is a great comfort to me to know that you are on the frontier at this critical juncture. Sir Henry expresses his satisfaction with

[9] Sale, apparently.

[1] 'The practice of writing *straight* for *not crooked*, and *strait* for narrow, rests mainly on the dictum of Ainsworth, approved by Johnson. [N. Fr. *estroit*; Lat. strictus.]' Extract from *Johnson's Dictionary*, by Dr. R. G. Latham, vol. ii. part ii. p. 1067.

your proceedings in every letter, and his satisfaction is shared by Lord Ripon. Depend upon it, I am not forgetful of your wishes as to further brevet rank, and I know well how useful eventually to the service your advancement would be.

I hope another year will elapse before you are compelled to cross the Sutlej. You will be prepared by that time, and the lapse of time will make your work easier. I wish I could think that your advance would not ultimately become necessary.

In any case it is wise to confine ourselves to attempting one thing at a time, and we have now a larger force in Sawuntwaree than we had at Candahar, and the troops at Sukkur are not disposable for Mooltan.

I am very glad to hear that my new road from Delhi to Bahawulpoor was found practicable by the Bundelcund Legion.

In the event of your going into the Punjab, I know Mr. Clerk will be ready at once to proceed thither. He is entirely at Sir Henry's disposal for that service, notwithstanding his eventual succession to the Council, which he would readily throw over. Most of the Surdars he knew are, however, gone. I believe all who were at Ferozpore are now dead, except the Fakeer Azeezoodeen.

I hope you will take care of your health during the hot weather, for you cannot be spared. My best wishes will ever attend you.

Yours &c.

ELLENBOROUGH.

The events of the time are mentioned in the following letter from Sir Henry Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough: some of them have been already described; but though repetition would be avoided by partial omissions, yet on the whole it seems better to quote the letter in substantial integrity.

Calcutta: March 8, 1845.

My dear Lord Ellenborough,—About 35,000 men of the Sikh army are before Jummoo, having left about 15,000 infantry, and the greater portion of their artillery and cavalry, in the plains around Lahore and Umritsur.

The generals were ordered by the punchayets not to interfere with the negotiations which they had commenced on the part of the army with Raja Golab Singh. These delegates, selected from the ranks, exceeding 150 in number, were most humbly received by Golab Singh. He laid his sword and shield at their feet, and declared them, as the representatives of the army, to be his masters.

Both parties agreed in abusing the Ranee and her brother. He

(Golab Singh) contrasted the prosperity of the Sikh State when his family were employed, with the misgovernment of a debauched woman and a brutal brother, who had recently mutilated a Brahmin by cutting off his nose, ears, and hands for having obeyed Heera Singh's order to arrest him. He compared his loyalty, his services, and his gratitude with the wretched system carried on by the present rulers, who would shortly not have bread for the soldiery. He promised a gold ring 10*l.* in value to each punchayet, and a donation of 250,000*l.* for the army.

They applauded his discourse. Sweetmeats, and drink, and women were provided, and the delegates have been with him for a week. His own troops are kept distinct; and hating him as the hill tribes do for his severity and extortion, they are so exasperated by the rape of their women and the scandalous excesses now indulged in by the Sikh army, that their loyalty to Golab Singh is for the moment secured by their hatred of the Sikhs.

The result of the negotiations is reported to have been an offer to Golab Singh to take the office of Wuzzeer, which of course he has declined in favour of Peshora Singh, who has consented to accept it provided his demand of five or six heads be conceded, particularly that of the slave girl Mungla.

He would equally have insisted on the head of the little Maharaja, but some time ago I desired Broadfoot formally to declare to the Durbar that if he were deposed by violence we would not recognise his successor, and with some strong expressions against the army this declaration was conveyed to the Durbar, and, Broadfoot reports, has undoubtedly saved the boy's life for the present; the army having more than once declared their readiness to depose him in favour of Peshora Singh.

The latter has also agreed to the terms of giving 15 rs. a month to every infantry soldier.

The punchayets enlist men; and the army, which had been gradually reduced by Heera Singh, has been augmented by the Ranee and the punchayets by about 9,000 men. The finances must shortly fail by the profusions and extortions of all parties to drain the treasury, and the want of power in the Ranee to resist.[2] She meditates flight to our side the Sutlege, but is so weak, and has so many treacherous confidants, that her design is known, and, if intercepted, [she] will probably lose her life.

This is the state of things by the last accounts; but I think it not unlikely that the army, at the last moment having marched up

[2] The finances must shortly fail, because profusion, and extortion of high rates of pay for the soldiers, are draining the treasury, and the Rani is powerless to resist.

into the mountains, will not consent to march down again without receiving the donation or the plunder of Jummoo. They will not be so stupid as to be satisfied with words, and are so completely without restraint that I expect to hear they have captured Jummoo, which is not strong, and therefore in which place the wily Raja will not trust himself.

Our protected Sikh territory begins to feel the effects of what is passing on the other side. I have not been able to ascertain that any impression has been made on our sepoys. Broadfoot has this matter in hand. I dare not write on this subject to the Commander-in-Chief. . . .

We shall now begin to move up the additional regiments to Ferozpoor, Loodiana, and Umballa, the barracks &c. being nearly ready; and as the fords deepen, and the heat increases, these movements will cause no alarm; but quietly we shall get the troops into their proper places.

We shall have seven European regiments between Meerut and the river, and the eighth European regiment at Agra, with about seventy pieces of horse artillery and field batteries within the same distance, and if the necessity should arise, full 40,000 men for field service, and 100 guns. During the next six months we hope to get the whole of our affairs with the protected Sikhs into better order; and we must be quite certain of their temper before we leave them in our rear. This military democracy of the punchayet system is most dangerous; the point of endurance beyond which it cannot be tolerated has not arrived, and the trial of attempting to maintain a Sikh Government in power must run its course. I do not think that any administration or any military chief can regain ascendency over the army managed by the punchayets. A strong Sikh Government, from its position, its resources, and its *religion*, is a desideratum which, I fear, is unattainable;[3] and when the finances fail, this Sikh people, or in other words this Sikh army, will relapse into the rude state of their grandfathers, from which they only emerged fifty years ago, and to which they will have no objection to return.

But as regards the policy of this question, there can be no doubt that it is an easier, a simpler, and more decisive mode of dealing with them, to cripple and subdue them as an army rather than to do the same thing[4] against hordes of Pindaries &c.

Indian policy and European feeling will become each day more difficult to reconcile; but being pretty well prepared for any event

[3] Means apparently, the Government cannot be strong, because (1) it is controlled by panchayats; (2) financial failure is imminent; and (3) its religion is democratic.

[4] This word is doubtful in the original.

at this season of the year, we have only to wait the progress of events, and act accordingly.

Napier has, with his characteristic energy, done everything that could be performed in his late expedition. The capture of their flocks may make them more cautious in giving us offence. At the same time it is apparent that these Parthians of the desert cannot be caught or their atrocities punished; we shall probably be able to come to terms with them, and I am expecting to hear from him daily.

The Sawunt Warree expedition has given us more trouble than it ought. The forts are very strong, the ravines steep, and the jungles on their sides almost impracticable. Col. Outram volunteered his services when recalled from Colapoor: they were accepted. He was placed at the head of 1,000 men, and certainly the boldness, energy, and perseverance with which he conducted his operations are a marked contrast to the feebleness and folly of the other commanders of the columns ordered to co-operate with him.

Sir G. Arthur has therefore offered him Sattara; Col. Ovans, after his exposure at Punalla, having resigned. I see Napier is surprised and annoyed. He was thanked for storming the breach at Punalla. I refused to do so on the ground that, being in a political office, he had no right to expose his life; and the officers of the army, who had had all the fag of the siege, ought not to have rival Bayards when there was no military necessity for the display of his courage. I am at the end of my sheet.

Yours &c. H. HARDINGE.

The Sikh army, exasperated by the successful treachery of Gulab Singh, were encamped in the immediate neighbourhood of Jammu. That city, the capital of the Raja's dominions, and still the political capital of the Kashmir and Jammu state, is beautifully situated on the right bank of the river Tavi or Tawi, in the outermost range of the lower Himalaya. It mainly depends on the Tawi for water, and both town and fort, separated from each other by the river, are commanded by an adjacent height. Between the little river and the plains is a belt of thick wood, outside of which is the Tillu tank. The hill men held the town and the belt of wood; the Sikhs occupied the stony plains beyond, which in the month of March, and indeed generally, except during the wet season, are dry, and not agreeable as a camping ground.

Want of water made the Sikhs attack the hill men; after a stubbornly contested fight, which lasted eight hours, and in which the leader of the hill troops was slain, the defenders

were driven from the river, the tank, and the outer jungle. It only remained to seize a small fort which commanded the approach to Jammu, to make certain of the capture of the city. The garrison of this fort sent out men to negotiate its surrender. But, instead of completing their victory, the Sikh leaders returned to camp, leaving their troops to follow as they pleased. The latter, after resting from the fatigue of fighting, pillaged the neighbourhood, 'committing such atrocities that many women having lost caste threw themselves into wells, and others to avoid dishonour were destroyed by their fathers, husbands, or brothers.'

The hill men in the mean time reoccupied all the ground they had lost, except the tank and lower part of the river.

On the second night they attacked, with great vigour, the camp of Sardar Sham Singh, Atariwala, captured two guns, and were on the eve of complete victory, when that chief dismounted from his elephant, rallied his men, recovered the guns, and repulsed the hill troops with loss.

By degrees the discomforts of the situation, and the want of any material success, spread discouragement amongst the Sikhs; and made them, in consequence, more disposed to entertain Raja Gulab Singh's overtures for negotiation. The report of a doubtful battle between Ratnu, the Raja's wazir, and Sardar Ranjur Singh, confirmed this feeling; and the panchayats eagerly accepted the Raja's terms. It is unnecessary to consider them, for neither party had any intention of abiding by them, when inconvenient, or when they could be evaded.

The news of a reconciliation between the Sikh leaders and Raja Gulab Singh was very unwelcome to the Darbar at Lahore. The Rani and her brother feared the immediate return of the troops, from whose detested presence they had enjoyed temporary relief. Sardar Jawahir Singh at once sent to Raja Lal Singh, the commander of the Sikh army, an agent, who was entrusted with orders desiring the prompt abrogation of the treaty, the seizure and transmission to Lahore of Gulab Singh's hostages, and the capture of Jammu.

The hostages appealed to the panchayats, who, without hesitation, conducted them in safety to Jammu. Then the Sardar's message was debated. After a stormy discussion the messenger was desired to return to his master, to inform him that he was unfit to govern, and would be speedily removed

from office, when he would be at liberty and have leisure to capture Jammu himself. This message filled the Sardar with terror. The Sikhs retired about five miles from the town, and their leaders met Gulab Singh, halfway between the two armies, in a garden near the Tillu tank, to arrange matters.

The Raja, with his hands folded and a sheet thrown over his neck as a suppliant, stood before the chiefs and professed sorrow for his offences, leaving punishment or forgiveness in their hands. They assured him that he had committed no offence, and after exchanging presents and conversing as friends for above an hour, they separated.

By the time the leaders had returned to the army, a change had come over the spirit of that unruly body. When told that peace had been concluded, and that they must return to Lahore, they answered 'that anyone who chose might go, but that they would not stir,' a decision which caused as great dismay in Jammu as their reported return had caused in Lahore.

But if there was dismay in Jammu, it was not felt by the Raja to such an extent as to paralyse his energy. The day after the interview he arrived in the Sikh camp with but a slender escort. The boldness of the step commanded the admiration of the troops, who, for a moment, saw in him the only possible reformer of the Lahore Government.

'At the Durbar the news caused terror, suspending even the drunkenness and buffoonery of the Holee,[5] which Sardar Jowahir Singh had carried to an excess unknown before,' and offensive to a court not remarkable for decency. But the army was very fickle; the news of some slight success gained by Sardar Ranjur Singh banished the favourable impression made by Gulab Singh, and he became virtually a prisoner in their hands. His position was extremely critical, and such as to demand the exercise of all his skill and resource.

Whilst the Punjab was in this disturbed state, Broadfoot endeavoured to prevent disorder from seriously affecting the protected states. In a letter to Lord Ellenborough, dated Zira, March 19, 1845, he wrote:

[5] *Holi*, the spring festival or carnival, in honour of Krishna and the milkmaids, the most noticeable feature being the sprinkling of a red powder over spectators, and singing obscene songs. See Yule's *Glossary*, p. 323.

I have been for some time trying to restore something like order in this part of the country, and not, I hope, entirely without success; but confusion in the Punjab will always prevent entire tranquillity on our side of the river.

Sir Charles Napier is showing the Belochees how little formidable they and their hills are to our troops when rightly led. He has been very successful, at which I rejoice on every account. It will tend greatly to tranquillise upper Sindh.

On this frontier all your plans are carried out, and with perfect success, hitherto and prospectively. If I cannot help wishing you had been here to guide the execution, it is not from any want of kindness towards me on the part of Sir Henry Hardinge, for that has been almost equal to your own. Nor has he adopted, as far as I can see, your policy in this quarter by halves: all his measures seem to me those which you would yourself have adopted under the circumstances.

The following extract is from a letter of the Governor-General to Lord Ellenborough:

Calcutta: March 22, 1845.

My dear Lord Ellenborough,—As I told you in my last note, so it has happened, that the negotiations having been closed by Golab Singh consenting to make the payments, the army sent Vakeels to receive the money; they received four lacs as an instalment, and a short distance from Jummoo were waylaid and deliberately murdered by Golab Singh's orders. The money was brought back to Jummoo.

The army then closed up, and some fighting has taken place, but with no important result; and if the Sikh army find the undertaking more difficult than they expected, they will probably again resort to negotiation, each party, by fraud and crime, trying to betray the other.

At Lahore everything goes on as usual. Gross debauchery and drunken brutality, in which Jowahir Singh killed one of his servants the other day. No prospect of any successor of Runjeet Singh's energy and mind; and no hope of any government ever regaining the ascendency over this republican army, so admirably organised for successful mutiny and the indulgence of licentious crimes.

Broadfoot is doing good service. I am sorry to say —— was in ——'s hands; and I hear that my letter desiring it to be understood and pointed out to the Rajas, that your foreign policy was to be unchanged, never was communicated, and that this lieutenant has been taking a latitude and power which, if it be proved, will induce me to remove him immediately. He is a perfect Sikh; but the

major will soon put our affairs to rights; and, in an opposite quarter, I have the pleasure to report that Durand continues to give full satisfaction and is very happy.

H. HARDINGE.

About the very time that the preceding letter was written, there occurred the first serious violation of our frontier. It was serious, not from the strength of the party which crossed the Sutlej without leave, but from the fact that it was a deliberate attempt to ascertain whether we were in earnest as regarded recent warnings addressed to the Darbar.

Broadfoot was in camp at Zira, a considerable place on the old road from Ludhiana to Firozpur, when the news reached him that a party of Sikh cavalry had crossed the river and taken up a position at Talwandi, a village near Harike patan[6] and not far from Sobraon, where the great battle was afterwards fought.

He sent off at once to ascertain the strength and position of the party; summoned the Vakil, who being in total ignorance of the matter could give no explanation; and informed the officer commanding H.M.'s 62nd Regiment, then in camp at Kot Isa Khan, distant about sixteen miles.

At midnight, having heard that the party consisted of about 200 horsemen of the Lahore army, and two officers, Broadfoot sent the Vakil to them to cause their return, and told him that unless news of their departure by daybreak was received, he would move his camp to the spot, and recommended that all should be settled before he arrived.

In the morning no news came, and the detachment which formed the Agent's escort marched; just as Broadfoot was about to join them, one of the Sikh party came and showed him an order from Sardar Hira Singh,[7] brother of the Rani, directing the keeper of the ferry to pass the party across the Sutlej.

He said that their destination was Kot Kapoora; but he professed readiness to return if I demanded it.

I directed him to inform those who had sent him, that warning

[6] Harike (Hureeke), ferry or ford. It is situated where the road from Amritsar to Zira, Dharmkot, and Ludhiana crosses the Sutlej a little below its junction with the Beas.

[7] Not to be confounded with Raja Hira Singh, the often mentioned Wazir.

having long since been given that armed parties crossing the river without permission would be destroyed, I recommended them to settle with the zemindars,[8] and recross before the detachment arrived; and I warned them that they would not be allowed to cross till compensation was made for the plunder of the evening.

When Broadfoot arrived at the village, he found the party gone, and no compensation paid. He therefore followed at once with the irregular horse of the escort, and at the river was met by the Vakil, who was profuse in excuses in order to give the party time to escape.

I therefore pushed on to the water's edge, where the sowars[9] were hastening their embarkation: it would have been easy to destroy or capture the whole party; but on coming near them I perceived that they were of the best description of Ghorcharra,[1] and therefore in all probability sent, as they said, by the Darbar, or rather by that portion of it which does not favour the English alliance. It seemed desirable, therefore, to do no more than was necessary to convince the Darbar that if they sent their troops across the frontier without leave, they put them into the position of criminals whose release was a matter of clemency.

In and near one boat were the leaders. This party I desired to give themselves up, and, on their refusal, warned them that they would be destroyed if they resisted. As they would not surrender, I ordered our cavalry to seize and disarm them, without using force unless resistance were made. The order was executed promptly, and with as little confusion and violence as can in such cases be expected. I heard only one shot, which I believe was fired by mistake, and it is doubtful whether it took effect.

Having secured the leaders, I directed the rest of the party to be suffered to recross unmolested, and carried the prisoners immediately to the neighbouring village.

In the evening the villagers attended, and the damage done by the horsemen was assessed and paid. The horses and arms were then restored, and the prisoners were made over to the Vakil, who was instructed to pass them across the river.[2]

Their leader was Baba Bishan Singh, Bedi, who soon

[8] *Zamindár*, cultivator holding village lands.

[9] *Sowár*, horseman.

[1] *Ghorcharra*, irregular cavalry.

[2] From a memorandum kindly furnished by him, it appears that Mr. R. N. Cust, Personal Assistant to the Agent, was present on this occasion.

fraternised with the Agent, and frankly confessed that he knew their action was contrary to rule; but such was the state of the Darbar, that a man could only save himself from insult[3] by doing what he knew to be wrong. That Diwan Dinanath was the only wise man left; but, he said, 'amidst ten fools a single wise man becomes also foolish.' The Bedi repeatedly said, 'The men of this day do not know, that without peace and friendship with the English we cannot stand. They will force on a quarrel, and then what will they do? Others who are wiser, are forced to join and will perish with them, for we also are Khalsa.'

The Bedi was right, and the noble death at Sobraon of Sardar Sham Singh, forced by the taunts and jeers of the Rani to oppose the English, against his better judgment, is an apt illustration.

In reporting the occurrence just detailed, Broadfoot remarked that the forbearance shown would probably be misunderstood, and ascribed to any cause save the true one.

The Governor-General expressed entire approval of the Agent's proceedings. He was in some doubt as to the object of sending the party across without leave, and thought it might be in order to test our state of preparation to prevent crossing, or perhaps the result of an intrigue to compromise some party with the Government.

In reporting the matter for the information of the English Government, he remarked that 'Major Broadfoot behaved with great firmness and judgment in the matter,' and that all his proceedings on the occasion, and his letters to the Vakil and Darbar, were approved.

The Home Government concurred with the Government of India as to the propriety of the Agent's conduct. The act was held to be, on the part of the Darbar, an improper one, opposed to existing practice, and a striking example of the risk of collision which might at any moment arise on the south side of the river, as long as the Lahore Government was in such a state of anarchy and confusion. If the Governor-General considered that other incursions were likely to be made, he was authorised to notify to the Maharaja's Government that such acts could not be tolerated; that the anarchical

[3] The expression he used was ''izzat bachānā.'

state of his Government had long been a source of inconvenience and annoyance; that in consequence a large force had to be kept on the frontier; that those friendly relations to which so great value was attached, were endangered; and that to the good faith of the British Government and to its support, it was probable that Duleep Singh owed his position as Maharaja, if not his life; but that the British Government were bound to protect their own subjects and dependants, and could not suffer their interests to be imperilled by the incapacity of the Lahore Government to control its turbulent army.

The Governor-General was further authorised to administer the Maharaja's cis-Sutlej estates, and to forbid the Lahore authorities, civil or military, to cross the river for any purpose of administration whatever. It was considered that this measure, being under the circumstances one of strict necessity and self-defence, could be no act of hostility or aggression on our part.

When Broadfoot was appointed Agent, he wrote home for an extensive outfit, plate, china &c. &c., on a scale which proved he was in need of the warning addressed to him in Havelock's last letter, to provide now for the future. Though a strict economist as regarded Government money, he was careless, and by nature generous and extravagant, as regarded his own. He was aware of this, and his time was fully occupied with Government work, which is to some extent an excuse; in many of his private letters he alludes to the subject, always going to save money, but somehow never doing so. His ideas were large, and may partly be gathered from the following letter to his aunt, Miss Sutherland.

Camp, Zeera: April 4, 1845.

Your letter of February 7 and all the bills have just arrived; and on looking over the lists of all the fine things I feel like a little boy with a new coat. Seriously I have no doubt that everything will be exactly what I wanted, and I hope you will believe how greatly I am obliged to you.

The sum is large, and with freight, carriage &c. from Bombay, another 100*l.* will be added at least. Yet when they reach me they will be better in every way than I could have collected in this country for 1,000*l.* or 1,200*l.*, and they are not superfluities, but matters of necessity.

I believe I have told you that I receive here 1,000*l.* a year more

than I did in Maulmain; but here, as there, I am obliged to keep open house for all comers of a certain rank that choose, and all of the highest rank honour me, as a matter of course, with their company as guests. When the people are agreeable it is pleasant enough, and in every case it is as much what I am paid for as the work amidst which your letter finds me, and from which I take a moment to answer. There is far more company to be seen here than in Maulmain, but in many respects this is a cheaper country. In Maulmain it would have been difficult to save money; here, once I am set up, I hope to save the extra 1,000*l.* a year.

I wish you could come out and keep house for me; I should then have the advantage of a married man, shall I wickedly say, without being plagued with a wife? That would be profane, so I only say the advantage, which is that people do not consider the house of a married man a hotel, except in rare cases of men of the highest rank.

I have been much amused at seeing *frills*; where are they worn? round the neck like Queen Elizabeth, or the wrists like Queen Anne's courtiers, or on the breast as in the days of the Prince Regent and dandies? See what an antediluvian I shall be reckoned when I return; yet it seems but yesterday since I was among you.

I am encamped here waiting for the results of a struggle at Lahore for the government, which was possible yesterday and may happen to-day; and I believe here is an express from that land of uproar, which must make me close this. It is an express, but no actual fighting as yet.

Early in April the Agent wrote a long and exhaustive report on the old treaties and papers which contained information regarding the relations of the Protected States to the Government of India. He considered it to be established that the Lahore cis-Sutlej property was as much a protected State as any other, and that the Sutlej was, and always had been since the time of the Mahrattas, considered as the boundary between the countries under the Sikh and those under the Indian Governments.

It will be recollected that the Sikh army was on its way to Lahore from Jammu with Raja Gulab Singh, virtually a prisoner. He appears to have employed his time during the march in endeavouring by promises and presents to create a party favourable to his interests. The soldiers were divided in opinion as to whether he or Sardar Jawahir Singh should be supported. Against the latter were his drunkenness, in-

capacity, and the improbability of his being able to fulfil his promises. Against the former were the fear of being reduced to obedience, the belief in his implacable hatred of the whole Sikh sect on account of the murder of his relations, his avarice, and duplicity.

On April 7 the Raja was brought into Lahore as a prisoner, seated on an elephant, with his face covered with a cloth to conceal him from the soldiers who crowded to see him. He was lodged in Kunwar Nao Nihal Singh's house, and a guard was placed to prevent him from escaping or committing suicide.

During April, Broadfoot marched about the districts, held the sessions, and tried local cases. In Capt. P. Nicolson's diary, the Agent's arrival at Firozpur on Saturday, April 12, is recorded. He is said by Nicolson to have aided him 'in screwing justice out of Mandot,[4] Faridkot, and other States, and did much good. He left again on Friday, the 18th, seemingly better satisfied with, and having more confidence in me, than he started with as his stock-in-trade on setting up in this quarter.'

The following letter to Lord Ellenborough shows a trait in Broadfoot's character too often wanting where it should be found; namely, a generous appreciation of assistance rendered to him, and an endeavour to procure its recognition by higher authority.

Loodeeana: April 21, 1845.

My Lord,—I am about to take a liberty, which, even with your Lordship, I almost fear may be thought too great; yet, as it is done solely on public grounds, I hope it will be forgiven.

By a letter from Capt. Wm. Smith, lately in command of the 'Siren,' I gather that he has not, as he hoped, been promoted on hauling down his pennant; he does not mention it, and hence I conclude he has been disappointed. Now, I feel sure that had your Lordship remained with us till he went home, some such expression of your opinion of his services would have been given as would have secured him his posting. This, I know, was also Capt. Smith's own feeling, for when he returned from Calcutta after just seeing your Lordship there, he plainly felt, like the rest of us, that he was at length working under the eyes of a master who would not leave exertion unnoticed, and he worked accordingly.

You may remember that when I was first sent to Tenasserim, a river flotilla had to be reformed under discouraging circumstances; that it was reformed with success, and that we were therein much

[4] Pronounced Mamdôt or Mumdote.

indebted to the zealous and active co-operation of Capt. Smith, whose local experience made his professional skill of double value. As I was then in charge of those provinces, it seems my duty to mention this to you, not with a request that you will adopt any specific measure; I know well that a thousand things may exist to make it difficult for you to move in such a matter, but I mention it because I know, if opportunity offers, you will see justice done, for justice it is. Smith is distinguished in the navy from his many namesakes as 'Yardarm' Smith, that being the channel by which he boarded the 'Chesapeake' under Capt. Broke. He took home the flag and got his lieutenancy. In the Burmese war he got his commandership for commanding the light division of gunboats which accompanied the army from Pegu; and it was expected that at the peace he would have been posted, but by some accident he was omitted, and he remains a commander. He fully expected his step on returning, and I grieve to find he does not say he has got it. I am sure I shall be forgiven for mentioning it, making no request, and not intimating to Capt. Smith that I have done so.

At Lahore, singular uncertainty prevails as to the future, that is among the actors themselves. Rajah Goolab Singh was, up to yesterday morning, still a prisoner, though he had been presented at the Durbar. Sometimes the troops spoke of making him minister, sometimes of allowing the Durbar to extract money from him by torture.

The brother and the lover of the Ranee head rival factions of the chiefs, and attend Durbar in arms. Anywhere else a convulsion must have long since happened; but all are so entirely at the mercy of the soldiery, that a movement among the latter causes all differences among the chiefs to be forgotten in the common fear.

An attempt was lately made to assert by force the right of sending troops across the Sutlege from the Punjab without leave. Foreseeing this, I had, with the approbation of the Governor-General, formally warned them of the consequences, and strengthened my escort. They sent over 200 horse as an advanced party one evening lately, and the following morning they were turned out after putting[5] the commandant into confinement, till he restored his plunder. I then called on the Durbar for explanation, and, after much debating, some bluster, and many artifices, a full apology and promise of good behaviour for the future are before me for transmission to Government.

There are, however, many embarrassing circumstances attending their cis-Sutlege territory. I have got over a good many of them

[5] Means 'after I had put' &c.

for the moment, but I see little prospect of any permanent arrangement of a satisfactory kind in the present state of the court and army of Lahore. Believe me &c.

G. BROADFOOT.

In writing to his sister,[6] who appears to have seen some paragraphs in a paper abusing his Tenasserim administration, Broadfoot remarked:

You mistook me in thinking I was restrained from newspaper writing by being Commissioner; it is by being in the Company's service; and while I am so, I must, like other public men in India, be abused by those who choose to do so, without power of defence. It is unpleasant, but cannot be helped.

I have no author brother at home, like my neighbour Sir C. Napier, to defend me when I cannot defend myself; and if I had, I doubt if I would enter into controversy. My time and temper would be expended on every unscrupulous rogue my duty makes me an impediment to in his crooked progress. On the whole, I believe the best plan is to hold on my way, and let them pelt on.

In my present situation I may and probably shall be abused, but I cannot help it. It may do me mischief, but nothing like what I fear the mere fact of my being a soldier and not a civil servant will do. So much for the press.

When the Agent's demand for explanation of the recent violation of the frontier, and his consequent action, were made known in Darbar, the generals and others present were very angry; they predicted that he would change his tone when the troops returned from Jammu, and recommended that the reply be deferred till then. Meantime they referred the Agent's letter to Fakir Azizuddin and Bhai Ram Singh, who declared its contents to be in conformity with justice and with existing treaties, and they advised unqualified submission. This advice was not followed, and a reply appears to have been sent couched in language very different from the usual style.

The increasing probability of ultimate rupture with the Sikhs, occasioned by some act of violence on their part, brought the question of our relations with the protected Sikh states into prominence. The Agent remarked that from Ochterlony's[7] time to the Kabul disasters the protected chiefs were governed

[6] Letter dated April 21, 1845.

[7] Major-Gen. Sir David Ochterlony, Bart., G.C.B. A name greatly respected in the Punjab. He was

with a firm hand; those disasters shook the belief in our invincibility, and the chiefs began to think that their relative position with us was changed. Other events, discussion in the press regarding them, and a spirit of concession from timidity which they thought they saw in our dealings with themselves and with Lahore, strengthened the impression. Disorder at Lahore removed all fear from that quarter, and the British power was regarded rather as an irksome restraint than a welcome protection. There were also embarrassments which attended the double allegiance of certain chiefs, likely to become more serious as disorder in the Punjab increased; and the complication was not lessened by the position of the Maharaja himself—an independent sovereign on one side of the river, a subject on the other.

In Lahore, Raja Lal Singh and Sardar Jawahir Singh, forgetting that Gulab Singh was a prisoner in the hands of the army, and that consequently they had no power over him, ordered him to appear at their Darbar. Gulab Singh, with great readiness, turned the circumstance to immediate account; he told the messenger that he could give no answer, and sending for the guard placed over him, explained what had happened; 'and begged, as he was the servant of the army and not of the Darbar, that the panchayats of the troops would instruct him what answer to give.' The panchayats rebuked the Darbar and declared Gulab Singh to be the chief personage, after the Maharaja, in the State; they further said that, as far as Sardar Jawahir Singh was concerned, he need not attend the Darbar, but that he should wait on the Maharaja and Rani at their convenience. It is said that on promising to pay 27,00,000 rs. (which at par is 270,000*l.*) Gulab Singh was formally set at liberty.

appointed to the E.I.C.S. in 1777, and served in the war with Haidar Alí, 1781. He was wounded and taken prisoner at Cuddalore, 1783, when the French regiments were repulsed by the 24th N.I. He next served throughout the Marátha war, 1803, and was afterwards appointed Resident at the Court of Delhi. In 1804 he defended that city against Holkar's army, till relieved by Lord Lake. In 1808 he commanded against Ranjít Singh in the cis-Sutlej states, and in 1809 occupied Ludhiána as Political Agent.

His services in the Nepál war (1814–16) were very eminent, and greatly conduced to its successful issue; for these he was created a baronet, received a pension of 1,000*l.* a year, and was made G.C.B.

In 1822 he was Resident in Málwá and Rájputána, and he died in 1825.

In the following letter from Lord Ellenborough two points will be noticed: first, that if war should break out he trusted the command of our forces would be given to Sir C. Napier; and second, the advice he gave Broadfoot as to preparation and attention to detail.

London: May 7, 1845.

My dear Broadfoot,—A great many thanks for your letter of March 19, which I received to-day. Our friends on the other side of the Sutlej have been doing apparently all we could desire, or nearly so; but still, I fear, they will be alarmed by the close neighbourhood of so many of our troops, and make up their quarrels if they can. The movement of the body guard is portentous, and it was unnecessary.

I do not think your force safely placed if there were reason to apprehend an attack from Lahore well directed; but an attack is become very improbable. I do trust Sir C. Napier will be brought up to you if there should be a forward movement at any time. How beautifully he has managed the campaign in the hills!

I conclude you have ascertained what force the several protected Sikh states can really furnish, and made, in your own mind, arrangements for the safety of the communications of the army from the Sutlej to the Jumna, in the event of a forward movement. Sir C. Napier is very anxious to have established a regular baggage train. I had intended to have this. If you do not turn over in your mind *all* the detail, depend upon it no one will. You are the only person on the frontier to whom the Governor-General can safely look; and you should not hesitate to give him your opinion upon all points of service. I trust your health is re-established.

Yours &c.

ELLENBOROUGH.

In May, Broadfoot went up to Simla; his health had suffered much from anxiety and overwork, and at Lahore matters were quieter than they had been.

The house he took was called 'The Crags;' it is well situated on Jacko, the highest of the Simla hills, and from it there is a most magnificent view of the snowy range. Here he remained during the summer and early autumn, with a house full of guests. He was treated for congestion of the liver by Dr. John Campbell Brown, but did not cease from work. Naturally, Havelock was much at the house, as were Edward Lake and Herbert Edwardes, who lived in the smaller house

just below, and who both owed to Broadfoot their selection for civil employment. Lake became one of his Assistants; Edwardes was not appointed till after the first Sikh war, as there was no vacancy before. Mr. R. N. Cust, who was Broadfoot's Personal Assistant and lived in the house with him, has remarked: 'Nain Sukh, the faithful servant, was major-domo; all his friends and guests are dead except Saunders Abbott and me.'[8]

The news from Lahore towards the end of May is interesting to a student of Asiatic methods of intrigue. The Rani, having apparently begun to tire of Raja Lal Singh, appeared disposed to favour her brother Sardar Jawahir Singh's pretensions to guide the policy of the State. Raja Gulab Singh sided first with one, and then with the other; on which Lal Singh, becoming discontented, absented himself from Darbar for some days, and held meetings in his own house with others who were similarly dissatisfied. Gulab Singh availed himself of this defection with much adroitness, and turned the circumstance to his own account.

About the same time there was a severe outbreak of cholera in the Punjab, and it spread by degrees to our provinces. It is open to question whether we are now much better informed as to the nature of this disease, or more able to treat it successfully, than we were then. The Governor-General, in expressing his anxiety lest it might spread, based his hope for its arrest on 'atmospheric influences which seem, under Providence, to affect this mysterious disease.'

One result of the outbreak was to do that which the Darbar could not effect; namely, to restrain the turbulence of the army. As a native correspondent graphically described it to Broadfoot, 'the soldiers have become as sheep, and the fear of God is before their eyes; on account of the cholera they now commit no violence.'

The Darbar wished to destroy Peshora Singh, and went as a body to the troops to make the proposal. The panchayats told them that the matter was one for the Khalsa to deal with, and wholly beyond their province. Jawahir Singh,

[8] Memorandum by Mr. Cust. Most of the guests are now (1887) dead, but not all; Sir J. C. Brown, for example. Col. H. Yule, C.B., also was an occasional guest, and there may be others.

anxious for the measure, entreated, argued, and expostulated; but in vain. They said that they would be treated as infamous for the murder; as Court's brigade, known as the Gurumar, were for slaying Baba Bir Singh, the punishment for which was now manifest in the special severity of their losses from cholera.

CHAPTER XIII.

1845.

Sir H. Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough: Punjab news—Complimentary letter from the Governor-General—Governor-General's presence on the Frontier—Letter to Sir H. Hardinge: review of the situation—Sir H. Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough—Disorganisation in Lahore—Precautionary arrangements—Sikh warlike preparations—Peshora Singh seizes Attock—Disturbance at Anandpur Makhowal—Mr. Clerk's memorandum referred to Agent—His reply—Sir H. Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough—Forbearance carried to the verge of danger—Gulab Singh's proposals: rejected.

THE following extract from Sir H. Hardinge's letter to Lord Ellenborough contains an epitome of Punjab news up to the end of May. It will be observed that Sir Henry then seemed to consider Gulab Singh as concerned in the murder of his nephew Hira Singh; and his conduct at the Darbar appeared to justify this view. Yet it must be recollected that such a scene in an Oriental Court would not, unsupported by other and much more trustworthy evidence than letters, be held to establish the charge.

If it were shown, for example, that Hira Singh had been seriously plotting to murder or plunder Gulab Singh; or that he was in any way more a hindrance than an advantage to his uncle's schemes, and at all likely to be dangerous; then Gulab Singh would have compassed his destruction without remorse.

In the absence of a strong motive of this kind, it may perhaps be safe not to assume his participation in the crime.

Amongst the papers describing the events of the time, in allusion to the accusation by the Rani, there is a note by Broadfoot to the effect that he considered there was no truth in it. The news brought one day might favour the presumption of the Raja's innocence, whilst that of the next day might appear conclusive of his guilt.

Calcutta: June 3, 1845.

My dear Lord Ellenborough,—At Lahore, Jowahir Singh, the drunkard, has been proclaimed Wuzzeer; Golab Singh in alliance with him, and against his rival, Lal Singh. The Ranee has recently taken a younger lover into favour; and the army and the Khalsa, not choosing to be governed by a Rajpoot whom they fear, have preferred the brutal Sirdar to the able Rajpoot; but he, Golab Singh, is steeped in crime. The other day, in Durbar, the Ranee told him to his face that he had advised the death of his nephew, Heera Singh. He wished to qualify the statement, when she stopped him by saying, 'I have the correspondence, and will produce it if you deny the fact.' He at once gave in.

The fords are impassable, and these intrigues will be confined to the Punjab. The brigades from Peshawur and Cashmeer have marched on Lahore, stating that they have not been relieved in their proper turn; and the troops at Lahore seem disposed to adopt two different parties; the majority [support] Maharaja Duleep Singh, and the smaller portion Peshora Singh, against whom a brigade was about to advance, but would not move without money. It appears by Broadfoot's reports to be true, that at one moment the plan of the Ranee was to have urged the troops to move against the English, to force our interference, to disavow the act of the troops, and to trust that we should restore their Government, after we had destroyed their army, on the basis of Lord Auckland's subsidiary arrangement of 1841.

. . . . . .

H. HARDINGE.

From Capt. Nicolson's diary it appears that cholera crossed the river, and appeared in the town of Firozpur, on June 5.

On the 7th it is recorded that Broadfoot had a bad fall from his horse. This would very probably complicate the illness from which he was suffering. Yet, though he does not appear to have written much officially at this time, he was in constant private correspondence with Mr. Currie, the Foreign Secretary; extracts from his letters have been published in the papers presented to Parliament. They are mainly illustrative of the riot and debauchery which prevailed at the Lahore Darbar, the details of which are unfit for publication.

When Sir Henry Hardinge heard of Broadfoot's fall from his horse, he wrote the following letter. It is valuable as showing the estimation in which Broadfoot's services were

held by the person best qualified to judge of them; and also as a record of Sir Henry's great kindness. The receipt of such a letter at such a time was probably more likely to contribute to recovery, than were the numerous leeches which were applied, and which no doubt performed their duty to their own satisfaction.

(Private.) Calcutta: June 14, 1845.

My dear Broadfoot,—I have just now your note of the 4th, giving an account of your fall. I shall be on the stretch of anxiety till I hear from you.

The fact is, I could not replace you. You have shown on every occasion since your appointment great energy and promptitude of decision; a true and steady judgment; ready and effective with your pen; and with such singleness of purpose and thorough sense of duty, that I feel I can rely upon a man who, come what may, at any time and in any position, makes his sense of duty his ruling principle.

The able manner in which you have conducted yourself is recognised at home as well as here; and I am confident you will acquire as much reputation by your success in preventing a rupture, as if you were under more stirring times on the other side the Punjab.

I waited till your first political campaign was over to express my satisfaction; and I now cordially inform you that you have surpassed my expectation. Pray take care of yourself.

Every despatch from England inculcates a pacific policy; and we must show that military men in the conduct of affairs usually transacted by civil officers, on which peace or war hangs by a slender thread, can be trusted for their prudence as safely as those who, in the event of war, would have no military reputation to gratify.

A strong Sikh Government as our advanced guard, occupying the five rivers between the Sutlege and the Indus, is a sound military and political arrangement. The advantage is evident, and British India, already overgrown, requires no addition by the appropriation of territory so long possessed by an ally whose interests have always been opposed to those of the British Government's enemies.

But if the indispensable condition of our forbearance be a Sikh Government; and if that, after a patient trial, be an impossibility, then the question resolves itself into a very narrow compass.

If the ruling power in the Punjab cannot be Sikh, it must not be Mahommedan—in fact it must be Sikh or British.

The more we exercise our power to maintain peace—if the last

alternative be war—the more honourably we shall stand justified in the judgment of our countrymen, by the proof that we have omitted no pains to prevent our ally's catastrophe.

Currie is unwell from a bilious attack. Again, pray take care of yourself. Yours &c.

H. HARDINGE.

The Governor-General had felt for some time that the rapidity with which the scenes changed at Lahore, and the gravity of the issues involved, rendered his presence on the frontier desirable. He therefore, on June 16, drew out a minute for the consideration of his Council; in this, after reference to the pacific policy which had been followed in spite of inconvenience and risk, he pointed out the danger enhanced by his absence from the frontier, and consequent incapacity to issue orders with sufficient promptitude.

It appeared to him, 'therefore, to be expedient, as a means of averting risk, and of carrying our policy more securely into effect, that the Governor-General should, in the month of October next, proceed to the Upper Provinces,'[1] a proposal in which the Council concurred.

In a letter home, dated June 23, Broadfoot thus described the fall from his horse already mentioned.

In case the newspapers should copy from the Indian papers any accounts of an accident which lately befell me, I may mention that a horse lately fell with and on me. It was a bad fall, but I am recovering, or indeed recovered, from the worst effects of it.

Otherwise I get on well. The work is very hard, and the responsibility great; but I have the satisfaction of finding Sir H. Hardinge's government as kind as Lord Ellenborough's. Now, as I write I have received a letter from Sir Henry, so kind that but for its being marked private, I would have sent it to you, knowing the pleasure it would give you. He tells me the authorities in England are also pleased.

Broadfoot had apparently recommended some of his Assistants for promotion and increase of pay; it was as much part of his nature to recognise and express his obligation for able assistance and good work, as to condemn unsparingly idleness or incapacity. Conduct which he considered to be in any way mean or contemptible, he could scarcely forgive.

[1] *Papers &c.* printed February 26, 1846, p. 1.

Mr. Currie wrote on the subject as follows:

June 28, 1845.

Sir H. Hardinge has every disposition to increase Mill's salary, and I think it will be done; but we must try and keep all according to rule. I have written to-day to Thomason about Abbott, and when I get his answer I will write to you again.

Cust will have to wait a little while, I suspect; I have sent to the Bengal Government for a note of the salaries of his contemporaries. Sir H. Hardinge is personally very well disposed to do anything for Cust, but the Council did not seem favourable yesterday to an immediate increase to his allowances. He will, in the end —I mean in the course of a very few years, which I sincerely hope will not be the end of his career—give all his contemporaries the go-by.[2]

On the same date Broadfoot wrote to Mr. Hardinge, the Governor-General's private secretary, to say that he would reply to the very kind letter of the 14th as soon as he possibly could; and asked him to explain, in case of delay, that it was caused by the necessity for investigating and remedying disorders of some standing, which were now becoming serious 'at Anundpore Makhowal, on the Upper Sutlege, a sort of Holy City, where our relations with Lahore are ill settled and very unsatisfactory. They are fighting among themselves,' and every Sikh from the Jumna to the Jhelum is becoming excited about it, so it must be stopped at once.'

I have nearly recovered from the outward effects of the fall I had; the inward effects are also gone, except the worst, that of the head;

[2] Mr. Robert Needham Cust, late B.C.S., LL.D. &c., son of the Hon. and Rev. H. C. Cust, Canon of Windsor, was educated at Eton and Haileybury. He went out to India in 1843 and returned in 1867, during which period he held, to the public advantage, many most important appointments. He first greatly distinguished himself as a linguist in Calcutta; was appointed Assistant Agent to the Governor-General, North-West Frontier, 1844; Under-Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, 1846; Deputy Commissioner, Hoshiarpur, 1846; Ambála, 1849; Joint Magistrate of Benares, 1852; Commissioner of Lahore, 1858; Financial Commissioner, Punjab, 1861; Judicial Commissioner, 1862; Member of the Viceroy's Legislative Council, 1864; Acting Secretary to Government of India in the Home Department, 1865; and in the same year was appointed Member of the Board of Revenue, North-West Provinces. For his services during the first Sikh war he was twice mentioned by the Governor-General; see despatch to the Secret Committee, dated December 31, 1845, and General Order, dated February 14, 1846. *Papers &c.* pp. 28 and 74.

but that is daily diminishing, and will, I hope, soon disappear. I am not, however, quite out of the wood yet.

Cholera, I grieve to say, has reached Loodeeana. It is very bad in our Malwa.[3] All we can do is done, and the Agra Government is helping manfully. I hope the rains will stop it, for it has come in and been most violent with the heat, which has been unusually great.

That day Broadfoot wrote the following letter to the Governor-General:

Simla: June 29, 1845.

My dear Sir,—The rains of the last week and mistakes of the dawk have delayed the arrival of your letter of the 14th.

For its great kindness I am wholly unable to express my gratitude, and I shall not therefore make the attempt, trusting you will not on that account think that I feel it the less deeply. It will be an additional incentive to exertion on my part, and I only wish I could hope to make my future services more worthy than they have hitherto been, of the indulgence and encouragement with which you have received them.

I have recovered from the worst effects of the fall more rapidly and perfectly than the doctors predicted; and am in hopes that every trace of them will have disappeared by the cold season, especially if the state of affairs should allow me to remain in the hills a month or two after the rains.

If I may be excused the presumption of saying so, I entirely concur in your view of our relations with Lahore. A strong Sikh Government such as that of Runjeet Singh, truly independent, yet bound to us by community of interest and mutual confidence, is the best of all frontiers for us, towards the great ocean of Mahomedanism between India and Europe; but it must be Sikh and it must be strong, or we must be in the Punjab ourselves. I can see no safe middle course. Yet in former days I have heard two such middle courses indicated by men for whose opinions I have great respect—a Dogra Government, or a subsidiary Government controlled by the Governor-General's Agent as Envoy or Resident at Lahore. But no Dogra Government could stand unless supported by us or by the Mahomedans of the West and North. In the former case it would be virtually subsidiary, in the latter its sympathies and interests would be opposed to ours. In a subsidiary Government, again, we should have in reality ourselves to maintain the frontier now defended by the Sikhs, with the additional burden of a Government to uphold against its subjects, while we should not have the resources of the country to

[3] Malwa, the country between the Sutlej and Jumna is referred to. The term included the cis-Sutlej Protected States.

work with, and above all, instead of the strength arising from our good government, placed side by side with Mahomedan anarchy, we should appear as the authors and supporters of the most degrading and unpopular of all the forms of Asiatic misrule.

I do not say that circumstances may not arise forcing such a course on us as the least evil at the moment: what has been, may be again; but still it would, I think, be an evil, and one to be by every proper means avoided.

I wish I could say I see any good prospect of a strong Sikh Government being formed. The despatches, which I hope to forward this week, will show improvement, both in the internal state of the Punjab and in their relations with us, but it would be a delusion to say that I look for any such change as would restore the prosperity and security of both sides of the frontier, and render it safe to lay aside our present state of armed observation.

In Lahore there is little change worth reporting. A detachment sent against the widow of Soochet Singh has, it is believed, expelled her from her fort and property. She went towards Jummoo on the night of the 20th inst., but this will be referred to in an early official despatch.

Allow me, my dear sir, to repeat that I feel most sensibly all your kindness, and to subscribe myself,

Your most faithful and obedient servant,

G. BROADFOOT.

The next letter from which extracts are made, refers, as is shown by the date, to the Lahore news of June.

Calcutta: July 2, 1845.

My dear Lord Ellenborough, . . . As usual, I have to report that affairs are as unsettled as ever in the Punjab. Intrigues and dissensions amongst the chiefs, and amongst the troops the same mutinous success in controlling the Government. The punchayet system, by its well-organised power, founded upon the customs of the people in their villages, will endure longer than the Government, and offers so complete an obstacle to any amelioration in the state of the Government that it is hopeless to expect improvement.

The Ranee is profligate and promiscuous as ever in her amours, which in a late instance gave rise to the scandal of her being robbed of jewels to the value of a lac,[4] which the fortunate youth succeeded in escaping with. On the occasion of the reconciliation of her brother the drunkard with her friend Lal Singh, she marked her satisfaction by sending a slave girl to each, bidding them do honour

[4] A lākh of rupees is, at par, equal to 10,000*l*.

to her present! The Wuzzeer is frequently so drunk that he cannot attend the Durbar, and Golab Singh as a Rajpoot is so mistrusted by the Sikhs that his influence will never be equal to Heera Singh's, whose assassination it is now proved he had recommended.

We are to be pressed to relinquish the treasure at Ferozpoor; but Soochet Singh's widow will not give her consent, and no demand has yet been made.

The army under Matub[5] Singh was bribed to move to Sealkote against Peshora Singh, who had revived his pretensions to the Guddee.[6] After four assaults they took the town, Peshora Singh being shut up in the castle. The punchayets of the army at Lahore met on June 4 and prohibited the general or the troops from molesting Peshora Singh. He showed great personal courage, and is a favourite with the troops, who wish to preserve him to play him off against Duleep Singh. The general was obliged to obey, and to report to the punchayets that he had done so.

The next day (the 5th) the punchayets proceeded to the Durbar to remonstrate against so incapable and *profligate* a minister as Jowahir Singh. He was too drunk to appear, and after threatening the Ranee to substitute Peshora Singh for her son, they retired. These are the scenes which are of daily occurrence.

The cholera has destroyed about 5,000 of the Sikh army, and rather a larger proportion of the town of Lahore.[7] At Ferozpoor it has subsided in the town, where few cases of death had occurred. On June 20 it attacked the 62nd Queen's, and six men had died. The thermometer was then ranging from 98° to 105° in the officers' bungalows. However, the rains had begun to set in, and we trust our cantonments will escape. The native troops had not suffered.

I have made arrangements for going up the country the latter end of September. Maddock delighted to be President, and resident in the Government House. You know both A and B and C, and are well aware, when any great emergency arises, of the value of the aid I shall receive. In health I am better than last year, and the business, though very heavy, has become more familiar.

We have horsed 6 field batteries of 9-pounders with 130 horses instead of 90; and by means of elephants on the line of march, and horses or bullocks in action, we shall be able to convert the iron 12-pounders into field guns. Twenty-four pieces of heavy ordnance will be drawn by elephants, and we shall have 600 elephants beyond Agra before October, with very little additional expense; 50 at Barrackpore were really doing nothing, and so on at various

[5] Mahtáb Singh.

[6] *Gaddi*, a cushion, a seat, a throne.

[7] Amongst others attacked by this disease were Sardar Sham Singh, Atariwala, and Raja Lal Singh: both recovered.

stations. The whole of the cavalry and artillery are now complete in horses, with 700 spare horses from the Gulf taken from the Bombay and Madras remounts; we shall have 1,200 from the studs in reserve, and 1,000 from Australia; but these 2,200 horses can be of little use till the autumn of 1846. We have no difficulty in procuring supplies of grain, having always twenty days in advance at the frontier stations; and in the event of a forward movement, Lieut-Col. Parsons pledges himself that there shall be no deficiency. The roads have been repaired, and as far as preparations can go unattended with expense, we are in a very good state.

H. HARDINGE.

The plots and intrigues at Lahore continued in full force. Raja Lal Singh and Sardar Jawahir Singh arranged to assassinate Raja Gulab Singh; but the latter, suspicious of their design, discovered it by means of some of his most trusted followers, who, by his orders, pretended treachery and obtained admission to the plot. Next, Jawahir Singh found out that his sister the Rani had all but consented to his assassination in order that her lover, again in favour, might be made Wazir. The only gainer in all these transactions was Gulab Singh; he lost nothing, and the course of his counterplot, too long to be here detailed, whereby he ruined two bitter and formidable enemies by the agency of a third, was considered to raise his reputation for wisdom and good fortune, and to entitle him to the public confidence.

On their part the Sikhs were not idle regarding warlike preparations. The Agent reported that by the next cold weather their army would be, as regarded material, more efficient than it had been for years. He also stated that these preparations were 'undoubtedly made with reference to possible collision with us;' but at the same time the reports showed that the Darbar's suspicion of the British was somewhat allayed.

Soon, however, Jawahir Singh, whose animosity appeared to be inflamed by his intemperance, showed a disposition to quarrel. He encouraged the protected chiefs to oppose the Agent's efforts to preserve or restore tranquillity in disturbed districts. He accused the Vakils of treachery, and ordered the confiscation of their jagirs and their recall, without appointing successors.

The imminent danger with which this was fraught made even the Vakils' enemies and rivals join in entreating the Sardar to suspend the execution of his order; but before it could be carried into effect, another change occurred.

The troops which had recently arrived from Kashmir, Hazara, and Peshawar, combined to refuse their pay, and declined to avail themselves of leave to disperse to their homes. The Sardar, who was so drunk that the threats of the troops were disregarded, was sobered and plunged into terror by news which arrived that day.

'Peshora Singh, proceeding towards the Sutlej, and there depositing his family, went secretly across the Punjab to the Indus, and, on the night of July 14, came with seven followers to the gate of the fort of Attock.' On the wicket being opened he and his men, having killed the sentry, surprised and destroyed the gate guard, which consisted of thirty-two men under two officers; he then went straight to the upper fort, and found 'the garrison so panic-stricken that they consented to lay down their arms, and quit the fort on the instant.

'No sooner were they outside than Peshora Singh called on the people of the town and neighbourhood to join him; and early next day he was at the head of a thousand men.' He increased the number of his followers, and issued orders to the chiefs and village communities from the Jhelum to the Khaibar, in which he declared his accession to the throne of Ranjit Singh, and required their allegiance.

Sardar Jawahir Singh wrote to every neighbouring governor to move at once against Peshora Singh. He wholly changed his tone towards the British, and abstained from interference with the affairs of the Protected States. The troops expressed unbounded admiration of Peshora Singh's gallant enterprise, and said that he must, in truth, be a son of Ranjit Singh. Gulab Singh took advantage of the terror prevailing at the Darbar to obtain permission to return to Jammu.

When the report of these events was received in England, the Government anticipated much advantage from Sir Henry Hardinge's contemplated visit to the frontier, as he would then be in a position to act with promptitude should the necessity arise. They further remarked that if the Sikh Government could take a sound view of matters and discern their true

interests, they could not fail to see that the best, if not the only, chance of maintaining the unity of their dominions was 'the cessation of their own miserable feuds, and a perfect reliance upon the honour, good faith, and power of the British Government.'

The disturbance at Anandpur Makhowal has already been mentioned. An arrangement for the management of the Sodhis, the proprietors of the town, a family of priests who claim descent from Guru Rám Dás, had been made by Wade in concert with the Darbar. Mr. Clerk had adhered to this, and had, in accordance with it, settled some disputes as to inheritance. This arrangement had been set aside just before Broadfoot was made Agent, with the result that disturbances soon arose. The people were rapidly getting excited, and it became necessary to act. Broadfoot sent an Amín or Commissioner to forbid hostilities, and to desire both parties to disarm till the Darbar, in concert with us, should settle the matter. Jawahir Singh, the wazir, being drunk and quarrelsome, sent an order to his agents at Anandpur to expel the Amin, who, having unfortunately become alarmed, took refuge in Biláspur.[8] This complicated matters; and, owing to the unfriendly temper of the Darbar, was likely to be considered a triumph. A somewhat similar case having occurred in Mr. Clerk's time, Broadfoot followed closely the course then taken; the difference being that he decided to act with greater mildness for two principal reasons, which he thus recorded:

1st. The season is unfavourable for moving troops to enforce orders. 2nd. The effect of acting as Clerk used to act, and as I used to act, would now be different. Instead of the chances being that it would end the business as in the case of the Sowars, the chances are it would lead to resistance and consequent petty hostilities, ending in war at a time when we might not be exactly ready. The causes of this change are, a persuasion which has arisen at Lahore, and here also, i.e. among natives, that Sir H. Hardinge has not the confidence of the authorities at home; or rather that he has it not to the extent enjoyed by his predecessors, and consequently that he has not their powers. As soon as I began to suspect this was their belief, I acted accordingly. . . .

[8] Kahlūr, Bilāspur; one of the hill states under the political superintendence of the Punjab Government. (Hunter's *Imperial Gazetteer*.)

Letters from Ventura had 'confirmed their belief that the real power is no longer in Calcutta, and that the Governor-General cannot act as to them till the instructions or Agent from England shall arrive for his guidance.'

You know natives, and how they look if possible beyond the power in immediate control with them to a higher, whom they hope to cajole; and you will not wonder that I have thus acted with double caution in this matter, and that I am far from sanguine that it may not lead at no distant time to grave results. For, though I may spin out time by reference to you, no long period can pass without our asserting our *jurisdiction*: the expulsion of an Ameen never occurred before, unless it may have done so in Richmond's time; and if the processes of our courts, such as they are, are not protected, we must resign the government.

Goolab Singh and the Vakeels, also sharing in the above belief, would gladly see Jowahir Singh ruined by a collision with us, which they think cannot involve the Punjab. Others, as Deewan Deenanath, profiting only by the favour of the moment, flatter Jowahir Singh's prejudices against us, seeing that in their opinion they cannot lead to anything serious for the present. One man alone, Fakeer Azeezooddeen, and perhaps also Bhai Ram Singh, will see the danger of not yielding at once and completely, and on their weight will depend the result. A week or ten days will show it.[9]

During the earlier part of August, the reports by the Agent to the Foreign Secretary showed that the Lahore Darbar continued its career of profligacy and debauch.

In reporting to the English Government, the Governor-General remarked that the extracts 'cannot fail to impress upon you the almost hopeless expectation of any immediate or permanent improvement in the condition of a state whose rulers abandon themselves to such open and disgusting debauchery, unredeemed by any of those statesmanlike qualities which distinguished the Government of the Maharaja Runjeet Singh.'

We deem it to be essential for a just understanding of the actual condition of the Lahore Government, that these details should be reported; they tend to show the unsatisfactory nature of that Government, and that our relations with a court thus constituted and an army solely governed by punchayets, must be in a very precarious state.

[9] Extracts from a letter from Major Broadfoot to Mr. Currie, dated Simla, August 1, 1845.

We are determined to maintain the pacific course of policy which we have hitherto pursued to the utmost extent of conciliation and forbearance.[1]

The extracts referred to are printed as inclosures to this letter, and it is unnecessary to reproduce them. Briefly they report Sardar Jawahir Singh as generally drunk and quarrelsome, neglectful of business, and disposed to send the Sikh army against us, in order to divert its attention from himself. The Agent remarked it was essential that the Government should know the exact truth, but that in telling it there would be difficulty in avoiding details unfit for the decency of a despatch. The Rani's mind had become seriously affected by her profligacy; from being clever and lively, she had become stupid and imbecile. One of the Agent's letters of remonstrance arrived before the effects of a debauch were gone; its contents were such as to sober the rioters for the moment, and an answer was promised. But after a day's sobriety, in compensation for so unusual a restraint, the Sardar and his low favourites, each supplied with a bottle of brandy, set out on an excursion. They returned drunk, and in place of replying to the letter, sent for dancing girls; and Jawahir Singh, emulating the worst traditions of Rome in its decline, dressed himself as a dancing girl, and danced with the rest.

Early in August, Sir H. Hardinge referred a memorandum by Mr. Clerk, on various matters connected with our relations to the Lahore State, to the Agent for remarks. The note forwarding it, from which the following extracts are made, is dated August 14, 1845.

I am so excessively pressed by quarrels between Outram and Napier &c. &c. that I have dictated to my son my observations on a memorandum of Mr. Clerk's, which Lord Ripon sent to me. I send you the memorandum *confidentially*, and shall be glad to have your comments upon it addressed to me.

If, unhappily, we cannot bolster up a Sikh Government, we must, by the most frank, loyal, and intelligible conduct, distinctly prove that forbearance had been exhausted.

Let us be accused of erring on the side of moderation, [or even [2]]

[1] Extract, Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee, No. 70, dated September 6, 1845. *Papers &c.* printed February 26, 1846.

[2] In the original the word is illegible.

of timid reluctance to draw the sword; but if we are forced into war, let the rupture be caused by some prominent aggressive act. An offence to our dignity offered by a weaker Power would not be ground broad enough to occupy; and in order that our moderation may not mislead the Durbar, we must speak and write very plainly.

In his comments on Mr. Clerk's memorandum, the Governor-General mentioned that he was disposed to think it had been written without recent accurate information.

The state of affairs at Lahore was very different in 1845 from what it had been in Maharaja Sher Singh's time, when Mr. Clerk was intimately acquainted with it. Then the army was reasonably obedient, now it was wholly insubordinate, and the existing government was merely nominal. Hence the position of affairs now was more critical than in Mr. Clerk's time.

The Governor-General expressed an opinion adverse to what appeared to be Mr. Clerk's views of the relative rights and power exercised by the Indian and Sikh Governments in the cis-Sutlej estates.

It is unnecessary to reproduce Major Broadfoot's notes on Mr. Clerk's memorandum, but the following is the reply to the Governor-General's letter just quoted:

Simla: August 29, 1845.

My dear Sir,—I have, as directed, answered Mr. Clerk's memorandum, as far as I could when not seeing clearly the object and drift of the document to be answered; but I shall not be able to copy out the paper for transmission by this post.

The principles laid down in your note for our dealings with Lahore are entirely those by which I have most anxiously endeavoured to guide my course. That in every detail I have succeeded, it would be presumptuous to hope; nay, I must not be surprised if you, on reviewing the whole undisturbed, as I have necessarily been, by the bewildering whirl of intrigue and ever varying cabal with which I am in constant contact, should find my failures far outnumber my successes. Still I am not without hope that you will see at the bottom of all I have done, or forborne to do, the very principles you have laid down, however defective or erroneous judgment may have prevented the details from conforming to them.

The next letter from the Durbar, whatever its tenor, will enable me to report fully on all our late discussions and the present state of the Durbar. If the letter be satisfactory, the long and dangerous delay will prevent my merely reporting that there have been

differences now arranged. If unsatisfactory, I mean to inform the Durbar that, not being empowered to acknowledge anything short of the subordination on this side of the Sutlej in force throughout Runjeet Singh's reign, and, indeed, up to the present Maharaja's accession, I must submit the whole to you.

I had, with this view, roughly sketched a report on our relations, of which I had lately resolved to suppress the greater part as superfluous. I shall now, however, complete and enlarge it, on the very ill-understood points on which Mr. Clerk's unprecise language may raise doubts, which I cannot conceive he shares, though I admit his paper has much surprised me; for though Mr. Currie once pointed out to me some strange language in one of Mr. Clerk's letters to Mr. Thomas Metcalfe, yet I ascribed it to the heat of controversy between men whose personal interests and feelings had jostled, and not to the possibility of Mr. Clerk holding an opinion I cannot but look on as preposterous in anyone conversant with the facts of our connection with Lahore.

From Mr. Hardinge's letter I gather that a despatch may be expected from England on the subject of our cis-Sutlej relations with Lahore. I do not think you will find it difficult to clear up any obscurity attending them; but I shall in the mean time look more and more to the subject, lest I should be called on by you for an opinion.

In all the existing discussions there is not one, I think, which can be called a case of offence to our dignity. The Durbar would not answer your letter, though merely complimentary, for a long time; nor at all till foolishly solicited, nay entreated to do so, by our native agent. This indiscretion of his put into such jeopardy the quiet settlement of other matters, by confirming their belief in your being restricted in power, that to remedy the error became indispensable. At the same time I wished to avoid this matter being made a subject of contest. I reprimanded our agent, therefore, for his folly, and gave a copy of the reprimand to the Lahore Vakeel.

At the same time I told him that an answer so given might be fairly declined, but that, as its terms were friendly, I would keep it back for a time, to see if the Durbar would explain the improper conduct of its servants, so that I might not have to report in forwarding it that the acts of the Durbar contradicted their language. This gave one more argument to the moderate party. The Durbar has finally made partial reparation in one case, but without abandoning the implication of non-subjection. . . .

I took advantage of some inaccuracies, real or apparent, and an unusual mode of transmission, to submit their letter a second time

for their consideration, warning them that I could only act on the rules in force in Runjeet Singh's time; and I told the Vakeel that reference to you now alone remained. Their answer will arrive by the first or second proximo if it comes at all, and then I shall send down the whole correspondence.

The acts of which I have complained are only parts of a system, and I have dwelt only on one or two glaring cases, where the Maharaja's orders have either been openly alleged, or are well known to exist, and where the actors have been men of some mark, though not of the highest rank.

The points in dispute are two: 1st, the right to cross the Sutlej without permission—i.e. the question settled when the Sowars crossed, and never doubted before that; and 2nd, exemption is claimed, or rather assumed, from the jurisdiction of my court, and consequently from that of the Government of India, for the Maharaja's cis-Sutlej subjects and estates; an exemption which has never existed up to this date, and which was never claimed till Pundit Julla, with partial success, did so in Col. Richmond's time.

These are points of nearly the highest weight, but they are of less consequence than others which must either in writing, or when you come up, be laid before you. Their frequent avowal in Durbar, and their causing such avowal to be made known indirectly to me, is a menace of their ability and desire to seduce from their allegiance the other Sikh chiefs and our native army. The very naming of such things with impunity for any length of time is unsafe, seeing the position now held in the State by their army.

On these points, however, I have thought it most prudent to say nothing to them; to appear to treat them with contempt; and the reference to you will be solely as to the other points, of which a satisfactory adjustment would go far for the present, and only for the present, to settle the minds both of the chiefs and of our soldiery.

The forbearance shown has been carried to the verge of danger. It so deceived some of the petty chiefs, that I have had to take strong measures with them. I need not tell you they are as a class dissipated, reckless, and ignorant beyond any other similar class in India.

At the same time I have warned the Durbar and the chiefs not to be misled by this forbearance, which proceeds only from your remembrance of the long friendship of Runjeet Singh, and your compassion for the tender years of the Maharaja, but cannot go on for ever.

I have spoken fully, freely, and so plainly that they are angry at it. I never laid aside the customary style to the Maharaja even

when speaking most plainly; but I left them no excuse of misinformation from evil counsels, for I referred them to Runjeet Singh's time, and even sent them copies of his letters, causing the Vakeel to read the originals, and I earnestly recommended abstinence from the danger of departing from the ancient rules, to which the late events tended.

This course is unusual, and apt to make us seem too anxious for a settlement by peaceable means; but I adopted it on mature reflection, from the very motives you have laid down for my guidance.

With respect to Peshawur, the intrigue which makes most progress, though slow, is not to give it to Dost Mahomed, but to his brother, Sooltan Mahomed Khan, now at Lahore, as a nominal vassal of that state. It is a difference in name only; that is, it is open to every objection to which possession by Dost Mahomed is open; but in that, as in other cases, a vigorous effort will be made to accomplish it *before* we invade, or at least *before* we conquer, in order that it may be for us the *status quo*. This will give you a key to much going on in the Punjab. I agree with you that for us to suffer a Barukzye power at Peshawur, with us at Lahore, would be most impolitic.

It is post hour, and I must defer writing on some other parts of Mr. Hardinge's letter till to-morrow.

Believe me &c.

G. BROADFOOT.

The next extracts are from Sir H. Hardinge's letter to Lord Ellenborough; in them news already given is repeated, but special interest must be attached to any epitome of news from the pen of the Governor-General.

(Extracts.) Barrackpore: August 18, 1845.

My dear Lord Ellenborough,—Many thanks for the sword and pistol; they are both very effective weapons.

. . . . . .

Mr. Clerk has either talked or written about his coming out to superintend the Punjab affairs. I did not answer your messages, saying 'he was ready to come out whenever I expressed a wish,' because I did not think it necessary that he should supersede Broadfoot, and place himself as a provisional member of Council in the position of superseding the Governor-General himself on this the great question of the day.

. . . . . .

Peshora Singh has taken Attock, and has offered Peshawur to

the Afghans in consideration of their support. I consider Peshawur of vital importance in a military and political point of view. It is 170 miles from Cabul, and would give the Afghans a depôt for aggressive operations against the Punjab, and the possession of both banks of the Indus by Afghans and Mahommedans would greatly increase the difficulties of the defence of Sind, the Afghans stretching their reconquest of territory from Peshawur to Mooltan, and thence to Sukkur &c.

In a political point of view the reoccupation of Peshawur and the banks of the Indus by Afghans would be a disgrace in the eye of the natives of the East, who recollect that Capt. Burnes left Cabul because Lord Auckland would not take a line respecting Peshawur adverse to the interests of Runjeet Singh, and that the Afghan war was the consequence.

I am convinced the truest policy for India is to have a strong Sikh Government in the Punjab. If this cannot be effected, we cannot tolerate Afghan or Mahommedan reoccupation. The Punjab must be Sikh or British. I go up on September 20. Every effort will be made to bolster up a Sikh Government, and not to draw the sword. . . . Ever &c.

H. HARDINGE.

In the course of a careful examination of correspondence regarding our relations with the Lahore Darbar, only two instances have been found in which the Government of India did not altogether approve of the course followed by the Agent; and as numerous occasions on which unqualified approval was expressed have been recorded, it is proper that mention of these should not be omitted; otherwise, they are not of sufficient importance to deserve record.

One of these is just hinted at in Sir Henry Hardinge's letter of August 14, when he remarked that an offence to our dignity would not constitute a sufficient *casus belli*.

It appears that the Darbar in recent correspondence had departed from certain forms usual on such occasions; and though this in itself may appear to Englishmen a very trivial matter, yet it is not so where Orientals are concerned. It is a case of what is known as 'trying it on.' Completely comprehending this, and considering that to resent it at once was likely to be the surest method of preventing its recurrence, and of thereby removing a source of irritation, the Agent declined to receive the letters till the usual mode of address was

adopted, and expressed his sense of the impropriety in plain terms.

The Government of India considered that he had animadverted rather more strongly than the occasion appeared to demand on some points which, however objectionable under ordinary circumstances, had better, in the present state of parties at Lahore, not have been treated as a matter of such serious importance. The Agent was accordingly warned not to be too sensitive in his communication with the Darbar and its officers.

The other instance referred to was, that when reporting the usual Lahore news, Broadfoot referred incidentally in his letter to being occupied with much graver matters, about which he had not, at the time, collected sufficient information to warrant his writing an official report. Now, as nearly all matters affecting our relations with the Darbar were then sufficiently serious, or rather involved very serious issues, the Governor-General naturally did not like to be told that the Agent was concerned with some especially grave cases, and at the same time to be kept in ignorance of their nature. The impropriety of this was pointed out; but before the letter from the Government of India was received, the desired report had been forwarded by the Agent, so that the correspondence was closed by his expression of regret that he had omitted, in the first instance, to indicate the nature of the cases to which he had referred. He added, however:

> Of one thing I feel considerable confidence, and it is this: that it will be found that the forbearance lately and still exercised with the Maharaja's Government is out of all comparison beyond what any example can be found, or indeed what would have been thought possible from the beginning of our cis-Sutlej relations with Runjeet Singh in 1808 down to the death of Sher Singh in 1843, that it has been carried to the verge of danger, and that this has been exercised declaredly from the motives now laid down in your letter for my guidance.

When the report became current in the Punjab and the Protected States, that the English Government had forbidden the Government of India to declare war against the Sikhs without permission, the demeanour of the Darbar immediately changed.

The question of Raja Suchet Singh's treasure, which had been revived by the Vakils, when threatened by the most violent party in the Darbar, was brought forward by Sardar Jawahir Singh. There is reason to believe that he wished to lay before the Agent the original unfortunate order regarding it, to denounce the whole subsequent conduct of the Government of India as a breach of faith, and to threaten war if the terms in that document were not fulfilled.

The Vakil[3] urged the Sardar to obtain renunciation of their claims on the treasure from Raja Suchet Singh's widow, and from Raja Gulab Singh. The latter, being in Lahore, was applied to, but answered that the British Government was no respecter of persons, and would place no value on his renunciation of a claim, as the widow was heiress.

She, being absent, sent evasive answers or refusals. This, however, presented no insuperable obstacle; a forged renunciation of her claims was prepared, and Gulab Singh was desired to sign it in token of its authenticity. He delayed, and asked permission to go to Jammu. His signature was made a condition. He wept, signed, and departed. He had, however, provided for this contingency, and did not sign the false deed until he had heard of the delivery of a letter from the widow to the Agent, requesting him on no account to part with the treasure. This he knew would neutralise the effect of the forgery. The messenger delayed giving the letter to the Agent until Gulab Singh was safe in Jammu.

A report reached Broadfoot that the health of the Governor-General was not in a satisfactory state; for, in writing to Mr. C. S. Hardinge, after mentioning that Prince Waldemar[4] was fortunately prevented from going into Tibet by the people on the frontier, who refused supplies, he expressed great anxiety as to Sir Henry's health. The bad effect his absence would have on the Punjab was noticed, as was also a rumour about Mr. Clerk, to the effect that he was about to take charge of our relations with Lahore.

The report was considered to be unfounded, but it had done, and was doing, much mischief.

[3] On this occasion it was Ram Dial, Vakil at Firozpur, not Kishen Chand, who advised the Sardar.

[4] Prince Waldemar of Prussia travelled as Count Ravensburg, and was accompanied by Counts Grueben and Oriolla, and Dr. Hoffmeister, who was killed at Firozshah.

The following extracts from a letter from Mr. Edwards, Under Secretary in the Foreign Department, refer to these matters:

Calcutta: August 25, 1845.

My dear Broadfoot,—I have just received your two letters of the 14th; and as Currie is out of town and will not be back until late in the evening, I at once reply to your inquiry respecting the Governor-General's health, although I trust your anxiety on this head will have been dissipated long ere this can reach you by Currie's letters, which, as they contain no mention of the fact, would of course incline you to disbelieve it.

I am happy to say that Sir Henry is in perfect health, and as strong as when he first arrived. Some time since, before I returned from the Straits, he was, I believe, a little out of sorts, but he is now quite well again. I can easily imagine the mischief caused by any reports of the Governor-General's failing health; but more especially by that of Clerk's deputation by H.M.'s Government to superintend Punjab affairs; the latter tending, as it so obviously does, not only to weaken your hands, but to lessen the influence of the Government.

On the same date as that of this letter, Broadfoot reported the arrival of a messenger on behalf of Raja Gulab Singh, to request the protection of the Government of India. The Raja asserted that, having recently quitted the Darbar, he was convinced that war would be forced on the English, and could not be delayed beyond the approaching cold season. The messenger, in corroboration of his master's opinion, said, 'I know it for certain, there will surely be war; I myself have seen it.' [5]

The Raja's proposals were to raise the inhabitants of the hills against the Sikhs, and to transfer his allegiance to the British; or to raise 40,000 or 50,000 men and destroy the Sikh army, and leave Lahore open to the British, who could then occupy it without firing a shot.

In return he stipulated for protection in the enjoyment of his possessions during his life; whilst Jammu and the neighbouring territories, with an income of 120,000*l.* a year, were to be guaranteed to himself and his heirs for ever. And as a proof of sincerity he offered hostages.

Broadfoot replied that the messenger should have known

[5] The words used were: 'Yakīn jānda jarūr jang hundā; asī khud dekhiyā.'

that as friends or as enemies the English were sincere; that when forced into war, though they spared those who yielded and rewarded those who served them, yet they made war openly and fairly, trusting to God,[6] and putting down their enemies by their own strength; but he ought equally to have known that the English sought peace and justice, and never war till driven to it. Still less would they stoop to intrigue; and to the Raja's overtures no reply could be given.

One of the results of the hostile feeling of the Darbar to the English was manifested in the Protected States; difficulties hitherto unknown were raised as to forage from waste lands, and about giving other supplies for our troops. This was no doubt aggravated by a dry season, and by the increased numbers of our force. The difficulty was overcome by the Vakils, who exerted themselves in a manner which elicited the Agent's praise.

With reference to the boats and bridge fittings which were being brought up the river, Broadfoot recommended that no concealment or mystery should be made about them. They formed part of our military equipment, and our soldiers should be exercised in their use, just as they were exercised in drill and in the use of their arms.

[6] 'Tawakkul ba Khuda.'

CHAPTER XIV.

1845.

Death of Major Leech, C.B.—Letter to Mr. C. S. Hardinge: evils from increased communication with Europe—The cis-Sutlej States—Letter from Sir H. Hardinge: general policy indicated—Sikh complaints against the Government of India—Strange scene in Darbar—Death of Peshora Singh—Rumours current in Punjab: Mohan Lal—Letter from Sir H. Hardinge: reference to rumours—Increased hostility of Jawahir Singh—The Khalsa demand his surrender—His death—Suttee of his wives—Sikh attempts to corrupt our sepoys—Desertion from native regiments—Notes from Capt. Nicolson's diary—Hopeless state of the Punjab Government—Sir H. Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough: Punjab news—Boats for bridge.

On September 3, Major Robert Leech, C.B., Assistant Agent at Ambala, died there, and Mr. R. N. Cust was sent down from Simla to take temporary charge of the district.

Broadfoot reported to the Government of India, that the loss of Major Leech was at that moment the heaviest the Agency could sustain. He added:

> I lament his death as a public and private loss. . . . Major Leech's knowledge of their[1] languages sacred and colloquial, his fondness for the study of their literature, his tolerance of native customs and prejudices, his easy temper and kindness of manners, balanced by sufficient firmness, a very dispassionate judgment, good sense and diligence in business, qualified him in no ordinary degree for such a post at such a time, and makes his loss on public grounds severe.

The following letter to the Private Secretary refers to Prince Waldemar of Prussia, who with his suite dined with the Agent about this time:[2]

Simla: September 5, 1845.

My dear Hardinge,—Poor Major Leech's death has given me so much to do to-day, that I have only time to say that Prince Walde-

[1] Refers to the dialects spoken by the inhabitants of the country near the hills.

[2] Mr. Cust's memorandum.

mar has come in, and that Count Oriolla has been here to ask, on the part of the Prince, whether he should remain here or go on, his object being to see a Punjab war &c. My answer was, that I would be frank with him; if the British Government could avoid it, there would be no war; it was even at this moment doing everything to preserve peace; its success depended wholly on the Sikh Government, for whom he would be a bold man who ventured to answer one way or other; that, therefore, I could tell him nothing, but if he thought it worth while to wait till the Governor-General came, he might learn more from him.

He evidently thought I was very diplomatic, which is generally thought by clever continental people when they are frankly dealt with.

Leech's place will be difficult to fill at present; but I can write no more to-day. Yours &c.

G. BROADFOOT.

The Prince is at the Hotel. He refuses all offers to do anything for him.

The Governor-General, when reporting the proposals made on behalf of Raja Gulab Singh, recorded his entire approval of the prudent answer given by Major Broadfoot, in which he stated that to encourage a subject of an allied prince to intrigue against his sovereign was a procedure repugnant to the feelings and customs of the British Government.

The inexpediency of interference by force of arms in order either to hold the Punjab by a subsidiary British force, or to establish a protectorate on the Sikh side of the Sutlej, was pointed out.

It was stated that in round numbers the population of the Punjab amounted to 3,000,000, of which there were 1,500,000 Hindus, 1,000,000 Musalmans, and 500,000 Sikhs.

The Governor-General considered that, if the British power dispersed the Sikh army, the interest of the people at large should no longer be subordinated to that of a small warlike sect, whose conduct had rendered interference necessary. He also predicted the ultimate failure of an attempt to govern a country so composed, by means of a Resident supporte by a subsidiary force. He was equally averse to attempting to govern the Punjab by means of the Sikh chiefs. 'We should be deprived of the resources of the country,

and the people would not have British justice, which, however repugnant to the national feelings, gradually gives to the mass of the population some compensation for the loss of national independence by the prosperity which an impartial administration confers.'

Whilst it was repeated that interference in the domestic affairs of the Sikhs was deprecated as strongly as ever, it was clearly stated that if their acts and insults should lead to open rupture, no half measure would be found to answer.

There is much interest in the following letter to Mr. C. S. Hardinge, Private Secretary to the Governor-General, and much truth in the remarks about the danger to India of minute interference by England. That danger is greatly enhanced when Indian measures are treated as party questions.

Simla: September 9, 1845.

My dear Hardinge,—Many thanks for your note of August 29, just received. I am delighted on public and private grounds to find the rumours about Sir Henry's health so totally unfounded. But even rumours are mischievous, now that we are, I think, on the eve of seeing a new phase of Indian politics, arising from the tendency of the native Powers to look rather to London than to the Government of India.

It has been somewhat hastened by the accidents of Mohun Lall being at home, his having played his cards so well, and his connections at Lahore and in our territories; but it is the natural result of the increased communication with Europe, and unless met by extreme caution and firmness at home, as well as by care to strengthen the hands of the Government in India, it may lead to results which even the ablest man, practically unversed in Indian business, could not anticipate. I believe that had Mohun Lall not been in England, had he, when there, been more cautiously received, and referred for pension to the Government of India, the present discussions with the Punjab would either not have arisen or have been settled long ago. And I believe that claims will now be made, never before made, because every doubt existing in London is picked up about the public offices, or even by unguarded conversation of public men, and sent out to the native courts and chiefs, well versed in the method of taking advantage of such things. Again, the Kythul question, but for the same cause, would long since have been quietly settled and forgotten: both cases will now be difficult to adjust satisfactorily. In due time such agency at home will take its place among the things not to be prevented, but never to be left

out of our calculations. It will probably produce some degree of permanent weakness in our Government, and consequently of our possession of the Indian Empire; but its dangers will in a few years perhaps diminish. I say *perhaps*, because if once change in England weakens our Executive Government there also, and every parliamentary or popular change affects Indian administration, as such changes now do that of the colonies, our rule in India will not be of long continuance, unless India itself should undergo in one generation the change of many centuries.

Even as it is, I dread the effects of any possible change of ministry in England. There are able and patriotic men among the Whigs. Their natural bias would be to support and strengthen the Governor-General; but they will come in supported and driven by a faction, that is by selfish and reckless men; and hopes for a season will be excited among intriguers, which, once communicated to the Indian courts, may lead to any amount of extravagance, and may produce effects not to be got rid of when the fallacy of these hopes is discovered. I have every day more and more regarded the present Governor-General's Administration as likely, when Indian history shall be rightly written, to figure as one of the most remarkable and most trying to its head, from his having new dangers and obstacles to meet, amidst difficulties the more formidable from their being ill understood.

That during the changes already begun or imminent there should be no change of hands, must be the wish of every man desirous of the public good; and situated as I am, and thinking as above indicated, you will not wonder at my feeling anxious when the Commander-in-Chief told me he had heard Sir Henry was in bad health. I have run into subjects I did not purpose on beginning to write. Let me only add, after reading over what is written, that I do not want you to answer me a word on the above subjects. I am not putting questions in the disguise of statements.

I am quite vexed at my reports not having gone in, but the way my time is devoured by the trans-Sutlej revellers is inconceivable. I have been from half-past eight till noon writing this letter; my time being occupied by the Vakeels and others interested on our border. Jowahir Singh has emissaries out to corrupt our sepoys; he has sent back to Anandpoor Makhowal the man he recalled at my instance; he has ordered troops to be in readiness to cross the Sutlej; he is trying to tamper with the chiefs. For all this I care little; it is mischievous and must be stopped, but will keep till the Governor-General comes. The chiefs and people, however, get far otherwise excited. I have to hear their stories and talk to them; to write or make preparations for contingencies from hour to hour,

to prevent some explosion difficult to handle. And so my time is not my own, not even the Governor-General's; it is Jowahir Singh's, who is probably at this moment in his cups cutting out work for me, and eventually for the Government.

The 'cis-Sutlej territory' question will naturally puzzle everybody who tries to form an opinion from our correspondence. I have touched on the subject in the remarks on Clerk's letter to Lord Ripon. In a report on my table, in its rough form, it is more particularly noticed; but I have not entered into it so fully as if specially called on, which perhaps I may be on the arrival of the despatch you mentioned. But is it not curious that these doubts having sprung up in London, from some source unknown, should be the same that the Durbar should work on, as if Clerk's letter had gone to Lahore, instead of to the Governor-General? And that some intimation of the kind did go there before I heard from you, I have no doubt. Nay, the very odd selection of Anandpoor Makhowal, and the awards of Sir E. Colebrooke, made by Clerk, is the one made also by the Durbar. And the agitation on this subject was renewed on the arrival of the mail which I believe to have brought Clerk's letters a few weeks ago to Calcutta.

An official letter of to-day will indicate the line I have taken: that of pointing out true relations, when I do so, in the way of proffered advice, but refusing to listen to a question of our existing rights. They want to throw on us what we can bear, but which belongs more properly to them, and which they cannot bear—the *onus probandi*.

If it be made a question of words, whether English or Persian, every cis-Sutlej chief can bring language of apparently the most conclusive kind to show that he is as complete a sovereign as Queen Victoria, and that consequently the servants of the said Queen and her ancestors have, for thirty-seven years, practised the most continued, barefaced, and unjustifiable oppression, not only on the Maharaja of Lahore, but on every other chief, great and small, having a kingdom (not estate) or share in a kingdom, whether measured by miles or yards, between Jumna and Sutlej; but if the words be compared with institutions and facts, and thereby interpreted, the very contrary of all this will be found, and whether in the Maharaja's cis-Sutlej or anybody else's cis-Sutlej territory, the sovereignty of the Queen, the Company, and the Government of India, will be found to be as complete and undoubted (among natives capable of thinking at all) as over the district of Hooghly; and this not by treaty or compact imposing limits on our power, but with an extent of jurisdiction exercised varying according to necessity in each case.

If called upon, I am prepared to defend these propositions, not

in the lawyer style, but as serving a Government desirous only of truth and justice, blinking none of the apparently strong arguments which can be adduced, but taking the very strongest of them (for on either side examples abound), and putting it to any dispassionate man whether the truth be with *facts* which are inexplicable on the supposition of cis-Sutlej independence, or with *words* which are from the imperfection of language necessarily ambiguous, but are completely compatible in most cases with either supposition, though only on one supposition compatible also with the facts.

Yours &c.

G. BROADFOOT.

The following letter from the Governor-General to Major Broadfoot confirms and repeats the instructions contained in an official letter,[3] which, though fuller and more precise, is not quoted.

(Private.) Government House: September 11, 1845.

My dear Broadfoot,—I have written an answer to your official letter respecting the tender of Raja Golab Singh's allegiance on certain conditions, and I have distinctly informed you that the Government will have nothing to say to proposals for intervention by means of a Resident and a subsidiary force.

Eight months ago I entered at some length with the Home Government on the impolicy of any such system of occupation: that for the interests of India I preferred the Sutlege as our frontier, with a strong Sikh Government as our advanced guard; but that it was in my mind clear that the Punjab up to Peshawur must be held either by Sikhs or by British.

I adhere more firmly than before to that view of our real policy; and in the letter which Edwards will send you, I have assumed that these proposals of influential men at Lahore, which they are ready to make, if they did not fear my powers to accept, are *limited* to the hire of a British army to disperse a mutinous Sikh army, the Sikh chiefs retaining their property, their power, and their nationality.

Then I am told I am to be forced to this line of intervention by various indirect acts short of an open rupture.

My answer will be, not only that I will not interfere on such terms, but that if by acts of violent aggression I am compelled to cross the Sutlege, I will do so without terms, giving them fair notice that they must take the consequences of throwing the first stone. You will perceive by the tenor of my public letter that I

[3] No. 584, dated September 10, 1845.

assume they are prepared for a *limited* system of intervention. Are they prepared for the *unlimited* consequences of compelling me to cross the Sutlege?

In your letter to Capt. Mills, in par. 3 you state that efforts are supposed to be making to tamper with our sepoys. Bear in mind that on October 7 the Act providing articles of war for the three armies will be promulgated to the troops. The temper in which they may receive it is a responsibility which I am prepared to take; the risk is so inferior to the advantage to be obtained, that I have not hesitated to incur it. October 7 may assist the Raja of Ladwa's schemes; but you will in the interval have been able to ascertain the nature of his progress, from which I confess I apprehend no serious result.

The intention to promulgate the new code on October 7 is confidential, although the Commander-in-Chief has in all probability informed you of the fact.

Mr. Currie left us some days ago; and as I start in ten days, I am severely tasked in getting through the public business. In great haste, Yours &c.

H. HARDINGE.

Meanwhile the Sikh Darbar was preparing an indictment against the Government of India, and the Vakil was desired to find out from the Agent how it would be received. He said that he had heard privately that the Darbar had caused an order to be written to him, but had not as yet sent it. The contents were as follow: That the Darbar had at great cost twice invaded Afghanistan for the benefit of the British. That English armies had traversed the Punjab to the detriment of its people and Government, an injury which had been patiently borne by the Darbar. That we had been permitted to occupy Firozpur, which by right belonged to the Darbar, on condition of keeping no more troops there than were necessary for the management of the district, but that, in spite of this, a great army was collected. Nor was this the only innovation since Col. Richmond's time: the passage of the Darbar's troops across the river had been forcibly prevented, and Lal Singh, Adálati, had been prohibited from crossing though sent on duty by the Darbar. The Vakil continued that he had heard he was to be ordered to demand prompt satisfaction on all these counts, and to be threatened with recall in case he did not succeed in obtaining it. He was further to point out that

these offences had all occurred since Major Broadfoot had been Agent; if that officer would at once withdraw from Firozpur all troops not required for police duty, would allow free passage to the Darbar's troops, and to Lal Singh, Adalati, it would be well; if not, the Darbar would decline to deal with anyone save the Governor-General in person.

It is said that the composition of the document which embodied these demands and threats caused a curious scene at the Darbar. The tone and words used were unusual and insolent, but the paper was heard by the generals with great applause. Bhai Ram Singh and Fakir Azizuddin, who represented what remained of the moderate party, would have nothing to do with it; whereupon Sardar Jawahir Singh said publicly that he would not be surprised if the troops and faithful Sikhs were to burn down their houses. They were summoned to the Darbar to consult on the document. The Bhai refused to attend, and left Lahore next day to avoid the consequences.

The Fakir, more at the mercy of the Darbar, attended; and, after a scene almost comical, gave an ambiguous approval understood by the intelligent, but taken literally by Jawahir Singh and his companions. He declared the style and composition to be admirable, and calculated to fill the English with terror; that in his day such a letter would not have answered, for Ranjit Singh had to deal with Sir D. Ochterlony and other headstrong men; but that he had no doubt the change was as great on the south as on the north side of the Sutlej, and if so the parwana[4] would produce the desired effect. He flattered them with so great ability that he obtained 500 rs. as a present, the promise of a jagir, and, what he valued more, the promise of never being sent for again on such a matter. On taking leave he said, so strong was habit at his years, that, greatly as he admired the parwana and the spirit which dictated it, he could not help advising, as most favourable to tranquillity, adherence to the old treaty and to established rules.

The Vakil asked Broadfoot whether he would receive such a parwana if it were sent; and was told that if sent officially it would undoubtedly be received and forwarded to the Government of India; that it would speak for itself, and save much trouble.

[4] The document in question. *Parwāna* means a letter or order from a superior to an inferior.

The Vakil then remarked that he knew the Agent was secure in the support of his Government; and he contrasted this with the ruin which might any day befall him at the instance of the Darbar.

It will be recollected that Kunwar Peshora Singh had seized the fort of Attock and raised the standard of rebellion. Sardar Chattar Singh of Atari and other chiefs, at the head of a considerable force, were sent to reduce him to submission. He soon discovered his inability to oppose them with success; and though Attock was a very strong fort, he yielded it on the promise of personal safety. Sardar Jawahir Singh sent the Vakil of Sardar Chattar Singh to his master loaded with presents, to induce him to put Peshora Singh to death. He is also said to have hired assassins to kill the Kunwar before he could arrive at Lahore.

The Khalsa troops, on the other hand, were anxious for his safe arrival there, as they meditated deposing Jawahir Singh, the Rani, and Duleep Singh, and setting up Peshora Singh in their stead. There is some obscurity as to the manner of his death. The account which seems to be the most probable is, that Jawahir Singh's bribes and promises induced Sardar Chattar Singh, and Fatteh Khan, Tiwána, to break the pledges they had given, and to murder, or connive at the murder of, the unfortunate Peshora Singh. It is said that when about twenty miles on their way from Attock to Lahore, a day's halt was proposed for hog hunting; that when, fatigued with the day's sport, the Kunwar had gone to rest, he was surprised in his tent by a band of armed men, put in irons, and taken secretly back to the fort of Attock. There he was murdered, and his remains were thrown into the Indus, which flows past swift and deep.

The two leaders, dreading the wrath of the Khalsa, separated. Fatteh Khan went towards Dera Ismail Khan, and Chattar Singh went into Raja Gulab Singh's territories. But Jawahir Singh, the instigator, remained in Lahore, blinded with joy at the event, to what must inevitably follow.

Day by day the regular army was slowly reassembling, to the embarrassment of the Darbar, and to the terror of Jawahir Singh when sufficiently sober to realise his position. In order to escape from it, he became more than ever desirous of war

with the British. He continued his efforts to tamper with the protected chiefs, and with the Company's sepoys. He proposed to withdraw the troops [5] from the Maharaja's cis-Sutlej estates, in which they had been placed by Ranjit Singh, and kept there to carry out the Agent's orders; and to replace them by Sikh troops, who knew nothing of the work, and whose insubordination could not fail to produce an early rupture.

On September 17, the Agent informed his Assistant at Firozpur, Capt. Nicolson, of the report that the Darbar was about to move troops towards our frontier and to station them there. This movement being contrary to usage and, before Sher Singh's death, unprecedented, would probably cause excitement. The Assistant was requested to use his endeavours to allay this, and, if the movement were executed, to take steps to keep himself informed of what passed among the Sikh troops, and to watch carefully the ghats [6] in their vicinity. He was desired in speaking of it to the people to treat the intention as improbable, and when mentioning it to the Vakil to say it was contrary to established usage, and therefore unlikely.

Allusion has been made, in some of the correspondence quoted, to rumours which were in circulation in the Punjab and Protected States, and which had a disturbing effect on the Darbar and on the cis-Sutlej chiefs. The reports were, as usual, vague: it was said that the Governor-General had been prohibited from declaring war against the Punjab; and it was also rumoured that Mohan Lal, then in London, had succeeded in influencing the English Government in its decisions on recommendations made by the Government of India. Both rumours had a tendency to make the natives look to London rather than to Calcutta for justice, and for final settlement of their cases; and, in consequence, to imply a weakness in the Indian Government not hitherto suspected.

Subsequent events showed that the first rumour was devoid of foundation. It would seem to have reached the Punjab

[5] The troops referred to were a body of men raised by Ranjit Singh, and kept in his cis-Sutlej estates for local purposes only. They were a sort of police, one of whose duties was to execute the orders of the Agency Court.

[6] *Ghât* in this case means the fords or ferries.

with Gen. Ventura's correspondence. When in London, he may easily have misunderstood the generally expressed wish, both of the Government and of the people, that war with the Sikhs might be avoided; and conceived that feeling to be so strong as to prevent the Indian Government from declaring war. At any rate his communications with the Darbar were so understood, and hence arose this mischievous rumour, which encouraged Sardar Jawahir Singh in his course of wanton insult and aggression towards the British; a course which other circumstances seemed to indicate as the safest for himself.

With regard to the other rumour, there was undoubtedly more foundation.

Mohan Lal, whose name is known in connection with that of Sir Alexander Burnes, and who wrote a description of his travels with that officer, had been employed in certain transactions and negotiations connected with the Kabul disasters. He claimed large sums of money as disbursed by him on secret service. He was attached to the North-West Frontier Agency, and had gone to England on the plea of business with Sir Alexander Burnes's brother. Whilst in London, he was lionised with that ignorant and indiscriminate enthusiasm characteristic of our society, and was liberally supplied with funds by the home authorities. He was an unprincipled intriguer; had a brother-in-law, a Mr. Hodges, in Ludhiana, and no doubt in his correspondence did not depreciate whatever he may have possessed in the matter of influence with people in power in England. He was also suspected of having assisted to spread the first-mentioned rumour.

These remarks will explain the allusions in the following letter from Sir Henry Hardinge:

(Private.) Calcutta: September 19, 1845.

My dear Broadfoot,—With regard to Mohun Lall, the inconvenience resulting from the arrangements made in his favour in England must be patiently borne. You are, of course, aware of the causes which induced the home authorities to conciliate that individual.

Whatever my opinion may be of that course, it is my business to assist the policy which they have thought it expedient to adopt; at the same time, if he or his brother-in-law gives me annoyance, I shall not hesitate to stop his pension and remove Hodges.

We have for the last two years had much annoyance to contend against in the case of the Ameers of Sind. The feeling of the majority of all classes in England is, that our seizure of their country is a very questionable proceeding. I have allowed their Vakeels at their own discretion to go to England. They have told various lies, which succeeded for a season, and now are pretty well settled. I have allowed, contrary to Napier's opinion of the danger, thirty-eight of the exiled families to remain with Ali Murad on his responsibility; and I shall give the Ameers liberty to reside where they please. Lord Ashley writes that in consequence he has postponed indefinitely his motion on the Ameers &c.

A discussion on Mohun Lall's services would be very awkward, as you are aware; not to me or my friends, but to British reputation.

I care not a straw for the rumours of my restricted powers, or that Mohun Lall is my master, but I do care that the sincerity of my professions to maintain peace shall be proved by my acts; and having the power to redress our own wrongs on this side of the river whenever we please, the moderate use of that power is the best and most honourable policy.

As to Mr. Clerk, I believe Lord Ripon said to him in conversation at a dinner party, that he wished he were going out; that Clerk replied he was ready, but could not move unless I expressed a wish to have him; and then the conversation dropped. Lord E.'s letters confirm this version; and as Mr. Clerk is a prudent man, and probably can take the true measure of Mohun Lall, he has abstained from communication with him.

I recommend you, in your official correspondence, to attach the least possible importance to these rumours. I have no doubt they have given all the trouble you describe, and to the Government the disrepute of being defeated by such low agents. The inconvenience is temporary; and as, in my letter of the 10th, I have distinctly stated the course I intend to pursue, I have no doubt I shall find you have acted with your usual discrimination. The Act giving to the Governor-General the whole powers of the Governor-General in Council will be published to-morrow. If such a document is invalid compared with Mr. Hodges's assurances of Mohun Lall having superseded the Governor-General, we must bear it patiently until the insane fit be over. Yours &c.

H. H.

On September 19 the Vakil waited on the Agent, and read to him some papers which were written in cipher, and which, he said, must be considered as unofficial; that is, he had not

been desired by the Darbar to communicate their contents. They contained statements of the determined hostility of Sardar Jawahir Singh to the British; of his rejection of a strong public remonstrance made by Bhai Ram Singh; and an intimation of attempts having been made to corrupt Sodhí Díwán Singh of Anandpur Makhowal.

Broadfoot answered as follows:

I said that I was sorry to hear the news just read; that, as he knew, I had done everything in my power to maintain friendship, and by repeated advice and warning, accompanied by the fullest explanations, to remove every chance of misconception on the part of the Durbar; that the ablest men remaining about the Durbar had now expostulated in vain; that it was grievous to see a friendship of so long duration, and so fully maintained by Runjeet Singh, thus cast aside; but amidst this regret was the satisfaction of knowing that no effort of any kind to preserve it had been wanting on our side, and that the forbearance shown by us was wholly unexampled, having, as he knew, led almost to serious evil.

The Vakil then broached the subject of the relief of the troops employed in the Maharaja's cis-Sutlej estates. The Agent, in reply, remarked on the inexpediency of introducing changes cis-Sutlej until the arrival of the Governor-General. He pointed out the danger of disturbance, from the substitution of insubordinate Sikh soldiers for the present men; but added, that as the Vakil was responsible to him for the good order of the estate, he would, on receipt of a written guarantee for the good behaviour of the new troops, sanction the proposed change. This conciliatory step of the Agent received the entire approval of the Governor-General.

The impression made on Sir Henry Hardinge by these and other reports at that time, was that there would be no immediate attack or violation of our frontier. He foresaw that the anger of the Khalsa would be directed against Jawahir Singh for having procured the murder of Peshora Singh; at the same time he considered there was such undeniable evidence of the hostility of the Wazir, that it would be imprudent to relax the defensive operations already commenced.[7]

The Governor-General was right; Jawahir Singh made

[7] Compare Governor-General to the Secret Committee, No. 4 of November 1, 1845. See *Papers &c.* printed February 26, 1846, p. 6.

more and more frantic efforts to divert the wrath of the Khalsa from himself to the British, and his violence was the measure of his desperation. Seeing this, the troops at Amritsar refused to receive one of his followers as their general, and threatened to kill him. They protested that they would destroy Jawahir Singh himself, but would make no war with the English, who had given them no cause of offence. In concert with the rest of the army, they framed a number of questions and put them to Jawahir Singh. He was required to produce Peshora Singh; and was directly charged with wishing to send the army against the English, whilst he himself was afraid to quit the fort of Lahore. The Khalsa informed him in rough language, that they were not so senseless as to march against the British at the bidding of a fool; but stated that they would not decline to do so after proper preparation, and if the assembled troops, chiefs, and Rajas, so decided at the approaching Dasahra.

What followed this is graphically told in the next letter; it has already been published, with numerous, though perhaps at the time unavoidable, misprints, in the papers on the outbreak of the first Sikh war which were presented to Parliament.

The Agent to the Governor-General on the North-West Frontier to the Secretary to the Government of India.[8]

Camp, Simla: September 26, 1845.

The troops continued on the 18th and subsequent days to maintain the same attitude as before—perfect order among themselves, and strict discipline towards the city and its neighbourhood. They pitched their camp at the plain of Miyan Meer, on the Ferozepore side of Lahore, where the punchayets held their nightly meetings, and in the morning issued the orders determined on, under the designation belonging to the Sikh sect before Runjeet Singh became a monarch, viz. the Khalsa Punth (Khalsa jee da Punth). They formally assumed the government, and sent letters bearing their seal, inscribed merely with the name of God, to all local officers, military leaders, and members of the Durbar, requiring their presence and obedience. They sent similar letters to the Ranee, requiring her to join their camp with her son, and to deliver up her brother and the murderers of Peshora Singh, if he were really dead. The Ranee

[8] *Papers &c.* pp. 8, 9, and 10.

justified his death, which her brother had denied. The troops answered that her admission proved it, and required her to choose between giving him up or sharing his fate with her son.

In such negotiations were passed the intermediate days. Sirdar Jowahir Singh trusted to holding the fort with his new levies and the artillery, of which the superior officers were much in his favour; but he found that, including the Englishman, or, as he himself says, the American, Col. Gardener, the troops and their officers were ready to obey the summons of the troops, and to join their camp; he [the Sardar] now began to think of escape, and laboured in every way to gain time and conciliate the levies, that they might at least connive at his flight.

On the 19th he and the Ranee sent Dewan Deena Nath, Fakeer Noor-ood-deen, and Sirdar Uttur Singh, Kaleewala, to urge the troops to return to their obedience on account of the danger of English invasion &c. The troops immediately made them prisoners, releasing Noor-ood-deen, whom they sent to warn the Ranee that the 20th was the latest day on which the option of surrendering her brother would be left her; that this delay was only given to spare the city the miseries of a siege of the fort; and that she and her son would pay with their lives the penalty of such siege, if their obstinacy made it necessary. At the same time, under the seal of the Punth, they required the troops in the fort to take care that no one escaped, and they posted guards at each gate of the city for the like purpose. Fakeer Noor-ood-deen, having fulfilled his mission, was honourably dismissed; the other prisoners were insulted, threatened, and derided by the soldiery.

On the night of the 20th, Sirdar Jowahir Singh made great presents and greater promises to his troops, giving one general half a lakh of rupees to facilitate his escape. They allowed him to reach the gate of the fort, where the guard peremptorily forbade him to go farther, saying that such were the orders of the Khalsa Punth. The Sirdar returned to his house in despair.

In the afternoon of the 21st it was announced that four battalions had left the camp to destroy all in the fort, of which the garrison, with all the artillery and generals, had marched to the camp of Miyan Meer. Immediate departure for the camp was announced to be the only chance of safety. The Sirdar, his sister, and her son, with all the members of Durbar who had not already gone to the camp, now mounted on the state elephants, and proceeded to join the troops, their tents having been already sent on. The four battalions which they met turned back in silence, and escorted them to the camp. When they arrived there it had become dark. The Ranee, the Maharajah, and their immediate attendants, except the slave Mungla,

were conducted to their tents by the troops, which ran tumultuously to them from every part.

Sirdar Jowahir Singh was put to death in his howdah by innumerable wounds of swords and muskets, and his body thrown out on the ground. Two of his leading associates, Bhya Chutter, a doorkeeper, and Bâwa Ruttun Singh, Bedee, a chabook sowar (a horse-jockey), were also put to death, as well as some orderly horsemen, much consulted on State affairs by the Sirdar. Of the rest of his attendants, most escaped in the dark. Rajah Lal Singh was made a prisoner, as also Sirdar Jiwun Singh, a man of low station, a native of Majeeta, but for some years a Hindoo Fakeer, in Rohilcund. Mungla, the slave, was also imprisoned, as well as a few others of less note. Sirdar Lal Singh, Morariya, who was designated to command the expedition against the English, fled, and is believed to have crossed the Sutlege. He was, on Heera Singh's death, only a risaldar of orderly horse, and was raised by Jowahir Singh first to be a general and then a Sirdar, with a view sometimes of going as a special ambassador to the English, and sometimes of commanding an army to invade them. Gen. Mehtab Singh, Majeeteea, and others of that family lately leaders at the Durbar, are in concealment, and orders were sent to bring Lal Singh, Adalatee, a prisoner from the Sutlege bank opposite to Ferozepore. Thus the whole of the members of the late Government were either slain, imprisoned, or fugitives.

On the morning of the 22nd, the Ranee, who has still great influence with the troops, reproached them for the death of her brother and threatened to destroy herself and her son. The punchayet released Deewan Deena Nath, and Sirdar Uttur Singh, Kaleewala, with orders to soothe the Ranee. After some time, she and her son, and their attendants, came out to where the body of Jowahir Singh was lying almost cut to pieces. The Ranee and her women broke out into violent lamentations, which moved the soldiers so much that they permitted her and her son to return to the fort, carrying with her the Sirdar's body. They also allowed Deewan Deena Nath, and Sirdar Uttur Singh, Kaleewala, to accompany her.

The body was carried first to the fort, and then to the burning place, where, amidst a great concourse of people, four of the Sirdar's wives were burned with it. The crowd was so great on the way from the fort, that they broke the order of the procession, and two companies of sepoys on duty with it, during the confusion, plundered the Sirdar's wives of all the jewels and ornaments with which they were decked for the occasion, and which were intended for distribution to Brahmins and others at the pile. Suttees are sacred, and receive worship; their last words are considered prophetic,

their blessing eagerly sought for, and their curses dreaded. Deewan Deena Nath, the Ranee, the Maharajah and others, prostrated themselves before them and obtained their blessing. This was repeated at the pile by Deewan Deena Nath, and by the Ranee and her son by proxy. The suttees blessed them, but cursed the Sikh Punth. At the pile they were asked the fate of the Punjab, and declared that during the present year its independence would cease, that the Sikh sect would be conquered, the wives of the Sikh soldiery be widows, and the country desolate; but that the Ranee and her son would live long and happily, and the Maharajah continue to reign. These prophecies made a great impression on the superstitious multitude, and I mention them on that account, and because they doubtless express the opinions of persons about the Durbar.

At noon of the 22nd my latest letters left Lahore; a company of infantry had arrived at the fort to demand Deewan Deena Nath and Sirdar Uttur Singh, Kaleewala; but with what intent was not known. The troops had that morning put Raja Lal Singh in irons, as having dishonoured the Ranee, 'the mother of all Sikhs.' They had also made Deewan Deena Nath announce, in their name, to all governors and officers the death of Jowahir Singh, and had consented to do the same to the Vakeels with me; but they had forbidden any communication directly to me, saying that in future no letter to the English was to be written till the army had deliberated on its contents. They declared, however, that they desired peace, but that if troops marched from our stations to Loodeeana and Ferozepore, they would march too; if not, that each Power should keep its own territory in peace.

They give out that Raja Goolab Singh is to have the Wuzeership, only on condition of increasing their pay and making a considerable donation; but till the party of chiefs, which is moving them through the punchayets, shall decide on its next step, little reliance is to be placed on what they may say. For the present, however, there is no recognised head of the Government, except the punchayets of the army, which have not for some days used the name of the Maharajah at all; and the voice of the troops was, on the 22nd, for remaining in this state till the Dusserah, when they propose to nominate a Government to carry on ordinary business under the punchayets. They have named one of the minor Sirdars, Miyan Pirthee Singh, a relation of the Jummoo family, who has, without appearing, been deep in the intrigues of the last few months.

Meantime the efforts of the Darbar to corrupt our native soldiers were not relaxed. Capt. Nicolson, in a letter to the

Agent, dated September 27, appears to have doubted whether the attempts were sufficiently serious to justify the Agent's anxiety. He said, 'I have no apprehension that "daghábází"[9] will do our sepoys any harm. Lal Singh's efforts, while here, appear to have been directed principally towards raising the zemindars[1] to plunder and cut off our communications.'.

In his next letter he mentioned having found a Sikh that morning among his orderlies, who had told them that the Lám[2] was six miles on this side of Lahore, and that the Sikhs would keep the festival of the Dasahra in Firozpur. As he failed to give a satisfactory account of himself, Nicolson detained him, and, on further inquiry, it appeared that he was a gunner of Imámuddín's artillery sent as a spy.

By September 29, Nicolson had found out that the Agent had good grounds for his anxiety. In a letter of that date to the Agent, he mentioned that Colonels Courtlandt and Lafont, formerly of the Sikh service, and a Signor Bartolozzi, were in Firozpur, where their presence was undesirable, as affording an opportunity for Sikh soldiers to come over the border on the pretext of visiting their old officers. The Agent was asked to sanction an order for turning these foreigners out of cantonments. That morning eighteen men of one of the Native Infantry regiments were reported to have deserted, 'supposed to be seduced away by the father of one of them who is a Lahore havildar,[3] and has, it seems, lately been in the lines of that regiment on a visit. Nothing but the utmost vigilance on the part of our commandants that *no strangers* visit their lines, can secure our troops. *I* cannot search, or employ police in the lines of regiments.' It was certainly a delicate and difficult matter to deal with; sometimes, if there be only suspicion of an enemy tampering with the sepoys, it may be highly injudicious to communicate this suspicion to the officers of the regiment, between whom and their men confidence should be mutual.

Broadfoot issued some excellent instructions on the subject both to Capt. Nicolson and to Capt. Mills.

[9] *Daghābāzī*, treachery.

[1] May here be translated the peasantry or inhabitants. *Zamīndār* means properly cultivator.

[2] This is the word generally used by Punjabis for an army. It may be a corruption of the French *l'armée*, introduced by the foreign officers.

[3] Meaning probably a sergeant in the Lahore army.

The foregoing is sufficient to show that September 1845 closed in a manner ominous to the continuance of those friendly relations with the Sikhs, which the Governor-General strove so earnestly to maintain. The impression caused by the report of these events in England was, that though the death of the profligate Wazir could not be a matter of regret, yet 'the frequency of such crimes and horrors as have for some years disgraced the Punjab, must deprive all who may in succession attain to power, of any title to our respect or confidence.'

During October, Broadfoot visited some of the hill states. The weather was cold and the work was somewhat rough, but the tent life did his health much good. He was accompanied by Mr. Cust. The Governor-General was on his way from Calcutta towards the frontier. His route lay through Muttra, Agra, Delhi, to Karnál, and thence through the country under the jurisdiction of the Agent.

On October 2, Capt. Nicolson officially reported to the Agent that he had discovered a direct act of tampering with our sepoys, by Rám Diál, the Lahore Vakil, and asked for orders. A sepoy visited the Vakil, and got a pass permitting him to cross the river. Next morning that man and three others of his regiment were missing. On October 6 the Agent wrote to say that he considered the arrest of the Sikh spy to be very important. He desired Capt. Nicolson not to place the Vakil under restraint without orders; but empowered him to use his own discretion regarding others implicated, and asked him to collect carefully all the proof he could obtain.

The desertions showed the officers of native regiments what was going on, and Nicolson complained that they were disposed to be somewhat premature in arresting persons suspected to be Sikh emissaries.

Reports of all kinds naturally spread abroad; at one time it was said that a party of fakirs visited the lines in broad daylight, and, after calling out the sepoys by blowing a shell, desired them in the name of God to leave the British service. At another, it was reported that as soon as the Sikh army crossed the Sutlej, our sepoys had determined to join them. Commenting on this, Nicolson entered in his diary the following remark: 'But still the sooner we put down the

rabble army the better. We are too near it for the example not to be detrimental.'

On October 10 the entry is: 'This is the Dusserah. No one knows what it may produce. But God rules the hearts of all. Grant that He may give me honour and justice on my side, however the ball may play.'

On that day Ram Dial visited Capt. Nicolson: he spoke about Anandpur Makhowal, and said that the Darbar had recalled Col. Chet Singh and Lal Singh, both of whom were rebels; that the Wazir, Jawahir Singh, had neither discretion nor sense, but that the Rani was wise and circumspect. The office of minister, he said, had been offered to Raja Gulab Singh, who had declined it, saying that he wished to live for more than six months. The Vakil further remarked, that two things were mischievous when they ran riot: a woman's tongue in a house, and the army in a state. He admitted the necessity for care and vigilance on both sides; on the Sikh side to prevent their troops from giving offence, and on ours to protect ourselves from injury. He seemed desirous to ascertain what movement of troops had been ordered by us, and also to give the impression that the Darbar was disposed to be friendly; but at the same time to convey a doubt whether it was able to restrain its own troops, and thereby in case of outbreak to provide an escape.

Immediately after Jawahir Singh's death, the new Government resolved to send letters to the Agent announcing that event, apologising for his conduct, and in general rectifying all that had been the subject of complaint on our part. This was no sooner settled, than the very brigade which had murdered Jawahir Singh, partly because of his hostility to us, demanded, as the price of their recognition of the existing Government, that they should be led against Firozpur. The sudden change frustrated the attempt at reconciliation. The army was divided in opinion as to the best arrangement for carrying on the government. Court's brigade was in favour of making Raja Gulab Singh minister; the other brigades seemed disposed to support the Rani, who behaved at this crisis with great courage. Sometimes as many as two thousand of these reckless and insubordinate soldiers would attend the Darbar at one time. 'The Ranee, against the remonstrances of the chiefs, receives

them unveiled, with which they are so charmed that even Court's brigade agreed to confirm her in the government if she would move into their camp, and let them see her unveiled whenever they thought proper.' These strange disorderly ruffians, even when under the direct influence of her great beauty and personal attractions, reproved her for her unconcealed misconduct with Raja Lal Singh, and recommended her, as she seemed to dislike solitude, to marry; they told her she might select whom she pleased out of three classes, namely, chiefs, akalis,[4] or wise men. She adopted a bold tone with the troops, and not only reproached them, but abused them in the grossest language, whilst they listened with pretended humility.

Contrary to expectation, the festival of the Dasahra went off quietly, and hopes were therefore entertained that the situation might improve. The state of the finances, however, precluded the Agent from attaching much importance to these hopes. He reported that a strong government might with strict economy make the country support the army at the present rate of pay, and without reducing its strength. In the absence of such a government, the moment was approaching when the demands of the army must be lowered, or the country would be unable to meet them. It was, indeed, so near, in the Agent's opinion, that the crisis might at any moment be precipitated either by causing the revenue to be withheld, or by a fresh demand for gratuities, or even by the failure of a single crop.

The Governor-General, in forwarding these reports, remarked: 'The state of affairs, however, cannot fail to exhibit the hopelessness of our seeing a permanent government established in the Punjab out of the elements that now exist there, capable of conducting the administration of the country, and reducing the army to a state of subordination and control.'[5]

Broadfoot's letters to his family were now necessarily very short, his time being fully occupied. There is a letter to his sister, dated October 19, 1845, in which, after explaining why he could not write much, he said:

[4] *Akáli*, a body of fanatical Sikhs, by name devoted to God the Immortal, by practice devoted to misrule and plunder.

[5] Governor-General to the Secret Committee, October 23, 1845. *Papers &c.* p. 7.

The Governor-General is at Agra, and I must soon go to meet him at the Jumna, the boundary of my district, so I am more occupied than usual.

Poor Stewart, of William's regiment, is in my house in a sad state from apoplexy, of which he has had several attacks; mind and body are shaken. He goes home, and Mrs. Stewart will see both you and all our aunts in London if possible.

That is all that appears in Broadfoot's papers; but in explanation, and as an instance of his natural kindness, and perhaps extravagance, it may be mentioned on the authority of Sir J. Campbell Brown, who was then Broadfoot's doctor, that Capt. Stewart was very ill in his own house, in one of the neighbouring stations on one of the lower hills. Broadfoot, on hearing of this, sent for him and his wife to stay at Simla, in hopes that the change might restore the invalid. Soon after their arrival he saw how ill Stewart was, and spoke to Dr. Brown about him, expressing an opinion that the only chance he had of recovery was to return at once to England. The doctor concurred; but when Broadfoot mentioned the subject, it appeared that the expense could not be met. Broadfoot then said, 'Sell your house and go.' They were very willing, but could not find a purchaser. He asked what the price was, was told, and bought the house.

Another reminiscence on the same authority may be here appropriately introduced.

In Simla, Broadfoot's health being unsatisfactory, he sent one day for Dr. Brown, and said he wished to consult him on a serious matter. He foresaw the storm gathering over the Punjab, and the possibility that ere long it would burst. He therefore asked the doctor whether his state of health was such as to warrant him in believing that he could carry on his work, and undertake such service as might become necessary. He added that he was in confidential correspondence with the Governor-General, correspondence not necessarily seen by the Government of India, and therefore it was his duty to warn Sir H. Hardinge if there were any probability of his breaking down at the impending crisis, in order that a competent successor might be ready.

Dr. Brown said that this was so serious a matter, that he would like to watch Broadfoot closely for a week before he

gave an opinion. He did so, and came to the conclusion that, as far as he could tell, Broadfoot might reasonably hope to do satisfactorily such duty as might be required.

In Capt. Nicolson's diary there is an entry on October 22, to the effect that Gen. Littler had a letter yesterday from Agra, in which Sir H. Hardinge's arrival on the 16th was mentioned. He was to live with Mr. Thomason till the 20th, and then go into tents in the fort, taking advantage of the palace buildings during the heat of the day. Immediately after breakfast on the first day, he said aloud to Mr. Thomason how well Broadfoot had behaved in preventing confidential information from becoming public. He also mentioned Broadfoot's fall from his horse, which, he thought, had made him a little more nervous than was necessary.[6]

The position of affairs, as viewed by the Governor-General, may be gathered from the following letter:

Agra: October 23, 1845.

My dear Lord Ellenborough,—The death of Jowahir Singh has caused the Durbar at Lahore to be most anxious to renew friendly relations with us, demonstrated by several acts, such as discouraging our deserters, and making the necessary atonements for some impertinences of Jowahir Singh towards Broadfoot.

The Ranee now reviews the troops *unveiled*, and dressed as a dancing woman, which displeases the old and gratifies the young; but her irregularities are so monstrously indecent that the troops have held her horse and advised her to be more chaste, or they would no longer style her the mother of all the Sikhs.

Golab Singh is hanging back, and prudently declines the dangerous distinction of being the Sikh Wuzzeer, biding his time, if ever it should arrive, when an opportunity may occur of restraining the Sikh army.

On the recent occasion the punchayets formally required the minister to attend upon them in their camp, and account for his conduct in having caused Peshora Singh to be assassinated contrary to their order, the prince being under their protection; now they dictate to the Ranee the course they think proper to adopt, and the chiefs, dreading their vengeance and violence, apply to us to abate the nuisance. These chiefs are mostly adventurers, with a few exceptions, and, in their desperate condition, desire the destruction of the army and their own restoration to power; but the whole Sikh

[6] Means presumably more apprehensive of an outbreak.

tribe or sect is merely one-sixth of the population; and to allow a British army to be hired to destroy the greater portion of the Sikh nation, to replace a few chiefs in power, is a policy worse than questionable. The Punjab must, however, be Sikh or British; and I see no elements out of which a Sikh Government can by possibility be constructed. The delay is merely a postponement of the settlement of the question; at the same time we must bear in mind that as yet no cause of war has been given. The lull following the late breeze will last, I think, through this cold season, and I anticipate no offensive operations.

With regard to my Council, in the minute proposing to go up to the frontier, I stated, as you had done, that it would be agreeable to me, if the public service would allow of it, that I should have the advantage of their advice. The home authorities, wishing this to be the course *because* Lord Auckland had got into his Afghanistan scrape when separated from his Council, and you into your Scinde conquest, very much wished that I should be protected from such vagaries by —— and ——! This I gather from letters written from the India House by the directors and others. I treat it as trash. The Taj inimitably beautiful! Yours &c.

H. HARDINGE.

Next day Sir Henry addressed the Commander-in-Chief on the subject of commissariat preparations which were required. He stated that though he did not anticipate our troops would have to take the field that autumn, yet, as we had to deal with an irresponsible and mutinous Sikh army, whose caprice might at any time lead to a rupture with our forces on the frontier, it was necessary to be prepared for movement to a limited extent. If, as was hoped, the attitude of the Darbar should become more friendly, then by degrees the present scale of defensive preparation might be reduced.[7]

The following letter to the Private Secretary refers to the boats which had been sent to Firozpur, and which were collected on the river near the village of Ghulám Husainwálá, in a suitable place chosen by Lieut. Goodwyn of the Bengal Engineers. Their custody would appear to have been entrusted to the General commanding at Firozpur; but it will be recollected that, without the express permission of the Agent, all exercise with them was forbidden. The dual con-

[7] Compare Governor-General to Commander-in-Chief, October 24, 1845. *Papers &c.* p. 11.

trol would seem to have threatened the usual result—an interruption to the harmony which should exist between the servants of one Government.

Camp, Puthurnulla: October 27, 1845.

My dear Hardinge,—I have this day had the pleasure of receiving your note of the 20th inst. inclosing copies of correspondence about the bridge of boats. Kindly assure the Governor-General that I have scrupulously abstained from everything which could bear the appearance of assuming control over these boats, nay, even of taking any interest in them once they reached Ferozepore; never speaking of them but when spoken to or written to, and even then confining myself to answering questions put, or doing as far as I could what was required. My reason was that I thought there was from the beginning a strange *touchiness* about these boats as well as the pontoon train, which, if not carefully humoured as far as duty allowed, might have interrupted the smooth working of the public service so far as I had to do with the Commander-in-Chief. This misconception, however, as to Edwards's letter explains some references both to me and to my Assistant at Ferozepore, which I could not at the time account for, and had to take a little pains to dispose of without offence. The Governor-General's letter will, however, no doubt set all right again.

When your note arrived I was writing to Currie to ask, what you tell me as far as Delhi, viz. the Governor-General's probable movements. The reports you mention circulated here also; and to contribute to settling them, I moved out in the opposite direction to the frontier. Believe me &c.

G. Broadfoot.

CHAPTER XV.

1845.

Lahore in November—Letter from P. A. Vans Agnew—Major Mackeson—Notes from Capt. Nicolson's diary—Broadfoot warns the Darbar—Intimates the Sikh movements to Sir H. Gough and Sir J. Littler—The Commander-in-Chief orders up certain troops—Broadfoot issues orders regarding supplies for them—Instructions to his Assistants—His view of the objects and duty of the frontier force—Sincerity of endeavours to maintain peace—Necessity for taking things coolly—Letters from Sir H. Hardinge and Mr. Currie—Final effort of the moderate party in Darbar to avert war—Broadfoot joins the Governor-General at Karnal—The Governor-General postpones bringing up the troops—The Sikh army moving towards the Sutlej—Vakil ordered to leave the camp—Provision for the rapid march of the Meerut troops—Capt. Saunders Abbott's narrative—The Sikh troops cross the Sutlej—Discrepancies in various reports—Proclamation by the Governor-General—Advance of the British army—Arrival at Mudki.

THE situation at Lahore in November is thus briefly epitomised by Herbert Edwardes. After recording the boldness and activity displayed by the Rani, who appeared to have 'laid aside her debaucheries with her veil,'[1] he remarked:

But the time for prudence had gone by. The vessel of State, too long unwatched, had drifted to the rapids' edge, and all that skill and courage could now do was to seize the helm, put the bark's head straight, and plunge boldly into the foaming gulf. Finding that it was hopeless to oppose the army, the Rani wisely yielded; encouraged its excesses; called its madness reason; and urged it on in the hope of guiding it to destruction. History scarcely records a conception more bold and able; and, while reprobating its unprincipled execution, we cannot withhold our admiration at the design.[2]

Early in November, Broadfoot left Simla in order to meet the Governor-General, who was marching towards the North-West. Havelock dined with him on the evening before he left, 'and kept us up late by describing the battle of Maharajpur at

[1] *Papers &c.* p. 10.
Calcutta Review, No. ix. vol. vi. art. vi. p. 250.

the dinner table. I remember Broadfoot's comment, that Sir H. Gough had not his troops in hand.'

On the road down from Simla, one of his Arabs fell over the cliff and was killed. Herbert Edwardes remarked prophetically that a Roman would have gone back if such an omen had befallen him.[3]

It is curious that an evil omen also befell Sir Robert Sale, on the same occasion which led Edwardes to remark:

A Greek or Roman general would have been more fortunate, though less brave; for he would have accepted the augury with which Sir Robert entered on the campaign, and returned in the belief that the gods were against the expedition. In coming down the hill from Simla, all the swords which had been presented to him for his former services were stolen from among his baggage, and never recovered.[4]

The following letter from Mr. P. A. Vans Agnew, Major Broadfoot's Assistant at Fázilka,[5] shows how imminent was the danger of action on the part of the Sikhs provocative of a rupture with the British power, even at a comparatively remote part of the frontier.

Fazilka: November 8, 1845.

My dear Sir,—I have already on two or three occasions brought to your notice a dispute about some villages which the Sikhs claim from this side. I believe the river has come over this year, but they behave with so much insolence to my people that I cannot get the water properly measured, and I cannot report officially to you until I do. To-day my Peishkar[6] has come back stating that he cannot get through his work, and that the Sikh Kardars[7] have sent over zemindars who have run away from me and are liable to punishment. [It is further reported] that the Sikhs have assembled a force to take possession, and are beyond control.

Having already written to you on this subject without having received any instructions, I cannot take upon myself the responsibility of any active measures. I have little doubt but that the villages will be taken before I can get your answer, and any attempt of mine to prevent this would cause bloodshed. The only force I have is nearly fifty irregular Sowars of the 8th Cavalry, and no

[3] Mr. Cust's memorandum.

[4] *Calcutta Review*, No. ix. vol. vi. art. vi. p. 264, footnote.

[5] Fázilka, municipal town in Sirsa district, Punjab, and headquarters of the tahsíl of the same name. (Hunter, *Imperial Gazetteer*.)

[6] *Peshkár*, an agent, deputy, or subordinate revenue officer. (H. H. Wilson, *Glossary*.)

[7] *Kárdár*, an agent of Government.

boats; so I am not in a position to check any insult they may perpetrate across the nulla. I am &c.

P. A. VANS AGNEW.[8]

Mr. Currie wrote on Nov. 9 to intimate the movements of the Governor-General's camp. He said:

We are to be at Delhi on the 15th, halt 16th, 17th, and 18th, and march on towards Kurnal and Umballa on the 19th. . . . When we meet we will settle about your Assistants; if you still desire to have young Cunningham from the Mysore Commission, I dare say it can be managed. The only objection is his being a *Madras* officer as well as yourself, brought up to our frontier.

With regard to a successor to Leech, it seems to me Mackeson[9] is the best man. He will soon be relieved in due course from his present office by the return of Robinson from the Cape; and he has talent, character, and experience.

The Governor-General, however, wishes you to state exactly your opinion of him, and if you think you can work cordially with him and be sure of his co-operation.

You know, of course, that Nicolson goes to the Mysore princes in Calcutta.

The Governor-General is much gratified at the entire ignorance in which the public seem to be kept as to all your proceedings, and his views and intentions regarding Punjab affairs. You must take care and not let your visiting us on our way create needless alarm.'

Capt. Nicolson's diary contains evidence that the continued strain of maintaining relations of amity with such a

[8] Mr. Vans Agnew was an excellent officer, of whom Broadfoot had a high opinion. He was afterwards killed at Multan.

[9] Major Mackeson's services as Political Officer at Peshawar have been incidentally mentioned, and his name has on many occasions appeared in these pages. He filled with credit a variety of appointments, and fell, in 1853, in Peshawar, by the hand of a murderous fanatic. His death was thus referred to and lamented by Lord Dalhousie, then Governor-General of India: 'The reputation of Lieut.-Col. Mackeson as a soldier is known to and honoured by all. His value as a political servant of the State is known to none better than to the Governor-General himself, who in a difficult and eventful time had cause to mark his great ability, and the admirable prudence, discretion, and temper, which added tenfold value to the high soldierly qualities of his public character.

'The loss of Col. Mackeson's life would have dimmed a victory. To lose him thus by the hand of a foul assassin, is a misfortune of the heaviest gloom for the Government, which counted him among its bravest and best.'

power as the Sikhs was becoming so intolerable, that open rupture would be welcomed.

In a letter to the Agent, in which he complained of the incivility of the Lahore Vakil, and promised to answer him with quiet civility, he concluded by expressing a wish that 'it were all at an end, and we were at the *ultima ratio*.' Soon there followed reports from Lahore that the Rani had promised, if the troops would swear to be faithful, to lead them against Firozpur and the English, and to give them rewards out of the treasure to be taken on our side of the river. At the close of a letter to Broadfoot, dated November 12, Nicolson said: 'The Governor-General has promised to give me the Mysore princes; but if the present news prove correct, I shall request to be permitted to continue in employ, or to accompany the force as a volunteer, if your arrangements for relieving me are complete. *Post Martem Venus!* as we used to say at school.'

Reports more or less frequent arrived of endeavours to seduce the sepoys from their allegiance. One of the agents, employed to discover what was going on, expressed great anxiety to know when the Europeans were expected to arrive; and when Nicolson said that they had plenty of European soldiers, who were not required in such numbers when supplemented by natives, the man quietly replied that no reliance was to be placed on the native army.[1]

On the 13th, Nicolson mentioned a report that the Sikh troops were being persuaded to cross the Sutlej, mainly on the plea that their treasuries were exhausted, and that they must depend for payment on British spoil. To discuss this, a great meeting was convened at Ranjit Singh's tomb for November 19; the party assembled was to swear solemnly to maintain good faith towards each other, and to pursue the common object, viz. to acquire funds and to punish the British, who were daily becoming more exacting and oppressive.

Next day he reported to the Agent that he believed the Sikh troops would move to Kana Kachha and Harike; but he doubted if they would advance farther.

On the 17th, Nicolson complained that the last letter he had received from Broadfoot was dated November 6.

He conjectured that the Agent was moving about the dis-

[1] The words he used were: 'Hindustānī lashkar par chandīn ittibār nahīn.'

trict, and probably was anxious lest the information he was sending daily should be received too late to be of use. Next day an express arrived with the news that the Darbar had given the Khalsa army leave to march towards the fords of the Sutlej, on condition of their promise to march to Peshawar after having taken Firozpur.[2]

By November 20, Broadfoot's continued silence was more than Nicolson could bear. In his letter to the Agent of that date he said:

I have rather pressed these precautionary measures from the state of total ignorance I am in relative to your vicinity to, or distance from, the frontier; from my ignorance of the present disposition of the Darbar towards us, which the newswriters' expresses describe as decidedly and actively hostile; from the fear that some of my letters, if not all, and your replies, must have miscarried, the last letter received from you being dated November 6.

Then followed a list of the unanswered letters, and the writer went on to say:

It is but natural, then, that I should apprehend some accident to our despatches; to determine which point I send this by horse express through Capt. Mills at Ludhiana, and request a reply by the same means.

In the mean time, I have adopted as my line of conduct, in the absence of all knowledge and orders, the most vigilant watch on the movements of the Khalsa troops, and every precaution on our part to prevent injury or loss to us, or any offence to the Durbar; in short, a strictly defensive line. In this I trust I am meeting the views of yourself and the Government, as I equally trust Sir J. Littler will be in opposing by force any armed intrusion into this pergunnah[3] by Sikh soldiers, whether on their own account or by orders from the Darbar.

I may add that I do not think the Sikhs will cross the river, unless there has been any misunderstanding between the Governments; but that the Ahlkars,[4] for their own safety, are urging their doing so I have not a doubt, in the hope of compelling British interference, and so saving their own lives. Besides, a fanatic and drunken armed body without a head is not at any time to be trusted.

[2] The expression used is, more literally, after having gained the 'fatteh Ferozi,' i.e. the Feroz victory, or the victorious victory.

[3] *Pargana*, a subdivision of a district.

[4] *Ahlikar*, an official.

But at the very time Nicolson was writing this letter, Broadfoot, who had arrived at Ambala on the previous day, and had received fresh rumours of the advance of the Sikh army, was writing to all concerned, giving suitable orders to his Assistants, and advice and information to others.

On November 18 he had addressed the Vakil on the subject of the reported movement of the Sikh troops. After stating in detail the nature of the report, and pointing out that the movement indicated was at variance with the old policy of Ranjit Singh, as well as with the relations of friendship still existing between the Darbar and the Government of India, he added, that though difficult to believe, yet it was possible that the report might be true; and therefore he was bound to record explicitly in writing, for the information of the Darbar, the following sentiments, which he had previously expressed in conversation:

That the fact of an army exhibiting a hostile purpose is incompatible with friendly relations.

If the purpose of the parties concerned be merely the destruction of that army, they entertain a mistaken notion; for the sender of the troops, whether openly or secretly, must be necessarily considered as implicated with them, for a ruler is responsible for the acts of his army or subjects. If the troops of any Government are enemies, then the Government to which they belong is also an enemy. The prowess of the British Government, and the strictness with which it maintains the rules of friendship, are well known to the Sikh Durbar. Communicate to me immediately whatever may come to your knowledge on this subject.[5]

To the Commander-in-Chief the Agent wrote, stating the reported movement of the Sikh army, and the strength of the various divisions. He said that with reference to the probability of their actually moving, his correspondents in Lahore appeared to doubt it, but were perplexed. He considered that prudence demanded preparation for the movement, and he accordingly, with the utmost submission to his Excellency's better judgment, suggested certain precautionary measures, and offered his aid in carrying them out.[6]

To Sir J. Littler, who commanded at Firozpur, Broadfoot

[5] *Papers &c.* pp. 17, 18.

[6] The letter will be found in *Papers &c.* p. 18.

also wrote, more with special reference to what might happen on that part of the frontier. In the letter he said that the Sikh army had taken the Darbar at its word, and threatened it with destruction unless the chief men evinced their sincerity by leading it against the English. In the Firozpur direction 4,000 horse and two brigades of infantry, with guns, were to go under Sham Singh of Atari, a bull-headed Sikh, who hated and feared the Sikh army, but if he once began to fight, would fight with courage.

In the event of invasion, the Agent considered that the great object of Sir J. Littler's force would be to hold the two important stations of Ludhiana and Firozpur. Not to protect the former would be dishonour to us, and shake confidence throughout India: the latter was important as a considerable military depôt. But he gave these opinions 'with diffidence to one so much my military superior.'

Sir H. Gough replied to Major Broadfoot on November 20, and intimated the following preparatory arrangements.

Her Majesty's 9th Lancers to move at once from Meerut to Umballa.

To be held in readiness to move from Meerut to Kurnal on the shortest notice: two troops of Horse Artillery; H.M.'s 16th Lancers; the 3rd Regiment of Light Cavalry; H.M.'s 10th Foot, save one company; the corps of Sappers and Miners; all save one of the regiments of Native Infantry.

The 8th Regiment of Irregular Cavalry will likewise be held prepared to move from Hansee to Kurnal, and the Sirmoor battalion from Deyrah to Saharunpore, where it will be centrically situated, and ready to be moved wherever it may most be required; the 4th Regiment of Irregular Cavalry will be brought up from Bareilly to Meerut.

On the margin of the original letter are Broadfoot's pencil notes, indicating the arrangements for providing supplies on the various lines of march.

He appears to have divided the labour thus: Cust, to see to supplies on the road from Meerut to Ambala, also from Hansi to Karnal, and on the Saharanpur road; he was also, in addition to the amins[7] with each regiment, to appoint a permanent amin for certain roads in the district; in all, four

[7] *Amin*, an agent, supervisor, or commissioner.

amins. Mills, four amins for the roads in his district. Nicolson, two amins. Abbott, two amins. Erskine, or, in his absence, Hodgson, orders to comply with the requisitions of the officers commanding European corps for coolies; Hodgson, if necessary, to be given full powers to direct chiefs to comply with his requisitions.

These officers were informed that the Quartermaster-General would be requested to furnish detailed routes, and to cause timely indents to be sent in; but in the mean time supplies must be held in readiness at the ordinary halting places and their neighbourhood. The protected chiefs were called upon to hold their troops in readiness, and to furnish supplies and carriage.

In reporting what he had done, for the information of the Governor-General, the Agent remarked that he had received no complaint from the Darbar; that the warning he had addressed to the Vakil, though merely a repetition of what had previously been given, was so explicit that nothing could be plainer; that his Assistants' reports from the frontier showed that our posts there were vigilant; but that now he had received authentic intelligence that the Darbar had adopted, and ordered in writing, a fixed plan of operations against the English, in consequence of which he had officially addressed the Commander-in-Chief. He added:

> I now only suggest abstinence from movement on account of the vicinity of the Governor-General, who will probably think the matter one which has now gone too far to be left unnoticed, whether the troops actually move from Lahore or not.
>
> That I presumed to suggest any delay whatever is owing to this. It appears to me that the frontier is too long to be defensible in all points by any force we can move; that our two posts on the frontier are strong enough to maintain themselves till relieved; and that to attempt reinforcements, therefore, in anticipation of those of the Sikhs, would be useless as protecting the open country, and might impede any operations which the Governor-General may resolve on. Moreover, the delay recommended is only one of two or three days, till an answer to this letter can be received.[8]

The instructions to Capt. Nicolson will be found in the

[8] *Papers &c.* pp. 19, 20.

following letter; they appear to be eminently suited to the occasion, and to the man to whom they were addressed.

Amballa: November 20, 1845.

My dear Nicolson,—I have to thank you for a good many letters, and answer all in one.

1st. What has now occurred has been for some time preparing, and has not been unknown: how it will end, no man here, or in Lahore, can predict; but whether the Sikh troops come across the Sutlej or not, our line of procedure is the same—watchfulness, readiness to defend our own posts, and then quiet forbearance, and this up to the last moment.

In your intercourse with the Vakeel, remember you are not charged with the relations between the Government of Lahore and that of India, but only with the duties of a district of the protected territory. You cannot, therefore, whatever occurs, assume that there is hostility between the Governments till you hear it from me. In opposing aggression or hostile conduct, you will therefore call on the Lahore Vakeel to help you. You will watch him, however, and effectually check any hostile practices on his part, without showing that you watch or suspect him, if it can be avoided; and if it cannot be avoided, assuming, till you hear the contrary from me, that in acting towards us with hostility he is disobeying his Government. You are already authorised to go to whatever expense you please to keep yourself informed of all that passes along the Sutlej, and you may now also employ men to obtain information from the other side of the river; but in this you will observe great caution, both in hiring men and in relying on their reports. You will, of course, keep me informed of all that passes.

With respect to the movements of the Sikhs, two things may happen: they may march to the Sutlej, and there halt; for this they are responsible to the Governor-General, no subordinate can call them to account for it; but not a man should be suffered to pass the river at Ferozepore, and any doing so should be forthwith apprehended. You will also inform the Vakeel that the movement of troops towards the Sutlej is contrary to ancient practice and the known rules of friendship, and that you are certain I will demand an account of it from the Durbar as soon as I hear of it. You will make no mention of the Government.

Should the Sikh troops cross the river at Ferozepore, the Major-General commanding will probably attack them; but he is the sole judge of what is to be done in such a case. Your business is simply, on his requisition, to give all possible aid in information, and in

placing as completely as may be the resources of your district at the Major-General's commands.

It will be useful, however, for you to know what, in my opinion, are the objects of the frontier force, so that you may be ready beforehand to aid in their attainment, remembering, of course, that if the Major-General should contemplate other objects, you will still aid him to the utmost, reporting fully to me. You must on no account risk the dishonour of our arms, because in your opinion they are not used exactly as the Government may wish: that is a point for the Government to settle with the Major-General. Your business is hearty co-operation with the latter.

In my opinion the frontier posts of Loodeeana and Ferozepore are only for the protection of the frontier generally during peace. It would be their duty to aid the political officers in putting down the disturbances or aggressions on a small scale to which peace is liable; but anything like an invasion in force they cannot be expected to cope with; their duty in that case is to maintain their posts till relieved, which would be speedily accomplished. The defence of the frontier against aggression is the power of the Government to punish the aggressive nation; and towards the exercise of that power the frontier force will contribute best by securing against all comers these important stations with the stores, boats &c. they contain. For the protection of the country at large, and the ultimate punishment of the invading nation, the Governor-General will provide. It is the business of the frontier forces to await his time for doing so.

The Sikh army marches well, and is strong in cavalry well adapted for plundering. If resolved on war, they can in spite of us cross before we know they have left Lahore; and they can ravage the open country and recross before we can reach them. Still more effectually can they for a time cut off the communications of the force at Ferozepore and Loodeeana. This need create no alarm: the Commander-in-Chief is at this station; the Governor-General is close at hand, and the very stoppage of the dawks would inform these authorities that the frontier posts required relief; and till that comes, I have no uneasiness about either station. I mention this because you will be closely watched, and you must treat all that may happen with seeming indulgence. You must moreover be prepared to allay any alarm which may arise.

In one of your letters you speak as if our Government was not sincere in its endeavours to maintain peace, and that you might do wrong in contributing more than in appearance to that end. Nothing can be farther from the truth. I cannot conceive whence such an impression has arisen. The Government has striven, and

still strives, earnestly to maintain peace; it may not succeed, but it has laboured unceasingly; and it has borne what, with other countries, would long since have been considered intolerable. You must, therefore, in all things act on the belief that though our Government may be forced into war, it desires peace, and that to this moment there has not been from the Lahore Durbar a complaint or angry word. On the contrary, its last communications were eminently friendly. Whatever be the result of what is now going on, remember that you are to consider the Government itself as friendly till you hear the contrary from me. It may be treacherous, but of that the Governor-General is the best judge.

Again, you ask for leave to burn and destroy, and speak of chapowing[9] troops north of the river. I can give no such leave. If the river is not crossed, you must only report. If it is crossed, all military operations must depend on the Major-General commanding. Moreover, chapowing Hareekee is scarcely within the province of a frontier post in case of invasion; nor, if it were, do I see any eventual gain to compensate the risk of weakening the post by detachments liable to be cut off.

Again, burning and destroying may be well enough for the Sikhs, but they are not, except in rare cases, suited to us; that is not the way we shall make war if forced into it. And finally you must remember that it is the Governor-General who must even then declare war, and no subordinate; and that it is for him and the chief military authorities to prescribe also in what mode it is to be conducted, if undertaken.

I am obliged by your offer to remain notwithstanding your appointment, and shall make it known to the Government, which will not, I hope, let you be a loser. You had better show this, or give a copy of it if you like.

Show no distrust of the chiefs and people on this side of the Sutlej; but leave as little as possible in their power. Guard against fire especially. Yours &c.

G. BROADFOOT.

Broadfoot addressed a somewhat similar and equally good letter to Capt. Mills; the variations were such as suited the different men and the different localities. It ended thus:

Finally, remember that we are strong enough to take things coolly. Let all the rascals in Lahore line the Sutlej, not a bugle need blow in Loodeeana. Even if they cross, take it coolly, or rather impress the necessity for this on the military authorities. A

[9] Attacking by surprise. See note, p. 289.

frontier force should at all times be vigilant and ready, visibly ready; but that is enough till actually attacked. Fluster and perturbation are in this case needless and mischievous; they encourage enemies and dispirit friends. [A] few men can cut off your communications; but what then? You are nothing the worse, and here are the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief, who by the very stoppage of communication will know you are wrong, and will soon set you right.

In the mean time you can enjoy life unpestered by daks,[1] and lick everybody that comes to rob your nest. I shall probably move rapidly up to you if these fellows do march, and, if possible, give you notice previously. You must then send me out a squadron of Christie's men to meet me, including, if you can, Mayne's men, whom I know.

At Lahore the disorderly condition of the troops was apparent. They were impatient to be led against the British, and furious when the auspicious moment, 11 o'clock A.M. of November 18, was permitted to pass without indication of an advance. They forced the astrologers, with threats and imprecations, to find another and an early fortunate moment for the movement. But whilst displaying this impatience, the soldiers who had got their pay dispersed daily to their homes. Sardar Sham Singh is said to have declared, that unless this were stopped he would find himself on his way to Firozpur with empty tents. It was probable that the soldiers who absented themselves did not believe in the serious nature of the move; nevertheless preparation for war was being made with unusual activity, and virulent abuse of the English was held to be a test of sincerity and patriotism.

It is clear that the crisis was full of danger, and such as to tax to the utmost the resources and ability of the Agent.

On November 23, Capt. Nicolson wrote to him:

I am much obliged by your instructions of November 20, which I was greatly in need of. One part, however, requires a remark, lest you should remain under an erroneous impression. It is that relative to our Government's desire for peace.

Knowing that the Durbar and our Government were in friendly relation—at least, that I had never been told the contrary—and in spite of that relation finding the head of the Durbar consenting to a hostile march against its allies, and those supposed to be friendly

[1] *Daks* may here be rendered 'correspondence.'

to us the most active in bringing that march about; the doubt *did* occur to me (not knowing anything of any cause of difference between the Governments) whether the Durbar might not be consenting to the march of the army against us with your knowledge, and to afford a chance of safety to the Maharaja and his mother and to the Ahlkars,[2] *now* threatened with death by the troops if they consent to any terms of accommodation. Your letter, however, removes that idea.

Meanwhile Sir Henry Hardinge was approaching by the usual marches; he very wisely declined to allow himself to show undue anxiety on account of the numerous conflicting reports. He addressed the following private letter to the Agent:

Camp, three marches from Kurnaul: November 22, 1845.

My dear Broadfoot,—I received your second despatch three hours after the first, informing me that the Sikh army had become more discreet.

One day the Government instigates the army to move, and it refuses, having received no offence from the English.

The next, officers and punchayets are clamorous to fight, and the Government withdraws. I will not make any comments on the motives of the chief actors, who from their position are responsible to us. I shall patiently wait your further report, and calmly proceed to Kurnaul by the usual day's marches.

I entirely approve of all you have done. I wish we may have as good a case as that which your letter in the first instance offered. No man can calculate on barbarian caprices; my own convictions are, however, very decided that no attempt will be made.

Currie has just come in, and is reading the papers, 6 o'clock P.M., having been delayed in the rear by Mrs. Currie's indisposition.

Yours &c.

H. HARDINGE.

P.S.—I have just received your letters of the 21st, and will reply to them to-morrow.

This letter was followed by two from Mr. Currie; that of November 24 is quoted *in extenso*, whilst an extract is made from the second letter. They are of interest as recording the impression made by the events of the time on the Foreign Secretary.

[2] See note 4, p. 361.

Camp, Paniput: November 24, 1845.

My dear Broadfoot,—Sir Henry wrote to you on the receipt of your letters of 19th and 20th, warning us of an impending invasion by the Sikhs. He has approved of all you did. It seemed to me *impossible* that, without plan or preparation, such a mad scheme could really be meditated; or that, if the folly were perpetrated, it need, with reference to the respective state of preparation of the two parties, cause any anxiety to us. I am sorry such urgent orders were sent to Meerut by the Commander-in-Chief. The matter with many exaggerations will be in all the papers, and the slave woman Mungla will laugh at our beards!

We are moving on steadily, and shall be at Kurnaul the day after to-morrow, where, it appears, we shall meet the Commander-in-Chief. I trust we shall meet you within two days afterwards; and then we can settle future plans and further movements.

I have your application for revised establishment on my table. Sir Henry Hardinge wishes to defer its consideration till we meet; but you have full authority to do what you please in the mean time. Your plan will be acceded to, I fancy, and with any retrospective effect that may be necessary.

I return you the Commander-in-Chief's letter, with marginal annotations. Your other letters I will give you back when I see you. Having met, I imagine we shall not separate for some time; but for this last affair I should have had to take the Governor-General across the Jumna, and perhaps the Ganges, before visiting Ferozepore and Loodiana. Now, I think, he will wish to go down there at once.

Of course the facts reported to us by you will be denied by the Durbar. How can we establish them? Yours &c.

F. CURRIE.

Camp, Gurounda: November 25.

My dear Broadfoot,—Sir Henry Hardinge is very anxious to see you, and he has desired me to write and say that he wishes you to join the camp with as little delay as possible. We march to Kurnaul in the morning; we make no halt, but proceed to the next stage on Thursday. Perhaps you will be able to meet us there. . . .

I cannot but think that this late affair at Lahore is part of Goolab Singh's game, to induce the Ranee and Sirdars to urge the army to this demonstration, with a view to bringing a solemn remonstrance at least from us; this remonstrance and our impending anger to be used by the troops as a plea for putting those obnoxious to Goolab Singh to death, and thus smoothing his way to power.

Yours &c.

F. CURRIE.

On November 24 the wiser and more moderate party in the Darbar seem to have made a final effort to avert the impending invasion. Bhai Ram Singh, addressing Raja Lal Singh, was the spokesman.

He pointed out that the English had in no way interfered with the affairs of the Khalsa, and asked where was the wisdom of making war at the bidding of the soldiers. He pointed out that the Governor-General's Agent, who was a steady friend, had written in the plainest terms that the English desired friendship with the Sikh State, but would not fail to hold the State responsible for the acts of its army and of its subjects. He therefore cautioned the Raja against marching to the frontier with the troops.

The Raja replied with much truth, that if he remained behind, the soldiers would kill him. He was then advised at least to delay his departure.[3]

On November 25, Capt. Nicolson reported to the Agent as follows: 'Your instructions put it all right, and I do what I can to prevent the General *marching out too soon*. He is not easily restrained. We can beat anything likely to come against us in fair field, and will do our best.' He intimated that Raja Lal Singh was reported to have gone alone towards Harike, and that the Sikh troops were divided into four camps or main divisions, to act against Firozpur, Harike, Phillaur, and Rupar.

There is an entry in Capt. Nicolson's diary, to the effect that after this date no trustworthy accounts were received from Lahore.

Major Broadfoot and his Personal Assistant, Mr. Cust, joined the Governor-General's camp on November 26, at Karnal. On the 27th they were met by Capt. Abbott at Thaneswar, who, on the departure of the camp for Ambala, returned, for a few days only as it proved, to his duties in the Kaithal district.

From this time Major Broadfoot's detailed and picturesque reports of the proceedings of the Lahore Darbar, and the greater part of his correspondence, may be said to have ceased. Being with the Governor-General, conversation and discussion presumably superseded writing. He remained responsible for supplying Punjab news, and did so; but that news as a basis

[3] Compare *Papers &c.* p. 21.

for history must be mainly looked for in the various letters from Sir Henry Hardinge.

Capt. Nicolson continued to write to the Agent almost daily, reporting the information he gathered. The following extracts may be recorded.

November 28.—I received yesterday your two letters of the 24th. We are all right here, and strong enough for anything that can be brought against Firozpur, and your orders touching communications set me at ease. We must, if necessary, act without waiting for any answers, should any point unprovided for arise. But your present instructions are full enough, I think.

Great preparations are making of magazine and provision of grain &c., which, joined to other trifles, leads me to think the move is one more of a defensive nature *now*, than aggressive. But you have more means of forming an accurate opinion than I.

On November 29 he mentioned a report that the Sikh troops, or rather a considerable number of them, were marching with the intention of fighting.

It is said that when they arrive at the ferries of Ganda Singhwala, Talli, and Harike &c. they will pitch,[4] and the soldiers of the A'in[5] force who have gone to take their pay home will be on the look-out for them and help them. Some say they will cross *incontinently*, and that the Purbias[6] who deserted say the sepoys will not fight against the Khalsa-ji.

The earliest intimation of an opinion entitled to consideration that the Sikhs had determined on war with the British, would appear to have been conveyed by Raja Gulab Singh's emissary whose interview with the Governor-General's Agent has already been described. That the Raja was convinced of the truth of his intelligence, is to some extent confirmed by his having sent another messenger to Brigadier H. M. Wheeler, who commanded the troops at Ludhiana. This messenger said that he was the bearer of a letter from the Raja, but that, finding he was about to be searched at the Phillaur ferry, he dropped the letter into the river and swam across to save his

[4] Their tents.

[5] The A'in troops were the regular troops of the Sikh army. They had recently been paid, and many of them, natives of the cis-Sutlej States, had returned there with their pay.

[6] Purbias, men from the East or Purab. Our sepoys who had deserted are referred to.

life. He said that the contents were, that Gulab Singh, having positive information that the Lahore Government meant to make war against the British, wished to cast in his lot with the latter, as his existence depended on their success.

The Brigadier said he thought that the man's story was true.

On December 2, the Governor-General sent the more important of Major Broadfoot's recent reports to England, and made the following remarks on the situation.[7]

It appeared that the troops, instigated by the Rani and her Government acting under a sense of self-preservation, had demanded to be led against the British, and since November 22 had moved out twelve miles from Lahore.

Considering that the precautions already taken were sufficient, that it was inexpedient to evince anxiety when none was felt, and anxious to take no step likely to accelerate collision, the Governor-General made no change in the arrangements for his tour.

He further, after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief, and with the concurrence of that officer, decided to postpone, 'for further consideration with his Excellency, any change in the present distribution of the troops.'[8]

Major Broadfoot's reports of Punjab news were daily received. If they were to be relied on, there was little doubt but that the Sikh army was advancing in force towards the Sutlej. The local feeling was widespread that it would advance, and would succeed; but the Governor-General still thought that it would not attack our frontier, but would more probably return after a short time to Lahore.

Yet, though this was his opinion, he was alive to the contingency, by no means impossible, that we might at any moment be forced into war. For this alternative, in communication with the Commander-in-Chief, he made what were considered appropriate arrangements. At the same time he declared his determination to avoid hostilities as long as he could, and to show every forbearance to the Government which was struggling against its own successfully mutinous army. The mere advance of that army to their own bank of the Sutlej would not be treated as a cause of war: the great

[7] Compare *Papers &c.* p. 12.

[8] *Papers &c.* p. 12

danger was the pernicious example to our sepoys, of the success of the Sikh soldiers in extorting from their Government a higher rate of pay than our men received.

The loyalty of the native army was not impugned; but it was pointed out that endeavours on a considerable scale to tamper with their fidelity had been made; and that this of necessity caused the Governor-General much anxiety.

The cis-Sutlej chiefs received assurance of protection, subject to the condition of loyalty and adherence to our interests; and the despatch was concluded with an expression of satisfaction with the ability, energy, and sound judgment displayed throughout these proceedings by Major Broadfoot.

On the same day, November 2, Capt. Nicolson wrote to Capt. Mills to say that he did not think the Sikh army would come on, but that it was feverish and must be carefully watched. It was ready for a start, with guns and commissariat, but Nicolson considered that it was taking up a position more with a view to defence, in case we should cross the river and attack, than to invade British territory.

Next day he wrote to the Agent referring to this letter, and added that the Sikh force might be described as in position in a semicircle on the south side of Lahore, about twelve miles from that city. Reference was made to a rumour that the late minister, Jawahir Singh, was in correspondence with the chiefs of Patiala and Nabha; and that the Darbar had recently sent to ask what their intentions now were. Their reply was said to have been that they had no promises to make, but would form their resolution when they saw the Sikh army on the south side of the river.

Nicolson added, that if the Sikhs did cross the river it would be for plunder, but that he did not think they would cross, though small independent bodies might do so.

A letter, intercepted by Gen. Littler, contained some astonishing particulars regarding the strength of the Sikh army of invasion and the extent of its operations. The regulars were to cross at Firozpur with 125,000 bullocks for transport, and the line was to extend from Kasur to Anandpur Makhowal. Arrangement was said to have been made for the supply of grain all the way to Delhi!

It was reported in a newsletter from Lahore, that, in reply

to the Agent's remonstrance regarding recent proceedings, the Darbar had retorted that the British had in four instances broken the treaty of friendship. The cases cited were: that Hakim Rai and his Sowars had been treated with indignity; that Lal Singh, Adálati, had not been allowed to cross the Sutlej; that the Lahore Ahlkars had been disrespectfully used; and that Suchet Singh's gold had not been handed over to the Darbar.

On December 4, Capt. Mills informed Capt. Nicolson that the main part of the Sikh army was moving quietly on Harike and Firozpur, with the intention of attacking the latter place and cutting off communication with the stations to the south and east. He added that all the reports he received tended to confirm this rumour. Two other entries from Capt. Nicolson's diary, dated December 5, may be quoted: 'Mackeson succeeds Leech,' and a correspondent writes that 'Fakir Azizuddin is dead.'

Two days after this date Tej Singh, the Sikh commander, was reported to have said to the Rani, on her remonstrating against the delay in attacking the British, 'Fakir Azizuddin was a wise and fortunate man to have withdrawn from public business two years ago, and devoted himself to meditating on God, and to have now found an honourable death, leaving an imperishable reputation here, and obtaining besides a place in heaven.'

The Governor-General's camp reached Ambala on December 3; and next day Capt. S. A. Abbott, who had been summoned by express from his district, arrived towards evening. On that day Sir Henry reported to the Secret Committee the recent steps which he had taken.[9] No reply having been received by the Agent to his remonstrance against the recent unusual proceedings, he was desired to see the Vakil, and require reply and explanation. The Vakil assured the Agent that he had received no answer from the Darbar; the Agent pointed out the discourtesy shown in ignoring the request for explanation, and the inevitable construction which must be placed thereon. He added that until a reply was received, the Vakil could not be permitted to remain in attendance, nor be admitted to interview. In compliance with these orders the Vakil left the camp.

[9] For greater detail see *Papers &c.* p. 22.

The Governor-General explained that this procedure was the mildest which he could adopt 'consistently with the dignity, position, and interests of the British Government.' The plain construction to be put on the silence of the Darbar was that its intentions were hostile; in which case it was inexpedient to give them more leisure for preparation than could be helped. On the other hand, to prove our good faith and forbearance, full time for a reply from Lahore was to be given before any precautionary movement was made.

Even then the Governor-General did not anticipate that the Sikh army would come as far as the Sutlej, or commit any positive act of aggression; but he saw that the Rani and chiefs, for their own purposes, were 'endeavouring to raise a storm, which, when raised, they will be powerless either to direct or allay.'

This being so, it became necessary to provide for the rapid march of the troops from Meerut, which might at any moment be ordered; and it was in connection with the arrangements for this contingency that Abbott had been summoned. He shall tell his own story.

I was informed by Broadfoot that the Governor-General was much put out by the Commissariat Department. He had asked the Deputy Commissary-General how soon he could collect supplies for 10,000 men, at intervals of twenty miles between Kurnaul and Ferozepore, with a view to the Meerut reserve forces marching up with as little carriage as possible. That officer informed him that it might possibly be done in six weeks.

Sir Henry's reply was more forcible than parliamentary, and he added:

'It must be done in five days;' and, turning to Broadfoot, said, 'You must do it.' 'Well,' said Broadfoot, 'it is rather sharp work, but it shall be done if possible.' And done it was. Broadfoot's object in sending for me was, that I should undertake two of the depôt stations, orders being sent to Mills, Lake, and Nicolson for stations farther in advance.

I had the honour of dining with Sir Henry, and immediately after dinner set off on an elephant, and reached the first depôt station at Pehoa in the early morning of December 5; and having put matters in train, and left my Assistant to complete the arrangements, I rode on to Samanah, in the Puttealah district.

When all was ready there, Abbott rejoined the Governor-General's camp on December 8, one march beyond Ambala, having ridden 100 miles on the fourth day.

Sir Henry expressed himself much gratified, and the Commissary-General was overjoyed, and almost embraced me.

Having completed my mission, I expected to be sent back to my district, where I had left my wife in camp, but Broadfoot ruled it otherwise. He said I must come on with the camp, and he would supply my wardrobe, for I had nothing with me but what was on my back.

On the 9th we made one march, but during the night or towards the morning of the 10th Broadfoot received news of the Sikhs crossing the Sutlej. I was with him in his tent, and I can see him now, in great spirits, hastening on his clothes, and saying, 'If we live through this, Abbott, we are both made men.'

We then went to the Governor-General's camp, and met Sir Henry and his Staff just mounting to move to the next camping ground at Sirhind. Broadfoot reported the news, and after a short conference the war offered by the Sikhs was accepted. Broadfoot and myself were then and there constituted aides-de-camp on Sir Henry's Staff, and I was ordered off in haste to bring down H.M.'s 29th Regiment and the 1st Bengal Fusiliers from Kussowlee and Subathoo, to join the camp at Khanna, or wherever I should find it, by forced marches.

With the hill well known in these parts as Tapp's Nose,[1] just above Kasauli, for a guide, Abbott set off at once across country. Thirty-five miles' ride brought him to Kalka, and eight miles beyond in the hills he arrived at Kasauli, where he found a dinner party being given by the colonel to the officers and ladies of the regiment. Abbott had made such good use of his time, that he had outstripped a messenger sent the previous evening to warn the regiments that they might be called on for service. His arrival at the party was, therefore, to use his own language, 'like the bursting of a shell, for they had no warning of coming events.' They had at once to prepare for a start next morning, and husbands and wives had to part, in many instances for ever.

On the 11th these two fine regiments encamped at Mani

[1] Col. H. M. Tapp appears to have been stationed at Sabathu, and probably exercised political functions under the Resident at the Court of Delhi from 1836 to 1840.

Majra on their way to the front, officers and men in high spirits at the prospect of active service. How and where they found the Governor-General and joined his camp, will in due course be told.

The foregoing information regarding a most important service on which Capt. Abbott was employed is extracted from, and based upon, a memorandum furnished by that officer. The modesty and simplicity with which the story is told afford a strong presumption in favour of its general accuracy.

Mr. Cust, in describing these events, has recorded that on the evening of December 9 he had gone to bed, but had not fallen asleep, when he was sent for and desired to make certain arrangements at once for the supply of the whole Ambala force.

Measures had already been taken to collect at certain places supplies for several thousand men; renewed exertions were now to be made to victual the whole army. Saunders Abbott was sent off to the hills, to bring down the regiments at Sabhatu and Kussoulie. The Lodeanah force was ordered to fall back and meet us at Bussean. All ladies were sent back to Ambala. Capt. Napier and his wife were with us: he is now Napier of Magdála.

Whilst his Assistants were thus employed, Broadfoot was not idle; indeed, constant active employment seems to have prevented his leaving any detailed account of his proceedings; they are merged in those of the Governor-General. The following letter to his sister has a double interest: it was the last ever received by his family from him, and it contains an explicit affirmation that he was employed to maintain peace, and that no Government had ever striven harder for that result.

Camp, Amballa: December 4, 1845.

You complain of my not writing, and I have nothing to say in defence, seeing that, hardworked as I am, I ought to give a few minutes to it; but the lassitude from unceasing labour makes me defer it till, as now, it is all but too late; and even now Sir Henry Hardinge's letter bag is waiting to be sealed till this is closed. The mail is gone, and this goes by an after express.

I am with Sir Henry, and remain with him while he continues in this division of the country. He treats me with the greatest kindness. Nevertheless, I would give a good deal for ever so short a sojourn among you all, with Jessie and all the London party assembled. That, however, must continue, I fear, for some time, a very distant hope.

You ask if I am employed in preserving peace. Of course I am; for whatever may be the result, never did Government strive as this Government has done to keep at peace.

Give everyone my kindest love. Remember me most kindly also to Mr. Loch; say that young Sutherland Orr wrote me lately. I have been too busy to answer, but have been trying to serve him. I fear, however, it is difficult, from his being already well off where he is. Ever &c.

G. BROADFOOT.

The following notes are taken from Capt. Nicolson's diary:

December 8.—The Sikh army has marched, and is in camp two kos (three miles) from the river. . . . They have fixed to cross on Thursday. Their cavalry are reported to be crossing now at Talli and Nagar, with the view of plundering our villages.

9*th*.—Wrote a hurried chit [note] to Broadfoot, telling the position of the Sikh force, and saying we were good for all comers, please God.

11*th*.—We had reports during the night of their crossing, but they did not really begin till morning, when one battalion and two guns and the standards of the others commenced, and the others soon followed. In the evening, nine battalions and eighteen jhandis (colours) were over, and some twenty guns or thereabouts.

The critical reader may notice an apparent discrepancy in the various reports as to the day on which the Sikhs crossed the Sutlej: for example, Capt. Abbott has recorded that Broadfoot received the news of their doing so on the morning of the 10th; whilst here Capt. Nicolson, more immediately in their neighbourhood, has reported that the crossing began on the morning of the 11th. Other slight discrepancies might be instanced. With reference to these there is what seems to be sufficient explanation; in certain cases Broadfoot, though somewhat more remote from the frontier than some of his Assistants, got important and trustworthy news before it reached them; and with reference to the apparent error of date, the fact would seem to have been that comparatively small bodies of the Sikhs crossed the river probably every day from December 8 onwards, but that the main body did not move till the morning of the 11th. This view is fairly consistent with the Governor-General's despatch of December 31, and is, it is believed, sufficient to account for the apparent inaccuracies.

Similar discrepancies, or what appear to be such, are found in respect to the events between the crossing of the Sutlej by the Sikhs and the battle of Múdkí, in which the first actual collision occurred. These are rather annoying than important; they are just sufficiently evident to make a close and detailed examination and tabulation of facts necessary. It is somewhat difficult to account for these mistakes; in certain cases a loose and careless mode of writing, or even a slip of the pen, must be blamed.

Respecting the date on which the Sikhs crossed the Sutlej and thereby provoked the war, some unanimity might have been expected from those who have described the event. Yet we have already noticed the discrepancy between Capt. Abbott's date and that mentioned by Capt. Nicolson. In addition to these it may be observed that the Governor-General has recorded that the Sikh army in large numbers commenced crossing the Sutlej on December 11. In an inclosure to the letter in which this is recorded, the Commander-in-Chief stated that on December 11 it became known in Ambala that the invasion had actually taken place. Now this information, in those days before the telegraph was used, could not by any possibility refer to the event described by the Governor-General, but manifestly alluded to the news received by Broadfoot in Abbott's presence early on the morning of the 10th. But it is more perplexing to find Henry Lawrence, from whom accuracy might have been expected, some time after these events, state precisely that 'on December 12 the Commander-in-Chief moved with his headquarters from Umballa. On the evening of the same day the Sikhs commenced crossing the Sutlej.'[2] The fact being almost certain that the Sikhs commenced crossing the river in violation of existing arrangements as early as December 8; that on the 11th the first crossing of their troops on a large scale occurred; and that the Governor-General selected this serious breach of neutrality as the act which justified the issue of the proclamation dated December 13, which was, in fact, a declaration of war. Therefore it would seem to be correct to adhere to the 11th as the date on which the Sikh army commenced

[2] *Calcutta Review*, No. xvi. vol. viii. art. vi. p. 488.

to cross the Sutlej. Without doubt the operation lasted for several days.

With reference to the various movements of importance between the 11th and the 18th, when the battle of Mudki was fought, it is hoped that the following record is fairly correct. It is compiled from the despatches of the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief, and from the accounts written by Herbert Edwardes and Henry Lawrence in the 'Calcutta Review.'

On December 7 and 8 the Governor-General desired the Commander-in-Chief to move up the force from Ambala, Meerut, and some other stations.[3] He then, being some days' march in advance of the Commander-in-Chief, rode to Ludhiana, inspected the fort, and, seeing that it could be held by a draft of the more infirm soldiers from the regiments stationed there, desired Brigadier Wheeler to be prepared to march at the shortest notice with the rest of his force.

By the 12th the Commander-in-Chief, with the headquarters and the Ambala force, marched sixteen miles to Rajpura. Next day they marched to Sirhind; eighteen miles of a sandy and distressing road. On that day the Governor-General, who was two marches ahead, received the 'precise information that the Sikh army had crossed the Sutlej, and was concentrating in great force on the left bank of the river.' He then issued a proclamation recapitulating events already described, announcing the invasion of our territory by the Sikh troops, and his determination to vindicate the authority of the British Government, and to punish the violators of treaties and the disturbers of public peace.

He declared the cis-Sutlej estates of the Maharaja to be confiscated and annexed to the British territories, and called upon the chiefs and inhabitants of the Protected States for co-operation and fidelity, promising indemnity in case of loss and threatening punishment in case of disobedience. By arrangement he met the Commander-in-Chief one march in advance of the army. The result of the consultation, as far as it affected the Ambala force, was the issue of 'after orders at midnight for a forced march of twenty miles on Esrú.'[4] The object was to reach Bussean before the Sikhs, and pre-

[3] *Papers &c.* p. 26. [4] *Calcutta Review*, No. xi. vol. vi. art. vi. p. 259.

vent them from seizing the supplies which Broadfoot and his Assistants had collected.

By the 14th the comparative safety of this important point was secured; the Ludhiana force, of 5,000 men and twelve guns, having been moved somewhat in front of it.

On December 15 the Umballa force moved on to Luttala, nearer thirty than twenty miles, and orders were issued for a rigid reduction of baggage. On December 16 the force marched thirty miles to Wudní, overtaking the Governor-General and the Lúdiana force at Bussean.[5]

Regarding the supplies for the army, Edwardes remarked that Major Broadfoot might be said to have been the Commissary-General of the army of the Sutlej.

Even after his death his subordinate officers became and continued till very late in the campaign the real Commissariat of the army. The people of the country were now all supposed to be hostile; and those who were with the advanced guard that day will not easily forget Major Broadfoot and his rough-and-ready troop of wild-looking Affghans, galloping across the plain from village to village, summoning out the greybeards, and, with perfect mastery of their corrupt and broken dialect, acquired in a short residence of fifteen[6] months upon the frontier, explaining the terms of the proclamation, and extracting from the most refractory *Mufsid*[7] supplies for the advancing army.[8]

On December 17 a short march of ten miles to Charrak was made, as the long marches had told most severely on man and beast. Next day a march of twenty-one miles brought the force to Mudki, where the first shot of the first Sikh war was fired.

During these days the Sikhs appear to have been employed crossing the river at various fords: on the 15th Capt. Nicolson has recorded that 'the Sikhs crossed, and we stayed where we were.' They plundered several villages situated six or eight miles north-west of Firozpur. At ten o'clock A.M. they threatened Firozpur itself, and Sir J. Littler moved out

[5] *Calcutta Review*, No. xi. vol. vi. art. vi. p. 260.

[6] Thirteen months, to be more accurate.

[7] *Mufsid*, malcontent.

[8] *Calcutta Review*, No. xi. vol. vi. art. vi. p. 260.

to meet them with two brigades. They did not accept the challenge, probably preferring to choose their own ground and to fortify it, so as to make the task of beating them as hard as possible. They encamped at Langiana, about three or four miles north of Firozpur. During the next two days a considerable number of the Sikh troops with guns advanced to Firozshah,[9] and took up a position, which they immediately entrenched and fortified. The news of the approach of the Governor-General towards Mudki reached Firozpur and probably the Sikh camp on the 16th, and the idea seems to have occurred to Raja Lal Singh that by a sudden attack he might be destroyed or captured. The force with the Governor-General was greatly under-estimated; in all probability the Sikhs did not reckon on having to deal with more than the Ludhiana force, and did not think that the Ambala force could have effected a junction. The plan was perfectly reasonable, and likely to be, even if not successful, very embarrassing to the English; for a considerable force, reckoned at sixteen battalions of infantry, over 3,000 cavalry, and fifty guns, threatened Firozpur; a strong force, the numbers of which were not known, had occupied Firozshah; and, in advance, Raja Lal Singh, with a considerable body of men supported by artillery, lay in wait for the Governor-General between Firozshah and Mudki. Such was the position on December 18, but even on that date more Sikhs were crossing the river.

[9] Firozshah, around which the well-known battle was fought, has also been called, with equal error, Ferozshahr and Pheerooshuhur. The correct name is probably Pherú Sháh, called after Bháí Pherú, a devotee or man of religious repute; Sháh being a not unusual title by which such people are addressed. A Punjabi speaking of the battle generally calls it 'Pheru da larai.' Shahr ('city') is a very unusual termination of a village name in that district.

CHAPTER XVI.

1845.

The battle of Mudki—Deaths of Sir R. Sale and Sir J. M'Caskill—Private accounts of the battle—Capt. S. A. Abbott's services—Arrangements for attack at Firozshah—Disposition of the forces—The Sikh position—The battle of Firozshah—Broadfoot killed—Our troops bivouac outside the Sikh lines—Insubordination among the Sikhs—Gravity of the situation of the British—Assault in the morning of the 22nd—Arrival of Tej Singh—Sufferings of our troops—Quotations from despatches—Burial of George Broadfoot—Letters and general orders about his death—His loss regretted in both Houses of Parliament—Opinions of eminent men of his value—Monument and tablet erected—Sir H. Hardinge to the Earl of Ellenborough—Arrival in England of the news of the battles—Comments on the Governor-General's measures—Current criticisms—Propriety of a Governor-General serving in a subordinate capacity discussed—Accusation of treachery made against Sikh leaders rejected—Mr. Currie to Lord Ellenborough—Inscription on the Madras memorial.

THE battle of Mudki was fought on December 18, 1845. On this field Britons met Sikhs for the first time as foes; and there was founded a mutual respect, confirmed three days later at Firozshah, which has lived to the present day.

The force under Raja Lal Singh has been estimated by Cunningham as under 'two thousand infantry, supported by about twenty-two pieces of artillery, and eight or ten thousand horsemen.'[1] Capt. Nicolson's estimate, from native report, fairly agrees with these figures; they are probably as accurate as any which can now be supplied, and may be considered approximate. It should, however, be recorded that the Commander-in-Chief, in his official despatch, made a very different estimate of the strength of his enemy. 'They were said to consist of from 15,000 to 20,000 infantry, about the same force of cavalry, and forty guns.'[2]

On the morning of the 18th the Raja advanced from Firozshah towards Mudki, and sent forward a detachment to

[1] Cunningham's *Sikhs*, p. 301. [2] *Papers &c.* p. 32.

watch and report the movements of the British army. On our side, Broadfoot, with a party of Christie's horse, was similarly employed. When he arrived at Mudki he found it occupied by the Sikh advanced party, of whose strength he was necessarily ignorant. He immediately informed the Commander-in-Chief, who was then about three miles behind. Sir H. Gough formed his troops in order of battle and resumed the march. The Sikh advanced detachment retired on their main body, and informed the Raja of the approach of the British. The latter marched steadily on and reached Mudki at noon; finding it unoccupied, there was a disposition to believe that Broadfoot's report of the Sikh occupation of the village was a false alarm, and the men, exhausted and suffering grievously from thirst, lay down to await the arrival of the baggage. Between two and three o'clock in the afternoon the camels began to come in; their loads were removed, and the men commenced to cook their food. The moment seemed to the Raja propitious for the attack, and he advanced accordingly. A scrap of paper was brought to Broadfoot, who was at luncheon with the Governor-General. He read it, and said, 'The enemy is on us.' He rode at once to the front, and gave immediate warning of the impending attack. He was not at first believed, and even the cloud of dust which appeared in the direction of the enemy failed to convince the sceptical, who attributed it to skirmishers.

'That dust,' he energetically exclaimed, 'covers thousands; it covers the Sikh army.' . . . While the British troops were yet forming, he returned from his reconnaissance, galloped up to the Commander-in-Chief, and gracefully saluting him, pointed to the rising cloud of dust ahead, and said, 'There, your Excellency, is the Sikh army!' It was the Political Agent making over the frontier to the soldier.[3]

The Sikh guns opened fire, and afforded convincing testimony to the accuracy of the Agent's information. The British artillery replied; the cavalry was sent forward, some to turn the right, and the others the left, of the enemy's line, which in length far exceeded that of the advancing British infantry. The cavalry manœuvre was brilliantly successful; the irregular Sikh cavalry was swept away on either side,

[3] *Calcutta Review*, No. xvi. vol. viii. art. vi.

and the guns even, for the moment, were silenced. The infantry continued to advance, and drove the Sikhs in front of them, 'using that never failing weapon, the bayonet, whenever the enemy stood. Night only saved them from worse disaster, for this stout conflict was maintained during an hour and a half of dim starlight, amidst a cloud of dust from the sandy plain, which yet more obscured every object.' [4] Fifteen guns were taken, and next day, apparently, two more were brought from the field to the fort of Mudki, thus making in all seventeen guns captured.[5]

Our loss was heavy; 215 Europeans and natives of all ranks were killed, and 657 were wounded. The enemy's loss cannot be ascertained.

Of the officers who were killed, the most distinguished at the time were Major-Generals Sir R. H. Sale, G.C.B., Quartermaster-General of the Queen's troops, and Sir J. McCaskill, K.C.B. and K.H. The former was struck by a grape shot, and the wound proved to be mortal; the latter was shot dead on the field. Both were veteran officers, whose services were of a highly distinguished order, and the former had especially a deserved reputation for great personal gallantry.

In a previous part of this work, the facts related tend to show that Sale, though personally most brave, was, like many other good men, unduly fearful of responsibility, and therefore scarcely equal to the position in which he was placed during the critical period of the siege of Jalalabad. It is, therefore, a duty as well as a pleasure to record, as fully as space will permit, the leading events of his distinguished career. He was born in 1782, and entered the 36th Regiment in 1795. He had a long and honourable record of service in the field; the principal sieges, battles, and campaigns at which he was present being: Seringapatam, 1799, medal; storming of the Travancore lines, 1809; capture of the Mauritius, 1816; first Burmese war, 1824–25, C.B.; first Afghan war, 1838–41, including the siege of Ghazni, at which he commanded the main column of the attack, and the operations in Kohistan which resulted in the surrender of Dost Muhammad; commanded the garrison of Jalalabad during the siege, 1841–42;

[4] *Papers &c.* p. 32. Commander-in-Chief's despatch, December 19, 1845.
[5] *Paper &c.* p. 24.

served with the army under Gen. Pollock, 1842, G.C.B. and three medals. He fell gallantly at the battle of Mudki, 1845, after more than fifty years' service.[6]

In the House of Lords, the late Lord Ripon, in expressing the regret felt for his loss, remarked: 'One of the most distinguished men in that or in any other army fell in that battle. Who does not know the name of Sir Robert Sale? Who can forget the services he has rendered to his country and his sovereign?' In the House of Commons Sir R. Peel similarly bore testimony to the value of his services.

Sir John McCaskill, too, had seen much service, both in the Peninsular war and in India. It will be recollected that he ommanded the force which took Istalif. He joined the army in 1797, and was, therefore, but two years junior to Sir R. Sale. His meritorious services were also acknowledged in both Houses of Parliament.

Amongst the wounded who afterwards rose to distinction may be mentioned Major P. Grant, D.A.G., dangerously wounded; Capt. Herbert B. Edwardes, A.D.C., slightly wounded; Lieut. G. Reynell Taylor, very severely wounded; and Lieut. Edward Lake.

The following extract from Mr. Cust's memorandum is interesting and graphic.

I found the Governor-General sitting under a tree writing letters. Of a sudden we heard that the Sikh army was *advancing in force*. . . . Our whole army turned out, the sepoys in their dhotees,[7] leaving their food. It was 4 P.M. I overtook Broadfoot and the Governor-General, and stuck to them; we were under a heavy fire. Regiment after regiment passed by us, and the Governor-General pointed out the direction of the advance. We saw old Gen. McCaskill killed. We heard the cheers in the front when the first battery was taken. We passed through it, saw the dead and dying; we saw Sir Robert Sale lying wounded on a gun, and many friends. The firing had now ceased, and the battle was won.

The only other account which should be quoted, and which has not, as far as is known, been previously published, is one

[6] This account of Sir R. Sale's services is taken from an obituary notice in the *Morning Herald* of February 24, 1846.

[7] *Dhotee, dhotī*, is the waist cloth. Hindus when cooking strip themselves to their *dhotis*.

found in an intercepted letter from a father present at the battle on the Sikh side, to his son in Lahore. It has at any rate the merit of being brief, and is probably not a very incorrect description of what took place.

> The Ghorcharras would not come on; the British charged; the Sikhs ran; lots killed and all or nearly all the guns lost.[8]

After the action the Sikhs seem to have retired on their main body at Firozshah, and the British to the village of Mudki.[9]

On the next day, December 19, it was expected that the Sikhs would renew their attack; the British troops were therefore for many hours under arms, but though dust was seen which betokened the presence of the enemy, our men were unmolested. That evening Capt. S. A. Abbott, an Assistant to Major Broadfoot, accompanying the 29th Foot, the 1st European L.I., the 11th N.I., and four heavy guns, arrived after an arduous and harassing march. It is not clear whether the value of Capt. Abbott's services on this occasion has been fully recognised. In a remarkably short space of time he had succeeded in carrying the message to the troops that they were wanted, and in piloting them to the front. The presence of these troops was of vital importance to the army, which even with them was scarcely adequate to the task they had to perform. The Governor-General appreciated this, and warmly thanked Capt. Abbott for his exertions.[1]

[8] Capt. Nicolson's diary. The Ghorcharras were the irregular cavalry.

[9] *Calcutta Review*, No. xviii. vol. ix. art. vi. p. 521.

[1] The Abbott family have rendered varied and meritorious services to their country. Four brothers were in the E.I.C.S. Major-Gen. Augustus Abbott, C.B., of the Bengal Artillery, had medals for Bhartpur, Ghazni, Jalalabad, and Kabul; he also had, but did not wear, the Order of the Durani Empire. He was honorary A.D.C. to the Governor-General, and died in 1867.

Major-Gen Sir Fred. Abbott, Kt., C.B. Bengal Engineers, has medals for Ava, Kabul, and Sobraon. He was for many years Governor of Addiscombe College, Member of the Council of Military Education, and of the Commission for National Defences.

Gen. James Abbott, C.B., Bengal Artillery, has medals for Chilianwala and Gujrat; he also saw service at Bhartpur, and commanded an expedition against the Hassanzais of the Black Mountain. He is best known, perhaps, for his adventurous journey to Khiva to negotiate the release of Russian prisoners, and as in charge of the district of Hazara in the Punjab, the headquarters of which, Abbottabad, is named after him.

On the evening of this day, Sir H. Hardinge tendered his services, as second in command in the field, to Sir H. Gough, who accepted the offer with pleasure.[2]

On the 20th, the British force completed the duty of burying their dead. Broadfoot and his Assistants were busy recording the information collected regarding the Sikh entrenched position at Firozshah.

> The information went to show that the position was entrenched on three sides, surmounted with guns of very heavy metal. It was somewhat in the shape of a horseshoe.
>
> The north face commanded the Loodeanah and Ferozepore road; the south, the road by which we were approaching; and the west, the position of Ferozepore. The eastern face was open and unprotected.
>
> That the position was attacked on the strongest faces was not due to want of information supplied by Broadfoot, . . . but to the desire of the Chiefs to relieve Ferozepore, which was considered to be in danger, and with a view to forming a junction with its garrison before the attack was delivered.[3]

During the evening of December 20, instructions were sent to Sir John Littler to move out from Firozpur towards Mudki with as strong a force as he could spare after providing for the safety of his post. He made his arrangements with great promptitude and skill, completely deceiving Tej Singh, the Sikh commander, who for some time was unaware that Littler had marched.

The plan arranged by the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor-General was, that after a junction with Littler's force had been effected, the combined army should assault the Sikh position in such a way as to interpose, at any rate, a considerable part of the British army between the Sikhs at Firozshah and the station of Firozpur.

To give effect to this, the troops, under the command of

Major-Gen. Saunders A. Abbott, Bengal Army, has a medal and clasp for Mudki and Ferozshah (severely wounded). A.D.C. to the Governor-General. Served in the Civil Department in the Punjab and Oudh; and after he had retired from the service, was Agent for the S. P. & D. Railway Co. at Lahore.

A fifth brother, Keith E. Abbott, served with credit for many years in the Consular Department. Was Consul-General at Tabreez in Persia, and afterwards at Odessa, where he died in 1873. Order of the Lion and Sun.

[2] *Papers &c.* p. 36.

[3] Gen. Abbott's *Episode &c.*

Sir Hugh Gough, marched on the morning of December 21 along the road from Mudki to Firozpur. The sick and wounded were left at Mudki, with two regiments of Native Infantry[4] for their protection. The road lay nearly four miles to the south of the Sikh position, opposite to which, towards midday, a halt was made to enable Littler to join, and advantage was taken by officers and men to eat a hasty meal if they could get it, and enjoy a little rest.

During this halt an incident occurred, which is of interest as illustrating the extreme delicacy of the position occupied by Sir Henry Hardinge. He was by his own offer serving as a lieutenant-general under the Commander-in-Chief; but he remained the responsible Governor-General of India. Whilst he and his Staff were resting and getting something to eat, Sir Hugh Gough arrived, and with characteristic impetuosity urged an immediate attack on the Sikh position, without waiting longer for Littler. The gravity of the situation was perceived by the Governor-General, and his resolution was formed. He retired for a short space with the Commander-in-Chief, pointed out to him that, though second in command as far as leading the troops was concerned, he was still responsible for the safety and welfare of British India, and therefore must, in his capacity of Governor-General, sanction nothing which in his opinion would imperil either. He considered that to attack without waiting for Littler's force was to incur an unnecessary risk of failure, and therefore he pronounced against the proposal.

Opinions differ as to the wisdom of the Governor-General's decision in this matter. This question need not be discussed just now; at present we are mainly concerned with recording events as they happened, as far as we have been able to discover them; and the fact here recorded is at once unusual and important. The Governor-General as supreme ruler in India took the responsibility of superseding the Commander-in-Chief in the field.

Littler's arrival was awaited; he was tolerably punctual, and it is recorded in despatches that the junction was complete by half-past one o'clock. The small plan at the commencement of this chapter shows in a general way the disposition

[4] *Papers &c.* p. 27. Governor-General's despatch.

of the British and Sikh forces, and will, it is hoped, assist the reader to follow the description of the battle.

The army was formed in four divisions; the first, under Sir Harry Smith, being in reserve. The other three were thus arranged: on the right the second division, commanded by Major-Gen. Gilbert; in the centre the third division, under Brigadier Wallace; and on the extreme left the fourth division, under Major-Gen. Sir J. Littler. The artillery was under Brigadier Brooke, and was principally massed between Wallace's and Gilbert's divisions.

The Sikh position was very irregular in shape and roughly traced. The longer sides towards the east and west may be said to have faced Mudki and Firozpur respectively. The entrenchments were not formidable as fortifications; that is, neither were the ditches deep nor the ramparts high. They were simply good shelter trenches, well defended by a well-appointed and easily movable artillery supported by a numerous and determined body of infantry.

Sir John Littler's division was on the left, and with his left thrown forward he appears to have commenced the attack. The Commander-in-Chief led the right wing, and Sir H. Hardinge commanded the left.[5] It was nearly four o'clock when the battle commenced. Littler's men advanced under a most galling and destructive fire to within 150 yards of the batteries, when they were ordered to charge. Had they done so with vigour, they would, in spite of the havoc and slaughter, have effected a lodgment; indeed, it is probable, in that case, that the loss of life would have been less. Unfortunately, they did not press home the charge; the 62nd halted and wheeled about, under an order, it has been said, of the Brigadier in command.[6] In vain did Sir John urge them to seize the prize which was within their grasp; and, ignorant of the order referred to, he naturally concluded that the arrest of the advance, and the retrograde movement, were the result of panic. This attack, therefore, failed; and the division, with greatly reduced numbers, passed the night in the vicinity of the spot occupied by the left of Wallace's division prior to the advance, and out of shot.

[5] *Papers &c.* p. 37.

[6] Compare *Calcutta Review*, No. xi. vol. vi. art. vi. p. 273; and Macgregor's *Sikhs*, vol. ii. p. 106.

It should be mentioned, that as Wallace's division advanced, they met the 14th N.I., who were retiring. That regiment, with its colours, joined the advancing troops, and returned to a more successful assault.

The attack on the south face would seem to have been delayed longer than was intended. As the line advanced, it became evident that its length extended considerably on either side beyond the limits of the immediately opposite part of the Sikh entrenchment.

The first result of this was that the men crowded towards the centre, and before long got in front of our own guns. The Sikh artillery fire was most destructive. Capt. Abbott was sent back to bring up the guns; he had scarcely returned, when his horse was shot and fell under him. He rose, but was immediately struck down by two bullets, one in the shoulder, one in the arm, in such a way as to show that the Sikhs had established a cross fire. Broadfoot, who was on horseback, called out to him to get up, and greatly to his surprise he found he could obey. The next moment it was Broadfoot's turn; he was shot in the thigh, and was either thrown from his horse, or dismounted to examine the nature of his wound. He considered it insufficient to stop him, remounted, and rode on cheering some men into the trenches.

The attack was resolutely made, and the Sikh resistance was most determined. The result was a partial success, achieved at a terrible sacrifice of life. It is difficult to trace precisely the part played by each regiment. In the confusion of the attack it is probable that the relative positions of the regiments were changed, and that this has led to some ambiguity in the various descriptions of the battle. In a general way it may be said that the Sikh batteries were carried at the point of the bayonet; but the Sikhs retired no farther from them than their tents and camp in the immediate rear, from whence they opened a severe musketry fire.

As the assault was being made, the Governor-General and his Staff appear to have moved towards the right. It was to the right of the centre of the south face that Broadfoot rode into the Sikh battery, and there he was killed: shot through the arm and heart, he fell dead. Abbott, noticing some hesitation in two companies of the 80th, and finding that all their

officers had been killed, put himself at their head. They responded to his order, charged the entrenchments, and fired a volley into the Sikh tents, which were set on fire, and the blaze spread along the line. The different regiments penetrated different distances into the Sikh camp. The despatches and some other accounts seem to show that those on the right got farthest in; and, indeed, the reserve under Sir Harry Smith[7] and part of the 1st E.L.I. are said to have reached the village of Firozshah and swept the Sikhs out of a great part of their camp.[8] H.M.'s 3rd Dragoons added to the reputation they had so justly acquired at Mudki. They were sent against a battery from which the Sikhs maintained a heavy fire. They charged, and carried it—

> the leaders filling up the yawning trench with their own numbers, and those who followed crossing on a living bridge of their comrades. . . . Having put the artillerymen to death and silenced the battery, this gallant band faced the whole Khalsa army within the entrenchment, swept through their camp with loud huzzas over tents, ropes, pegs, guns, fires, and magazines, cutting down all that opposed their passage; and, having traversed the enemy's position from side to side, emerged among their friends, with numbers thinned indeed, but 'covered with imperishable glory.'[9]

The combat was continued with obstinacy on either side till night fell, and even then it did not cease. Numerous explosions of mines or magazines occurred, one of which took effect under the feet of the 1st E.L.I., the distinguished regiment of which William Broadfoot had been adjutant; and rending it in twain scattered the survivors on either side. The brave men, however, when no longer able to find their own regiment, attached themselves to the nearest and continued the struggle. The Sikh fire was so destructive, and successful progress in the dark so improbable, that it was decided to withdraw the troops from the entrenchments, restore some degree of order, and await the dawn. Accordingly a position from 300 to 400 yards distant from the south face of the Sikh camp was selected, and there were gathered together the remnants of Gilbert's and Wallace's divisions.

[7] The movements of the reserve under Sir Harry Smith are involved in considerable obscurity. The despatch in which they are described is far from being either clear or distinct.

[8] *The War in India: Despatches &c.*

[9] *Calcutta Review*, No. ix. vol. vi. art. vi. p. 276.

Their combined strength did not exceed that of one division, and the men were exhausted, hungry, and thirsty. They were put under Gen. Gilbert's command, and with them were Sir H. Gough and Sir Henry Hardinge, who were indefatigable in visiting the various regiments or detachments, encouraging the men, and, with Gen. Gilbert, showing an example of calmness and fortitude most valuable in that trying time. Thus order was restored, and the men lay down to rest.

As has been already stated, the movements of the reserve are somewhat doubtful. The troops under Sir H. Smith are said to have penetrated to the village of Firozshah, to have held it for some time, and eventually during the night to have retired to Misriwala, distant about two miles to the south or south-west.

The Sikhs, having recovered that part of their position, appear to have somewhat cautiously returned to the batteries on the south face. They manned some guns and opened fire whenever they could discover the position of any part of the British force. On one occasion the fire was so harassing, that Sir Henry Hardinge called on the 80th and 1st E.L.I. to charge the battery.

> Lieut.-Col. Bunbury, assisted by Lieut.-Col. Wood, my aide-de-camp, led the attack, on which occasion the latter officer was wounded. The guns were spiked, the enemy driven away with loss, and this part of our line left undisturbed for the remainder of the night.[1]

Fortunately for us, insubordination and licence prevailed in the Sikh camp: the Akalis plundered the tents of Lal Singh, the Sikh commander-in-chief; a general riot ensued, and the remnants of discipline were lost. This was not known to our leaders; had it been realised, they would have been spared a night of anxiety unparalleled in our experience of war in India. The prospect, it cannot be disputed, was gloomy in the extreme. The Sikhs had practically recovered the whole of their entrenched camp. The remnant of Sir John Littler's division was away in a village due west of Firozshah, Sir Harry Smith's division was two miles distant in another direction, each ignorant of the position and intentions of the other, and of those of the exhausted division and headquarters which alone remained on the field.

[1] *Papers &c.* p. 44.

It is not a matter of surprise that some officers were unequal to the emergency, and suggested retreat on Firozpur; nor will it astonish anyone acquainted with the impetuous gallantry of the Commander-in-Chief, and the quieter but not inferior resolution of the Governor-General, that such suggestions met with the reception which they deserved.

The two Chiefs met in the night and decided, without hesitation, that the attack must be at once resumed in the morning, and that the result must be victory or death.

In case of disaster, which was far from impossible, the Governor-Governor sent orders to Mudki, where Mr. Currie was in charge of the official papers of the Government of India, and Mr. Cust of the records of the Agency, for the destruction of all State papers. Sir Henry's son Charles, who was private secretary, being a civilian, was ordered off the field. Major Somerset conveyed the order, and was mortally wounded about five minutes afterwards. Mr. Hardinge passed the night with Major Brind's battery, and rejoined the Governor-General next morning immediately after the Sikh camp had been carried. Prince Waldemar of Prussia and his suite were also desired to leave the field, but not before Dr. Hoffmeister had been killed.

Whilst thus the situation of the British, as far as could be known to their leaders, was well nigh desperate,[2] there is no doubt that the courage and resolution of the Sikhs had been severely tried by the day's fighting, and had much abated. Their position, defended by an artillery greatly superior in number and weight of guns to that of their assailants, had been stormed at the point of the bayonet; whilst, as has been recorded, the 3rd Dragoons had ridden over and through their camp, unchecked by opposition or by obstacles. Such shocks are not without their effect, and cannot be sustained with impunity. One result was manifest in the insubordination and riot already mentioned. And so it happened that when dawn at last appeared, and the one division on the field, which had been led forward in the dark close to the edge of the entrenchment, and there lay concealed, arose and delivered its

[2] The position of the British was unnecessarily aggravated by the action of an officer in the Adjutant-General's Department, who, presumably acting under some uncontrollable impulse of a mind unequal to the situation, ordered several regiments to retire from the field to Firozpur. The order was obeyed by a considerable portion of the force.

assault, a success was achieved which decided the result of the battle.

As in the proceedings of the previous day, so in the accounts of what took place on the morning of the 22nd, differences and discrepancies are to be found. In the despatches of the Commander-in-Chief, and of Sir H. Hardinge as second in command, it is stated that Gough led the right, and Hardinge the left; but Major-Gen. Gilbert has reported thus:

> The front of the left of my division was led into action by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and the right by the Right Hon. the Lieut.-Gen. Sir H. Hardinge, and I myself leading her Majesty's 80th Foot; and notwithstanding the advance was made under a tremendous fire of heavy guns, the enemy's entrenchment was retaken, battery after battery, at the bayonet's point.[3]

It is not, perhaps, of much importance to fix precisely the posts occupied by the two leaders. Sir Henry Hardinge had sent his son Arthur, the only unwounded member of his Staff, with Col. Benson to bring up Sir J. Littler and his division; but the advance was not delayed till they arrived. On hearing the firing commence, Capt. Hardinge galloped on and rejoined his father, who, with the Commander-in-Chief and the officers of their Staff, rode thirty yards in front of the British line to prevent the men from firing.

The assault was made on the south face, which was carried; the troops then turned, swept eastwards, keeping the village of Firozshah on their left, and emerged victorious on the plain to the north. There they were formed in line, and received their two leaders with loud cheers. Many standards, seventy-three guns, and the whole Sikh position, were in possession of the victors.

But their work was not yet done. Tej Singh, who commanded the force which threatened Firozpur, either attracted by the cannonade, or more probably informed by some of the fugitive Sikhs that the fortune of the day was going against them, brought up his army, principally cavalry, and a large field of artillery. By this time Sir J. Littler and Sir Harry

[3] Major-Gen. Gilbert's despatch to the Commander-in-Chief, dated Dec. 24, 1845. *War in India: Despatches &c.* second edition, 1846, p. 70.

Smith, with their men, had joined; but at no moment was the situation of the British more critical than when Tej Singh's fresh troops drove in our wearied cavalry parties, whose horses could not even muster a trot. Our soldiers were exhausted and starving: there was no ammunition for the guns. Fortunately the Sikh commander did not know to what extremity we were reduced. He made a strenuous effort to regain the position, was repulsed, but immediately renewed the contest, and opened a heavy fire from his artillery. Our guns could not reply, but the best that could be done was done: a bold front was shown to the enemy, and preparations were made indicative of an intention to attack him on either flank.[4] Meanwhile Tej Singh became aware of the loss and carnage which had attended our capture of the position; and considering that an assault when we were the defenders would be hopeless, he withdrew his troops, to the intense relief of the British leaders.[5]

Thus, after a prolonged and determined struggle, which had lasted with but little interruption for twenty-four hours, the British remained masters of the field, and the Sikhs, defeated but not demoralised, retreated towards the Sutlej.

The British loss during the twod ays' fighting amounted to 694 killed and 1,721 wounded; in all, 2,415 of all ranks.

This description of the battle of Firozshah has been compiled from many sources, some of which have been accessible to the public and others have not. Endeavour has been made to omit what is merely conjecture, and to verify the statements

[4] *Papers &c.* p. 38.

[5] This is the reason given by Tej Singh himself for his inaction, and it seems sufficient. Gen. S. A. Abbott has recorded the following remarks on the subject: 'It has been said that Tej Singh, alarmed by the movement of the troops which deserted the field the previous evening, thinking it a threatening flank movement, desisted from the attack; but he informed the writer of these lines, some time afterwards, that finding the loss we had sustained in capturing the position, as evidenced by the numbers slain, he gave it up as hopeless when we were the defenders.' (*Episode &c.*) This account has been recently confirmed by Major-Gen. R. Young, R.E., who, being present soon after at an interview between Henry Lawrence and Tej Singh, heard the former ask the latter why he withdrew. Tej Singh replied as indicated in the text. The retrograde movement of our cavalry and some of our artillery on Firozpur, in obedience to an unauthorised order, may have nevertheless influenced the Sardar; that it did so is believed by some whose opportunities for observing, and ability to deduce correctly, entitle their opinion to consideration.

made; but the difficulty of making a trustworthy and complete account of circumstances and movements, in themselves involved in confusion and obscurity, as well as of reconciling evidence apparently conflicting, is fully realised.

The sufferings of the troops, both wounded and unwounded, may be more easily imagined than described. As far as can be ascertained, it would seem that, with the exception of some limited refreshment about noon of the 21st, neither food nor water which could be used was available till the evening or night of the 22nd. A very scanty supply of rum was served out during the night of the 21st. Dead bodies had been thrown into the wells at Firozshah by the Sikhs in order to make the water undrinkable. There was no field hospital, nor were medical stores, instruments, or appliances procurable, save those attached to regimental hospitals. Capt. Abbott, who, though severely wounded, had with great gallantry continued to serve wherever he could be useful, has thus described the night of December 22:

> The Governor-General bivouacked under a tree that night with a miserably reduced Staff, of which I was one, desperately hungry. But fortunately during the night some refreshments came up. The next morning, [the 23rd] I accompanied Sir Henry Hardinge on an elephant to Ferozepore.

There Abbott's wounds were for the first time attended to; he was laid up for six weeks, during which he was often visited by Sir Henry, and 'properly supplied with every necessary by the well-known Buxoo, the head butler.' The other wounded occupants of his tent were Herbert Edwardes and Paul Haines, now Sir F. P. Haines, who afterwards became Commander-in-Chief in India.

Of those killed, the foremost place in Sir Henry Hardinge's despatches is assigned to George Broadfoot, because of his official position and the value of his services, political and military. The same compliment may be appropriately paid in this book to him whose services form its most prominent feature. The paragraphs in which his death is recorded are as follows: first in despatch as second in command:

> It is now with great pain that I have to record the irreparable loss I have sustained . . . in the death of Major Broadfoot, of the Madras Army, my Political Agent. He was thrown from his horse

by a shot, and I failed in prevailing upon him to leave the field. He remounted, and shortly afterwards received a mortal wound. He was as brave as he was able in every branch of the political and military service.[6]

Again, in a letter to the Secret Committee:

I have now to conclude this despatch by expressing my deep concern for the loss, in the action of the 21st instant, of that most invaluable officer, Major Broadfoot, my Political Agent for these States. He was wounded and thrown off his horse at my side, but I failed in prevailing on him to retire. He remounted his horse, and shortly afterwards received a mortal wound in leading on the troops against the battery in our front. I entertained the highest opinion of his abilities. He was second to none in this accomplished service, in every qualification by which the political or military interests of the East India Company could be advanced; and I shall be most gratified if, at a season of more leisure, some special mark of honour can be conferred, by which his great merits and glorious death may be perpetuated.

Major George Broadfoot was the last of three brothers, who held appointments in the Company's army, and all these have fallen in battle, in the service of their country.[7]

Brigadier Wallace 'fell bravely at the head of his troops.'

Major Somerset was mortally wounded about the same time that Broadfoot was killed; he 'was shot through the body, conducting himself with the hereditary courage of his race. He was always foremost where difficulties required to be overcome.'

Capt. P. Nicolson, whose name has often appeared in these pages, was killed on the 21st in the assault on the western face led by Sir J. Littler. The Governor-General has recorded that he 'was a most able and gallant officer.'

The officers of the Agency, Major Broadfoot's Assistants, mentioned in the despatch of the Governor-General to the Secret Committee, were Capt. Abbott, Lieut. Lake, Capt. Mills, and Mr. Cust; Mr. Currie's services as Chief Secretary to the Government of India were also warmly acknowledged.

For a complete list of the officers killed and wounded, or specially mentioned, reference must be made to the despatches which are printed and available to the public. The selection

[6] *Papers &c.* p. 45. Despatch of Lieut.-Gen. Sir H. Hardinge.

[7] *Papers &c.* p. 28. Despatch of the Governor-General, dated Dec. 31, 1845.

of the names here recorded is not intended to be in any way invidious, but is made because of their connection with Major Broadfoot, either in the conduct of the business of the Agency, or as, for the time, fellow members of the Staff of the Governor-General.[8]

After the battle the British army marched to Sultan-khanwala, where they destroyed about 80,000 lbs. of gun-powder collected by the Sikhs; and afterwards the head-quarters moved towards the Sutlej in the neighbourhood of Atari and Butawala, in the direction of Harike. There they remained awaiting ammunition and reinforcements.

From Firozpur the Governor-General issued the usual notifications, proclamations, and general orders.

On Christmas Day, 1845, Major Broadfoot's body, with that of Capt. Hore, Assistant Military Secretary, who had been killed about the same time and near the same place, was brought into Firozpur. He was buried with military honours, the Governor-General and his Staff attending the funeral.

It is appropriate to record here letters from persons well qualified to judge of Broadfoot's character and merits; the reader, who has accompanied us so far, can form his own estimate of the man as a soldier, as an administrator, and as a diplomatist.

On December 30, Mr. Cust, his Personal Assistant, wrote to Broadfoot's only surviving brother as follows:

Camp, Ferozepore: December 30, 1845.

My dear Sir,—It is my painful duty to announce to you the death of your brother, Major George Broadfoot, in whose demise I have lost a valued and esteemed friend, and the East India Company one of their most distinguished and talented servants. Your brother's end was caused by a shot through the heart while accompanying the Governor-General on the battle-field of Ferozshahr on December 21. He was first wounded through both thighs, and thrown off his horse; but with that gallantry which distinguished him through life, he again mounted his horse, when almost immediately he was pierced through the heart and arm, and fell dead. His remains were brought in and buried with the usual honours at Ferozepore, in the presence of the Governor-General.

[8] Capt. Herries and Capt. Munro, both A.D.C., were killed at Mudki. Capt. Hore at Firozshah. All the Staff were killed or wounded except Capt. Arthur Hardinge.

Everyone bears testimony to the singular talents, and noble and heroic character, that distinguished your lamented brother; but it remains to those who knew him intimately as I did, to speak of his kindness of heart, his benevolence, his wonderful and almost universal information. I have lived with him as his private secretary for more than a year, and have sincerely to regret his loss, both in a public and private view.

Yours &c. ROBERT CUST.

The Governor-General wrote thus to Mr. Alexander Broadfoot:

Camp, Ferozpoor: January 1, 1846.

My dear Sir,—You and I have sustained an irreparable loss.

Your able and distinguished brother fell by a grape shot in the battle of Ferozshah on December 21, whilst bravely animating the troops to do their duty. The first shot threw him off his horse by my side. I in vain entreated him to retire. His invincible courage induced him to remount, and he was killed as we took the batter in our front.

I caused him to be brought in here and buried in the military burial ground; my chaplain and all of us, who admired and esteemed him, attending at this last mournful ceremony.

His abilities were of the highest order; and in all the relations of life, whether public or private, the force of his character was felt and appreciated.

In my despatch to the Committee of the E.I.C. I have expressed my sentiments of my late friend. I send you a copy. If ever I should have the felicity of making your acquaintance, I should be most happy to express to you how sincerely I was attached to him. I never can replace him. I remain &c.

H. HARDINGE.

And again:

Camp, Ferozpoor: January 13, 1846.

My dear Sir,—My invaluable friend, your late brother, being an officer on the Madras Establishment, I wrote a letter to the Marquis of Tweeddale, desiring that the services of Major Broadfoot might be noticed in a general order to be published to the whole of the Madras Army, to which he belonged.

Scarcely a day passes in the midst of these stirring scenes which does not forcibly remind me of the loss the service has sustained in your admirable brother.

The Arab on which he was mounted has had two bullets extracted, and will recover. I am now the owner of the animal, and

with care he will be fit to be ridden, and always be a protected favourite of my stud.[9]

Mr. Cust will have written to you on matters relating to your brother's affairs. Believe me &c.

H. HARDINGE.

The general order referred to, dated January 10, 1846, is as follows:

Sir,—I am directed by the Governor-General to state, for the information of the Most Noble the Governor in Council of Fort Saint George, that in the battle fought at Ferozshah, on December 21, Brevet Major Broadfoot, C.B., of the 34th Regiment, Madras Army, was killed in action.

2. The Governor-General desires me to observe, that the career of this brave officer had been so highly distinguished during the Afghan war, and in the defence of Jellalabad, and now so gloriously closed in the hour of victory (for he fell in the enemy's camp, which had been carried), that he deems it his duty to the Madras Army to cause the circumstances under which he died to be promulgated for the satisfaction of that army.

3. Major Broadfoot's remarkable intelligence had induced the Governor-General, in the latter end of 1844, to appoint him to be his Political Agent on the North-Western Frontier. In the performance of this very arduous duty, he on all occasions evinced great ability and judgment.

4. In reporting the death of this most able officer to the home authorities, the Governor-General has expressed his sense of his merits in the following words. . . .[1]

5. Major Broadfoot's remains were laid in the burial ground of this cantonment, by the side of Sir Robert Sale's and Major Somerset's, with the military honours due to his rank; the Governor-General and his Staff, and the civil authorities, attending the funeral.

6. The Governor-General deeply regrets the loss which the public service has sustained by the death of this distinguished officer. I have &c.

J. STUART, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

[9] Sir Henry's son, the present Lord Hardinge, has remarked: 'I often rode this horse myself; so did the Governor-General, who was very fond of him. The shot passed clean through the withers. He was kept in the Governor-General's stable till he left India.'

[1] The quotation is omitted, as it has already been made. See page 399.

Lieut.-Col. H. Havelock to Miss Broadfoot.

Simla: October 30, 1846.

My dear Miss Broadfoot,—Three or four days ago your letter of the 5th ultimo reached me, and I cannot describe the emotion with which I received a communication from one so near to my lost and ever lamented friend. How often, in my evening rides at this place, do I look up as I pass it at the house on a lofty eminence which George Broadfoot occupied last year, and almost expect to see his well-known figure pacing his favourite verandah; and then when I awake to the reality of my loss, with how heavy a heart do I move on around the mountain, kept back from the sin of repining only by the remembrance of God's presence, of the innumerable comforts and blessings with which my cup still overflows, and of the necessity of calmly acquiescing in the inscrutable decrees of Providence, which, though painful and seemingly severe, are assuredly benevolent and wise!

. . . . . .

I rejoice indeed to hear of the pensions granted to you and your sister, as a tribute of respect to the memory of dear Broadfoot. Lord Hardinge told me a few days before that this arrangement had been or would be made. His Lordship's regard for your brother, my lamented friend, was perfectly enthusiastic. To love and admire him, indeed, it was only necessary to understand, and not to envy; but to compass these two was a difficulty too great for small men and bad men; and you will conceive that we are not exempt from the plague of selfish sciolists [2] in India any more than in other countries.

I have been attempting a memoir of my friend, to be published either in the paper called the 'Friend of India' or the 'Calcutta Review.' A part of it is already in type; and I took some extracts from the journal to aid me. I have felt, indeed, at every step that the time, as you observe, was not yet come to speak plainly about Jellalabad, whilst regarding Maulmain my information was deficient. However, if my sketch is only finished, it shall, I will take care, be sent to you, and I think I must venture then to ask of you to aid me with facts to enable me to write more fully at some future period. You will not find the journals when they reach you very ample, for the entries in them were evidently made in great haste in two small books. . . . There is attached, however, a very valuable memorandum of the proceedings of the council of war at Jellalabad, in which I may say your brother George's firmness mainly contributed to the salvation of Sale's force. Of this he had previously sent me a copy. The most valuable pages in the journal are those which contain a record

[2] This word is doubtful; the original is difficult to read.

of Broadfoot's own views during the blockade of Jellalabad, which are clear and convincing, at times almost prophetic. . . .

Believe me &c.

H. HAVELOCK.

Lord Ellenborough to Miss Broadfoot.

(Extract.) Southam House: April 12, 1846.

Madam,—I have read with the most sincere interest, but with much pain, your letter. . . .

You must well know the personal regard as well as the public confidence I reposed in your brother.

Of the seven officers who had been on my personal staff and were present in the late battles, four were killed and three were wounded; of these, one, I fear, mortally; but deeply as I lament the misfortunes of all of them, I feel that on public grounds I must give my greatest sorrow to the fate of your brother; while I know at the same time that I lost in him one of the truest friends I made in India, where I hope I made many.

Time will, I trust, give tranquillity of mind to you and your sister; but the loss you have sustained is in all respects irreparable.

I beg you to believe me &c.

ELLENBOROUGH.

On Monday, March 2, 1846, Major Broadfoot's death was recorded as a public calamity in both Houses of Parliament. The following are extracts from the speeches in which the thanks of Parliament were conveyed to the Army of the Sutlej. There is an inaccuracy in the Earl of Ripon's speech, but it is of little consequence. Broadfoot had held the post of Agent for about fourteen months only, not for two years and a half; but he had previously acquired considerable knowledge of the country and of some of the leading men.

In the House of Lords, the Earl of Ripon, after bearing testimony to the value of the services of the Governor-General, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Army of the Sutlej generally, and after deploring the loss of Sir Robert Sale and Sir J. McCaskill, proceeded to say:

There was another individual who fell in this action, whom I cannot help noticing, even if it should appear to be somewhat invidious to do so, because it is impossible to mention all who fell on this occasion: I mean Major Broadfoot, one who has singular demands upon our respect and gratitude, as a political servant of

the Company, as well as in his military capacity. He had been two years and a half Political Agent of the Governor-General in those quarters, and performed his duties in a manner which won for him universal respect and admiration. He knew the country and he knew the people, and of all men was perhaps the most fitted to be employed in so delicate and difficult a mission. Admirably, however, as he performed his civil duties, he did not forget what belonged to his military character. If he had any fault, it was that of being too forward. He was always first in the fray, and in this instance he paid the penalty of his gallant character. The tribute paid to him by the Governor-General is no more than is just and deserved; and though I have no right to panegyrise him as an officer, yet, knowing what he has done in his political character, I thought I was bound to notice the irreparable loss which we have sustained by the death of that individual.

In the House of Commons, in his speech on the same subject, Sir Robert Peel said:

We have, Sir, also to deplore the loss of Sir J. McCaskill, to whom a brief but touching testimony of approbation is borne in the despatch of the Commander-in-Chief, as well as one of the most eminent men in the civil and military services of India—Major Broadfoot. In that gentleman the highest confidence was placed by everyone who came in contact with him. He obtained the applause of every civil and military authority in the country, and his prudence and skill as a civilian were only equalled by his ardour and bravery in the field. He was, I believe, the last of three brothers, all of whom have died in the service of their country on the field of battle. Major Broadfoot was present with Sir R. Sale during the siege of Jellalabad, and took a most conspicuous part in its defence. It is mournful, Sir, that we should have to deplore the loss in the same conflict of two gallant men so devoted to their country's service as Sir R. Sale and Major Broadfoot.

The following letter from the Earl of Ripon to Miss Broadfoot has an interest because it is from the person to whom Major Broadfoot's secret reports were submitted in the ordinary course of business. He was therefore specially qualified to pronounce an opinion on the value of the Agent's services.

Putney Heath: April 14, 1846.

Madam,—I have the honour to acknowledge your letter of the

8th inst., and beg you will accept my grateful thanks for the manner in which you have expressed yourself in respect to what was stated by me in the House of Lords regarding your lamented brother. I can claim no other merit in having so spoken of him than that of having spoken the literal truth: and the manner in which my observations were received by the House satisfied me that those to whom they were addressed fully sympathised with my own feelings.

. . . . . .

I have no right to intrude upon you, or other of Major Broadfoot's family, with my personal condolence. But next to those higher sources of consolation to which you refer, it must be grateful to you to know the universal admiration and respect in which Major Broadfoot's memory is held, not merely by those who knew him, but by the public at large. No one not connected with his family can entertain those feelings more strongly than I do.

I have &c.

RIPON.

Over Broadfoot's grave at Firozpur his friend Colin Mackenzie caused a stone to be placed, on which there is a brief inscription, in which he is termed 'the foremost man in India.' Exception has, not unnaturally perhaps, been taken to the expression; the benevolent ascribing it to the well-known enthusiastic admiration of his friend. But the opinion there expressed was shared by many well qualified to judge. It might be less briefly but more accurately defined thus: that Broadfoot, in the eminence of services rendered, and the brilliant promise of services to come, had distanced all competitors of his own standing, and had passed the greater number of his seniors.

Amongst those who appear to have concurred with Colin Mackenzie in his estimation of Broadfoot's value, may be mentioned Sir Henry Havelock and Sir Herbert Edwardes. The former was by nature rather cold and prudent than enthusiastic, and therefore what he has said on the subject is entitled to weight.

In 1848, in seconding an address to Sir George Clerk in Bombay, Havelock said:

> Now, of the defenders of Jellalabad, Sir Robert Sale, Col. Dennie, and greater than either—greater than any and all that fought for the defence of that old wall—Major George Broadfoot are in their soldiers' graves.

Further, in a letter dated March 9, 1849, he remarked:

To my youngest son, born in June 1847, I have ventured to give the names of George Broadfoot. If he lives to look upon a battle-field, surely his heart will not fail him when he thinks of this prefix to his father's designation.[3]

And again on June 5, 1856, in a letter to this son:

I have just returned from the tomb of the great man after whom you are named—Major George Broadfoot. He is called in the inscription on it, from the pen of his friend Colin Mackenzie, 'the foremost man in India,' and truly in intellect and resolution he was.[4]

Sir Herbert Edwardes was a younger man than Broadfoot, Havelock was older. The younger man thus wrote after a description of the battle of Firozshah:

Foremost among the dead, as he was for ever foremost among the living, let us weep over GEORGE BROADFOOT, with whose life there left this earth one of the noblest spirits that ever lit upon it. Alas, that even the memory of such a man should not be sacred from slander, calumny, and *lies*—lies as black as his name was *fair!* . . .

A more honourable man than George Broadfoot never lived. . . . Whatever may have been Lord Ellenborough's deficiencies, he was undoubtedly possessed of that keen insight into character which is, to statesmen and governors, *a diviner's rod.*

A civil reformer was wanted in Maulmain: Broadfoot was selected; and scarcely were the abuses of a corrupt administration in those provinces cleared away, than he was chosen to succeed Col. Richmond in the important charge of the North-West Frontier. A higher compliment could not have been paid by the Government than in thus calling him from one extremity of the Empire to another. The nature of our relations with the Punjab at this crisis has been fully entered into at the commencement of this article; and the 'Papers laid before Parliament' supply us with abundant evidence, and indeed the most repeated and solemn assurances, that the course which Sir H. Hardinge wished to steer through that stormy sea was the one which promised most effectually to maintain *peace.* The danger is throughout admitted to be great; fears even are anxiously confessed that war cannot be avoided; but *peace* is declared to be the Governor-General's *policy*; and for its

[3] *Memoirs of Sir H. Havelock &c.* p. 167. [4] *Ibid.* p. 215.

preservation the Governor-General is ready to incur the reproach of infatuation and neglect, to sacrifice everything except the national *honour*. When, therefore, this same Governor-General, who has staked all on peace, finds himself plunged in *war*—and that war threatening to embarrass his whole administration if not endanger the very stability of the Empire—it would have been only too consistent with weak human nature, and especially hard, ungrateful, *statesman nature*, if he had at once thrown the whole blame of the frustration of his policy on the incapacity or treachery of the Agent who should have carried it out. That that Agent was *dead*, would only have made the plan more feasible, and surprised us less; for it is astonishing how uncomplainingly the dead bear the burdens of the living! Sir Henry Hardinge, however, was too true a soldier to ask any man to fight his battles; and he pronounced over Broadfoot's tomb—or rather over his grave, for those were not the days of *tombs*—that remarkable eulogy, *that* '*he was second to none in this accomplished service.*' No man can read that passage of Sir Henry Hardinge's despatch, wherein he laments the untimely death of his Agent, and expresses his determination 'at a season of more leisure to confer some special mark of honour, by which his great merits and glorious death may be perpetuated,' without a full conviction that it came from the *heart*, and was written of one who had *done his duty ably and conscientiously to the Government*. Let those, therefore, who are not behind the scenes, and have no means of judging what Broadfoot either *did* or *did not*; who have no access to public documents, and who could possibly know nothing of a man who had *no confidant* in State affairs; reflect for a moment on what is implied in the charge of 'forcing on the war,' and pause ere they vilify the memory which the Governor-General of India and the Prime Minister of England have delighted to honour.[5]

These observations might well have been kept in mind by some who have undertaken to write the history of those times. In some cases the accusation was made through ignorance, in others from causes of a different character; but it is trusted that the papers now published form a complete reply, and may be held to entirely refute the charge.

The opinion of Broadfoot's character held by an older and by a younger man have been expressed: the sentiments of the Governor-General, who was Broadfoot's immediate official superior, are declared in the following extracts: the first is from a letter to Mr. Alexander Broadfoot, dated May 18, 1846.

[5] *Calcutta Review*, No. xi. vol. vi. art. vi. pp. 282–284.

I shall never cease to regret the loss of your excellent brother, on my own and the public account. He united a greater variety of admirable qualities than any other officer I have met with in the Indian Army.

The next is from a letter to Miss Broadfoot:

Great Stanhope Street: July 4, 1849.

. . . All your excellent brother's letters will bear the severest scrutiny in proof of the integrity and judgment with which all his political and diplomatic duties were transacted, his private letters always confirming his public acts; and though written at moments of great fatigue, show in every line the energy and ability of his superior mind. I accidentally perused a memoir of his on Jellalabad, which induced me to come to the decision that he was the ablest man I could select for the most difficult station; and had his ardent courage been of a less heroic stamp, he might have refrained from further conflict after his first wound, which threw him off his horse by my side. But, guided by his noble courage, as long as he could sit his horse he felt he could be useful at a most critical moment of the battle; and at the close of the assault on the enemy's batteries he received his mortal wound at the very moment of our success.

There was a project of building a church at Ferozpoor when I left India, which I hope will shortly be carried into execution, on the inside walls of which I have ordered a tablet in gun-metal to be erected as a testimonial of my personal friendship for the dear friend we have lost.

You are aware that the E.I.C. feel the greatest difficulty in laying down any rule by which selections could be determined upon for raising public monuments at their expense to the memory of officers dying in their service.

In your brave brother's instance the monument ordered by the officers of the Madras Army will, however, be an honourable and lasting testimonial to his fame; whilst my more humble tribute, as a personal friend, will, on every Sabbath day, remind every young officer of the meritorious life and heroic death of the most accomplished officer of the Indian Army, near the spot where I attended his burial after the battle of Ferozshahur.

I will not dwell on this subject. The perpetuation of his fame will be secured in the Presidency, and near the spot where he devoted his life to his country; and in Madras, which army can claim the honour of lending Broadfoot to Bengal, his memory will survive as long as the British power in India.

Yours &c.

HARDINGE.

Two more expressions of Havelock's opinion seem worthy of record here. The first is to Mrs. Anderson, a distant connection of the Broadfoot family.

George Broadfoot was my most intimate friend. Our intimacy was not indeed of long duration, for it began in the defile of Khoord Cabool, and ended on the bloody field of Ferozeshahur. But I not only ever regarded him, and think him still, a giant in intellect and resolution amongst ordinary men, but I was attracted in a manner which I should in vain attempt to describe, by the truthfulness of his mind, the largeness and tenderness of his heart, and the more than Roman self-devotion of his character.

The other is a quotation from the 'Memoirs of Sir H. Havelock.'

In the annals of British India . . . there is no name more illustrious than that of George Broadfoot. Havelock, his bosom friend, remarks of him: 'No person of common discernment could have enjoyed opportunities of knowing him intimately without perceiving that he was eminently, as old Paoli described the youthful Napoleon, "one of Plutarch's men," a man formed, if his life had been spared, to play a leading part in great events, and astonish those who gazed around and after him, by the vigour and grasp of his intellect, his natural talent for war and policy, his cool and sound judgment, his habit and powers of generalisation, his moral courage and personal intrepidity, and his uncompromising love of truth.' [6]

Sir Henry Lawrence, who succeeded Broadfoot on the frontier, and who could not be correctly described as his enthusiastic admirer, has recorded that he 'had no equal on the frontier, and perhaps few in India.' [7]

These opinions and estimates of Broadfoot's character and ability, held by distinguished men, having been freely quoted, there is no necessity to add further praise, which might, moreover, be attributed to exaggeration not unnatural under the circumstances.

As an acknowledgment of his services the Court of Directors continued the allowance of 200*l.* a year which he had made to his two unmarried sisters.

The following letter from Sir Henry Hardinge to the Earl

[6] Marshman's *Life of Havelock*, p. 86.

[7] *Calcutta Review*, No. xvi. vol. viii. art. vi. note, p. 476.

of Ellenborough is full of interest: it was written on the eighth day after the battle, whilst recollection was fresh.

Camp, Ferozpoor: December 30, 1845.

My dear Lord Ellenborough,—The despatches will inform you that the Sikhs have crossed the Sutlege in great force, that we moved up the Umballa force to support Ferozpoor, and that we have fought a very severe battle, driving the enemy out of his entrenched position defended by 60,000 men and 108 pieces of cannon, of which we have now 91 pieces in the fort here. No accident or disaster has occurred, and the enemy is now on the other side of the river.

As far back as November 15 the Sikhs began to assemble their forces. Major Broadfoot demanded explanations: no answer was sent. The army was held in readiness to move; the accounts of the Sikh preparations perpetually varied, and all our best politicians decided that the Sikhs would never cross the river. I reached Umballa on the 2nd, and dismissed the Lahore Vakeel until he should bring with him some explanation in reply to Major Broadfoot's remonstrance, considering his residence improper whilst his Court continued to treat the Political Agent's letter with disregard. On the 6th I marched towards Loodiana. No infantry or artillery had moved from Lahore, and the movement appeared to be much the same as similar demonstrations had been in 1843 and 1844. However, we were prepared with 4,000 camels, and Broadfoot had laid in supplies on the routes by which the troops, if required, would have to march.

On December 8, I ordered the Umballa forces to move forward, and also those from Meerut, because the preparations of cattle and artillery stores indicated some larger movement than usual. Still no aggression had been committed. The Sikhs had a right to move to their bank of the river, and the only act of hostility was in the silence of the Durbar in affording no explanation. On the 11th we were in full march. On the 13th I heard the enemy had crossed the river, followed by infantry and artillery.

When our force came near Loodiana, I galloped over, inspected the fort, and ordered the Brigadier to be ready to march in twenty-four hours with *all* his force on Bussian, restricting our defences to the fort, and leaving in it the old and infirm men. To leave two or even three regiments in such a defenceless cantonment appeared to me to be an encouragement to an active enemy to cut such a force off. I therefore took every regiment, drafting their weakly men into the fort. Brigadier Wheeler marched at once on Bussian with 5,000 infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and twelve field guns. The Umballa force was one day in his rear, and was 7,000 strong. After

a rapid march on Moodkee, which we reached on the 18th, having closed up the rear columns as we approached Ferozpoor, we were apprised, shortly after our arrival, that the Sikh army was close at hand, and intended to attack us. This turned out to be a portion of the Sikh army, which, believing our force to be much weaker than it was, and that we had not closed up, wished to surprise us. We stood to our arms, met the Sikh forces, overthrew them, pursued them for three miles in the dark, and captured seventeen guns.

We had the two hill regiments and two Native Infantry regiments with some heavy guns one march in our rear; they joined us the following day.

We then found that the Sikhs had entrenched themselves in a camp at Ferozshah, ten miles from Ferozpoor, and ten miles from our camp at Moodkee; that their force was estimated at from 50,000 to 60,000 men and 108 pieces of cannon. Tej Sing with 20,000 men invested Ferozpoor on the side of the ghauts.[8] It was evident to me that no attack would be made on Ferozpoor, but that the enemy, disconcerted by the rapidity of our march, would attempt to intercept the Umballa force, and fight it separately.

The troops being much fatigued, we halted the 20th to refresh.

On that night I wrote to Littler to say we should march by our left, avoid the entrenched camp until joined by him, and when united attack the enemy.

We left 2 B[9] of Native Infantry at Moodkee to protect our wounded and the camp equipages; and we marched at four o'clock across the country about 10,000 men and forty pieces of artillery. At half-past one o'clock we saw a dense cloud of dust, which proved to be Littler with 5,000 infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and twenty-one guns. The junction was then complete.

We then moved to the attack of Ferozshah, formed our line, marched through a jungle, and, in spite of all obstacles, the centre left, which I commanded, carried the enemy's batteries and that part of the camp adjoining to the guns. The tumbrils and loose powder soon set the tents and provender on fire. It was also dark, and we could only hold our ground on the skirts of the burning camp. It was impossible to traverse it. I therefore collected the men, and made them lie down whilst the other portions of the enemy's camp, about a mile and a half long, continued to fire their artillery; the infantry being driven out by parties of our men on the right and left. Still the two or three batteries on the farthest side of the Sikh camp continued to cannonade us. Littler had been repulsed on the extreme left attack; Smith with the reserve was not to be found in the dark; and the two brigades I had led, and a.

[8] Fords or ferries.

[9] Two regiments were left.

portion of the right led by Gough, were the main force on which we relied for securing our victory and completing it the next morning when daylight should return. We had fired into each other at Moodkee, and I determined to run no such risk here. The enemy's artillery fired as signals to the Sikhs that the camp still resisted, and during the night fresh troops were brought up. Before dawn we reformed our men carefully, and having formed our line, supported by horse artillery, we moved by our right, Gough taking the right and I the centre; we swept along their whole camp, carrying battery after battery without a halt, and then drew up on the outside in an excellent line, the men hurrahing and the regimental colours dropping as I and Gough passed along.

During the night I was obliged to attack the enemy's batteries by a charge of the 80th, in which Wood was wounded. Such was the despondency at one time on hearing the Sikhs arrive in the camp about midnight, that weak suggestions were made which had better be buried in oblivion. Gough came to me on this subject: I at once said we must fight it out; that we should carry the position in the morning, or die in the attempt. He cordially concurred, and we certainly did it in good style. All my Staff except Arthur had been killed or wounded; but Col. Birch, Col. Parsons, and young West and Arthur, were with me. I rode Meanee thirty yards in front of the line to prevent our men from firing, and we carried everything by the bayonet at one vigorous sweep.

Thus we settled this affair, which the darkness of the preceding night, and the sudden explosion of powder, and the burning of the camp, had rendered of necessity incomplete. The enemy appeared in large force about eight o'clock: we formed in line to oppose him. After a cannonade he retired; again reappeared at eleven, and also at three o'clock. Our Native Cavalry did not behave well. The body guard very well at Moodkee. The 3rd Dragoons on every occasion behaved admirably, going through everything. They come in to-morrow, being very low in numbers from their heavy losses.

The British infantry, as usual, carried the day. I can't say I admire sepoy fighting. . . .

It is a fine sight to see the seventy-four pieces taken at Ferozshah in our fort. The seventeen pieces will come in in a few days from Moodkee; we have amongst them the two six-pounders given by Lord William Bentinck to Runjeet Singh.

My position has been most painful; I have had to exercise my authority very peremptorily; but I will enter into these matters on some future occasion. I am so tired, I have been twice asleep whilst attempting to write this letter.

When put in orders as second in command, I made Broadfoot and his Assistant my aides-de-camp. I have had five aides-de-camp killed and five wounded. The assault of the battery was as hot a job as I ever had.

Poor Broadfoot was struck off his horse. I entreated him to retire. He got on his horse, and was shortly afterwards mortally wounded. Herries, and Somerset, and Munro, killed, and a Capt. Hore of the Military Secretary Department. The reports are that the Sikhs lost 4,000 men. Our loss in killed and wounded is 2,200; the killed nearly half the wounded, attributable to its being an artillery battle.

This republican army has more vigour and resolution in it than any with which we have yet had to contend. I have great doubts whether we can cross this season. I cannot tell you the anxiety of watching every movement made for fear of some fatal mistake. It is cruel. Ever &c.

H. HARDINGE.

Reference is made in this letter to losses at Mudki from regiments firing into each other. This was not wholly avoided at Firozshah; in the confusion, smoke, and darkness, regiments behind did unfortunately fire into those in front.

It will have been noticed that Sir Henry was unfavourably impressed with sepoy fighting. Dr. Macgregor, in describing the battle, has made some admirable remarks on the differences of constitution between the European and the native soldier. The latter, though more abstemious, collapses sooner than the former if deprived of food and water: at Firozshah many had reached that stage; soon after, when the sepoys fought, properly fed, alongside of Europeans at Sobraon, they fully maintained their reputation for courage and gallantry, and Sir Henry was not slow in recognising the fact.

The news of these battles reached England towards the end of February before the despatches arrived. The Government and people were greatly gratified by the successes, and especial weight was given to the fact that the Sikh aggression was unprovoked, that the war was on our part a strictly defensive one, and that no desire of conquest nor want of extreme forbearance had occasioned the rupture. The despatches arrived on February 23, when the Park and Tower guns announced the victories to the public. The news was thus commented on:

The annals of India do not record any acts of war more important in their bearing upon the great interests and security of our Empire, or more honourable to those brave men by whom the victory has been achieved.

Of Sir Henry Hardinge it was recorded that whatever of energy, foresight, skilful combination, and prudence, could be expected in a person filling his high situation, had been throughout and without ceasing manifested by him.

Entire approbation of the whole of his conduct, from the time when he first arrived in the North-West Provinces and had an opportunity of ascertaining the state of affairs at Lahore, was expressed. He was considered to have been right in pursuing to the very last the pacific policy which he had, from the commencement, adopted as the leading principle of his conduct in respect to the Sikh Government.

He was justified in abstaining from making any forward military movement beyond such as were necessary for defence. This course could not fail to deprive the Sikh Government of any ground for ascribing hostile intentions to the British Government; such were always disclaimed, and never entertained by the Governor-General.

The steps taken were considered to be admirably suited to meet the crisis and to repel the danger.

The concentration of the Loodiana force with that from Umballa at the point of Bussian, which placed him in a condition to move forward without hesitation to the relief of Ferozpore, and the skill and judgment with which, after the action near Moodkee, he directed the operations of the army with a view to a junction with the force under Sir J. Littler, deserve the highest praise for promptitude and accuracy of combination.

This march completely paralysed the Sikh army. They could no longer hope to take Ferozpore without previously obtaining a great victory in a general action; and they were at once reduced to the necessity of acting upon the defensive.

By the victories 'the doubts and fears of the wavering had been dispelled; the confidence and zeal of our friends confirmed; and the conviction of our superior power established amongst all. Such are the immediate results of this brilliant opening of the campaign.'[1]

[1] MS. records.

This forms a very complete approval of the Governor-General's policy, and of his conduct of the war in concert with the Commander-in-Chief. It would appear, however, that the full severity of the struggle, the temporary prostration of the victors in consequence, and the resources and stubborn energy of the vanquished, were not at first fully realised.

The very heavy losses we had sustained at Mudki and Firozshah, and the inaction afterwards, led very naturally to severe criticism. They were facts not to be disputed; and from them the critics, according to their nature, abilities, and information, made inferences, some no doubt sound, but others entirely wrong.

The policy of the Governor-General, and the Agent by whom it was carried out, were assailed. It was inferred that the Governor-General, having received pacific instructions from England, obeyed them with slavish fear, to the neglect of the safety and honour of our arms. It was also inferred that the conduct of the business of the Agency was such as to provoke war rather than to maintain peace. That there is no just ground for these inferences is, we trust, clear to the careful reader of the evidence furnished in this work. Both the Governor-General and the Agent, following implicitly the policy and opinion declared by Lord Ellenborough, desired beyond everything to maintain the Sikh power in the Punjab, as the best possible barrier for British India against Afghanistan and the other Musalman states. In order to effect this, forbearance was carried, as the Agent had plainly reported, to the verge of danger. This policy was defeated by the Sikh army, which, inverting the usual order, exacted obedience from its officers, and dictated to the Government. The pay of the soldiers was doubled, whilst the supply of money to meet the increase was neglected. The result was inevitable: as the exhaustion of the treasury became imminent, it followed that the soldiers must either go without pay, or help themselves from the treasure of their neighbours. They preferred the latter alternative, and believed in their ability to plunder and sack the country as far as Delhi; and this belief was adroitly made use of by the Darbar to relieve themselves from a pressure which had become intolerable. It is quite unnecessary to seek for more remote causes of war, or to advance inferences

for which there was no foundation beyond the assertions of personal opinion.

Another and more plausible accusation is, that with the evidence and information in their possession, the Governor-General and his advisers committed a grave error of judgment in believing to the last that the Sikhs would not, as an army, cross the Sutlej and fight.

It is easy to be wise after the event. We must recollect that the Sikhs had before, more than once, made similar demonstrations, but had invariably, from one cause or another, retired without actually violating the frontier. The Governor-General and the political officers, conscious that they were straining every nerve to maintain peace, believed that their efforts now, as before, might succeed. They might justifiably doubt whether the Sikh army in full force would be mad enough to cross the river and involve itself in a struggle which must ultimately end in the destruction of the power of one or other of the combatants. From all that can be gathered in the course of a careful examination of extensive private as well as public correspondence, the fact seems to be, that, though striving to maintain peace, the Governor-General and his advisers were aware that war was more or less imminent; but it was hoped to the last that, for the present at least, it might possibly be prevented.

This being so, the preparations for the defence of the frontier, commenced with such commendable forethought by Lord Ellenborough, were continued with increased vigour, as circumstances seemed to demand, by Sir Henry Hardinge. These, it will be observed, were for defensive, not offensive, war; and they were carried on as quietly and unostentatiously as possible, to avoid alarming the Sikhs, and thereby precipitating the crisis which it was desired to avert. Nevertheless they were real and effective. When Lord Ellenborough left, the available strength on the whole frontier, exclusive of the hill stations, whose garrisons were unchanged, amounted to 17,612 men and sixty-six guns; when war broke out, 40,523 men and ninety-four guns were available. Even with this, we now know, the margin of safety was dangerously approached.

It has been shown that the policy and the measures of

the Governor-General and his Agent were criticised by some: others condemned the military conduct of the campaign. They asserted that, though we were victorious, our battles were gained at an unnecessary sacrifice, and the impetuosity of the Commander-in-Chief was blamed.

The time when this question can be fully sifted has, perhaps, scarcely arrived. Till all documents bearing on the matter can be examined, and possibly made public, it would be manifestly premature to pronounce a final opinion. Those who hold that the Commander-in-Chief was free from blame, urge that the political necessities of the case were permitted by the Governor-General to overrule prudent military preparation. They further consider that the Governor-General made a mistake in not accepting the Commander-in-Chief's proposal to attack Firozshah before Littler's force joined. Much might be urged for and against the proposal; for the present purpose, however, it is enough to record that the Governor-General, himself an experienced soldier, deliberately rejected it as introducing an avoidable element of danger.

It has been recorded, that after Mudki the Governor-General tendered his services as second in command of the army.

This arrangement has been praised and condemned. Generally, perhaps, the praise has prevailed. The exigency was great, and, in the present instance, it may have been the simplest solution of a delicate matter.

At the same time the objections appear stronger than the advantages. The Governor-General is entrusted with powers involving responsibility from which no act of his own can set him free. By accepting any subordinate position he merely makes the exercise of these powers, should the necessity arise, more difficult and invidious. This view appears to have been held by the English Government. They recognised the emergency of the moment, and the great immediate advantage of the course taken; but as a question of principle, and with a view to the future, they were of opinion that:

> It is impossible that we should not feel that it might be productive of serious inconvenience, if not injury, to the public service, if the political head of the Government, who has to decide upon the objects for the attainment of which the military means of the

Government are to be applied, should, in the application of those means, and in the endeavour to attain those objects, serve in a subordinate military capacity.[2]

The war in progress was one of no ordinary nature; the warlike spirit of the Sikhs, their great military resources and geographical position, gave to it an unusual importance, and caused it to be attended with unusual risk. It was possible that at one moment military operations would have to be subordinated to political considerations, whilst at another these would have to give way to military necessity. Hence it was desirable, in a case like the present one, that the conduct of the civil and military affairs should be entrusted to one person: 'and that individual can obviously be no other than the Governor-General of India.'

It was pointed out that this arrangement did not imply want of confidence either in the provisional successor to the Governor-General, or in the Commander-in-Chief or other military officers; but was a special arrangement to suit special circumstances.

One other matter should be noticed here. In certain descriptions of the battles it has been thought necessary to infer and assert treachery on the part of the Sikh leaders, Raja Lal Singh and Sardar Tej Singh, to account for the success of the British, rather than, as would seem sufficient, to attribute it to the valour and self-devotion of our brave soldiers. The latter has at any rate the advantage of being a fact, whilst the former is an inference formed on no sufficient basis that we have been able to discover. It would have been, according to our ideas, natural enough in a Sikh historian to excuse failure by alleging treachery on the part of their leaders; yet the old Sikhs, immediately after the events, as is recorded by Col. Lawrence, and some years later, as we can testify, never put forward any such accusation. They were not as a nation, and assuredly they had no cause to be, ashamed of the result of measuring their young strength with ours in its maturity. They have since, alongside of us and under our banners, given ample proof of steadiness in danger equal to that of any troops in the world.

[2] MS. records.

Now, whilst the men, the Khalsa, did not accuse their officers of treachery, the officers, on the other hand—and this seems a strong argument—did not, when we prevailed, claim any reward for supposed treacherous conduct. On the contrary, like their men, they were rather disposed to boast of their deeds.

And further, it should be clearly understood, all assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, that the Khalsa was supreme throughout the campaign. The soldiers, through their panchayats, ruled not only their officers, but the State. They could make war or peace. With the men unanimous, the leaders, even if so inclined, had no chance of employing successful treachery. They could gain over no serious number of the Sikh army with which, at the critical moment, they might desert to the British. As little did they dare at Firozshah to propose that the Sikhs should leave their entrenchments and fight the British in the open, or make any military movement which would have the effect of weakening the defence. In the temper of the men at the time, either proposal, or even a suspicion that either was entertained, would have led to a prompt execution of the leader who had thus rendered himself obnoxious.

These considerations seem ample to dispose of the oft repeated assertion of treachery; but in order to ascertain as far as possible how it arose, and upon what it was based, considerable inquiry has been made. The result appears to show that the accusation was first made from the Sikh side, by one of the European adventurers in the Sikh service; and Tej Sipgh, rather than Lal Singh, is selected as the chief culprit, though all the officers are considered to have been implicated. No clear evidence of treachery is adduced; the accusation is based on speeches said to have been made by the men to their leaders, of which the authenticity is, to say the least, doubtful; so much so that the author who published them remarked that many of the stories attributing treachery and cowardice to Tej Singh were not to be implicitly believed.[1] Treachery is further inferred from the conduct of the campaign; but, unfortunately for the value of this inference, it is in other parts of the work clearly shown that the regimental

[1] Carmichael Smyth's *History &c.* pp. 180–184.

panchayats ruled, and that the officers were more or less ciphers.[4]

The charge is repeated with much greater weight in Cunningham's 'History of the Sikhs.' Capt. Cunningham appears to have based it mainly on inference, thus: the destruction of the Khalsa army meant the salvation of the chiefs; the leaders, therefore, desired nothing more than that the British should prevail, and consequently he saw in the conduct of the campaign what satisfied him of the treachery of Lal Singh[5] and Tej Singh.[6]

Against the former, in addition to what is inferred, it is stated in a note that 'it was sufficiently certain and notorious at the time that Lal Singh was in communication with Capt. Nicolson, the British Agent at Ferozpoor; but owing to the untimely death of that officer, the details of the overtures made, and expectations held out, cannot now be satisfactorily known.'[7] Fortunately sufficient evidence exists to show that Cunningham was mistaken in supposing that Capt. Nicolson held out any expectations to Lal Singh. In the first place Capt. Nicolson was not the British Agent at Firozpur, but he was the British Agent's Assistant, precisely as Cunningham was another of his Assistants at that time stationed at Bahâwalpur; and no one had better reason to know that the Agent's Assistants were not authorised to hold out expectations to Punjab chiefs, or to have political dealings with them beyond referring them to the Agent, should any overtures be made.

Raja Lal Singh, and no doubt others of the Sikh leaders, were sufficiently far-seeing to allow for the possibility of the defeat of their army by the British; and most of the chiefs would have wished, if possible, to provide against this event. One way of saving themselves, which would at once recommend itself to the Oriental mind, was to be able to show that they had acted as far as possible as friends to the English; and when they had done otherwise, that it was under compulsion. Such a negotiation had a double advantage. If the English, deceived by it, neglected any precaution and suffered defeat, then additional merit on behalf of the chief or leader who

[4] Carmichael Smyth's *History &c.* p. 172.
[5] Cunningham's *Sikhs*, p. 299.
[6] *Ibid.* p. 304.
[7] *Ibid.* p. 299, note.

organised the plan might be claimed. If, on the contrary, the English were victorious, then the vanquished leader might claim, certainly immunity from punishment, possibly reward.

The success of such a negotiation would be, to put it mathematically, inversely as the penetration of the British Agent. The less able man would entertain the proposal, and permit his plans and views to be affected by it; the more able would treat it with the contempt which it deserved.

In the letters and papers consulted by the editor of this book—and the search has extended over a large area of documents, and has been minute—no evidence whatever of any such negotiation on the part of Tej Singh has been discovered.

On December 12, 1845, Raja Lal Singh made overtures of the nature above indicated to Capt. Nicolson. They were such as he could at any moment disavow under the plea of compulsion. Nicolson, not having taken upon himself the responsibility of declining to discuss such a matter, reported the Raja's proposals to Broadfoot on December 18, and before the letter could have arrived the action at Mudki was fought. The precise proposals need not be recorded; they were of a nature, one would imagine, to excite suspicion even in the unwary; but one expression in Nicolson's letter must be quoted as directly contradicting the insinuation that expectations had been held out to Lal Singh. It is as follows: 'I have made no terms with him, even personal. . . .'

Foiled in this instance, the Raja once more attempted a similar negotiation, this time with Broadfoot himself, and immediately before the battle of Firozshah. Broadfoot was killed within a few hours, and so left no record of the transaction; an eyewitness, however, has described with what scorn and contempt he received the message, and the short and decisive answer he gave.

An event occurred during this short halt[8] or interval which affords a fitting opportunity for correcting a certain historical inaccuracy repeated recently in the 'Life of Lord Lawrence;' viz. a rumour to the effect that Raja Lal Singh had sold his army into the power of the British.

So far from such being the case, it was during this short in-

[8] The halt made near Firozshah to enable Littler to join.

terval that Lal Singh did send emissaries to Broadfoot with some such proposition; but the proposition was indignantly rejected, with a reply that if he caught Lal Singh he would hang him to the first tree he came to. Nor is there anything to show that any such influence was exerted; but, on the contrary, the Khalsa stuck to their guns and died at them like brave men, and this is well borne out by the heavy losses we sustained in capturing them.[9]

The following extracts from articles in the 'Calcutta Review' bear upon this subject, and are entitled to respect. One of the articles is known to have been written by the late Sir Henry Lawrence, and there is some probability that both articles proceeded from the same pen.

After having pointed out the absurdity of some of the accusations made against the Sikh leaders, the reviewer has remarked:

All this talk of treachery tends to a wrong impression. No men could have exerted themselves more than did the majority of the Sikh generals; and even Tej Singh and Lal Singh, once engaged, had no choice but to fight. One proof that the chiefs did act honestly by their men *then* is, that *now* they pretend to no credit for treachery, but rather boast of their prowess during the war.[1]

With reference to the assertions of treachery on the part of the Sikh leaders, made in Cunningham's 'History,' the writer in the 'Calcutta Review,' who evidently wrote with cognisance of the facts, observed:

It is obvious that Capt. Cunningham has not penetrated the designs of the Sikh leaders. Their treachery was rather against than for us. That they pretended to serve us is true; but it is not true that they did serve us. . . . On the 12th Lal Sing opened a communication with Capt. Nicolson, making a merit of sending round the Sikh cavalry by Harike. As the first movement was to have been on Ferozepore, the cavalry would have been of little use; and Lal Singh was aware that, in taking this step, he was earning, or endeavouring to earn, the favour of the British at the smallest possible cost to the Sikhs. On the 19th, after the battle of Mudki, Lal Singh's agent came to Major Broadfoot, and was dismissed with a rebuke.[2] From that day to February 7 no communication of any

[9] Gen. S. A. Abbott's *Episode &c.*

[1] *Calcutta Review*, vol. ix. p. 523.

[2] Probably referring to the proposals made to Broadfoot on Dec. 21.

kind was received from Lal Singh or from Tej Singh. It is believed that the former sent Col. Lawrence a sketch of the Sikh entrenchments at Sobraon; but our engineer officers had gained by that time the information that we desired to possess, and the Sirdar's communication was of little or no value to us. Lal Singh was wounded at Ferozshuhur; he was with the Sikh army after its defeat at Sobraon, and only quitted it after the arrival of the British at Lahore.

We cannot perceive, indeed, that he threw any obstacle in the way of the success of the Khalsa. . . .

The treachery of Tej Singh is equally doubtful. This Sirdar is pronounced to be a traitor because he did not attack the British on the morning of December 22. But our army had then just beaten the Sikhs at Ferozshuhur, and captured their camp equipage and eighty pieces of artillery. Flying from our attacking columns, the routed Sikhs fell back on Tej Singh's force, and carried dismay into its ranks. Had he known that the British had exhausted their ammunition, we do not doubt that he would have advanced to give us battle. It is said, indeed, that he did offer to lead his regiments to the attack, but that they declined so hazardous an enterprise. If not, the *Punches* were with the army, and they could have decreed the attack.[3]

It is gratifying to find similar opinions expressed by Sir Lepel Griffin in the 'Punjab Chiefs,' a work of great interest and merit.[4]

Persistent reiteration of the accusation has made it necessary to state at some length the reasons why the assertion of treachery on the part of the Sikh leaders is rejected. The charge, as far as we can ascertain, is absolutely unfounded.

The following extracts from a long letter to Lord Ellenborough, though necessarily repeating much already told, are interesting. The situation naturally caused Mr. Currie great anxiety; and it is instructive to notice that he, like many others, in time of trouble, turned to Lord Ellenborough for advice and assistance.

Camp, Ferozepore: January 1, 1846.

My Lord,—Sir Henry Hardinge has, I know, written to your Lordship to-day, and from his letter and the despatches, which will, I hope, be shown to you, you will hear that we have had very sharp

[3] *Calcutta Review*, vol. xi. pp. 523–558. [4] Pp. 38–40 and 63, 64.

work of it lately. From the state in which the Lahore Durbar and the Sikh army have been for the last eighteen months, no one could have anticipated the unity of purpose they suddenly displayed of invading the British territories, or the vigorous exertions they have made to render their invasion effectual. The posts of Ferozepore and Loodiana had both been strengthened by Sir Henry Hardinge, but neither of them was in a condition to withstand for any length of time the weight of the whole Sikh army concentrated upon it. When, therefore, Ferozepore was invested by the overwhelming force which the Sikhs passed over the Sutlege with exceeding celerity, the relief of that fort became a matter of great anxiety and difficulty. Fortunately Sir Henry Hardinge was in advance of Umballa, and approaching the frontier at the time. The disposition he made of the available forces, and the rapid marches by which we reached the neighbourhood of Ferozepore, are described in the despatch to the S.C.,[5] and in Sir H. Hardinge's letter to Lord Ripon. The whole was certainly admirably managed; and though the long marches not only harassed but dispirited the troops, especially the natives, the result has been entirely successful.

Ferozepore is relieved; the Sikh army has been beaten in two severe actions; all their cannon and ammunition, camp equipage &c. taken, and the routed troops driven across the Sutlege.

In both actions the British troops fought under great disadvantages. At Moodkee they had had a succession of forced marches with short supplies, and had just come twenty-two miles, many being still behind, when the enemy came down in great force to the attack. The troops were hardly under arms before the Sikhs were upon us; and when the action commenced, there was not much more than an hour of daylight remaining.

. . . . . .

Night soon closed in; we were in low tree jungle, and the dust was excessive: all this added to the confusion. The troops got pell-mell together, and it was impossible to distinguish friend from foe, or to tell where anyone was. The enemy were beaten back with heavy loss, and seventeen guns out of twenty-four they brought with them were captured; but in the confusion our troops fired upon one another. Twice was I with Sir Henry under a heavy and destructive fire of grape and musketry from our own guns; and I am satisfied, so is Sir H. H., that half the casualties at Moodkee were from the fire of our own people.

I was not at Pherooshuhur, or Ferozeshah as the Commander-in-Chief is determined to call it. Sir H. H. had given me a written

[5] S.C. Secret Committee.

positive order to remain behind; but I have had the above circumstances related to me by Sir H. H. and many others; and I assure you the fate of our army, and with it the fate of India, was for a time very critical, and redeemed . . . by the personal exertions and decision of the Governor-General. How he was exposed, may be gathered from the fate of his Staff. His young son, Arthur, and Benson were the only two with him not either killed or wounded. Though the thing has been handsomely done, the loss on our side is very heavy.

. . . . . .

There is one other point which I wish to mention. Considering Sir Henry Hardinge's position, and the circumstances of the present times, some one capable of administering the duties temporarily should be made provisional Governor-General. If anything were to happen to Sir Henry Hardinge, —— would be for some months Governor-General! and in these critical times it is fearful to think what might be the consequences. Sir G. Arthur is the fittest man in India for the provisional appointment.

I have written you a long letter, my Lord, and I know you don't like long letters; but the urgency of the case must be my excuse. I have considered it my duty to make known the facts I have stated to your Lordship, that you may communicate them, in confidence, to those who have it in their power to apply the remedy.

We have heard little from Lahore since the tidings of the defeat and flight of the invincible Khalsa was known there. We have reason to fear that Loodiana, which has been necessarily left with small protection, will be plundered and burnt. This will have a bad moral effect, and do much mischief; but Amritsur is a more important place!

Mrs. Currie is at Saharunpore, where she is doing all she can to befriend poor Mrs. Somerset in her affliction.

I am &c. F. CURRIE.

Some interesting letters and information about events of the first Sikh war, subsequent to the battle of Firozshah, have been collected; but the limit assigned to this book prevents their being now published. Moreover, as this is a record of Major Broadfoot's services, it is appropriately closed at his death. His career was short but brilliant: as a soldier, exceptionally so; and in the conduct of civil administration and of diplomatic duties, neither his enemies nor those jealous of his success could discover a blot to expose, or a transaction which would not bear the severest scrutiny.



John Murray, London.

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Of the few survivors who knew George Broadfoot, those whom we have met are unanimous as to the deep impression which he made on them; they still look back on him as one of the most rising men of the time. The great majority of them cordially assent to the fervent eulogies of Mackenzie and Havelock already cited;[6] and to this day they lament the life prematurely cut short on the field of Firozshah in the midst of a great career.

We cannot more suitably close this book than by transcribing the inscription on the Madras memorial.

Per Ardua Virtus.

SACRED TO THE MEMORY OF

MAJOR GEORGE BROADFOOT, C.B.,

34TH MADRAS LIGHT INFANTRY,

OF KIRKWALL, IN THE ORKNEYS, AND OF LONDON.

HIS VALOUR, FORESIGHT, AND SCIENCE MAINLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE SUCCESS OF THE GLORIOUS DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD,
AND IN THE ENSUING AFGHAN CAMPAIGN HE, WITH HIS BRAVE CORPS OF MOUNTAIN SAPPERS, ACQUIRED ENDURING RENOWN.
HIS DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY SERVICES, AS COMMISSIONER OF THE TENASSERIM PROVINCES AND AS GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S AGENT ON THE NORTH-WESTERN FRONTIER, AT A MOST IMPORTANT CRISIS,
CALLED FORTH THE ELOQUENT EULOGY OF SIR HENRY HARDINGE,
'THAT HE WAS AS BRAVE AS HE WAS ABLE, AND SECOND TO NONE IN ALL THE GREAT QUALITIES OF AN ACCOMPLISHED OFFICER.'
HE FELL AT THE BATTLE OF FEROZSHAHAR, DECEMBER 21ST, 1845,
IN HIS 39TH YEAR,
ACTING AS AIDE-DE-CAMP TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL,
DEEPLY AND UNIVERSALLY LAMENTED.
'THOUGH SEVERELY WOUNDED, HE CONTINUED HEROICALLY TO LEAD AND ANIMATE THE TROOPS IN THE ASSAULT, UNTIL MORTALLY WOUNDED IN THE SIKH CAMP AT THE MOMENT OF VICTORY.'
HIS LOSS WAS RECORDED AS A PUBLIC CALAMITY IN BOTH HOUSES OF THE IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT.
HE WAS THE LAST OF THREE BROTHERS, WHO DIED FOR THEIR COUNTRY ON THE BATTLE-FIELDS OF ASIA.

Raised by a public subscription throughout the Presidency of Madras.

[6] Pp. 406, 410.

INDEX.

ABBOTT

Abbott, Capt. A., 39, 43, 59, 62, 69, 70, 74, 75, 76, 77; account skirmish March 24, 88, 92, 157, 158, 192, 275; services, 388, *note* 1

Abbott, Capt. F., now Sir Fred., 165, 388, *note* 1

Abbott, Gen. James, C.B., 388 *note* 1

Abbott, Capt. S. A., now Gen., 229; collects Suchet Singh's treasure, 230; 308, 314, 364, 371, 375; quoted, 376–377; 378, 379, 380; his services, 388, 389 *note* 1; quoted, 389; wounded, 392; 397 *note* 5, 398, 399; quoted, 422–423

Abdul Ghafúr, 79, 112, 115

Achakzai (Achikzye), 59

Acho, 223

Addiscombe, 2, 3, 32

Afghanistan, 1; 3; war in, 4; events prior to war, 5; 10; 22; 42; 52; conquest of, 55; government of, 57; 66; 73; 75 *note r*; 83; 84; Ellenborough's policy regarding, 85; 110; 113; ignorance of resources of, 121; 124; retention of, 129; 131; 167; 170; 175; 177; 178; 180; 181; 183; 184; 189; 201; 213; 221; 223; 225; 246; 280; 338; 416

Afghans, 1, 9, 10, 14 *note* 4, 19, 26, 27, 28, 31; value as soldiers, 33, 34, 38, 40, 43, 44, 48, 49, 53, 60, 61, 65, 70 *note f*, 72, 79, 85, 91; defeated April 7, 91–93, 98; notions of warfare, 99, 102; admire Colin Mackenzie, 103, 120, 124; cannot face disciplined troops, 128, 129, 141; good soldiers in hill war, 149 *note m*,

ARTHUR

157, 158, 159, 160, 162, 164, 180, 184, 242, 289, 327, 382, 427

Afrídí, Afreedee, 98

Agent, *see* Richmond to October 1844, afterwards Broadfoot, George

Agra, 11; the Taj, Moti Masjid, 11, 173, 175, 234, 293, 315, 350, 353, 354; Taj, 355

Ahmad, Mulla, 280, 281

Ajít Singh, Sindhanwália, 224, 226

Akálí, 352 *note* 4, 394

Akbar Khán, *see* Muhammad Akbar Khan

Albert, Prince, 205

Albuera, 216

Alígarh (Allyghur), 11, 12, 192

Ali Morád, 288, 343

Alison, history quoted, 216

Allard, Gen., 221

Ambála (Umballa), 193, 215, 234, 249, 260, 262, 266, 267, 279, 293, 332, 359, 362, 363, 371, 375, 376, 378, 380, 381, 382, 383, 411, 412, 415, 425

Amherst, 188

Amínulla Khan, chief of Logar, 51, 70, 123, 160; at Istálif, 163–164

Amritsar (Umritsur), 229, 291, 345, 426

Anandpur Makhowál, 314, 320, 335, 336, 344, 351, 374

Anderson, Lieut. Engineers, 7

Anderson, Mrs., 153

Anderson, Mrs., 410

Anne, Queen, 302

Anquetil, Brigadier, in command of Shah Shuja's force, 23–41, 127

Army of Indus formed, 6; reduced, 8, 55

Arthur, Sir G., 294, 426

ASHLEY

Ashley, Lord, afterwards Earl of Shaftesbury, 343
Asia, central, 5, 118, 183
Assaye, 128
Assistant agents, instructions to, 246, 280, 281; dabbling in intrigues, 282, 313, 362, 364, 365–368, 378, 389
Atári, village Firozpur District, 400
Attar Singh, Kálewálá, 256, 346, 347
Attar Singh, Sindhanwália, 228; slain, 229
Attock, 15, 17, 270; seized by Peshora Singh, 319, 326, 340. (*See* also Indus.)
Auckland, Lord, Governor-General, 4, 5; his manifesto criticised, 6; alternatives presented to, 10, 12–13, 28; departs from Calcutta, 83, 84, 110, 118, 120, 311, 355
Australia, 318
Ava, 198
Avitabile, General, governor of Peshawar, 14; description of, 14 *note* 4, 16, 18, 79, 221
Azízuddín, Fakir, 220, 291, 305, 321, 339; death of, 375

Bachna, Wazír, 287
Backhouse, Capt. Julius B., account of Indus bridge, 7, 34, 35, 36; quoted, 36–37; Broadfoot's opinion of, 39, 42, 44; quoted, 45; quoted, 46; quoted 49, 53, 60, 62, 71, 71 *note g*, 75, 76, 77, 82; account skirmish March 24, 87–88; describes forage parties, 89, 90; counsels vigour, 91; describes action April 7, 91–93; moralises, 93, 151 *note q*, 158, 159, 160 describes remains Kabul force, 161, 164, 193 *note* 3, 197
Badiábád, 96
Bahawalpur, 291
Baird, Sir D., 176
Bájgáh, 9
Bálábágh, 51, 57
Balúchí, Belochee, &c., 85, 297
Bámián, 9, 153
Bárakzái (Barukzye), 5, 50; 76 *note t*, 99, 150 *note m*, 326
Barlow, Sir G., 173
Barrackpur, 275, 317
Bartolozzi, Signor, 349
Bayley, Mr. Butterworth, 153
Bayley, Mrs., letter to, 11–12; another, 102–103; another 103–106; another, 118–123, 153; letter to, 156; another, 168

BROADFOOT

Beaufort, Duke of, 189
Bejá Khán, 252, 254, 273
Belí Rám, Misr, 221, 226
Benares, 175
Bengal, 40, 66, 210, 236, 241, 409
Benson, Col., 396, 425
Bentinck, Lord W., 119, 413
Berhampur, 275
Besúd, 112, 115, 116, 118, 121
Bhartpur (Bhurtpore), 11, 82, 177
Biláspur, 320, 320 *note* 8
Birch, Col., 258, 413
Bird, Mr. W. W., 66, 192, 196; on the native press, 197, 203, 208
Bír Singh, Bhai, 228; slain, 229, 309
Bishan Singh, Bábá, Bedí, 299, 300
Blair, Col. H., R.E., 116 *note* 2
Blundell, Mr., 170, 171, 188, 194, 195, 196
Boats for bridge or flotilla, 283–286, 331, 355, 356
Bokhara, 9, 56
Bombay, 28, 166, 204, 283, 301, 318
Bond, Major, 134
Bradford, 2
Brind, Major, afterwards Sir James, 395
Broadfoot, Mr. Alex., 400; letters from Governor-General, 401–402, 408
Broadfoot, George, letters, &c., 1; early years; posted to 34th Madras N.I., 2; friends, return to India, appointed to commissariat, 3; Reforms, 4, 5; 'Broadfoot's Sappers,' 9–11; letter to Mrs. Bayley, 11–12; recruiting, 12; commands Shah's Sappers, 12–13; escort of Kábul royal families, 13; his resolution, 14; declines to halt, his success, 15; letters to Cullen and Malcolmson, 15–19; Macnaghten's report, 20; letter to Mr. Loch, 20–22; solicits detailed orders for service, 23–24; interviews with Envoy and General, 24–28; his action justified, 29; his Sappers on service, 30; letter to Prinsep, 30–33; Sappers engaged but forgotten in despatches, 31; at Butkhák, 32–33; in Khurd Kábul pass, 34; at Tezín, 35; distinguished conduct, 37; letter to Malcolmson, 38–40; his estimate of officers, 39; remarks on his corps, 40; desires to help Kabul force, 41; letter to Malcolmson,

BROADFOOT

41-44; his opinion of Havelock, 42, 44; his praise of Cunningham, 45; supports the cavalry, 46; his report on Jalálábád quoted, 47-48; garrison engineer, 48-49; extracts from his diary, 49-54; letter to Malcolmson, 51-52; letter to Mr. Prinsep, 54-58; extracts from diary and letters, 58-60; submits plan for retreat, 61; letter to Mrs. Bayley, 61-62; council of war, 62; letter to Havelock, 62-64; letter from Havelock, 64-65; accuracy of his account of councils, 64 66; letter from Durand, 66; memorandum on councils, 67-77; opposition to Sale, 68, 71-74; reads paper, 70; opposes giving hostages, 73-74; gains majority, 76-77; his conduct criticised, 78; extracts from his diary, 78-80; earthquake, 82; his services recorded, 86-87; wounded March 24, 87-88; anecdote, 88 *note* 5; letter from Lord Ellenborough, 95; reply, 95-96; letter to Malcolmson, 96-100; his views as to prisoners, 100; praise of his subalterns, 100; his opinion of Ellenborough's orders, 101; his eulogy of Mackenzie, 102; his remarks on Gen. Elphinstone, 102; letters to Mrs. Bayley, 102-106; praise of Mackenzie, 103-104; wound, 106-107; his action in council mentioned, 107-108; his letter to Mackeson, 109, 111; letter to Mr. Loch, 112-115; Dr. Forsyth's services, 113-114; commands expedition to Besúd 115-118; letter to Mrs. Bayley 118-123; mentioned in Lord Ellenborough's letters, 124; appointed A.D.C. to Governor-General, 125; comments on Eyre's narrative, 126-129; commands expedition to Fatehábád, 129, 130; summoned to Mámú Khel, 131; his report, 131-133; Col. Taylor's letter, 133; his reply, 134-152; letter to Mr. Loch, 153-155; letter to Mrs. Bayley, 156-157; affair at Jagdalak, 158; at Tezin, 160, 161, 163; at Istálif wounded, 164-165; letter to Malcolmson, 165-166; capacity for command, 166; letter to Miss Sutherland, 167; letter to Mrs. Bayley, 168; special distinction, 169; letter to Mr. Loch, 169-170; commissioner, Tenasserim, 170; Brevet Major and C.B., 171, 186; letter to Lord Ellenborough, 187; arrives in Tenasserim, 188; letter from Havelock, 188-192; letter from F. Cunningham, 192-193, 194; appointment reported to the Queen and Duke of Wellington, 194-195; administration of Tenasserim, 196, 197; letter from Havelock, 198; letters from Mr. and Mrs. Cameron, 199-201; correspondence with Lord Ellenborough, 202-204; Order of Bath sent and acknowledged, 205; on Governor-General's recall, 208-210, 211; letter to Miss Sutherland, 212-213; letter from Havelock, 214-215; appointed Agent N.W.F., 214, 216, 218, 223; succeeds Col. Richmond, 232, 233, 234; congratulatory letters, 235-236; visit of chiefs, 236; his knowledge of native languages, 237; first interview with Vakil, 237-240; letter to Lord Ellenborough, 241-242; orders to assistants, 246; orders from Government, 247; his conduct approved in England, 248; letters to Com.-in-Chief, and Gen. Gilbert, 249-250; letters from Sir H. Gough and Sir C. Napier, 250-252, 253; letter from Sir C. Napier, 254; letter to Gen. Gilbert, 255; his care to ensure secrecy, 256; inquiry as to Sepoy disaffection, 257-259; his services appreciated, 260; he addresses Sir H. Gough about a rumour, 260; Vakil asks for explanation, 261; his reply, 262; letter from Government of India, 263; letter to Lord Ellenborough, 264-266; letter from Sir H. Gough, 267; Mr. Currie on the political situation, 268-270; difficulty of inquiry into Sepoy disaffection, 270-271, 272; letter from Sir C. Napier, 273; orders of Government of India, 276-277; letter from Gen. Ventura, 277-278; interview with Vakil, 279-280, 281, 282; letter from Private Secretary, boats, 283-286; letter from Sir C. Napier, 288; letter from Havelock, 289-290; letter from Lord Ellenborough, 290-291, 292; letter to Lord Ellenborough, 297; viola-

BROADFOOT

tion of frontier resolutely resented, 298–300; his action commended, 300; letter to Miss Sutherland, 301; letter to Lord Ellenborough, 303–305, 305; letter from Lord Ellenborough, 307, 308, 310, 311; complimentary letter from Sir H. Hardinge, 312, 313; his assistants, 314; his reply to Sir H. Hardinge, 315–316, 318, 320; letter to Mr. Currie, 320–321, 322; letter to Governor-General, 323–326, 327, 328, 329, 330; rejects Gulab Singh's overtures, 330–331; on Leech's death, 332, 333; letter to Private Secretary, 334–337; letter from Governor-General, 337–338, 339, 341; letter from Governor-General, 342–343, 344; letter to Government of India, 345–348, 349, 350, 352; his health, 353, 354; letter to Private Secretary, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361; he warns the Darbár, 362; warns Commander-in-Chief, and Sir J. Littler, 362–363; Sir H. Gough's reply, 363; arranges supplies, 364; reports to Government, 364; instructs assistants, 365–368, 369; letters from Currie, 370; joins Governor-General's camp, 371, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 382; at Múdki, 385, 387, 388, 389; killed at Firozshah, 392, 398, 399; buried, 400; letters about his death, 400–404; loss regretted in both Houses of Parliament, 404–406; his grave, 406; opinions held by eminent men, 406–410, 411, 414, 416, 418, 422, 423, 426; inscription on Madras memorial, 427

Broadfoot, James Sutherland, birth, appointed to Bengal Engineers, 2; early distinction, 4; Indus bridge, 7; surveys Ghilzi country, 8; explores the Gomal route, 9; value of his reports, 9; killed at Parwán, 9; Afghan account of his death, 10; reputation, 19, 49, 109, 165, 168, 186

Broadfoot, Miss, 352, 403, 404, 405, 409

Broadfoot, Lieut. William, birth, appointed to 1st European Regiment, 2; early distinction, 4; at Bámián, &c., 9; enlists Hazaras, 9; question of the command of the corps, 12; receives political appointment, 13; dangerously ill, 19, 38; killed, 40, 41, 42, 49; Afghans wish to revenge his death, 51, 52, 100, 109, 122, 125, 165, 168, 186, 393

Broadfoot, Rev. William, 2

Broke, Capt., 304

Brooke, Brigadier, 391

Brougham, Lord, 179

Brown, Dr., afterwards Sir J. Campbell, anecdote of Broadfoot, 88 *note* 5, 307, 353

Bruen, Sergeant, 58, 144 *note* 2, 187

Brunnow, Baron, 179

Brydon, Dr., 41, 60, 67, 68, 98

Búgti, Boogty, &c., 251, 252, 254, 255, 263, 274, 283, 288

Bukkur, 7

Bunbury, Lieut.-Col., 394

Bundelkhand, Bundlecund, 254, 291

Burmá, Burmese, 33, 52, 82, 149, 194, 195, 198, 203, 211, 304

Burn, Capt., 44

Burnes, Sir Alexander, mission to Kabul, 5, 13, 19; desires to succeed Macnaghten, 23; erroneous idea of Ghilzis, 28, 29; quoted, 30; killed, 40, 41, 42, 122; why murdered, 122–123, 125, 342

Burnes, Lieut., killed, 40, 41

Bussean, 378, 381, 411, 415

Butawálá, 400

Butkhák (Bootkhak), expedition to, 26, 30; night attack at, 31–33, 34, 161, 192

Bygrave, Capt., 80, 153, 162

CALCUTTA, 19 *note* 2, 61, 64, 83, 84, 123, 168, 169, 173, 186, 187, 188, 196, 198, 212, 213, 267, 272, 290, 303, 321, 336, 341, 350

'Calcutta Review,' 403, 423

Cameron, Mr. C. H., quoted, 35, 105, 199, 231, 235

Cameron, Mrs., 105, 118, 199; remarks on Lord Ellenborough, 201, 281

Campbell, Dr., 153, 161

Canning, Sir S., afterwards Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, 179

Carnatic, 57

Casement, Sir W., quoted, 94, 200

Cawnpore, 234, 266, 275

Chahár bágh, 58, 79

Chambal, Chumbul, 214

CHAMBAL

Chamberlain, Lieut., afterwards Sir Neville, 165
Chamkanni, 165
Chand Kawar, Rani, 222; killed, 223
Charde, Mr., 285
Chárikár, 66, 163, 165
Charrak, 382
Chattar Singh, Atáriwálá, 340
Cherry, Mr., 175
'Chesapeake,' boarded by 'Yardarm' Smith, 304
Chet Singh, Col., 14, 351
China, 181
Christie's horse, 368, 385
Chunda Sahib, 57
Cis-Sutlej States, 228; the Lahore, 270, 272, 277, 293, 296, 301; agent's opinion as to Lahore estate, 302, 304, 305, 306, 307, 323; agent's views, 324–326, 331, 336, 337, 341, 344, 374; Lahore estate confiscated, 381
Civil authority, evil of subordinating military to, 6, 111, 117, 175, 176, 177, 178
Clerk, Mr., now Sir G. R., quoted, 14, 21 *note* 3; his vigour, 53, 82, 84, 107, 108, 109, 129, 168, 192, 194; appointed Lieut.-Governor, 196, 221, 232, 238, 239, 257, 272, 278, 290, 291, 320, 322; remarks on memorandum by, 323–326, 326, 329, 336, 343, 406
Clive, Lord, 80, 210
Colebrooke, Sir E., 336
Commander-in-Chief, *see* Officer's name
Commissariat, Madras, 3; reforms in, 4; in Punjab, 318, 355, 363–364, 376–377, 378, 382
Coombs, Lieut., distinguished conduct, 37, 39
Coorg, 193
Cornwallis, Lord, 173
Corunna, 216
Cotton, Sir Willoughby, 189, 191
Council of war, Jalálábád, 61; its members, 62; letters about, 62–66; memorandum on, 67–77; account of, verified, 64, 65, 66; remarks on, 77–78, 108, 109, 403
Court of Directors, value of, 22, 177, 195, 196; quarrel with Lord Ellenborough, 205–206; award pension to Broadfoot's sisters, 410
Court, Gen., 221, 351, 352
Courtlandt, Col., 349
Crispin, Cornet, killed, 9

Cromwell, Oliver, 191
Cubbon, Gen., 193
Cuddalore, 306 *note* 7
Cullen, Gen. W., 3, 4, 5, 15; valuable services, 21–22, 40, 43, 99, 102, 107, 114, 128, 154
Cunningham, Francis C., on service at Zurmat, 23; services, 36 *note* 8; distinguished conduct of, 36–37, 39; at Mámú Khel, 44, 45, 53, 58, 69 *note* e, 87; praised by Broadfoot, 100, 136, 143–144 *note* z, 155; captures a gun, 160, 170, 187, 192, 359
Cunningham, Capt. J. D., 192, 384; charges Sikh leaders with treachery, 421; 'Calcutta Review' quoted, 423
Currie, Mr., afterwards Sir Frederick, 211, 256, 263; letter to Broadfoot, 268–270, 311, 313, 314, 324, 330, 338, 356, 359, 369; letters to Broadfoot, 370, 395, 399; letter to Lord Ellenborough, 424–426
Currie, Mrs., 369, 426
Cust, Mr. R. N., quoted, 21 *note* 3, 236, 256, 299 *note* 2, quoted, 308; early promise, 314; his services, 314 *note* 2, 332, 350, 363, 371; quoted, 378, quoted, 387, 395, 399; letter to Alexander Broadfoot, 400–401, 402

Dakha, 98
Dakhan, Dekan, Deccan, 173
Dalhousie, Lord, eulogium on J. Thomason, 21 *note* 3; on Mackeson, 359 *note* 9
Darbár, durbar, the Sikh or Lahore Court, 14, 221, 222, 223, 225, 227; misled about Suchet Singh's treasure, 230; remonstrate about Mowran, 232, 234, 237, 238, 239, 243, 246; coerced by Sikh army, 247, 253, 256; message to, 257, 259; their newswriters, 260; excitement in, 261, 262, 265; warned about Sikh army, 272, 276, 277, 279, 280, 286, 287, 292, 295, 296, 298, 299, 300, 304; anger in, 305, 306, 308, 310; riot and debauchery, 311, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 323, 324; disputes with agent, 325, 327; forbearance with, 328, 329, 330, 331, 336, 338; scene in, 339, 340, 341, 342, 344, 345, 346, 348, 351, 354, 355, 361; warned, 362, 364, 365, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371,

374; case against British, 375, 376, 411, 416, 425
Dariyá Khan, Duriya Khar, 289
Darwin, 204
Dawes, Lieut. Michael, 30; his coolness, 34, 36, 39, 42, 43, 46, 51, 75, 92, 121, 122
De Bradfute, Sir Hew, 2 *note* 1; Marion, 2 *note* 1
Delafosse, Major, 160
Delamotte, Gen., 283
Delhi, 11, 12, 62, 97, 173, 175, 186, 187, 211, 229, 291, 306 *note* 7, 350, 356, 359, 374, 416
'Delhi Gazette,' 131, 133, 144 *notes a, b*, 198
Demonstration, 26; defined, 26 *note* 7
Dennie, Col., C.B., 34, 35, 38, 43, 45, 46, 49, 59, 62, 69, 70, 71, 71 *notes g* and *i*, 72, 72 *note l*, 73 *note n*, 75 *note s*, 76, 77, 86, 90, 91; killed, 92, 101, 105, 122, 406
Dera, Deyrah Doon, 363
Dera Ismáil Khán, 9, 340
Deraját, 261
de St. Amand, M., 282
Desa Singh, Majithia, 221
Deyrah, 251, 274, 288
Dhanna Singh, 232
Dhyán Singh, Raja, 220, 221, 222, 223; murdered, 224, 244
Dig (Deeg), 11, 82
Diná Náth, Diwán, 220, 244, 300, 321, 346, 347, 348
Dinapur, 275
Discouragement in troops, 42; remedied, 42-43; the chief danger, 52, 82, 86, 98
Dogra, 315
Dost Muhammad Khán, Bárakzái, Dost Mahomed, Amir of Kábul, 5; his views misrepresented, 6, 8; a wanderer in Turkestan, 9; action at Parwán pass, 9-10; surrender, 10, 50, 68, 99, 183, 326
Dowson, Lieut., 45
Dowson's horse, 115
Duleep Singh, Maharaja, 220; proclaimed, 224, 225, 230, 231, 244, 245, 247, 257, 269, 270, 279, 282, 292, 301; position of, cis-Sutlej, 306, 311, 317, 325, 336, 340, 346, 348, 369
Dúmkís, 255
Dundas, Mr. H., afterwards Lord Melville, 173, 174
Durand, Sir H. M., quoted, 6, 7, 35, 41, 62, 63, 64; letter from Have-

lock, 65-66; letter to Broadfoo 66; quoted, 74 *note* 7; quoted, 78, 197, 202, 214; appointed to Tenasserim, 214, 233, 242, 249, 298

Earthquake at Jalálábád, 82, 97
Edwardes, Sir H. B., quoted, 6, 14 *note* 4; on Havelock and Broadfoot, 41, 94, 307, 308; on situation at Lahore, 357; quoted, 358, 381; on supplies for army, 382, 387, 398, 406; vindication of Broadfoot, 407-408
Edwards, Mr., Under Secretary, 258, 259, 260, 330, 337, 356
Elizabeth, Queen, 302
Ellenborough, Lord, 21 *note* 3, 66; arrives in Calcutta, 83; his correspondence, 83-84; his policy, 85; his notification of victory April 7, 94-95; addresses Broadfoot, 95; the reply, 95-96, 100; recognises Pollock's services, 100-101; effect of his orders, 101, 104, 106; his orders to Pollock and Nott, 110-111; subordinates politicals to generals, 111, 113, 117, 120, 122; his opinion of Broadfoot, 123-124; appoints him A.D.C., 124-125, 154, 155, 167; receives Jalálábád garrison, 169, 170, 172; letter and memorandum from Lord Wellesley, 173-179; correspondence, 179; his policy, 180-181, 183, 184, 185, 186; impartial in exercise of patronage, 187, 189, 192; extracts from letters, 193; to the Queen and Duke of Wellington, 194-195, 196, 200, 201, 202; quarrel with Directors, 205-206; his recall, 207-210; he justifies Broadfoot's appointment, 211; maxims, 212, 216, 217, 226, 228, 229, 230, 233; letter from Broadfoot, 241-242, 248; letter from Sir H. Hardinge, 248; letter from Broadfoot, 264-266, 274, 290; letter from Sir H. Hardinge, 291-294, 296; letter from Broadfoot, 303-305; letter to Broadfoot, 307, 310, 311, 313; letter from Sir H. Hardinge, 316-318; another, 326-327; another, 354-355, 404, 411, 416, 417, 424
Elmhirst, Lieut., 9th Regiment, 159, 164

Elphinstone, Lord, 4, 5; letter to Col. Cullen, 4, 15, 43, 99, 107, 154
Elphinstone, Col. Buller, 155
Elphinstone, Gen., 22, 24; ill and unable for business, 24–29, 50, 59, 73 *note o*, 74 *note q*, 79, 82, 102, 126, 127, 128; Broadfoot and Pottinger's remarks on, 155
Engineers employed with Bengal force, 7
England, Government of, 10, 162, 172, 174, 175, 178, 179, 181, 183, 184; difference with Directors, 207, 209; commend orders to Agent's assistants, 246; attention directed to Punjab, 248; approve policy towards Punjab, 248, 273; approve Agent's proceedings, 300; pacific policy ordered, 312; approve Sir H. Hardinge's visit to frontier, 319, 321, 328; minute interference with India dangerous, 334–335, 337, 341, 350, 414, 415, 416; on Governor-General as second in command, 418–419
'Englishman,' newspaper, 52, 64, 133; Broadfoot's letter to, 134–152, 144
Erskine, Hon. C., 364
Esrú, 381
Europe, increased intercourse with, 334
Ewart, Major, 80
Eyre, Lieut. V., afterwards Sir Vincent, Commissary of Ordnance, 24, 112, 125, 236; his narrative, 126, 129
Eyre, Mrs., 153

Fane, Sir H., 6
Farangi, Feringee, 79, 102
Faridkot, 303
Fatehábád, 45; passage of rear-guard through, 45, 129, 132, 134, 153
Fatehpur Sikri (Futtehpore Sikri), 11
Fatteh Jang, 155, 162
Fatteh Khán, Tiwána, 340
Fatteh Singh, Mán, 221, 225; death of, 287
Fázilka, 358
Fenwick, Capt., 37
Firozpur, Ferozpore, Ferozepore, &c., 6, 16, 62, 129, 166, 167, 186, 211, 215, 221, 225, 226, 227, 229, 234, 248, 249, 250, 251, 257, 258,

274, 275, 276, 277, 284, 285, 286, 291, 293, 298, 303, 311, 317, 338, 339, 341, 345, 348, 349, 351, 355, 356, 360, 361, 362, 363, 365, 366, 368, 370, 371, 372, 374, 375, 376, 382, 383, 389, 390, 391, 395, 396, 398, 400, 406; tablet in church at, 409, 411, 412, 415, 423, 425
Firozsháh, Ferozshuhur, &c., 383, 383 *note* 9, 384, 388, 389; battle of, 389–398, 400, 401, 402, 409, 410, 412, 413, 414, 416, 418, 420, 422, 424, 425, 426, 427
Fitzgerald, Lord, 111, 175, 195, 196; died, 206
Forsyth, Dr. J., 112; his skill and services, 113–114, 144 *note z*, 155; cadetship, given to son of, 169, 187, 192
Forsyth, Mr. A. G., cadetship asked for, 114, 169
Forsyth, Mrs., 114, 115, 169
France (French), 3, 173, 174, 190, 217, 278, 306 *note* 7
Fraser, Capt., 2nd B.C., wounded, 9, 10
Fraser, Major, 124
'Friend of India,' quoted, 37, 176, 198, 285, 403

Ganda Singhwálá, 372
Gandamak (Gundumuk), 29, 37, 38, 41, 57, 103, 129, 130, 134, 135, 153, 157, 161
Ganges, 198, 370
Gardener, Col., in Sikh service, 346
Gardiner, Col., 191
Garrison orders, 45, 86–87, 88–89
Gáwilgarh, 128
Gerrard, Capt., 45, 53
Ghazní, Ghuznee, 6; capture of, 8, 9; Mahmud of, 30, 155, 156, 180, 186
Ghilzi, pl. of Ghilzai, tribe in Afghanistan, 8; insurrection of, 8; sappers on service against, 23; Envoy's opinion of, 27; Burnes's opinion of, 28; expedition against, 30, 35, 37, 66, 70, 149 *note m*, 150 *note m*, 156, 158
Ghulám Husainwálá, 355
Gilbert, Gen., letter from Broadfoot, 250; again, 255, 391, 393, 394, 396
Gobardhan, 11
Gomal Pass, 9
Goodwyn, Lieut., Bengal Engineers, 355

Gorakhpur, Goruckpore, 12
Gough, Sir H., Commander-in-Chief, afterwards Viscount, 214, 215, 233, 234, 247, 249; letter to Broadfoot, 250, 255, 257, 260, 261, 265, 266; letter to Broadfoot, 267–275, 288; invitation to Mandarin, 289, 293, 335, 338, 355, 356, 358, 362; orders up troops, 363, 364, 366, 368, 370, 373, 380, 381; at Múdkí, 384–386, 389; at Firozshah, 389–398, 404, 413, 418, 419
Governor-General, *see* name of office-holder
Govind, 10th Gúrú, 218, 219
Govindgarh, 282
Gowan, Col., 275
Grant, Capt., 275
Grant, Major P., now F.M. Sir Patrick, 256 *note* 2, 387
Greathed, Mr., 192
Griffin, Sir Lepel, quoted, 287 *note* 4, 424
Grueben, Count, 329 *note* 4
Guláb Singh, Raja, afterwards Maharaja of Jammú and Kashmír, 220, 222, 230, 231, 234, 238, 241, 259, 261, 265, 272, 274, 275, 279, 282, 287, 291, 292, 294, 295, 296, 297, 302, 303, 304, 306, 308, 310, 311, 317, 318, 319, 321, 329; his proposals, 330, 333, 337, 348, 351, 354, 370, 372, 373
Gundooee, 274
Gúrkhas (Ghoorkas, &c.), recruited, 12, 13; character of, 40
Gurmukh Singh, Bhai, 226
Gúrúmár, 229, 309
Gustavus Adolphus, 191
Gwalior, 196, 203, 215, 248

Haft Kotal, 160
Haidar Alí, 128, 306 *note* 7
Haines, Capt. F. P., now Gen. Sir F., 398
Hájí, Alí, 150 *note m*
Hákim Rai, 375
Hánsi, 363
Hardinge, Sir H., afterwards Viscount, succeeds Ellenborough, 207, 208, 210, 214; his previous services, 216–218, 230; displeased about Suchet Singh's treasure, 231; appoints Broadfoot agent, 232; letter to Lord Ellenborough, 233–234, 241, 242, 247; letters to Lord Ellenborough, 248–249; confidential memorandum to Broadfoot, 257, 260, 266, 270; letter to Lord Ellenborough, 274 276, 277, 280; opinion of Broadfoot, 281; letter to Lord Ellenborough, 282; instructions about boats, 283–286, 290, 291; letter to Lord Ellenborough, 291–294, 297; letter to Lord Ellenborough, 297, 300, 307, 308, 310; letter to Lord Ellenborough, 311; complimentary letter to Broadfoot, 312; prepares to visit frontier, 313, 314; letter from Broadfoot, 315–316; letter to Lord Ellenborough, 316–318, 320, 321, 322; letter from Broadfoot, 323–326; letter to Lord Ellenborough, 326–327, 327, 329, 330, 333, 334, 335, 337, 341; letter to Broadfoot, 342–343, 344, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 359, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370; summons Broadfoot, 370, 371, 372; postpones advance of troops, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 380, 381; issues proclamation, 381, 383, 385, 388, 389; at Firozshah, 389–398; extracts from despatches, 398–399, 400, 402, 403, 404, 407, 408; extracts from letters, 409; letter to Lord Ellenborough, 411–414, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418; as second in command, 418–419, 424, 425, 426, 427
Hardinge, Capt. A., now Gen. Sir A., 396, 400 *note* 8, 413, 425
Hardinge, Mr. C. S., now Viscount, Private Secretary to Governor-General, letter to Broadfoot, 247, 271, 314, 324, 326, 329, 332; letter from Broadfoot, 334–337, 355, 356, 395, 402 *note* 9
Hardinge, Lady Emily, 217
Hare, Archdeacon, 290
Harem, Zenana, of Kabul royal family, 12, 13; of Ranjit Singh, 220
Harike, Hureekee, 229, 298, 360, 367, 371, 372, 375, 400, 423
'Harkara,' Hurkaru, 198
Hastings, Lord, 197
Hastings, Warren, 210
Havelock, Sir H., life quoted, 13; Broadfoot's opinion of, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 52, 54, 60, 62; letter from Broadfoot, 62–64; reply, 64–65; letter to Durand, 65–66, 67, 70, 74, 74 *notes o, q*, 79, 82, 91, 92; in Broadfoot's place, April 7, 98, 102, 106; at Mámú Khel, 135–152; at Istálif, 163, 166, 188, 197, 198;

letter to Broadfoot, 214, 288; letter to Broadfoot, 289–290, 307, 357; letter to Miss Broadfoot, 403; memoir of Broadfoot, 403, 406, 407; opinion of Broadfoot, 410, 427
Havelock, Mrs., 64, 199
Hay, Capt., 127
Hazára, Punjab, district of, 261, 319
Hazára, Afghans enlisted, 9, 13; character, 40
Hazúri bágh, or garden, 221
Herat, 5; siege raised, 6, 22, 56, 203 *note* 8
Herries, Capt., 400 *note* 8, 414
Hill, Lord, 191
Hillier, Capt., 106
Hillier, Mrs., 122
Himalaya, 242, 294
Hindú Kúsh, 159
Hindustánis, recruited, 12, 13, 40, 89, 236; in Sikh army, 259
Hira Singh, Raja, 220, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228; appeals to Khálsa against Attar Singh and British, 228, 230, 231, 234, 238, 241, 242; failure of his policy, 243, 244; flight and death of, 245, 246, 249, 255, 256, 264, 276, 292, 310, 317, 347
Hira Singh, Sardár, brother of Rání Jindán, 298
Hisárak, Hissaruk, 66, 143, 150
Hodges, Mr., 342, 343
Hodgson, Mr., 364
Hodgson, Mr., 123, 124
Hoffmeister, Dr., 329 *note* 4; killed, 395
Holcombe, Lieut., 67 *note a*
Holkar, 238
Hore, Capt., 400, 414
Hostages, 35; with the Afghans, 60, 65, 69, 70, 71 *notes h* and *k*, 72, 73, 73 *note o*, 74, 109
Húglí, Hooghly, 336
Huish, Major, 26th N.I., 133; at Mámú Khel, 134–152, 159, 191
Hukm Singh, 232
Hunt, Mr., G. Broadfoot's early promise, 2
Husain Khan, 236

Illiassee, 274
Imámuddín, Shekh, 228
Impey, Miss, 106
India, 1, 3; Government of, 5, 10; and Major D'Arcy Todd, 22; relief from, 42, 52; security of, 55, 56; Government of, 61; indignation against, 68, 72, 73, 75 *note r*, 83, 101, 118, 119; danger of defensive measures in, 120, 121, 126, 128, 162, 171, 174; tenure of, rests on military basis, 174, 176, 178; education in, 179; policy of Government of, 180–181; dissatisfied with Tenasserim administration, 188, 206, 209; relations with Ranjít Singh, 219, 220, 221, 222, 224, 229; correspondence about Suchet Singh's treasure, 230–231; about village of Mowran, 232, 233, 237, 238; supreme on left bank Sutlej, 240; Broadfoot's reports to, 242, &c.; approve orders to Agent's assistants, 246; orders to Agent, 247, 261; orders regarding Napier's expedition, 263–264, 266; orders on Agent's letter to Sir H. Gough, 276, 277, 279, 281; approve Agent's proceedings, 300, 302, 323, 325, 327, 328, 329, 332, 334, 335, 336; Sikh complaints of, 338, 339, 341, 342, 362, 365; striving to maintain peace, 367, 368, 379
Indus, river, 6; passage of, 7; referred to as the Attock, 16, 85, 180, 198; flood of 1841, 223, 225, 242, 270, 283, 285, 312, 327, 340
Ireland, 179, 217
Istálif, 66; described, 163; captured, 164, 387

Jabakí, 93
Jabalpur, Jubbulpore, 204
Jacquemont, M. Victor, quoted, 219
Jagdalak, Jugdulluck, 36, 43, 66, 127, 128, 150 *notes m, n*, 151, 157, 158
Jakránis, 255
Jalálábád (Jellalabad, &c.), 3, 14 *note* 4; Monteath's force sent to, 27; necessity for magazine at, 29, 30, 42, 44, 45; arrival of Sale's brigade at, 46; described, 47–48; defence of, 47–95; first sortie, 48; second sortie, 49, 59, 60, 61; scheme for evacuation of, 61, 62, 64, 65; councils of war in, 67–77; evacuation of, 69, 74 *note q*, 75, 75 *note r*, 77, 81, 82; earthquake at, 82, 86, 90; action, April 7, 91–94; 'That illustrious garrison,' 94; Mackenzie's arrival, 96, 98, 100, 101, 108, 109; Pollock's force at, 110,

112, 125; advance of Pollock's force, 130, 134, 150 *note* o, 162, 165, 167; garrison crossed Sutlej, 169, 170, 171, 181, 184, 189, 192, 195, 197, 198, 199, 223, 289, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 409, 427
Jalla, Pandit, 225, 226, 227, 228, 242, 244; slain, 245, 246, 249, 264, 325
Jammú, Jummoo, 220, 221, 225; Rajas, 226, 244, 245, 279, 282, 287, 291, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 302, 305, 316, 319, 329, 330
Jamrud (Jumrood), 59
Ján Fishán Khán, his account of the action at Parwán pass, 10, 10 *note* 1; his wife's noble words, 10 *note* 1
Jasrota, 282
Jatog, Jitogue, 199
Jawáhir Singh, Miyán, 244, 259
Jawáhir Singh, Sardár, 227, 265, 291, 295, 296, 297, 302, 304, 306, 308, 311, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 329, 335, 336, 339, 340, 342, 344, 345; in danger, 346; put to death, 347–348, 351, 354, 374
Jazailchí (Juzailchee), 60, 104, 126, 132, 137, 150 *note* m
Jehlam, Jhelum, &c., 242, 314, 319
Jenkins, Lieut., 53
Jhanjálí, 167
Jind Kawar, Rani, or Jindán, 225, 227, 243; appeals to the army, 244, 249, 256, 261, 265, 271, 272, 274, 282, 291, 292, 295, 300, 304, 306, 308, 310, 311; her excesses, 316, 318, 322, 340, 345, 346, 347, 348, 351, 354, 357, 360, 370, 373, 376
Johnson, Capt., 41, 127, 161
Jumna, 307, 314, 336, 353, 370

Kabar Jabar, 35
Kábul, Cabul, Cabool, 5, 6; occupied, 8, 13; Broadfoot's journey to, 13–21; in September 1841, 22, 30, 33, 35; outbreak at, 40, 41, 42, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56; disasters foretold, 57, 60, 62, 64 *note* 4, 66, 69 *note* e; force, 72; 74, 75 *note* r, 76, 77; force, 79; 82, 84, 85, 90, 97, 98, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 111, 120; disasters, 125, 126, 127, 129, 132, 134, 143, 150 *note* o, 154, 155, 156, 157, 161; remains of force, 161, 162, 165, 171, 172, 174, 176, 178, 180, 181, 184, 193, 221, 223, 248, 265, 280, 327, 342
Káfir, 57; with spectacles, 79, 102, 103, 123
Kaithal, Khytul, 192, 193, 260, 267, 334, 371
Kálka, 377
Kána Kachha, 225, 360
Kandahár, Candahar, 6; arrival of army at, 8, 11, 50, 55, 73, 84, 110, 111, 161, 224, 291
Karáchí, Curatchee, &c., 198
Karnál, Kurnaul, army assembled at, 6, 187, 267, 350, 359, 363, 369, 370, 376
Kasauli, Kussowlee, &c., 194, 234, 377, 378
Kashmír, Cashmeer, &c., 241, 243, 261, 294, 311, 319
Kashmíra Singh, 220, 227, 228; slain, 229
Kasmor, Kusmore, 251
Kasúr, 374
Kata Sang, 36, 159
Kazilbásh, Kuzzilbash, 99
Keane, Sir J. (afterwards Lord), Commander of army of Indus, 6; leaves heavy guns at Kandahár, 8
Kelly, Sergeant-Major, distinguished conduct, 37, 45, 58, 144 *note* s, 187
Kesri Singh, Rai, 14, 228, 243
Kháibar (Khyber) Pass, 54; failure to penetrate, 61, 66, 67, 78, 79, 82, 86, 90, 91, 93, 97, 98, 111, 118, 120, 166, 193, 319
Khálsa, 219, 222, 225; reprove Hira Singh, 227; respond to Hira Singh's appeal, 228; destroy Attar Singh, &c., 229; their insubordination, 255, 287, 300, 308, 311, 340, 344, 345, 346, 361, 371, 372, 393, 420, 421, 423, 426
Khanna, 377
Kharrak Singh, Maharaja, 220; succeeds Ranjít Singh, 221; dies, 222, 243
Khelat, Khan of, 273
Khiva, 184
Khulum, 9
Khurd Kábul, forcing the pass, 33–34, 35, 51, 53, 86, 121, 159, 161, 410
Khush Gúmbaz, 58
Khushhál Singh, Jemadar, 221
Kila i-Nishán Khán, 236
Killa i-Bakhtán, 58
King, Lieut., 13th L.I., killed, 34

Kirkpatrick, Col., 173, 174
Kirkwall, 2, 427
Kishen Chand, Rai, Vakíl, 221; interview with Agent, 237–240; asks explanation from Agent, 261; asked to explain movement of Sikhs, 271, 277, 279, 280, 298, 299, 318, 321, 324, 325, 326, 329, 331, 335, 338, 339, 340, 343, 344, 348, 362; dismissed, 375, 411
Koh dámán, 163
Kohistán, of Kábul, 9, 99, 152
Kolhápur, Colapoor, 294
Korán, 123
Kot Isa Khán, 298
Kot Kángra, 261
Kot Kapúra, 298
Kúdí Khel (Koodee Khel), 64, 65, 133, 135–152
Kunar, 116 *note* 2

Lábh Singh, Miyán, 226; brave death of, 245
Ládwa, Raja of, 338
Lafont, Col., 349
Lahna Singh, Lena Singh, Majíthia, 221, 245, 265
Lahore, 221, 222, 223, 225, 228, 229, 232, 238, 240, 241, 244, 245, 248, 249, 250, 256, 260, 261, 267; political situation at, 269, 275, 279, 282, 291, 295, 296, 297, 302, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 311, 314, 315, 317, 320, 323, 324, 326, 328, 329, 330, 334, 336, 337, 340, 345, 349, 360, 362, 364, 365, 367, 368, 370, 371, 373, 374, 376, 388, 411, 415
Lake, Lord, 175, 177
Lake, Lieut. Edward, afterwards Gen., 307, 308, 376, 387, 399
Lál Singh, Adálatí, 338, 339, 347, 349, 351, 375
Lál Singh, Raja, 228, 271, 295, 304, 306, 308, 311, 316, 318, 347, 348, 352, 371, 383, 384, 385, 394; accused of treachery, 419–424
Lane, Dr., 214
Langiána, 383
Latála, 382
Lawrence, Sir G., 60, 102
Lawrence, Sir Henry, 60, 82, 116 *note* 2, quoted, 129, 162, 193, 209; letter to Broadfoot, 235, 289, 380, 381, 397 *note* 5, 410, 419, 423, 424
Leech, Major R., C.B., death, 332, 359, 375

Ligny, 217
Limerick, 289
Littler, Sir J., 249, 258, 275, 354, 361, 362, 363, 365, 366, 374, 382; at Firozsháh, 389–398, 399, 412, 415, 418
Loch, Mr. J., 20, 43, 100, 112; letter from Broadfoot, 112–115, 153; letter from Broadfoot, 169, 379
Loch, Miss, 115, 155, 170
Logar, river and valley in Afghanistan, 66
Lohání merchants, 9
London, 2, 81, 109; Gazette, 171, 212, 334, 336, 341, 342, 353, 378, 427
Londonderry, Marquis of, 217
Lord, Dr. Percival, killed, 9
Lucknow, 233
Ludhiána (Loodhiana, Loodeeana, &c.), 12, 16, 57, 106, 215, 234, 235, 242, 282, 293, 298, 306 *note* 7, 315, 342, 348, 361, 363, 366, 367, 370, 372, 378, 381, 382, 383, 389, 411, 415, 425, 426
Lughmán, 68, 79, 93, 97, 98, 109, 116 *note* 2, 118
Lughmání, 66
Lumley, Major-Gen., 61, 81

Macartney, Lieut., 127
McCaskill, Gen. Sir J., 133; at Mámú Khel, 134–152, 159; at Istálif, 163–165, 189, 266; killed, 386, 387, 404, 405
Macgregor, Capt., afterwards Sir George, political agent, 25; joins Monteath, 34; negotiates, 35, 42, 43, 49, 50, 51, 54, 55, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 72 *note* m, 73, 74, 74 *note* q, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 92, 108, 109, 115, 116 *note* 2, 117, 125, 142, 143, 162
Macgregor, Dr., 414
Mackenzie, Colin (afterwards Gen. and C.B.), 3, 11–12, 33; services at Khurd Kabul Pass, 34, 35, 38, 41, 50, 55; a prisoner, 55, 58, 59, 73 *note* o; sent to Jalálábád, 96, 97, 99, 100; Broadfoot's eulogy, 102; character admired by Afghans, 103; he returns to captivity, 103; services deserve reward, 104, 106, 109, 115, 118, 120, 121, 125, 126, 153, 166, 168, 199, 236; erects tombstone to Broadfoot, 406, 407, 427

MACKESON

Mackeson, Capt., afterwards Lieut.-Col. and C.B., political officer at Peshâwar, 14, 49, 51, 63, 67, 72, 78, 108; letter from Broadfoot, 109, 359, 359 *note* 9; succeeds Leech, 375
McLeod, Lieut. Norman, Engineers, 7
McLeod, Capt. W. C., 212
McLeod, Mrs., 212, 213
Macnaghten, Sir W., envoy, 6, 10, 19; reports arrival of royal families, 20; Governor of Bombay, 22; orders regarding Monteath's expedition, 24–29, 28; erroneous idea of Ghilzi power, 28; killed, 40; had summoned Nott and Sale, 41, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 72, 78, 98, 99, 102, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 165, 175, 176, 177
McNeill, Sir J., 22
Maddock, Mr. T., afterwards Sir T., 62, 66, 194, 200, 317
Madras, 2, 3, 4, 17, 107, 174, 193, 204, 211, 318, 359, 401; general order, 402; Broadfoot memorial, 409, 427
Magdála, 378
Mahárájpur, 163, 203, 207, 357
Mahmud, of Ghazni, 30
Mahomed Ali, 57
Mahtáb Singh, 317, 347
Majítha, Majeeta, 347
Malcomson, Dr. John, 3, 5, 15, 18, 38, 51, 59, 63; letter from Broadfoot, 96–100; another letter, 101–102; letter to Miss Broadfoot, 107; to Gen. Cullen, 107–108, 109, 125; letter from Broadfoot, 165, 166; death and services, 204
Málwá, 306 *note* 7
Málwá, of Punjáb, 315, 315 *note* 2
Mámú Khel, destruction of fort at, 44, 53, 64 *note* 4; Pollock's despatches, 131, 132, 133, 134–152, 153, 193
Mandot, 303
Mangla, Mungla, 244, 271, 272, 292, 346, 347, 370
Mani Májra, 378
Marátha, Mahratta, &c., 128, 173, 302, 306 *note* 7
Marris, Murrees, 251, 283, 288
Marshman, John C., quoted, 13, 64, quoted, 160, 188, 215, 290
Martaban, 198
Matthews, Capt., 127
Maulmain, Maulmein, Moulmein, 4, 64, 66, 171, 187; Broadfoot's

MUTINY

arrival at, 188, 192, 195, 198, 199, 210, 214, 290, 302, 403, 407
Mayne, Lieut., 34, 45–46, 49, 78, 100, 116, 117; at Mámú Khel, 136–152, 193, 248, 368
Mazárí, 288
Mediterranean, 242
Meean Meer, Miyan Meer, 345, 346
Meerut, 234, 235, 293, 363, 370, 376; supplies for troops from, 376–377, 381, 411
Meerzakee Ghunsee, 274
Metcalfe, Mr. T., 324
Metcalfe, Mr. and Mrs., 12
Midnapur, 275
Miller, Hugh, quoted, 204
Mills, Capt. C., 282, 314, 338, 349, 361, 364, 367, 374, 375, 376, 399
Misriwálá, 394
Moffat, Cornet, 9 *note* 9
Mohan Lal, 334, 341, 342, 343
Mohmand, 70 *note f*
Mokam Chand, Diwán, 221
Monson, Col., 177
Monteath, Col. T., C.B., 23–24, 26–28; commands expedition, 30–33, 34, 39, 40, 44, 53, 62, 64, 65, 69, 70, 74, 75, 77, 79, 80, 90, 91, 112, 118
Montgomery, Sir R., 21 *note* 3
Moore, Sir John, 98, 216
'Morning Herald,' 387
Mountain train, Backhouse's, 34, 45, 157, 158
Mowran, difference with Darbár about village, 232, 239, 240
Múdki, Moodkee, 380, 381, 382, 383; battle of, 384–388, 389, 390, 391, 393, 395, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 418, 423, 425
Muhammad Akbar Khán, kills envoy, 40, 50, 51, 59, 60, 68, 69, 70, 71, 79, 82, 89, 91; defeated April 7, 92–93, 94; sends Mackenzie to negotiate, 96, 97, 98, 103, 106, 126, 127, 134, 151, 153, 156, 159, 160, 223, 289
Muhammad Sháh Khán, 115, 118, 160
Múkúr, 155
Mull, Madras officer, 39
Mulráj, Diwán, 263
Múltán, 242, 251, 252, 254, 263, 273, 274, 291, 327, 359 *note* 8
Munro, Capt., 400 *note* 8, 414
Mutiny, in Sikh troops, 13–14; in escort of convoy, 14; in Punjab, 14–19, 222, 223; in Company's

sepoys, 227, 257; in Sikh troops, 261
Muttra, 11, 12, 350
Muzafarábád, 241, 261
Mysore, 128, 359, 360

Nábha, 232, 282, 374
Nádir Sháh, 116 *note* 2
Nagar, 379
Nain Súkh, Broadfoot's chief servant, 308
Nának, Gúrú, founder of Sikh sect, 218
Náo Nihál Singh, Kunwar, 221; dies, 222, 303
Napier, Capt., now Lord Napier of Magdála, 378
Napier, Sir C. J., 248; letter to Broadfoot, 251, 253; letter to Broadfoot, 254, 263, 264; letter to Broadfoot, 273, 283; letter to Broadfoot, 288, 294, 296, 305, 307, 322, 343
Napier, Sir W., quoted, 217, 305
Napoleon Bonaparte, 156, 410
Narbadá, Nerbudda, 204
Nasírí, Nusseeree, 199
Neave, Mr. and Mrs., 12
Nepál, 123, 209, 306 *note* 7
Nicolls, Sir Jasper, Commander-in-Chief, 61, 83, 84, 189, 191, 194
Nicolson, Capt. P., 249, 250, 258, 303, 311, 341, 348, 349, 350, 354, 359, 360, 361, 362, 364; instructions from Broadfoot, 365-367, 368, 371, 372, 374, 375, 376, quoted, 379, 380, 382, 384; killed, 399, 421, 422
Nimla, 44
Ningráhár, 69
Nizam of Haidarábád, 170, 173, 187
Norris, Sir W., 290
Norton, Lieut., 31, 33
Nott, Sir W., 41, 83, 86, 110, 111, 130, 154; reaches Kabul, 161; anger at delay, 162, 165, 169, 170, 172, 181, 184, 248
Núruddín, Fakir, 346

Ochterlony, Sir D., 305 *note* 7, 339
O'Connell, Dan., 187
Ogle, Major, 9th Regiment, 65, 133; at Mámú Khel, 146–152
Oldfield, Capt., 34, 45–46, 49, 62, 65, 66, 70, 71, 74 *note p*, 77
Orders from officer who capitulates are void, 56, 74, 74–75 *note q*
Oriental Club, 213
Oriolla, Count, 329 *note* 4, 333
Orkney Islands, 2, 427
Orr, Lieut., quartermaster with convoy, 17; on service in Zurmat, 23, 39, 58, 87, 88, 89; praised by Broadfoot, 100, 132, 139, 144 *note s*, 155, 170, 187, 235, 379
Oudh, King of, 179
Outram, Capt., afterwards Sir J., commands against Ghilzis, 8, 109, 283, 294, 322
Ovans, Col., 294
Oxus, 9

Paghmán, 10 *note* 1
Palmerston, Lord, condemns withdrawal, 182
Panála, 283, 294
Panchâyat (punchayet), 16; defined, 16 *note* 5, 17, 223, 227, 261, 291, 292, 293, 295, 306, 308, 316, 317, 321, 345, 347, 348, 354, 369, 420, 421
Paniár, Punniar, 203
Paoli, 410
Pari Darra, 36
Paris, 217
Parsons, Col., 318, 413
Partáb Singh, Kunwar, murdered, 224
Parwán Pass, action at, 9; J. Broadfoot killed, 9–10, 165
Patiála, 232, 282, 374, 376
Paton, Capt., 39
Pattle, Col., 12
Peel, Sir Robert, defends withdrawal, 182, 189, 248; extract from speech in Commons, 405, 408
Pegu, 304
Pehoa, 376
Pelly, Capt., now Sir L., anecdote of Broadfoot, 168 *note* 2
Persia, 22, 181, 281
Persian, 236, 254, 336
Pesháwar, Peshawur, 5, 13, 14, 14 *note* 4; Broadfoot ill at, 18, 47, 50, 52, 53, 59, 60, 67, 69, 72, 76, 77, 79, 81, 84, 98, 100, 109, 118, 120, 162, 165, 167, 192, 221, 223, 261, 311, 319, 326, 327, 337, 361
Pesh Bolák, 112
Peshora Singh, 220, 227, 228, 229, 245, 256, 265, 274, 282, 292, 308, 311, 317, 319, 326; death of, 340, 344, 345, 354
Phillaur, 371, 372
Pigou, Lieut., Engineers, 7

PINDARI

Pindárí, 293
Piper's Hill, 48, 49
Pitt, William, 173, 174
Plutarch, 410
Pollock, Sir G., 62, 64 *note* 4, 73 *note* o, 79, 80; appointed to command army of relief, 81; his services, 82, 83, 86, 90, 91; arrives at Jalálábád, 93, 97, 98, 99, 100; thanked by Governor-General, 101, 105, 108, 109, 110, 111, 113, 115, 117, 118, 124, 129, 130, 131, 133; at Mámú Khel, 134–152, 156, 157, 159, 160; reaches Kabul, 161, 162, 165, 166, 169, 170, 172, 178, 181, 184, 189, 191, 209, 234, 248
Ponsonby, Capt., wounded, 9
Pottinger, Eldred, defender of Herat, 6, 56, 57, 60, 78, 97, 126, 155, 161, 163
Prinsep, Mr. H. Thoby, 30, 54, 59, 104, 105, 106, 109, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, quoted, 124
Prisoners, *see* also Hostages, 60, 72, 74, 79, 93, 97; question of ransom, 100, 105, 115, 118, 156, 159; released, 161, 172, 178, 181
Protected states, *see* Cis-Sutlej states
Prussia, King of, 217
Pulájí, Poolagee, 251, 254, 273, 274
Punjab, 1, 2, 3; Broadfoot's march through, 13; Sikh officers to accompany, 14; anarchy in, 16; Broadfoot's march through, 13–21, 53, 86; carriage procurable in, 119, 120, 128, 180, 183, 184, 194; sketch of history: I. to death Ranjít Singh, 218–221; II. to death Sher Singh, 221–224; III. to outbreak of first Sikh war, 224–383; dialect of, 237; assistant agents not to correspond with, 246; must be Sikh or British, 312; population, 333, 355, 407, 416

RÁJPURA, 381
Rajpút, 270, 311, 317
Rájputána, 306 *note* 7
Rám Dás, Gúrú, 320
Rám Diál, Vakil at Firozpur, 230, 246, 258, 318, 321, 329, 331, 335, 341, 348, 350, 351, 360, 365
Rám Singh, Bhai, 221; overtures to Agent, 272, 305, 321, 339, 344, 371
Rangoon, 198

SALE

Ranjít Singh, Runjeet Singh, 5; his ability, 18, 218; consolidates Sikh power, 219; described, 219, 220, 221; members of his court, 221; death, 221, 222; his policy abandoned, 225, 232, 238; his respect for British frontier, 239, 240, 265, 268, 269, 279, 280, 297, 315, 319, 321, 324, 325, 326, 339, 341, 344, 345, 360, 362, 413
Ranjúr Singh, Majíthia, 221, 295, 296
Rathronan, 289
Ratnú Wazír, 295
Ravensburg, Count, *see* Waldemar
Rávi, Ravee, 167, 168
Richmond, Col., C.B., 160; Agent N.W.F., 194, 196; appointed to Lucknow, 214, 215, 224, 225; orders to, about Attar Singh's escape, 229, 230; orders to, about Suchet Singh's treasure, 231, 232, 233, 234, 239, 240, 241, 247, 278, 321, 325, 338, 407
Ripon, Earl of, 206, 210, 291, 322, 336, 343; extract from speech in Lords, 404; letter to Miss Broadfoot, 405–406, 425
Robertson, Mr. T. C., Lieut.-Governor N.W.P., 20–21, 84
Rohri, 6
Roleia, 216
Rúpar, 371
Russia, intrigues in Persia and Kabul, 5, 181, 183, 184

SABZALKOT, Subzulcote, 254
Ságar, Saugor, 195, 275
Saháranpur, 363, 426
Saidú, 15
Sáighán, 9
Saiyid Muhammad Khán, Chief of Paghmán, 10 *note* 1
Sale, Sir R., commands in Kohistan, 9; joins Monteath, 30; his despatches, 31, 33; wounded, 33, 34; sends back part of his force, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 45; arrives at Jalálábád, 46, 47, 48, 49; his despatches, 52, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74 *note g*, 76, 77, 79, 82; his 'after orders,' 86–87, 89, 91; commands action April 7, 92–93, 94, 95, 101, 107, 108, 115, 121, 122, 125, 127, 129, 130, 134, 135 *note a*, 149 *note l*, 150 *note m*, 156, 158, 171, 178, 190, 198, 290, 358; killed, 386;

his services, 386–387, 402, 404, 405, 406
Sale, Lady, quoted, 10 *note* 1, 50, 127
Salwín, Salween, 195, 197
Samáná, 376
Samangarh, 283
Samrú, Begam, 256
Sanders, Capt., Engineers, 7, 163; killed at Mahárájpur, 203
Sappers and Miners, Bengal, 157, 158, 285, 289 *note* 8
Sappers, Sháh Shuja's, afterwards Broadfoot's Sappers, 3, 9, 10–11; George Broadfoot appointed to command, 12; described by Marshman, 13; mutiny in, 14; tools and stores for, 23–29; with Monteath's expedition, 30; engaged at Butkhák, 31–33; at Khurd Kábul, 34; at Jagdalak, 36–37, 39; composition and character of, 40, 45, 49; their services, 58, 60; mentioned in 'after orders,' 86–87, 93, 115, 117, 126–127, 128; summoned to Mámú Khel, 130, 132; at Mámú Khel, 134–152; in post of honour, 157, 158, 159, 160; at Istálif, 164, 167; excitement on getting medals, 168, 187, 289, 427
Sarehálí, 229
Sarúbí, 150
Sátára, 294
Sáwan Mall, Diwán, 221, 242, 263
Sáwantwárí, 283, 291, 294
Seaton, Capt., afterwards Sir T., 122
Sedan, 217
Seh Bába, 36, 159
Sepoys, 226, 227, 247; contrast of pay with Sikhs, 249; inquiry regarding, 257–259, 268, 270, 271; danger of Sikh example, 274, 293, 338, 341, 349, 350; reliance on, 360, 372, 374, 413, 414
Serampur, Serampore, 64, 215
Seringapatam, 175
Shádí Bagiárí, 93
Sháh Ahmad, Abdálí, 5, 116 *note* 2
Sháhdera, 244
Sháh Shuja, 5, 6; seated on Kabul throne, 8; discontented, 10; harem of, 13; tries to relieve Burnes, 40, 47, 50, 57, 67, 68, 69, 73, 76, 76 *note t*, 85; murdered, 97, 108; his service abolished, 112, 116 *note* 2, 121, 123, 124, 126, 168, 175, 183, 238
Sháh Zamán, 13, 16

Shakespear, Sir Richmond, 161
Shám Singh, chief of Atárí, 14, 15, 221, 244; destroys Hira Singh, 245, 295, 300, 363, 368
Shelton, Brigadier, 17, 50, 79, 82, 104, 127
Sher Muhammad, 273
Sher Singh, Maharaja, 167, 218, 220, 222, 224; murdered, 224, 226, 227, 323, 341
Shikárpur, 7, 263, 283
Shinwárí, 70, 70 *note f*
Siálkot, 317
Sikh, war, 1, 2; army mutinous, 13–18; chiefs with convoy, 14; co-operation, 82, 85, 86; services in Khaibar, 93, 116 *note* 2, 120; army on Sutlej, 167, 184, 215, 218, 225, 226; omens in camp of, 226; just complaint against British, 228; impression made by death of Bír Singh, 229; grievances, 229–232; chiefs visit Agent, 236, 241, 242; chiefs oppose Hira Singh, 243; disorder in army, 245, 247, 253, 254, 255, 257, 258, 259; move towards Sutlej, 261; army, 272, 279, 282; atrocities, 282, 284; wish to maintain power, 286, 287; excesses of army, 292; stable government unattainable, 293; army at Jammu, 294–296, 302, 305, 312, 315, 316; warlike preparations, 318, 322; pacific policy towards, 327, 333, 337, 348, 350, 351, 355, 358, 363, 365, 366, 372; army advancing, 373, 376; cross Sutlej, 377, 379, 382; at Múdkí, 384–388; at Firozshah, 389–398, 411, 412, 413, 415, 416, 417; leaders accused of treachery, 419–421; charge investigated, 420–424; accusation rejected, 424; army, 425
Sim, Col., Madras Engineers, 43, 213; story about, 214
Simla, 191, 289; Broadfoot at, 307, 353, 357, 358
Simmons, Capt., 41st Regiment, 189
Simpson, commanding column against Búgtis, 252, 263
Sind, Scinde, Sindian, 85, 194, 196, 207, 227, 248, 251, 253, 254, 257, 258, 259, 273, 285, 287, 297, 343
Singapore, 196
Sirhind, 215, 234, 377, 381
Smith, General, afterwards Sir Harry, 20–21, 189, 199, 290; at Firozshah, 391–398, 412

SMITH

Smith, 'Yardarm,' Capt. R.N., 241; services, 303–304
Smyth, Major Carmichael, 270
Sobraon, 298, 300, 414, 424
Sodhi Diwan Singh, 344
Sodhis, 320
Somerset, Lord Fitzroy, 189, 190
Somerset, Major, killed, 395, 399, 402, 414
Somerset, Mrs., 426
Somnáth, idol from, 30; gates, 169; despatch, 183
Sonepat, Soneput, 12
Spain, 190
Stacey, Brigadier, 164
'Standard,' quoted, 181
Stewart, Capt. A., E.I.I., 353
Stewart, Mrs., 353
Stewart, Col., 124
Sturt, Lieut., 7, 60
Subáthu, Soobathoo, &c., 194, 234, 377, 378
Suchet Singh, Raja, 220, 224, 227; his death, 228; treasure, 229–231; widow, 231; treasure, 239, 243; widow, 316, 317, 329, 375
Sufed Koh, 135
Sukkur, 6, 254, 284, 285, 286, 291, 327
Sultán Ján, 70
Sultán Khánwálá, 400
Sultán Muhammad Khán, 326
Surkháb, 36; river, 135, 157
Sutherland, Miss, 212, 301
Sutlej, Sutlege, &c., 167, 169, 194, 219, 225, 226, 228, 234, 239, 249, 250, 253, 255, 258, 259; Sikhs move towards, 261, 262, 266, 268, 270, 271, 273, 275, 276; Sikhs withdrawn from, 279; the limit of supremacy, 280, 284, 285, 289, 291, 292; crossed without leave, 298–300, 302, 304, 307, 312, 314, 324, 333, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 347, 350, 360, 361, 365, 367, 373, 375, 376; Sikhs cross, 379–381, 382, 388, 397, 400, 404, 411, 417, 425
Suttee, 224; plundered, 245, 347; curse the Sikh sect, 348
Switzerland, 190

Taimúr Sháh, 116 *note* 2
Tait, Capt., 132
Talains, 198
Talfourd, Sir T. N., 290
Talli, 372, 379
Talwandi, 298

VAN-AGNEW

Tára Singh, 220
Tatang, fort, 134, 153
Taví, Tawí, 294
Tavoy, 203, 241
Taylor, Col., 9th Regiment, 65, 131, 133, 134–152, 159, 191
Taylor, Lieut. Reynell, 387
Tej Singh, Sardár, 289, 375, 389, 396, 397, 412; accused of treachery, 419–424
Tenasserim, provinces, 1, 3, 63 *note* 3, 65, 66, 170, 171, 186, 195, 196, 198, 201, 203, 211, 214, 233, 241, 242, 303, 305, 427
Tezín (Tezeen) district and forts in Afghanistan, 23, 26, 32, 34, 35, 59, 60, 66, 73, 103, 126, 159; action at, 160, 163
Thain, Major, 24, 127
Thaneswar, Thunesar, &c., 371
Thirlwall, Connop, Bishop, 290
Thomason, James, 20–21; services and Lord Dalhousie's eulogium, *ib. note* 3, 66, 193, 260; his praise of Broadfoot, 260, 290, 314, 354
Thomson, Capt. G., chief engineer, 7; his great service at Ghazni, 8
Thomson, Dr. T., 19; services, 19 *note* 2
Tibet, 329
Tillú tank, 294, 296
'Times' commends withdrawal, 182; blames Auckland's policy, 182; praises Ellenborough, 185
Tipú Sultán, Tipoo, 128, 173, 174
Tira, Teera, 66
Todd, Major D'Arcy, 22
Tonge, 274
Tools and stores, 29
Torabáz Khán, 53
Trevor, Capt., 41, 54
Tripartite treaty, 5–6
Tritton, Capt., 149 *note* 1, 160
Troup, Capt., 41, 153, 161, 192
Tulloch, Brigadier, 135, 163
Turkistan, 9, 11, 159
Túrú, Tootoo, 66
Tweeddale, Marchioness of, 193
Tweeddale, Marquis of, 193, 214, 401

Udham Singh, Miyán, killed, 222
Ulús, Ooloos, 37
Umarkot, Omercote, 251
Urdú, 236

Vans-Agnew, Mr. P. A., 358, 3 *note* 8

VENTURA

Ventura, Gen., 221, 222, 256, 258, 270; letter to Broadfoot, 277–278, 289, 321, 342
Vicovich, Russian Agent, 5
Victoria, Queen, life attempted, 111–112, 171, 191; letters from Lord Ellenborough to, 194–195, 205, 336
Vimiera, 216
Vincent, Gen., 258
Vittoria, 217

WADE, Sir C., 6, 320
Wade, Capt. H., 52, 62, 69 *note* e
Wadní, 382
Wálá Jáh, 57
Waldemar, Prince of Prussia, 329, 332, 333, 395
Wales, Prince of, 81
Wallace, Brigadier, 391, 392, 393, 399
Wallace, Sir W., 2 *note* 1
Warde, Col., 213
Wellesley, Marquis of, 57, 83, 101, 119, 172, 173; on governing India, 173–179, 209, 210
Wellington, Duke of, 68, 83, 98, 111, 121, 128, 175, 176, 189, 190; letters from Lord Ellenborough, 195, 207, 216, 217, 248, 274

ZURMAT

West, Lieut., 413
Westminster, 2
Wheeler, Brigadier, 372, 373, 381, 411
Whittingham, Sir S., 4
Wild, Brigadier, 60, 61, 67, 72, 82, 119, 120, 166
Wilkinson, Capt., 158, 189
Williams, Sir E., 81
Winchilsea, Lord, 217
Wood, Lieut.-Col., 394, 413
Woodburn, Capt., 50
Wyndham, Capt., distinguished conduct, killed, 37, 39

YOUNG, Lieut. R., now Major-Gen., R.E., 223 *note* 8, 397 *note* 5
Yule, Col. H., C.B., R.E., vii.; 308 *note* 8
Yusufzai, Eusofzye, &c., 13, 14 *note* 4, 149 *note m*, 221

ZAMÁN KHÁN, Nawáb, 70
Zamán Sháh, *see* Sháh Zamán
Zenana, *see* Harem
Zíra, 296, 298
Zurmat, Zoormut, province in Afghanistan, 23, 24, 26, 27

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